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Abstract	  	  	  	  	  This	   thesis	   deals	   with	   the	   investment	   behaviour	   of	   government-­‐led	  investment	  vehicles,	  widely	  known	  as	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  (SWFs),	  and	  the	  implications	  that	  arise	  from	  their	  investments	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  western	  world.	  In	   the	   last	   10	   to	   15	   years	   SWFs	  have	   grown	   in	   size	   and	  number	   and	  have	  drawn	   the	   attention	   of	   many	   government	   officials	   because	   of	   their	   non-­‐transparent	  nature	  and	   their	  expansionary	   investment	  policies.	  Although	  SWFs	  have	   been	   a	   valuable	   source	   of	   foreign	   investment	   in	   the	   past,	   their	   non-­‐transparent	   nature,	   combined	   with	   their	   government-­‐controlled	   status,	   raises	  fears	   that	   their	   investments	   might	   be	   politically,	   rather	   than	   economically,	  motivated.	  Specific	  examples	  of	  those	  concerns	  are	  the	  risk	  that	  SWFs	  use	  their	  economic	   influence	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   critical	   information,	   to	   transfer	   jobs	  abroad	  or	  compromise	  the	  operation	  of	  strategically	  important	  companies	  such	  as	  telecommunications	  or	  energy	  companies.	  The	   above	   concerns	   have	   led	   many	   western	   governments	   to	   take	   active	  measure	   to	   regulate	   sovereign	   investors.	   Such	   regulation	   comes	   in	   the	   form	  of	  legislation	   establishing	   procedures	   to	   control	   the	   impact	   of	   their	   investments.	  Additionally,	   various	   forms	   of	   regulation	   have	   been	   established	   at	   the	  international	   level,	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   Codes	   of	   Conduct.	   The	   main	   case	  studies	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   are	   those	   of	   France,	   Germany,	   the	   USA	   as	   well	   as	  instruments	  promulgated	  by	   international	   bodies,	   such	   as	   the	  Organisation	   for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development,	   the	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	  the	  European	  Union.	  In	   this	   thesis,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   legislative	   measures	  adopted	  at	  the	  national	  level	  are	  overly	  protectionist	  and	  go	  far	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  potential	  concerns	  associated	  with	  SWFs,	  while	  they	  seriously	  risk	  damaging	  their	  positive	  effects.	  It	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  international	  instruments	  are	  better	  placed	  to	  address	  the	  potential	  negative	  impact	  of	  SWFs	  while	  preserving	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  operation.	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1. Subject	  and	  Focus	  
	  This	   thesis	  deals	  with	   the	   investment	   activities	  of	   Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  (SWFs)	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   and	   the	   legal	   responses	   adopted	   by	   EU	  Member	  States	   to	  address	   them.	  The	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  given	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	   is	   ‘state-­‐owned	   investment	   vehicles,	   which	   manage	   a	   diversified	  portfolio	   of	   domestic	   and	   international	   financial	   assets’.1	  These	   are	   typically	  found	   in	   developing	  nations	   that	  manage	  natural	   resources,	   such	   as	  Qatar	   and	  Russia,	   or	   simply	   enjoy	   significant	   positive	   trade	   balances,	   such	   as	   China2	  and	  Singapore.3	  More	  recently,	  SWFs	  have	  appeared	  in	  western4	  nations	  with	  budget	  deficits,	   such	   as	   France.	   It	   is	   common	   for	   a	   SWF	   to	   invest	   its	   capital	  internationally	   in	   search	   of	   opportunities	   to	   diversify	   its	   country’s	   income	   or	  simply	  to	  achieve	  better	  returns	  than	  those	  provided	  in	  its	  home	  market.	  Recipient	  countries,	  meaning	  countries	  receiving	  SWF	  investments,5	  usually	  consider	   SWFs	  as	   a	   separate	   type	  of	   investor,	  mainly	  due	   to	   their	   state-­‐owned	  nature	   and	   their	   unusually	   large	   size,	   and	   often	   have	   concerns	   about	   their	  investment	  motives.	  While	  private	  investors	  are	  normally	  profit-­‐driven,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  for	  SWFs,	  which	  are	  state-­‐owned	  and	  therefore	  may	  hide	  political	  agendas.	  Such	  motives	  may	  include	  using	  financial	  investments	  in	  order	  to	   obtain	   political	   benefits	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   recipient	   economies	   by,	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Commission,	  ‘A	  Common	  European	  Approach	  to	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  COM(2008)	  115	  4.	  2	  Commission,	  ‘China	  Trade	  Statistics’	  (2012)	  Directorate	  General	  for	  Trade	  <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf>	  accessed	  21	  October	  2012.	  3	  Singapore	  Government,	  ‘Balance	  of	  Payments’	  (2012)	  Singapore	  Department	  of	  Statistics	  <www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/bop.html>	  accessed	  21	  October	  2012.	  4	  As	  western	  countries,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  are	  taken,	  the	  Member	  State	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (Ireland,	  United	  Kingdom,	  France,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  Belgium,	  Luxemburg,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Austria,	  Germany,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  Sweden,	  Norway,	  Iceland,	  Lichtenstein,	  Switzerland,	  Greece,	  Italy,	  Slovenia,	  Cyprus,	  Malta,	  Estonia,	  Lithuania,	  Latvia,	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Hungary,	  Poland,	  Bulgaria,	  Romania,	  Slovakia),	  the	  EU	  candidate	  members	  (Croatia,	  Serbia,	  Montenegro	  and	  Turkey),	  Albania,	  Bosnia	  Herzegovina,	  Kosovo,	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Israel.	  5	  Also	  called	  ‘host’	  or	  ‘target	  countries’.	  By	  analogy,	  the	  terms	  ‘host’,	  ‘target’	  and	  ‘recipient	  companies’	  are	  also	  used	  to	  describe	  those	  individual	  companies	  that	  receive	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	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example,	  gaining	  access	  to	  confidential	  national	  security	  or	  critical	  technological	  information.6	  The	   opacity7	  of	   those	   institutions	   means	   that	   external	   observers	  cannot	  easily	  verify	  if	  there	  is	  or	  is	  not	  any	  basis	  for	  those	  concerns.	  The	  problem	  is	  exacerbated	  when	   investments	  originate	   from	  geopolitical	   rival	  countries8	  or	  when	   they	   are	  directed	   towards	  public	  providers	   (such	  as	   energy	  or	   transport	  companies).	  Other	  threats	  posed	  by	  SWFs	  relate	  to	  their	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  financial	  stability	  of	  recipient	  economies.	  The	  large	  size	  of	  their	  investments	  may	  have	   destabilising	   effects	   if	   SWFs	   were	   to	   collectively	   enter	   or	   exit	   a	   specific	  market.9	  These	   issues	   have	   been	   raised	   both	   in	   the	   discourse	   of	   governments	  and	  in	  the	  academic	  literature.10	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  have	  passed	  regulation	   targeting	   state-­‐owned	   funds	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   compromise	   of	  national	  security	  or	  negative	  economic	  effects	  caused	  by	  their	  investments.11	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  argue,	  however,	  that	  these	  regulations	  have	  no	  rational	  basis	  but	  are	  driven	  by	  unsubstantiated	  prejudices	  against	  foreign	  economic	  actors.	  If	  so,	  they	  run	   the	   risk	  of	  deterring	  Foreign	  Direct	   Investment	   (FDI)12	  without	   addressing	  any	  real	  and	  existing	  threats.	  This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   SWFs	   by	   examining	   their	  operation,	   i.e.	   the	   investment	  activity,	   from	  a	  holistic	  point	  of	  view,	   taking	   into	  account	  economic	  and	  political	  considerations	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  ones.	  Thus,	  policy	  proposals	   made	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   thesis	   are	   based	   on	   conclusions	   drawn	   in	  previous	  chapters	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  impact	  of	  SWFs.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  thesis	   is	  the	  EU.	  Thus,	  primarily,	  the	  thesis	  examines	  sovereign	  investments	  targeting	  EU	  markets	  and	  the	  respective	  reactions	  of	  EU	  Member	   States	   and	   the	   relevant	   EU	   law.13 	  For	   comparative	   and	   analytical	  purposes,	   regulations	   and	   investment	   activity	   in	   third	   countries,	   such	   as	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Chapter	  3,	  at	  119.	  7	  Meaning	  the	  secrecy	  surrounding	  their	  structure	  and	  investment	  portfolio,	  see	  at	  46	  onwards.	  8	  Such	  as	  when	  Russia	  invests	  in	  Europe,	  or	  China	  invests	  in	  the	  USA.	  9	  Chapter	  3,	  at	  129.	  10	  For	  instance,	  Chapter	  5,	  at	  210.	  11	  Such	  as	  chapter	  5,	  at	  212,	  221.	  12	  Definition	  provided	  n	  742.	  13	  In	  particular	  Article	  63(1)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  for	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (previously	  56(1)	  EC)	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.	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United	  States	  of	  America	  (USA),14	  and	  those	  established	  at	  the	  international	  level	  are	  also	  examined	  in	  depth.	  It	  must	   be	   noted	   that	   sovereign	   entities	  make	   foreign	   private	   investments	  using	   a	   variety	   of	   vectors,	   such	   as	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises	   (SOEs)	   or	   public	  pension	  funds.15	  Although	  not	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  these	  entities	  are	  studied	  for	  exemplary	  purposes	  where	  their	  manner	  of	  operation	  is	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  SWFs	  and	  can	  causes	  similar	  concerns.	  	  	  
2. The	  Background	  
	  Recent	   developments	   in	   the	   area	   of	   global	   economic	   imbalances16	  and	   the	  rise	  of	  direct	  investment	  from	  third	  countries	  into	  the	  EU	  make	  the	  subject	  and	  focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   timely.	   These	   developments	   relate	   to	   the	   economic	  performances	   of	   SWFs’	   managing	   countries,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   financial	   state	   of	  western	  countries,	  the	  traditional	  recipients	  of	  SWF	  investments.	  Since	  2000	  SWFs	  have	  grown	  considerably	  in	  size	  and	  importance,	  reflecting	  the	  high	  growth	  rates	  of	  their	  countries’	  economies.	  Countries	  such	  as	  China	  and	  Russia	  have	  recently	  demonstrated	  great	  economic	  growth17	  which	  has	  enabled	  them	   to	   establish	   large	   SWFs	   and	   conduct	   aggressive	   investment	   policies	  throughout	  the	  world.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  rising	  energy	  prices18	  have	  resulted	   in	  large	  revenues	  for	  commodity-­‐exporting	  countries,	  mainly	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  (such	  as	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  the	  UAE	  and	  Qatar).	  An	  additional	  development	  connected	  to	  the	  place	  and	  role	  of	  SWFs	  relates	  to	  recent	   financial	  crises.	  The	   first	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  (GFC)	  began	  with	   the	  bursting	   of	   the	   housing	   bubble	   in	   the	   USA	   in	   2007	   and	   affected	   all	   financial	  institutions	   that	   had	   invested	   heavily	   in	   housing	   related	   securities. 19 	  The	  immediate	   threat	   of	   the	   crisis	  was	   addressed	  with	   government	   action	   in	   those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  below,	  at	  232.	  15	  DPW	  at	  230,	  and	  Lenovo	  Group,	  at	  61.	  16	  Chapter	  1,	  at	  35-­‐36.	  17	  Chapter	  1,	  n	  105.	  18	  Chapter	  1,	  n	  104.	  	  19	  Chapter	  2,	  at	  86	  onwards.	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countries	   concerned,	   but	   the	   long-­‐term	   effects	   continued	   to	   distress	   the	  economies	  of	  western	  developed	  nations.	  These	  effects,	  combined	  with	  a	  number	  of	  national	  and	  EU-­‐level	   structural	  deficiencies,	   resulted	   in	  a	   subsequent	  crisis,	  this	  time	  affecting	  Eurozone	  countries	  that	  had	  accumulated	  excessive	  debt.20	  All	  those	  recent	  developments	  are	  of	  direct	  interest	  to	  the	  study	  of	  SWFs:	  the	  rapid	   growth	   of	   many	   developing	   countries	   accounted	   for	   the	   creation	   of	  numerous	   new	   SWFs	   and	   increased	   the	   reserves	   available	   to	   them,	   thus	  expanding	  their	  size.	  The	  urgent	  need	  for	  capital	  in	  Europe	  and	  America	  caused	  by	   the	   crises	  prepared	   the	   ground	   for	   an	   increased	  presence	  of	   SWFs	   in	   those	  countries.	   As	   a	   result,	   SWFs	   today	   control	   stakes	   in	   some	   of	   the	   west’s	   most	  valuable	   corporations, 21 	  a	   fact	   that,	   however	   beneficial	   to	   the	   west,	   may	  introduce	   a	   new	   round	   of	   protectionism	   against	   foreign	   state	   investors	   in	   the	  future.22	  	  	  
3. Formulation	  of	  the	  Research	  Question	  
	  In	  light	  of	  the	  above	  considerations,	  it	  becomes	  relevant	  to	  consider	  whether	  SWFs	   should	   be	   regulated	   and,	   if	   so,	   under	  which	   form.	   This	   issue	   is	   the	   core	  research	  question	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  this	  inquiry	  is	  to	  draw	  policy	  lessons	  and	  give	  recommendations	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  SWFs	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  achieving	   the	  most	   efficient	   outcome	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   both	   investors	  and	  host	  countries.	  This	  end	  necessitates	  a	  focus	  on	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs.	  First,	  it	  should	  be	  determined	  which	  entities	  are	  classified	  as	  SWFs	  and	  what	  their	   main	   characteristics	   are. 23 	  Next,	   their	   investment	   behaviour	   must	   be	  analysed.24	  This	  analysis,	  which	  must	  also	   take	   into	  account	  different	  economic	  environments	  (such	  as	  times	  of	  growth	  and	  times	  of	  economic	  crisis),	  may	  allow	  the	  determination	  of	  common	  investment	  patterns	  among	  SWFs.	  The	  next	  issue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  As	  it	  is	  known	  as	  a	  ‘Eurozone	  debt	  crisis’,	  for	  instance,	  see	  Chapter	  5	  at	  225.	  21	  Chapter	  2,	  at	  61	  onwards.	  22	  Chapter	  2	  at	  135.	  23	  Chapter	  1.	  24	  Chapter	  2.	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deriving	  from	  the	  main	  research	  question	  relates	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  SWFs	  on	  host	  economies.25	  Specifically,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	  assess	   the	  various	  benefits	   and	  costs	  brought	   by	   SWFs	   to	   their	   recipient	   countries	   before	   establishing	   the	   need	   for	  regulation.	   These	   effects	   are	   examined	   at	   both	   a	  micro	   (individual	   companies)	  and	  macro	  level	  (economy-­‐wide	  effects).	  With	   the	  conclusions	  reached,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   frame	  a	  regulatory	  rationale	  for	  SWFs:	  one	  that	  would	  take	  into	  account	  the	  actual	  impact	  and	  characteristics	  of	  those	  investment	  funds.26	  Numerous	  academic	  regulatory	  proposals	  for	  SWFs	  that	  have	  appeared	  in	  the	  literature	  can	  be	  usefully	  analysed.	  More	  importantly,	  this	   framework	  of	   analysis	   can	  also	   serve	   to	  assess	   the	   regulatory	   instruments	  that	  have	  been	  adopted	  by	  various	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  third	  countries.27	  The	  examples	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  those	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece	  and	  the	  USA.	  Finally,	  to	  address	  all	  matters	  flowing	  from	  the	  principal	  research	  question	  it	  is	  necessary	   to	   consider	   whether	   the	   best	   solution	   might	   be	   one	   at	   the	  supranational	  level.28	  	  	  	  
4. Assessment	  Method	  and	  Challenges	  
	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   establish	   what	   constitutes	   a	   proportionate	  response	   to	   the	   risks	   brought	   by	   SWFs,	   justify	   the	   restrictions	   that	   meet	   the	  actual	   risks	   and	   identify	   those	   cases	   that	   use	   SWFs	   as	   a	   pretext	   to	   raise	  protective	   barriers.	   This	   research	  will	   necessitate,	   first,	   a	   close	   scrutiny	   of	   the	  commercial	  operations	  of	  SWFs	  and,	   second,	  a	   scrutiny	  of	   the	  views	  of	  various	  commentators	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  SWFs	  on	  the	  EU	  and	  global	  economies.	  Because	   of	   the	   secrecy	   of	   SWFs,	   only	   a	   limited	   amount	   of	   information	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  this	  research	  is	  publicly	  available.	  Therefore	  extensive	  use	  is	   made	   of	   web	   resources	   –	   reliable	  media	   sources	   specialising	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Chapter	  3.	  26	  Chapter	  4.	  27	  Chapter	  5.	  28	  Chapter	  6.	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finance	  –	  which	  provide	  news	  about	  SWF	  commercial	  operations.29	  In	  addition,	  reports	   issued	   by	   financial	   institutions,	   such	   as	   commercial	   and	   investment	  banks,30	  can	   reveal	   useful	   information.	   Furthermore,	   a	   number	   of	   informal	  personal	  correspondences	  are	  made	  with	  persons	  with	  relevant	  specialities.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  close	  scrutiny	  and	  collection	  of	  news	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  holistic	  view	  on	  the	   benefits	   and	   costs	   arising	   from	   SWF	   investment	   in	   western,	   and,	   in	  particular,	  EU	  economies.	  The	  following	  analysis	  of	  regulatory	  proposals31	  requires	  an	  examination	  of	  papers	  published	  by	  academics	  and	  news	  commentators	  offering	  suggestions	  for	  regulatory	  frameworks.	  Some	  of	   those	  proposals	  are	  more	  detailed	  than	  others	  and	  those	  are	  chosen	  for	  more	  extensive	  analysis.	  Next,	   an	   examination	   of	   actual	   legal	   instruments	   dealing	   with	   SWFs	   is	  required.	   As	   far	   as	   the	   laws	   of	   EU	   Member	   States	   are	   concerned	   (France,	  Germany	  and	  Greece),	  these	  must	  also	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  EU	  law	  on	  free	   movement	   of	   capital.32	  A	   similar	   examination	   is	   carried	   out	   as	   regards	   a	  third	  jurisdiction,	  namely	  the	  USA.	  The	  study	  of	  each	  jurisdiction	  is	  preceded	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  its	  history	  and	  general	  relation	  to	  SWFs,	  which	  require	  the	  use	  of	  further	   news	   articles	   and	   reports.	   The	   same	   method	   is	   used	   to	   examine	  regulatory	   instruments	   put	   in	   place	   at	   the	   supranational	   level.33	  To	   this	   end,	  numerous	  documents	  published	  by	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	   Development	   (OECD),	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   (IMF)	   and	   the	  European	  Commission	  will	  be	  used.	  Therefore,	  the	  methodological	  approach	  and	  discussion	  of	  this	  thesis	  moves	  between	  the	  study	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  factors,	  the	  analysis	  of	  national	  law,	  EU	   case	   law	   and	   international	   regulatory	   instruments.	   The	   economic	   aspect	   is	  mainly	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   thesis,	  while	   the	   legal	   part	   occupies	  most	   of	   the	  second	  half.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Such	  as	  Financial	  Times,	  Guardian,	  Reuters,	  NY	  Times	  and	  various	  Gulf	  based	  sources,	  such	  as	  
Arabian	  Business	  and	  Business	  24/7.	  30	  Such	  as	  Deutschebank	  and	  Morgan	  Stanley.	  31	  Chapter	  4,	  at	  162-­‐185.	  32	  Chapter	  5,	  at	  188-­‐198.	  33	  Chapter	  6.	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The	  problems	  encountered	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  twofold:	  the	  opacity	  of	  SWFs	  and	  the	  volatility	  of	  modern	  financial	  markets.	  Firstly,	  SWFs	  are	  notorious	  for	  secrecy.	  The	  great	  majority	  of	  them	  make	  no	  information	  available	  as	  to	  their	  ownership	  portfolio,	  business	  plans,	  internal	  governance	  or	  names	  of	  executive	  officials.	  More	   importantly,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   ascertain	   the	  extent	  of	  government	  influence	  on	  their	  management	  decisions.	  This	  limitation	  inevitably	  constrains	  the	  available	  field	  of	  research	  and	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  therefrom.	  A	  similar	  limitation	  applies	  to	  the	  public	  institutions	  charged	  with	  overseeing	  SWF	  investments	   in	   certain	   jurisdictions	   due	   to	   the	   confidential	   nature	   of	   their	  work.34 	  To	   minimise	   this	   problem,	   this	   thesis	   uses	   numerous	   examples	   of	  transparent	   SWFs	   that	   disseminate	   the	   required	   information	   (for	   example,	  equity	   portfolio	   constitution)	   to	   make	   broad	   conclusions.35	  For	   the	   remainder	  more	   secretive	  SWFs,	   some	   limited	   information	   that	  appears	   in	   the	  news	  or	   in	  financial	   reports	   (for	   example,	   regarding	   individual	   transactions	  or	   investment	  strategies)	   is	   used.	   These	   sources	   can	   be	   a	   helpful,	   if	   imperfect,	   source	   of	  information.	  Secondly,	   as	   seen	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	   the	   place	   and	   role	   of	   SWFs	  evolves	   in	   parallel	  with	   the	   latest	   events	   and	   developments	   in	   global	   financial	  markets.	  At	  times	  of	  economic	  volatility,	  especially	  pertinent	  now,	  observing	  the	  behaviour	   of	   SWFs	   and	   the	   attitudes	   of	   western	   countries	   towards	   them,	   let	  alone	  drawing	  safe	  conclusions	  about	  them,	  can	  be	  particularly	  challenging.	  This	  can	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   slowing	   down	   the	   process	   of	   collecting	   needed	  material	  and	  lengthening	  the	  time	  required	  to	  draw	  robust	  conclusions	  about,	  or	  evaluate	  the	  place	  and	  role	  of,	  SWFs	  in	  modern	  markets	  from	  a	   long-­‐term	  perspective.36	  This	   thesis	   has	   sought	   to	   take	   into	   account	   all	   available	   information	   about	   the	  behaviour	   of	   SWFs	   and	   recipient	   countries	   in	   different	   environments.	   It	   has	  taken	  the	  time	  necessary	  for	  appropriate	  scrutiny	  and	  comment.	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  terms	  ‘company’	  and	  ‘corporation’	  are	  used	  interchangeably.	  In	  addition,	   ‘company’	   is	  sometimes	  also	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  referred	  to	  describe	  SWFs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Such	  as	  the	  USA	  one	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  at	  232-­‐235.	  35	  Such	  as	  Singapore’s	  Temasek	  or	  Norways’	  GPFG.	  36	  For	  example,	  evaluating	  SWFs’	  behaviour	  or	  future	  western	  attitudes	  towards	  them.	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5. Structure	  
	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  
Chapter	   1	   delineates	   the	   subject	   by	   providing	   an	   analysis	   of	   various	  definitions	   and	   categories	   of	   SWFs	   but	   also	   specifies	   state-­‐owned	   investment	  entities	   that	  will	  not	  be	   the	  subject	  of	   the	   thesis,	   such	  as	  public	  pension	   funds.	  The	  main	   characteristics	   of	   SWFs	  are	  described:	   their	  unusually	   large	   size	   and	  their	  general	  lack	  of	  transparency.	  A	  suggestion	  is	  made	  that	  because	  many	  SWFs	  originate	  from	  non-­‐democratic	  countries	  this	  might	  account	  for	  their	  opacity	  and	  general	  structure.	  
	  
Chapter	   2	   focuses	   on	   the	   investment	   behaviour	   of	   SWFs	   and	   attempts	   to	  discover	  common	  patterns	  in	  this	  behaviour.	  It	  shows	  SWFs	  to	  be	  predominantly	  conservative	  investors	  with	  a	  long-­‐term	  and	  largely	  passive	  investment	  outlook.	  It	   also	   shows	   that,	   when	   SWFs	   do	   participate	   actively	   as	   investors	   they	   may	  contribute	  positively	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  their	  recipient	  companies.	  The	  chapter	  also	  offers	   a	   comparison	  between	  SWFs	  and	  other	   investment	   entities;	  namely	  hedge	  funds	  and	  institutional	  investors.	  
	  
Chapter	   3	   uses	   the	   conclusions	   from	   the	   earlier	   chapters	   to	   assess	   the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  posed	  by	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  EU	  and	  western	   countries.	  This	   assessment	  will	   later	   form	   the	  basis	  of	   a	   rationale	  for	   regulation.	   This	   chapter	   shows	   that	   SWFs	   bring	   substantial	   benefits	   to	   the	  recipient	   economies,	   primarily	   in	   the	   form	   of	   reliable	   and	   stable	   foreign	  investment.	   In	   addition,	   SWFs	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	   stability	   of	   their	   target	  countries	   by	   providing	   capital	   at	   times	   of	   crisis.	   Arguments	   emphasising	   the	  costs/risks	   caused	   by	   SWFs	   are	   challenged.	   Potential	   costs,	   framed	   in	   the	  language	  of	  national	  security	  threats	  or	  risks	  to	  financial	  stability	  are	  shown	  as	  often	  based	  on	  theoretical	  scenarios	  lacking	  realism.	  Moreover,	  such	  arguments	  have	   failed	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   frame	   of	   operation	   of	   SWFs,	   the	   scrutiny	  applied	  on	  them	  by	  national	  governments	  and	  the	  press,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  general	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willingness	   to	  remain	   low	  key	  (in	   the	   large	  majority	  of	  cases).	   It	   is	  argued	  that	  SWFs	   can	   bring	   minor	   indirect	   costs,	   such	   as	   increasing	   the	   overall	   political	  influence	   of	   their	   home	   countries	   and	   sometimes	   sparking	   protectionist	  backlashes	  in	  their	  target	  countries.37	  However,	  based	  on	  these	  considerations,	  it	  appears	   that	   SWFs	   bring	   significant	   benefits,	   while	   potential	   detriments	   are	  often	  theoretical,	  unrealistic	  or	  indirect.	  
	  
Chapter	   4	   establishes	   a	   rationale	   for	   regulating	   SWFs	   as	   well	   as	   the	  principles	  that	  should	  underlie	  this	  rationale.	   It	   is	  held	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  SWFs	  does	  not	  call	  for	  particular	  hard	  regulatory	  instruments;	  rather	  a	  limited	  form	  of	  regulation	   may	   be	   needed	   to	   address	   certain	   costs,	   such	   as	   to	   suppress	  protectionist	   backlashes	   and	   to	   increase	   investor	   confidence	   in	   the	   markets	  where	  they	  operate.	  To	  achieve	  this	  purpose,	  regulation	  should	  aim	  to	   increase	  the	   transparency	   and	   global	   accountability	   of	   SWFs	   without,	   however,	  compromising	   their	   competitive	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   other	   international	  investors,	  notably	  hedge	  funds.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  accepted	  that	  the	  growing	  acquisition	   of	   political	   leverage	   by	   developing	   countries	   (to	   which	   SWFs	   also	  contribute)	   is	  not	  something	   that	  can	  necessarily	  be	  addressed	  by	  regulation.38	  Rather,	   this	   occurrence	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	   growing	   phenomenon	   of	   global	  imbalances	  that	  is	  best	  tackled	  by	  foreign	  diplomacy	  and	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  The	   chapter	   concludes	   by	   analysing	   various	   regulatory	   proposals	   categorised	  under	   ‘limiting	   SWF	   acquisitions’,	   ‘command	   and	   control’	   and	   ‘incentive-­‐type’	  regulation	  as	  well	  as	   ‘self-­‐regulation’.	   It	   is	  argued	   that	  most	  of	   them	  are	  overly	  protectionist	  and	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  real	  implications	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs.	  
	  
Chapter	   5	   focuses	   on	   national	   measures,	   in	   particular	   those	   of	   France,	  Germany,	  Greece	  and	  the	  USA.	  The	  analysis	  of	  EU	  member	  countries	  is	  preceded	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  EU	  case	  law	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  how	  this	   may	   apply	   to	   the	   case	   of	   SWFs.	   Each	   of	   those	   jurisdictions	   constitutes	   a	  unique	  example.	  France	  and	  Germany	  make	  up	   large	  and	  efficient	  markets	  that	  attract	  SWF	  investment,	  although	  each	  has	  responded	  in	  a	  considerably	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  ibid.	  38	  at	  153.	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manner.	  As	  a	  result,	  their	  legal	  provisions	  have	  also	  had	  differing	  success	  under	  the	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   European	   Commission.	   For	   example,	   the	   German	   law	   was	  found	  to	  comply	  with	  EU	  law,	  while	  France	  was	  obliged	  to	  amend	  its	  provisions.	  Greece,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   has	   no	   significant	   SWF	   presence,	   although	   its	   legal	  response	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   due	   to	   the	  manner	   of	   its	   speedy	   adoption	   in	  response	  to	  one	  single	  threat.	  The	  USA,	  finally,	  is	  the	  most	  attractive	  investment	  destination	   for	   SWFs	   and	  has	   long	  dealt	  with	   issues	  of	   foreign	   investment	   and	  national	  security.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  constrained	  by	  a	  supranational	  regulator	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  as	  EU	  Member	  States	  are.	  Therefore,	  it	  constitutes	  an	  excellent	  example	   to	   compare	   with	   EU	   jurisdictions. 39 	  It	   is	   argued	   that	   those	   legal	  instruments	   largely	   disregard	   the	   reality	   of	   SWFs	   and,	   therefore	   create	  inefficient	   investment	   structures	   which	   impose	   costs	   on	   their	   economies	   by	  distorting	  the	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  capital.40	  Moreover,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  laws	  of	  EU	  Member	  States	  are	  concerned,	  these	  often	  fall	  foul	  of	  established	  EU	  laws	  which	  state	   that	  all	   restrictions	   to	   free	  movement	  of	   capital	  between	  Member	  States	  and	   between	   Member	   States	   and	   third	   countries	   are	   prohibited.41	  In	   short,	  most	   laws	   at	   the	   national	   level	   are	   misconceived	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   SWF	  phenomenon.	  	  Finally,	  Chapter	  6	  deals	  with	  measures	  taken	  at	  a	  supranational	  level.	  While	  the	  hard	   law	  option	  might	  be	  unworkable	  at	   the	   supranational	   level,	   a	   form	  of	  voluntary	  self-­‐regulation	  might	  bring	  the	  desired	  results	  without	  compromising	  the	   financial	   operation	   of	   SWFs	   and	   the	   efficient	   allocation	   of	   capital.	   Such	  initiatives	   have	   already	   been	   undertaken	   by	   various	   international	   institutions,	  with	  the	  most	  important	  being	  the	  one	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  International	  Working	  Group	   (IWG)	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	   IMF	   in	   2008.	   Although	   supranational	  instruments,	   as	   they	   currently	   stand,	   could	   be	   further	   improved	   to	   better	  address	   the	   issues	   of	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   of	   SWFs,	   it	   is	   submitted	  that,	   to	   date,	   they	   offer	   the	   best	   alternative	   to	   hard	   regulation.42	  Moreover,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Chapter	  5,	  at	  228.	  40	  Chapter	  5,	  at	  248-­‐249.	  41	  Article	  56	  TFEU;	  42	  ibid.	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financial	  regulations	  already	  in	  place	  in	  Europe	  and	  America,	  such	  as	  hedge	  fund	  regulation,	   can	   further	   contribute	   to	   raising	   the	   benchmark	   of	   transparency	   in	  the	  wider	  financial	  sector,	  thus	  encouraging	  SWFs	  to	  follow	  suit.	  A	  list	  of	  abbreviations	  used	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  also	  attached.	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CHAPTER	  ONE	  
-­‐	  
Definition	  and	  Characteristics	  of	  SWFs	  	  	  	  INTRODUCTION	  	   This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   definition	   of	   SWFs	   and	   identifies	   their	   specific	  characteristics.	   To	   this	   end,	   first,	   various	   definitions	   of	   SWFs	   are	   provided,	  followed	   by	   an	   analysis	   of	   their	   two	  most	   fundamental	   characteristics,	   namely	  their	  size	  and	  lack	  of	  transparency.	  The	   difficulty	   of	   defining	   SWFs	   consists	   mainly	   in	   their	   large	   number	   and	  diverse	  nature.	  Although	  all	  SWFs	  share	  a	  number	  of	  common	  features	  (such	  as	  government	  control),	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  as	  to	  how	  far	  this	  definition	  should	  stretch.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  not	  certain	  whether	  SOEs	  should	  also	  be	   included	   in	   the	  definition.	  An	  additional	  question	   relates	   to	   the	   inclusion	  of	  the	   purpose	   of	   a	   SWF	   in	   the	   definition	   (such	   as	   ‘government	   revenue	  stabilisation’	   or	   ‘the	   guarantee	   of	   future	   state	   pension	   liabilities’).	  While	   some	  definitions	   are	   based	   entirely	   on	   a	   fund’s	   investment	   behaviour,	   others	   focus	  solely	  on	  the	  purpose	  behind	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  fund.	  The	   size	   and	   transparency	   of	   SWFs	   is	   examined	   next.	   An	   understanding	   of	  those	  two	  features	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  their	  investment	  behaviour	  and	  for	  the	  discussion	  on	  various	  issues	  that	  arise	  from	  their	  operation.	  The	  question	  of	  size	  is	  strongly	  linked	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  definition.	  The	  collective	  size	  attributed	  to	  SWFs	  depends	  on	  the	  width	  of	  the	  definition	  and	  the	  number	  of	  funds	  included	  in	  it.	  The	  collective	  size	  of	  assets	  held	  by	  SWFs	  changes	  dramatically	  if	  stabilisation	  funds,	   public	   pension	   funds	   and/or	   central	   bank	   reserves	   are	   included	   in	   the	  definition.	   Next,	   the	   discussion	   on	   transparency	   is	   crucial	   to	   understand	   the	  various	   criticisms	   made	   against	   SWFs.	   As	   SWFs	   differ	   greatly	   between	   them,	  their	  levels	  of	  transparency	  can	  also	  vary	  or	  change	  over	  time.	  All	  in	  all,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  there	  is	  a	  pattern	  towards	  increased	  transparency.	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   A. DEFINITION	  AND	  PURPOSE	  	  
1. Definition	  of	  SWFs	  	  
i. Broad	  and	  narrow	  definitions	  	   Defining	   SWFs	   is	   a	   necessary	   first	   step	   for	   all	   the	   authorities	   that	   seek	   to	  regulate	   them.	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   universally	   accepted	   definition	   for	   SWFs	  until	  this	  day.	  A	  number	  of	  sources	  have	  attempted	  to	  define	  SWFs	  (see	  below)	  based	   on	   their	   investment	   behaviour	   or	   the	   source	   of	   their	   funding	   but	   there	  remains	  disagreement	  about	  the	  types	  of	  state-­‐owned	  funds	  that	  are	  included	  in	  it.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   not	   uncommon	   for	   SWFs	   to	   argue	   that	   they	   do	   not	   come	  under	  any	  definition	  and,	  therefore,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  ‘SWFs’.	  One	  example	   of	   such	   case	   is	   Saudi	   Arabia	   whose	   government	   denies	   possessing	   a	  SWF,	  thus	  contradicting	  many	  published	  studies	  that	  consider	  the	  Saudi	  Arabian	  Monetary	  Authority	   (SAMA)	  or	   the	  Public	   Investment	   Fund	   (PIF)	   to	   be	   a	   SWF.43	  Another	   example	   is	   China’s	   State	   Administration	   of	   Foreign	   Exchange	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Although	  SAMA	  itself	  may	  not	  be	  structurally	  a	  SWF,	  there	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  reports	  or	  studies	  that	  consider	  the	  SAMA	  or	  the	  PIF	  (or	  many	  other	  funds	  managed	  by	  the	  SAMA)	  to	  come	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘SWFs’.	  Jen	  identifies	  a	  number	  of	  funds	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  concludes	  that	  ‘trying	  to	  exclude	  the	  funds	  that	  are	  under	  the	  names	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  royal	  family,	  I	  am	  guessing	  that	  US$300	  billion	  or	  so	  could	  be	  considered	  in	  SWFs’,	  Stephen	  Jen,	  ‘How	  Big	  Could	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  funds	  Be	  by	  2015’	  (2007)	  Morgan	  Stanley	  Research	  Global	  <www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070504-­‐Fri.html#anchored3a90be-­‐419e-­‐11de-­‐a1b3-­‐c771ef8db296>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013;	  The	  SAMA	  and	  PIF	  also	  appear	  in	  the	  studies	  held	  by	  the	  SWF	  Institute,	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘Fund	  Rankings’	  (SWF	  Institute,	  October	  2012)	  <www.swfinstitute.org/fund-­‐rankings/>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012;	  The	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  a	  known	  USA	  NGO,	  also	  includes	  SAMA	  and	  the	  PIF	  in	  theirs	  considerations	  on	  SWFs	  but	  states	  that	  the	  SAMA	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  stabilisation	  fund	  than	  a	  typical	  wealth	  fund	  and	  notes	  that	  the	  PIF	  seems	  more	  targeted	  towards	  domestic,	  rather	  than	  foreign,	  investment,	  Brad	  Setser	  and	  Rachel	  Ziemba,	  ‘GCC	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  –	  Reversals	  of	  Fortune’	  (2009)	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Center	  for	  Geoeconomic	  Studies	  <www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CGS_WorkingPaper_5.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  1-­‐4;	  Kern,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  simply	  states	  that	  ‘various	  funds’	  exist	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  which	  are	  equated	  to	  SWFs	  but	  gives	  no	  other	  information,	  Steffen	  Kern,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  –	  State	  Investments	  on	  the	  Rise’	  (2007)	  Deutsche	  Bank	  Research	  <www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-­‐
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(SAFE)	   which	   claimed	   that	   it	   did	   not	   fall	   under	   the	   definition	   of	   SWFs	   and	  therefore	   it	   should	   not	   be	   covered	   by	   any	  measures	   intending	   to	   regulate	   the	  behaviour	   of	   SWFs.44	  Singapore’s	   Temasek	   Holdings45	  has	   also	   made	   similar	  claims.	   All	   of	   these	   state	   funds,	   however,	   are	   classified	   as	   SWFs	   by	   the	   SWF	  Institute	   and	   other	   organisations.46	  This	   stance	   could	   possibly	   be	   explained,	   in	  part,	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   term	   ‘SWF’	   in	   the	   west	   has	   acquired	   a	   negative	  connotation,	   which	   discourages	   many	   states	   from	   openly	   admitting	   that	   they	  manage	  one.47	  The	   term	   ‘SWFs’	  was	   first	  evoked	  by	  Rozanov	   in	  2005,48	  and	  no	  consensus	  has	   yet	   been	   reached	   on	   its	   exact	  meaning.	  Most	   definitions	   suggest	   these	   are	  state-­‐owned	   investment	   funds	   (not	   operating	   companies)	   that	  make	   long-­‐term	  domestic	  and	   international	   investments	   in	  search	  of	  commercial	  returns.	   In	  his	  article	  Rozanov	  lists	  the	  major	  SWFs	  and	  attempts	  to	  estimate	  the	  size	  of	  each.	  In	  a	  subsequent	  article,	  the	  author	  claims	  that	  the	  most	  important	  step	  in	  designing	  a	   fund	   is	   defining	   its	   liability	   profile.49	  Accordingly,	   he	   classifies	   SWFs	   in	   five	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  PROD/PROD0000000000215270.pdf>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012,	  2.	  44	  Oxford	  Analytica	  staff,	  ‘China's	  SAFE	  Poses	  Challenges	  to	  SWF	  Code-­‐of-­‐Conduct	  efforts’	  Oxford	  
Analytica	  (Oxford,	  2009)	  <www.wnd.com/markets/news/read/6704669/china’s_safe_poses_challenge_to_swf_code>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013.	  45	  Straits	  Times	  Staff,	  ‘Temasek	  Says	  it	  Is	  Not	  a	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund’	  Straits	  Times	  (Singapore,	  22	  March	  2008)	  <www.straitstimes.com/Free/Story/STIStory_219340.html>	  accessed	  10	  June	  2009.	  46	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘List	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2012)	  <www.swfinstitute.org>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012;	  SWF	  News,	  ‘The	  Largest	  Funds’	  (SWF	  News,	  16	  September	  2011)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/ranking.php>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012;	  See	  for	  example	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Algerian	  fund,	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘Revenue	  Regulation	  Fund’	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2008	  -­‐	  2009)	  <www.swfinstitute.org/fund/algeria.php>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  47	  One	  example	  being	  the	  government	  owned	  Sanabil	  al-­‐Saudia	  fund	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  which	  is	  named	  ‘investment	  company’	  to	  avoid	  being	  labelled	  as	  an	  SWF,	  Zawya,	  ‘Saudi	  Arabian	  Investment	  Company’	  (Zawya,	  Profile,	  2012)	  <www.zawya.com/company/profile/1009276/Saudi_Arabian_Investment_Company/>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  48	  Rozanov’s	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  is	  ‘neither	  traditional	  public-­‐pension	  funds	  nor	  reserve	  assets	  supporting	  national	  currencies,	  but	  funds	  set	  up	  with	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  objectives:	  insulate	  the	  budget	  and	  economy	  from	  excess	  volatility	  in	  revenues,	  help	  monetary	  authorities	  sterilize	  unwanted	  liquidity,	  build	  up	  savings	  for	  future	  generations,	  or	  use	  the	  money	  for	  economic	  and	  social	  development’,	  Andrew	  Rozanov,	  ‘Who	  Holds	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations’	  (2005),	  Vol	  XV	  Number	  4,	  Central	  Banking	  Journal	  <www.centralbanking.com/central-­‐banking-­‐journal/feature/2072255/holds-­‐wealth-­‐nations>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012,	  52-­‐57.	  49	  Andrew	  Rozanov,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Defining	  Liabilities’,	  (2007)	  State	  Street	  Global	  Advisors	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categories:	  stabilisation/buffer	  funds,	  endowment	  funds,	  pension	  reserve	  funds,	  development	  funds	  and	  government	  holding	  funds.50	  Some	  definitions	  are	  much	  narrower,	  such	  as	  Truman’s,	  who	  defines	  a	  SWF	  as	   ‘a	   pool	   of	   domestic	   and	   international	   assets	   owned	   and	   managed	   by	  governments	  to	  achieve	  a	  variety	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  objectives,	  including	  the	   accumulation	   and	   management	   of	   reserve	   assets,	   the	   stabilisation	   of	  macroeconomic	   effects	   and	   the	   transfer	   of	   wealth	   across	   generations’.51	  If	   one	  follows	  this	  definition,	  it	  would	  include	  forty-­‐four	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  significant	  SWFs,	  including	  eight	  funds	  from	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE),	  three	  from	  the	  USA,	   two	   from	   Venezuela,	   Russia,	   China	   and	   Singapore	   and	   including	   the	  Algerian	  Revenue	  Regulation	  Fund.52	  The	  definition	  offered	  by	  the	  SWF	  Institute	  is	  more	  inclusive	  than	  Truman’s.	  SWFs	  are	  defined	  as	  ‘state-­‐owned	  investment	  funds	  composed	  of	  financial	  assets	  such	  as	  stocks,	  bond,	  real	  estate,	  or	  other	  financial	  instruments	  funded	  by	  foreign	  exchange	  assets’.53	  According	  to	  this	  definition	  we	  would	  include	  forty-­‐seven	  of	  the	  world’s	   largest	  SWFs.	   In	  particular,	   this	  definition	  would	  also	   include	  funds	  from	   Angola,	   Australia,	   Bahrain,	   East	   Timor,	   and	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Ireland’s	  pension	  funds	  that	  would	  be	  missing	  from	  Truman’s	  list.	  Moreover,	  the	  Chinese	  SAFE,	  which	  as	   seen	  above	  avoids	  being	   labeled	  as	   a	   ‘SWF’,	  would	  also	  appear	  only	  under	  the	  second	  definition,	  while	  SAMA	  would	  surface	  under	  both.	  As	  far	  as	  national	  and	  international	  institutions	  are	  concerned,	  according	  to	  the	  IMF,	  SWFs	  can	  generally	  be	  defined	  as	   ‘special	   investment	   funds	  created	  or	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  accessed	  1	  August	  2009	  (registration-­‐based).	  50 	  One	   of	   the	   most	   expansive	   definitions	   of	   SWFs	   is	   that	   of	   Balding	   who	   encompasses	  government-­‐run	   pension	   funds,	   development	   banks,	   and	   other	   investment	   vehicles.	   This	  definition	  would	  yield	  a	  truly	  spectacular	  total	  value	  of	  sovereign	  wealth,	  Christopher	  Balding,	  ‘A	  Portfolio	  Analysis	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2008)	  Working	  paper,	  University	  of	  California-­‐Irvine	  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141531>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  9.	  51	  Veljko	  Fotak,	  Bernardo	  Bortolotti	  and	  William	  Megginson,	  ‘The	  Financial	  Impact	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Investments	  in	  Listed	  Companies’	  (2008)	  <www.gresi-­‐cetai.hec.ca/cref/sem/documents/081107.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  1.	  52	  Ibid	  Table	  1	  Panel	  A.	  53	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘About	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’,	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2008	  -­‐	  2009)	  <www.swfinstitute.org/swf.php>	  accessed	  10	  June	  2009	  (registration-­‐based).	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owned	   by	   governments	   to	   hold	   foreign	   assets	   for	   long-­‐term	   purposes’.54	  The	  OECD	   defines	   them	   as	   ‘government-­‐owned	   investment	   vehicles	   funded	   by	  foreign	  exchange	  assets’.55	  The	  two	  definitions	  reflect	  the	  two	  trends	  apparent	  in	  the	   academic	   definitions	   above	   to	   define	   SWFs	   either	   according	   to	   their	  investment	  objectives	  (as	  the	  IMF	  does)	  or	  based	  on	  the	  origin	  of	  their	  funds	  (as	  the	   OECD).	   Moreover,	   both	   definitions	   appear	   to	   be	   quite	   broad	   and	   they	  encompass	   a	   variety	   of	   state	   funds.	   The	   OECD’s	   definition,	   however,	   appears	  somewhat	  narrower	  since	   it	  would	  exclude	  all	  pension	   funds	   that	  receive	   their	  funds	  from	  social	  security	  contributions.	  The	   definition	   given	   by	   the	   EU	   Commission	   in	   a	   2008	   Communication	   on	  SWFs	  is	   ‘state-­‐owned	  investment	  vehicles,	  which	  manage	  a	  diversified	  portfolio	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  financial	  assets’,56	  while	  the	  USA	  Treasury	  defines	  them	  as	  ‘government	  vehicles	  funded	  by	  foreign	  exchange	  earnings	  but	  managed	  separately	   from	   foreign	   reserves’.57	  Whereas	   the	   Commission’s	   definition	   is	  clearly	  inspired	  by	  the	  one	  offered	  by	  the	  IMF,	  the	  USA	  Treasury’s	  appears	  much	  like	  the	  OECD’s.	  Their	  differences	  consist	  in	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  definition	  also	  includes	   the	   management	   of	   domestic	   assets	   while	   the	   IMF	   only	   mentions	  foreign	  ones,58	  and	  that	  the	  USA	  Treasury’s	  definition,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  OECD’s,	  includes	   a	   mention	   of	   how	   the	   assets	   are	   managed:	   ‘separately	   from	   foreign	  exchange	   reserves’.	   In	   any	   event,	   both	   the	   EU	   and	   USA	   definitions	   are	   quite	  broad,	   which	   is	   to	   be	   expected	   as	   those	   bodies	   may	   seek	   to	   expand	   their	  regulatory	  net	  in	  case	  they	  decide	  to	  regulate	  such	  funds	  in	  the	  future.	  However,	  the	   American	   definition	   may	   be	   held	   to	   be	   broader	   than	   the	   EU’s	   as	   it	   may	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  IMF,	  ‘Global	  Financial	  Stability	  Report,	  Financial	  Market	  Turbulence	  -­‐	  Causes	  Consequences	  and	  Policies’	  (2007)	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Global	  Financial	  Stability	  Report,	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2007/02/pdf/text.pdf>	  4	  May	  2013,	  115.	  55	  OECD,	  ‘International	  Investment	  of	  [SWFs]:	  Are	  New	  Rules	  Needed?’	  (2007)	  Issue	  5,	  OECD	  Investment	  Newsletter	  <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/48/39979894.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  4.	  56	  Commission,	  ‘A	  Common	  European	  Approach’	  (n	  1)	  4.	  57	  USA	  Department	  of	  Treasury,	  ‘Remarks	  by	  Acting	  Under	  Secretary	  for	  International	  Affairs	  Clay	  Lowery	  on	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  the	  International	  Financial	  System’	  (2007)	  USA	  Department	  of	  Treasury	  <www.treasury.gov/press-­‐center/press-­‐releases/Pages/hp471.aspx>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  58	  And	  as	  a	  result	  is	  wider	  than	  the	  IMF’s.	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encompass	  some	  stabilisation	  funds	  that	  escape	  the	  EU’s	  list.59	  In	  this	  thesis,	  given	  that	  for	  a	  large	  part	  SWFs	  are	  examined	  from	  an	  EU	  law	  perspective,	   the	   definition	   offered	   by	   the	   Commission	   is	   adopted.	   Since	   the	  Commission	  does	  not	  provide	  any	   further	  details	  on	   the	  classification	  of	  SWFs,	  Rozanov’s	   classification,	  which	   is	   largely	   compatible	  with	   the	   above	   definition,	  can	   also	   be	   accepted.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   the	   research	  ambit	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  necessarily	  confined	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  definition.	  In	   fact,	   there	  may	  be	  other	   entities	   that,	   albeit	   not	   SWFs	   stricto	  sensu,	   are	   also	  worth	  considering	  and	  analysing.	  To	  better	  clarify	  this	  point,	  three	  fund	  classes	  are	  analysed	  next:	  stabilisation	  funds,	  SOEs	  and	  public	  pension	  funds.	  	  
ii.	  Stabilisation	  funds	  	  Stabilisation	  funds	  are	  national	  investment	  funds	  whose	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  offset	   revenue	   declines	   due	   to	   falling	   commodity	   prices	   or	   production	   levels;	  most	  such	   funds	  are	  created	  by	  countries	  whose	  budgets	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  natural	  resources,	  such	  as	  oil,	  copper,	  diamonds	  or	  others.60	  As	  seen	  earlier,	  Rozanov	  did	   include	  stabilisation	   funds	   in	   the	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  but	  recognised	  that	  they	  ‘are	  a	  class	  of	  their	  own	  and	  stand	  out	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  fund	  types’.61	  The	  reason	  is	  that,	   ‘while	  all	  other	  funds	  are	  managed	  primarily	  for	  long-­‐term	  return	  and	  wealth	  maximisation,	  stabilisation	  funds	  have	  as	  their	  primary	  objective	  risk	  management’.62	  Since	  a	  formal	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  does	  not	  yet	  exist,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  state	  with	  certainty	  whether	  stabilisation	  funds	  are	  included	  in	  the	  broad	  SWF	  category.	  Morgan	  Stanley	  writer,	  Jen	  addressed	  this	  topic	  in	  2006	  where	  he	  accepted	  Rozanov’s	  definition,	  but	  noted	  that	  with	  the	  permanent	  rise	   in	  oil	  prices,	  most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  This	  is	  because	  certain	  stabilisation	  funds	  do	  not	  focus	  at	  managing	  a	  diversified	  portfolio	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  assets	  but	  rather	  on	  fixed	  income,	  Rachel	  Ziemba,	  ‘Responses	  to	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Are	  Draconian	  Measures	  on	  the	  Way?’	  
RGE	  Monitor’s	  Economic	  Analysis	  (New	  York,	  18	  October	  2007)	  <www.economonitor.com/analysts/2007/10/17/responses-­‐to-­‐sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐are-­‐draconian-­‐measures-­‐on-­‐the-­‐way/>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  and	  see	  below	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  stabilisation	  funds	  n	  61	  onwards.	  60	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  24.	  61	  Rozanov	  (n	  49)	  2.	  62	  ibid.	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oil	  stabilisation	  funds	  have	  evolved	  into	  ‘wealth-­‐accumulation’	  funds.63	  He	  notes	  that	   several	   Asian	   currency	   stabilisation	   funds	   have	   outgrown	   their	   liquidity	  needs	   and	   thus	   Jen	   predicts	   that	   many	   Asian	   stabilisation	   funds	   will	   change	  priorities	  and	  emphasise	  on	  wealth	  appreciation.64	  Truman,	   in	   2007,	   distinguished	   between	   stabilisation	   funds,	   aiming	   at	  providing	  liquidity	  and	  characterised	  by	  low-­‐risk	  investments,	  and	  SWFs,	  which,	  he	   claimed,	   have	   longer-­‐term	   investment	   objectives	   and	   are	   invested	   in	   a	  broader	  array	  of	  instruments.65	  But	  the	  author	  did	  emphasise	  that	  the	  distinction	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  and	  that	  most	  funds	  share	  characteristics	  of	  both	  stabilisation	  and	  wealth-­‐appreciation	  funds.	  This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   examine,	   not	   only	   SWFs	   themselves,	   but	   also	   various	  responses	  by	  regulators	  and	  the	  general	  public	  towards	  them.	  Since	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  commentators	  perceive	  stabilisation	  funds	  to	  be	  SWFs,	  these	  will	  also	  be	  taken	  into	   account	   further	   below.	   Paraphrasing	   Jen,	   the	   issue	   is	   that	   they	  manage	   a	  diversified	   portfolio	   of	   foreign	   assets,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they,	   strictly	  speaking,	  fall	  in	  the	  definition.66	  	  
iii. State-­‐owned	  Enterprises	  	   Another	  way	   through	  which	   countries	   invest	   in	   foreign	   entities	   is	   through	  purchases	   by	   SOEs.	   The	   first	   time	   that	   an	   international	   investment	   by	   a	   SOE	  aroused	   controversy	   in	   the	   USA	   was	   in	   2005,	   when	   the	   Chinese	   National	  Overseas	   Oil	   Company	   (CNOOC)	   attempted	   to	   purchase	   Unocal,	   only	   to	   be	  blocked	   by	   opposition	   from	   the	   USA	   Congress. 67 	  One	   year	   later,	   popular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Stephen	  Jen,	  ‘Currencies:	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Official	  FX	  Reserves’	  (2006)	  Morgan	  Stanley	  Global	  Economic	  Forum	  <www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2006/20060915-­‐Fri.html#anchor2>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  64	  ibid.	  65	  Edwin	  Truman,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  The	  Need	  for	  Greater	  Transparency	  and	  Accountability’	  (2007)	  PB07-­‐6,	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics	  Policy	  Brief	  <www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=783>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012,	  4.	  66	  What	  Jen	  noted	  in	  2006	  was	  that	  SWFs	  started	  to	  look	  more	  like	  private	  mutual	  funds,	  rather	  than	  official	  reserves,	  Jen	  (n	  63).	  67	  n	  196.	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opposition	  expressed	  through	  Congress	  again	  scuttled	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  major	  American	   operating	   company	   by	   a	   foreign	   state-­‐owned	   enterprise,	   this	   time	  Dubai	   Ports	   World’s	   (DPW)	   purchase	   of	   operating	   rights	   to	   six	   key	   port	  facilities.68	  Other	  examples	  include	  the	  purchase	  of	  IBM’s	  computing	  business	  by	  the	   Chinese	   government-­‐controlled	   Lenovo	   Group;69	  Russia’s	   Gazprom	   buying	  pipelines	  and	  other	  energy	   infrastructures	   in	  Europe70	  and	   the	  attempted	  huge	  investment	  by	  China’s	  Chinalco	  into	  Anglo-­‐Australian	  mining	  company	  Rio-­‐Tinto	  in	  2009.71	  Notably,	   neither	   of	   these	   foreign	   companies	   was	   a	   SWF,	   yet	   their	   actions	  fueled	  the	  popular	  backlash	  against	  acquisitions	  of	  western	  companies	  by	  state-­‐owned	   entities.	   More	   importantly,	   it	   was	   the	   backlash	   to	   such	   actions	   that	   in	  many	   instances	   triggered	   the	   adoption	   of	   protective	   national	   laws.72	  It	   must	  therefore	  be	  understood	   that	  although	  national	   laws	  protecting	  vital	   industries	  often	  target	  SWFs,	   in	  reality	  most	  of	   them	  were	   implemented	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  actions	  of	  SOEs.	  As	   a	   concequence,	   today	   SOEs	   are	   sometimes	   put	   in	   the	   same	   category	   as	  SWF	  and	  similar	  criticisms	  are	  used	  against	  both	  types	  of	  state	  companies.73	  This	  tendency	  of	  confusing	  SWFs	  with	  SOEs	  prompted	  the	  annoyance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  SWFs,	   since	   they	   profess	   purely	   economic	   motivations	   and	   argue	   that	   no	  significant	   example	  of	  politically	  motivated	   investment	  by	  SWFs	  has	  ever	  been	  recorded.74	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  n	  197.	  69	  n	  195.	  70	  n	  201.	  71	  Terry	  Macalister,	  ‘Rio’s	  Deal	  With	  Chinalco	  Collapses’	  The	  Guardian	  (London,	  4	  June	  2009)	  <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jun/04/rio-­‐tinto-­‐chinalco-­‐investment>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  72	  For	  example	  see,	  Simpson	  Thatcher,	  ‘Reform	  of	  the	  CFIUS	  process	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Dubai	  Ports	  World’	  Simpson	  
Thatcher	  and	  Bartlett	  LLP	  (New	  York,	  10	  August	  2007)	  <www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub624.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  May	  2013,	  2.	  73	  Ian	  Traynor,	  ‘Gazprom	  Likened	  to	  SWFs	  as	  Brussels	  Calls	  From	  Regulation’	  The	  Guardian	  (London,	  28	  February	  2008)	  <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/feb/28/oil.globaleconomy>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  see	  also,	  Larry	  Catá	  Backer,	  ‘Sovereign	  Investing	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis:	  Global	  Regulation	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds,	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Experience’	  (2009)	  Vol.	  19,	  No.	  1,	  Transnat'l	  L.&	  Contemp.Probs	  179.	  74	  Statement	  by	  unnamed	  SWF	  officer	  (personal	  communication	  24	  February	  2009).	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iv. Public	  Pension	  Funds	  	   Public	  Pension	  Reserve	  Funds	   (PPRFs)	   could	  be	  defined	  as	   funds	   set	  up	  by	  governments	  or	  social	  security	  institutions	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  contributing	  to	  financing	   the	   relevant	   pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	   pension	   plans.75	  Based	   on	   this	   definition,	  two	   sub-­‐categories	   of	   pension	   reserve	   funds	   can	   be	   identified:	   firstly,	   social	  security	  reserve	  funds,	  set	  up	  as	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  social	  security	  system,	  where	  the	   inflows	   are	   mainly	   surpluses	   of	   employee	   and/or	   employer	   contributions	  over	   current	   payouts,	   as	  well	   as,	   in	   some	   cases,	   top-­‐up	   contributions	   from	   the	  government	  via	   fiscal	   transfers	  and	  other	  sources.	  Secondly,	   sovereign	  pension	  reserve	   funds,	   referring	   to	   those	   funds	   which	   are	   established	   directly	   by	   the	  government	   (completely	   separated	   from	   the	   social	   security	   system),	   and	   its	  financial	   inflows	  are	  mainly	   from	  direct	   fiscal	   transfers	   from	  the	  government.76	  Unlike	  the	  first	  type	  of	  reserve	  fund,	  those	  within	  this	  category	  have	  been	  set	  up	  by	  governments	  to	  meet	  future	  deficits	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system.	  SWFs	  and	  PPRFs	   share	   some	  similarities:	  both	  are	   large	   in	   terms	  of	   assets	  under	  management,	  and	  are	  autonomous	  and	  accountable	  only	  to	  governments	  or	   public	   sector	   institutions.	   Like	   SWFs,	   PPRFs	   are	   also	   increasingly	   investing	  abroad	  and	  moving	  into	  alternative	  assets	  (for	  example,	  property,	  private	  equity	  and	   hedge	   funds).77	  However,	   there	   are	   also	   considerable	   differences.	   First,	  PPRFs	  manage	  assets	  to	  meet	  clearly	  defined	  liabilities,	  while	  SWFs	  tend	  to	  have	  broad	   objectives	   and	   are	   rarely	   assigned	   to	   meet	   specific	   government	  expenditures. 78 	  Second,	   PPRFs	   often	   face	   strong	   pressures	   to	   invest	   their	  resources	  domestically,	  as	  opposed	  to	  SWFs,	  which	  are,	  by	  construction,	  mainly	  or	  solely	  invested	  in	  foreign	  assets.79	  Third,	  SWFs	  are	  mainly	  financed	  by	  foreign	  exchange	   revenues	  on	  commodity	  exports	  and/or	   transfers	  of	   foreign	   reserves	  from	   the	   Central	   Bank.	   PPRFs,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   are	  more	   often	   financed	   via	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Blundell-­‐Wignall,	  Yu-­‐Wei	  Hu	  and	  Juan	  Yermo,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Pension	  Fund	  Issues’	  (2008)	  No.	  14	  OECD	  Working	  Papers	  on	  Insurance	  and	  Private	  Pensions	  <www.oecd.org/insurance/privatepensions/40345767.pdf>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012,	  5.	  76	  ibid.	  77	  ibid	  9.	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  ibid.	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  ibid	  10.	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social	   security	   contributions	   or	   direct	   fiscal	   transfers	   from	   the	   government.80	  Finally	   PPRFs	   also	   raise	   issues	   concerning	   fiduciaries’	   responsibilities	   and	  trustees	  may	  require	  what	  these	  funds	  can	  do	  and	  require	  greater	  transparency	  than	  is	  the	  case	  for	  SWFs.81	  As	   opposed	   to	   most	   commentators,	   Truman	   includes	   government	   pension	  funds	   in	   the	   SWF	   category.82	  Most	   others	   exclude	   government	   pension	   plans,	  with	   the	   unique	   exception	   of	   Norway’s	   Government	   Pension	   Fund	   –	   Global	  (GPFG),	  which	  is	  shoe-­‐horned	  into	  the	  definition	  because	  of	   its	  size,	   its	  unusual	  global	  asset	  allocation,	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  profitability	  make	  it	  more	  similar	  to	  other	  SWFs	  rather	  than	  to	  other	  government	  pension	  plans.	  83	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   Norwegian	   pension	   fund,	   PPRFs,	   due	   to	   their	  structural	   differences	  with	   SWFs	   and	   because	   of	   the	   different	   issues	   raised	   by	  each	  type	  of	  investments,	  they	  do	  not	  make	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
2. Purpose	  Behind	  the	  Creation	  of	  SWFs	  
	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  definition	  of	  SWFs,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  examine	  the	  purposes	  behind	  their	  creation.	  However,	  as	  said	  before,	  SWFs	  are	  large	   in	  number	  and	   their	  objectives	  may	  be	  multiple,	  overlapping	  or	  changing	  over	  time.	  The	  rationale	   for	  setting	  up	  government	   funds	  steams	   from	  two	  challenges	  faced	   by	   governments	   that	   accumulate	   substantial	   wealth.	   First,	   natural	  resources	   are	   exhaustible,	   and	   their	   consumption	   and	   export	   leads	   to	   their	  depletion.	  Second,	  superior	  international	  competitiveness	  of	  domestic	  industries	  can	   be	   a	   transitory	   phenomenon	   and	   it	   may	   change	   over	   time.	   Governments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  ibid.	  81	  ibid.	  82	  Edwin	  Truman,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Acquisitions	  and	  Other	  Foreign	  Government	  Investments	  in	  the	  [USA]:	  Assessing	  the	  Economic	  and	  National	  Security	  Implications’	  (2007)	  USA	  Senate,	  Testimony	  before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  <http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=4c63b142-­‐fd5c-­‐4b82-­‐aff9-­‐75e254271056&Witness_ID=466dee50-­‐7158-­‐4039-­‐9309-­‐b2f7b2f23f61>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  2-­‐3.	  83	  It	  may	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  Norwegian	  fund	  is	  not	  a	  PPF	  in	  the	  first	  place	  because	  its	  revenues	  finance	  the	  state	  budget,	  rather	  than	  pensions	  and,	  as	  such,	  the	  term	  ‘pension	  fund’	  in	  the	  definition	  is	  misleading.	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therefore	   face	   the	   challenge	   of	   ‘inter-­‐generational	   equity’	   as	   well	   as	   of	  transforming	  the	  present-­‐day	  revenue	  streams	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  resources	  or	  other	  export	  successes	  into	  sustainable	  income.84	  	  
i. The	  first	  SWFs	  	  National	  governments	  in	  the	  middle	  and	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  gradually	   acknowledged	   the	   importance	   of	   managing	   revenue	   from	   natural	  resources.	   According	   to	   Truman,	   the	   first	   SWF	   was	   established	   in	   1956	   by	  Kiribati,	  a	  tiny	  pacific	  island,	  to	  manage	  the	  revenue	  from	  phosphate	  deposits.85	  However,	   it	   is	   more	   widely	   accepted	   that	   the	   first	   SWF	   was	   the	   Kuwait	  Investment	  Authority	   (KIA)	   set	  up	   in	  1953.	  The	  Kuwait	   Investment	  Board	  was	  set	  up	  on	  that	  year	  with	  the	  aim	  of	   investing	   its	  surplus	  oil	  revenues	  to	  reduce	  the	  country’s	  reliance	  on	  its	  finite	  oil	  resources.	  Replaced	  in	  1965	  by	  the	  Kuwait	  Investment	  Office	  (KIO),	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  KIA,	  the	  organisation	  today	  manages	  a	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	  Future	  Generation	  Fund,	  which	   by	   law	   receives	   funds	  from	  the	  state’s	  oil	  revenue.86	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  two	  funds,	  the	  number	  of	  SWFs	  has	  grown	  in	  two	  major	   waves:	   First,	   in	   the	   1970s,	   for	   example,	   the	   creation	   of	   Singapore’s	  Temasek	  Holdings	   in	  1974	  and	   the	  Abu	  Dhabi	   Investment	  Authority	   (ADIA)	   in	  1976.	   Second,	   since	   the	   1990s	  with	   the	   Iran	  Oil	   Stabilisation	   Fund	   (1999),	   the	  Qatar	  Investment	  Authority	  (QIA)	  in	  2000,	  and	  other	  notable	  funds.	  As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   term	   ‘SWFs’	   dates	   only	   from	   2005.	   Before	   that,	  such	   funds	   were	   called	   ‘stabilisation	   funds’	   i.e.	   funds	   whose	   purpose	   was	  revenue	   stabilisation.	   According	   to	   Fotak	   and	   others,	   ‘governments	   whose	  revenue	  streams	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  value	  of	  one	  underlying	  commodity	  have	  engaged	  in	  diversification	  of	  investments	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  stabilising	  revenues’.87	  As	   a	   result,	   most	   SWFs	   have	   been	   established	   in	   countries	   rich	   in	   natural	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  4.	  85	  Truman	  (n	  82)	  2.	  86	  Law	  decree	  No	  106	  1976	  ‘Concerning	  the	  Reserves	  for	  Future	  Generations’,	  see:	  Kuwait	  Investment	  Authority,	  ‘Overview	  of	  Funds’	  (KIA,	  2008)	  <www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Overview_of_Funds/Pages/default.aspx>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  87	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  4.	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resource,	  with	  oil-­‐related	  SWFs	  being	  the	  most	  common	  ones	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Arab	  Gulf	  countries,	  ex-­‐Soviet	  republics	  and	  Norway).	  	  
ii. Common	  objectives	  	   Balin	   states	   three	   principal	   reasons	   why	   states	   chose	   to	   establish	   SWFs:	  Firstly,	   as	   an	   intergenerationalotransfer	  mechanism,	  where	   future	   government	  pensions,	   asset	   liquidity,	   and	   fiscal	   revenues	   are	   guaranteed	   by	   today’s	   export	  earnings.88	  Thus,	   when	   the	   country’s	   natural	   resources	   are	   exhausted	   future	  generations	   can	   continue	   to	   live	   prosperously	   using	   the	   earnings	   of	   their	  forefathers.	  Secondly,	  to	  diversify	  a	  country’s	  income	  so	  that	  it	  can	  respond	  to	  shocks,	  for	  example	  when	   the	   country	   suffers	   from	   low	   competitiveness.89	  By	   outsourcing	  funds	   to	   a	   SWF	   an	   economy	   can	   also	   shield	   itself	   from	   the	   high-­‐level	   price	  volatility	   of	   the	   commodities	   market.	   The	   low	   levels	   of	   oil	   prices	   recorded	   in	  200890	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extreme	  example	  of	  such	  price	  volatility.	  As	  argued	  by	  Deutschebank	  author,	  Kern	  ‘in	  this	  case,	  the	  fund	  serves	  as	  a	  liquidity	  pool	  which	  is	   replenished	   at	   times	   of	   favourable	   commodity	   price	   conditions	   or	   reserve	  inflows,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  drawn	  upon	  in	  cases	  of	  low	  asset	  prices	  or	  shortage	  of	  reserves’.91	  In	   this	   category	   fall	  most	   cases	   of	   the	   stabilisation	   funds	   discussed	  above,	  which	  are	  established	  in	  countries	  rich	  in	  natural	  resources,	  such	  as	  Chile,	  Iran,	  Mexico,	  Sudan,	  Venezuela	  and	  Russia.92	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Bryan	  Balin,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis’	  (2008)	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  School	  of	  Advanced	  International	  Studies	  <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/32826/Sovereign%20Wealth%20Funds%20A%20Critical%20Analysis%20032008.pdf>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012,	  4.	  89	  ibid;	  An	  example	  is	  what	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Dutch	  disease’:	  the	  danger	  of	  misallocation	  of	  capital	  if	  the	  sale	  of	  natural	  resources	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  real	  exchange	  rate	  and	  thereby	  diminishes	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  other	  sectors	  in	  the	  economy,	  Rietveld	  Malan	  and	  Robert	  Pringle,	  ‘The	  Evolution	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Management’	  in	  Jennifer	  Johnson-­‐Calari	  and	  Malan	  Rietveld	  (eds),	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Management	  (Central	  Banking	  Publications	  2007).	  90	  Jad	  Mouawad,	  ‘Oil	  Prices	  Drop	  to	  20-­‐Month	  Low’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  11	  December	  2008)	  <www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/business/worldbusiness/12oil.html>	  accessed	  10	  July	  2012.	  91	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  4.	  92	  In	  the	  case	  of	  stabilisation	  funds,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  ‘objectives’	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  fund	  become	  a	  critical	  part	  of	  the	  definition.	  According	  to	  the	  definitions	  suggested	  by	  Rozanov	  and	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A	  third	  reason	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  return	  on	  assets	  held	  in	  their	  central	  bank	  reserves.93	  By	   investing	   in	   securities	   other	   than	   USA	   or	   European	   sovereign	  bonds,	  they	  can	  raise	  returns	  above	  the	  3-­‐5%	  annual	  returns	  garnered	  by	  most	  foreign	   exchange	   reserve	   holdings.94	  With	   rapidly	   expanding	   foreign	   exchange	  stocks	   in	  many	  emerging	  markets	  and	   the	  decline	  of	   the	  USA	  dollar—and	   thus	  lower	  returns	  on	  dollar-­‐denominated	  debt—this	  desire	  has	  become	  increasingly	  prevalent	  in	  recent	  times.95	  An	  additional	  motivation	  behind	  the	  setting	  up	  of	  a	  fund	  may	  be	  to	  increase	  transparency.	  This	  may	  seem	  like	  an	  unlikely	  reason	  since	  SWFs	  generally	  make	  the	   targets	   of	   accusations	   for	   opacity.	   However,	   Malan	   and	   Pringle	   argue	   that	  allocating	   assets	   to	   SWFs	   can	  help	   increase	   transparency	  and	  accountability	   in	  the	   government	   sector	   by	   increasing	   public	   scrutiny	   of	   public	   finances. 96	  Depending	  on	   the	  organisational	   form	  and	   the	  reporting	  requirements	   that	   the	  fund	   is	   obliged	   to	   fulfill,	  managing	  national	   assets	   via	   a	   separate	   entity	   can,	   in	  theory,	  contribute	  to	  a	  less	  opaque	  management	  of	  national	  wealth.97	  Finally,	   some	   funds	   are	   set	   up	   and	   used	   typically	   to	   help	   fund	   socio-­‐economic	   projects	   or	   promote	   industrial	   policies	   that	   might	   raise	   a	   country’s	  potential	  output	  growth.98	  These	  are	  also	  known	  as	  ‘development	  funds’.	  	  
iii. Political	  motivations?	  	  Some	  SWFs	  also	  seek	  to	  promote	  investment	  and	  technological	  transfer	  from	  large	   foreign	   corporations	   to	   their	   domestic	   industries.	   To	   achieve	   this	   goal,	   a	  fund	  would	  have	   to	   acquire	   a	  majority	   stake	   in	   a	   company	  or	   form	  a	   coalition	  with	   other	   shareholders.	   Using	   its	   voting	   power,	   the	   SWF	   can	   appoint	   board	  members	   in	   corporations	   that	   could	   direct	   a	   company	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   SWF’s	  home	   country,	   and	   especially,	   establish	   research	   and	   development	   facilities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Truman	  the	  distinctive	  feature	  between	  stabilisation	  funds	  and	  other	  government	  funds	  is	  the	  objectives	  pursued	  by	  the	  former.	  93	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  4.	  94	  ibid.	  95	  ibid.	  96	  Malan	  and	  Pringle	  (n	  89).	  97	  ibid;	  This	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  for	  the	  Norwegian,	  Australian,	  Canadian	  and	  USA	  SWFs.	  98	  ibid.	  
Definition	  and	  Characteristics	  of	  SWFs	  
	   34	  
there.	  However,	   because	   of	   the	   political	   ramifications	   of	   such	   a	   strategy,	   this	  practice	   is	  rather	  exceptional.	  Only	  those	  countries	  seen	  as	   ‘allies’	  of	  the	  USA—Taiwan,	   South	   Korea	   and	   Singapore—have	   invested	   in	   foreign	   companies	   to	  promote	   technological	   innovation	   in	   their	   local	   industries.99	  Furthermore,	   only	  Singapore’s	  fund	  has	  actually	  acquired	  corporations	  for	  this	  purpose.100	  	  	  	   B. CHARACTERISTICS	  OF	  SWFs	  	  
1. Size	  	  The	   rapidly	   growing	   size	   of	   SWFs	   is	   a	   matter	   that	   after	   the	   middle	   and	  towards	   the	   end	  of	   the	   2000s	   attracted	  much	   attention.	   This	   section	  discusses	  the	  source	  of	  wealth	  of	  SWFs,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  previous,	  current	  and	  future	  size	  estimates.	  	  
i. Where	  does	  their	  wealth	  come	  from?	  	  The	  funds	  received	  by	  SWFs	  are	  derived	  from	  excess	  liquidity	  in	  the	  public	  sector	   stemming	   from	   official	   reserves	   at	   central	   banks,	  which	   throughout	   the	  2000s	  have	  been	  rising	  faster	  in	  the	  developing	  than	  the	  industrialised	  world.101	  In	   other	   words,	   they	   are	   a	   ‘by-­‐product’	   of	   national	   budget	   surpluses.102	  Such	  reserves	  are	  accumulated	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  natural	  resources,	  from	  rapid	  growth,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  5.	  100	  ibid;	  It	  has	  also	  been	  reported	  that	  some	  of	  Singapore’s	  investments	  in	  China	  and	  India	  were	  interpreted	  as	  forging	  strategic	  ties	  with	  the	  city-­‐state’s	  larger	  and	  more	  powerful	  neighbors rather	  than	  seeking	  financial	  returns,	  Shai	  Bernstein,	  Josh	  Lerner	  and	  Antoinette	  Schoar,	  ‘The	  Investment	  Strategies	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2009)	  JEL	  No.	  G23,G24	  <www.nber.org/papers/w14861.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  29.	  101	  Steffen	  Kern,	  ‘SWFs	  and	  Foreign	  Investment	  Policies	  -­‐	  an	  Update’	  (2008)	  Deutschebank	  Research	  <www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-­‐PROD/PROD0000000000232851.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  5.	  102	  Rozanov	  (n	  48)	  52.	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current	  account	  surpluses	  or	  government	  fiscal	  surpluses.	  Kuwait’s	  KIO,	  for	  example,	  is	  responsible	  for	  managing	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	   Future	   Generation	   Fund	   and,	   as	   such,	   manages	   10%	   of	   the	   country’s	   oil	  revenues	  allocated	  to	  the	  fund	  annually	  by	  the	  State	  of	  Kuwait.103	  China,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   manages	   the	   world’s	   largest	   foreign	   exchange	   reserves	   (see	   table	  1.1),	  mainly	  thanks	  to	  its	  dynamic	  export	  activity.	  It	  is	  those	  reserves	  that	  it	  uses	  to	  fuel	  its	  sovereign	  funds.	  	  
Table	  1.1:	  Largest	  holders	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  2008	  
	  (Kavaljit	  Singh,	  ‘Frequently	  Asked	  Questions	  about	  SWFs’	  Cornerhouse	  2008,	  15)	  	   Other	  types	  of	   funds,	  such	  as	  public	  pension	  funds	  are	  more	  often	  financed	  via	   social	   security	   contributions,	   according	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   each	   social	   security	  system.	  	  
ii. Their	  size	  and	  growth	  projections	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  2008	  	   SWFs	   demonstrated	   impressive	   growth	   between	   2000	   and	   the	   middle	   of	  2008.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  development	  were	  mainly	  high	  oil	  prices104	  and	  rapid	  growth	  rates	  of	  China	  and	  Russia.105	  The	  same	  reasons	  led	  also	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Law	  decree	  No	  106	  1976	  (n	  87).	  104	  Terry	  Macalister,	  ‘Oil	  Price	  Rises	  Sharply	  After	  Opec	  Meeting	  Collapses	  in	  Disarray’	  The	  
Guardian	  (London,	  8	  June	  2008)	  <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jun/08/oil-­‐price-­‐rises-­‐after-­‐opec-­‐meeting-­‐collapses-­‐in-­‐disarray>	  accessed	  10	  July	  2012.	  105	  For	  China,	  see:	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the	   number	   of	   SWFs	   around	   the	   world,	   beginning	   in	   the	   1990s	   but	   more	  extensively	  during	  the	  2000s.106	  As	  explained	  above,	  the	  question	  of	  size	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  SWFs.	   Size	   estimates	   differ	   according	   to	   the	   funds	   included	   in	   the	   definition.	  Morgan	   Stanley	   author	   Jen,	   who	   accepted	   Rozanov’s	   definition,	   estimated	   the	  total	  value	  of	  SWFs’	  global	  assets	  to	  be	  $1.4	  trillion	  in	  2006107	  and	  $2.3	  trillion	  in	  2007,108	  while	  Kern	  made	  an	  estimate	  of	  3.422	  trillion	  in	  2007109	  and	  of	  3.645	  in	  2008.110	  Based	  on	  Truman’s	  definition111	  SWFs	  totaled	  US$2.97	  trillion	  in	  2008,	  whereas	  based	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  SWF	  Institute,112	  this	  amount	  would	  reach	  $3.78	   trillion	   the	   same	   period.	   Moreover,	   International	   Financial	   Services	  London	  gave	  an	  early-­‐2008	   figure	  of	  $3.3	   trillion.113	  The	   IMF	  avoided	  a	  precise	  figure	   but	   estimated	   the	   size	   of	   SWFs	   in	   2008	   between	   $2.093	   and	   $2.968	  trillion.	  The	  size	  of	  SWFs	  can	  also	  be	  calculated	  with	  relation	  to	  other	  funds,	  such	  as	  hedge	  funds,	  mutual	  funds,	  insurance	  funds	  and	  pension	  funds	  (see	  table	  1.2).	  In	  early	  2007	  according	  to	  Gerald	  Lyons,	  the	  aggregate	  size	  of	  SWFs	  ($2.1	  trillion)	  was	  still	  much	  smaller	   than	   the	  aggregate	  assets	  of	  either	  pension	   funds	   (circa	  $21	   trillion)	  or	  mutual	   funds	   (circa	   $17	   trillion),	   but	   larger	   than	   the	   aggregate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OECD,	  ‘Economic	  Survey	  of	  China’	  (2010)	  OECD	  Economic	  Surveys	  <www.oecd.org/document/43/0,3746,en_2649_33733_44477419_1_1_1_1,00.html>	  accessed	  10	  July	  2012,	  chapter	  1;	  For	  Russia	  see:	  OECD,	  ‘Russian	  Federation’	  (2011)	  OECD	  Economic	  Surveys	  <www.oecd.org/eco/49207915.pdf>	  accessed	  16	  March	  2013,	  table	  1.	  106	  Some	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  SWFs	  were	  created	  between	  2000	  and	  2008	  such	  as,	  Qatar	  Investment	  Authority	  (2000),	  Algeria’s	  Revenue	  Regulation	  Fund	  (2000),	  Mubadala	  Development	  Company	  (2002),	  Korea	  Investment	  Corporation	  (2005),	  Bahrain’s	  Mumtalakat	  Holding	  Company	  (2006),	  Investment	  Corporation	  of	  Dubai	  (2006),	  Emirates	  Investment	  Authority	  (2007),	  China	  Investment	  Corporation	  (2007)	  and	  Russia’s	  National	  Welfare	  Fund	  (2008).	  107	  Jen	  (n	  63).	  108	  Stephen	  Jen	  and	  Charles	  St-­‐Arnaud,	  ‘Currencies:	  Tracking the Tectonic Shift in Foreign 
Reserves and SWFs’	  (2007)	  Morgan	  Stanley	  Global	  Economic	  Forum	  <www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070316-­‐Fri.html>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  109	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  3.	  110	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  3.	  111	  n	  51.	  112	  n	  53.	  113	  IFSL,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  2008’,	  (2008)	  International	  Financial	  Services	  London	  -­‐	  Research	  <www.ifsl.org.uk/output/ReportItem.aspx?NewsID=20>	  accessed	  10	  June	  2009,	  chart	  4	  (registration-­‐based).	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size	  of	  all	  hedge	  funds	  (at	  about	  $1.5	  trillion).114	  In	   January	   2009,	   Teslik	   of	   the	   Council	   on	   Foreign	  Relations	   (CFR)	   gave	   an	  overall	  figure	  of	  $3	  trillion	  for	  SWFs	  which	  surpassed	  the	  $1.5	  trillion	  managed	  by	   hedge	   funds	  worldwide	   but	   ‘were	   dwarfed	   by	   the	   $53	   trillion	  managed	   by	  institutional	  investors	  like	  pension	  funds	  and	  endowments’.115	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   Johnson	  of	   the	  IMF,	  says	  that	   the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  whether	   $3	   trillion	   is	   a	   lot	   of	  money	  depends	   on	   the	  point	   of	   reference.	  As	   he	  affirms,	   USA	   GDP	   is	   $12	   trillion,	   the	   total	   value	   of	   traded	   securities	   (debt	   and	  equity)	   denominated	   in	   USA	   dollars	   is	   estimated	   to	   be	  more	   than	   $50	   trillion,	  and	  the	  global	  value	  of	  traded	  securities	  is	  about	  $165	  trillion.	  In	  that	  context,	  he	  concludes,	  ‘$3	  trillion	  is	  significant	  but	  not	  huge’.116	  This	  can	  also	  be	  ascertained	  from	  the	  figures	  provided	  in	  table	  1.2	  below.	  	  
Table	  1.2:	  Comparison	  of	  SWFs	  to	  other	  investor	  classes	  in	  USD	  tr.	  
	  (Jason	  Kotter	  and	  Ugur	  Lel,	   ‘Friends	  or	  Foes?	  The	  Stock	  Price	  Impact	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Investments	   and	   the	   Price	   of	   Keeping	   Secrets’	   (2008)	   International	   Finance	  Discussion	   Papers	  37)	  	   The	  projected	  growth	  prospects	  of	  SWFs	  were	  equally	   impressive.	   In	  2007	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Gerard	  Lyons,	  ‘State	  Capitalism:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2007)	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Affairs,	  USA	  Senate	  <http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/111407_Lyons.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  11.	  115	  Teslik	  Lee	  Hudson,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2009)	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations	  <www.cfr.org/publication/15251/#5>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013.	  116	  Simon	  Johnson,	  ‘Straight	  Talk:	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2007)	  Volume	  44,	  Number	  3,	  IMF	  -­‐	  Finance	  and	  Development	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	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Jen	  estimated	  that	  SWFs	  would	  grow	  in	  the	  next	  decade	  at	  around	  $40	  billion	  per	  year,117	  concluding	   that	   the	   pool	   of	   assets	   managed	   by	   SWFs	   could	   reach	   $12	  trillion	   by	   2015.118	  In	   the	   same	   year	   Kern	   also	   stated	   that	   SWFs	   assets	   could	  grow	   to	   ‘over	   $5	   trillion	  within	   the	   next	   five	   years	   and	  more	   than	   $10	   trillion	  within	  the	  next	  ten	  years’.119	  It	  becomes,	  therefore,	  clear	  why	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  2008	  many	  commentators	  and	  government	  officials	  were	  becoming	  alarmed	  by	  the	   sudden	   growth	   and	   proliferation	   of	   SWFs.	   If	   those	   projections	   were	   to	  materialise,	  SWFs	  would	  simply	  acquire,	  perhaps,	  significant	  influence	  in	  global	  financial	  and	  political	  affairs.	  Things,	  however,	  took	  a	  different	  turn	  towards	  the	  middle	  of	  2008.	  	  
iii. Their	  size	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  (mid	  2008	  –	  middle	  of	  
2009)	  	  Chapter	  2	  below	  offers	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘crisis’	  and	  its	   effects	   on	   SWFs.	   However,	   since	   this	   section	   only	   purports	   to	   give	   size	  estimates,	  it	  suffices	  for	  now	  to	  establish	  that,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  GFC	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  the	  period	  following	  the	  2nd	  quarter	  of	  2008.	  This	  period	  does	  not	   necessarily	   coincide	   with	   the	   recession	   in	   the	   USA	   and	   other	   parts	   of	   the	  world	   but	   is	   aimed	   to	   target	   the	   time	   when	   SWFs	   were	   most	   affected	   by	   the	  economic	  downturn.	   It	   should	  also	  be	  kept	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   losses	   suffered	  by	  SWFs	   did	   not	   all	  materialise	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   period,	   as	  most	   occurred	  progressively.	  At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   recession	   experienced	   in	   the	   USA	   and	   much	   of	  Europe	  (beginning	  and	  middle	  of	  2008),	  when	  prices	  of	  commodities	  where	  still	  high	   and	  world	   growth	  was	   still	   persisting,	   SWFs	   seemed	   to	   survive	   the	   crisis	  unaffected.120	  With	  the	  deepening	  of	  the	  recession,	  however,	  and	  the	  slowdown	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Stephen	  Jen,	  ‘Russia:	  The	  Newest	  Member	  of	  the	  “SWF	  Club”’	  (2007)	  Morgan	  Stanley	  Research	  Global	  <www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070427-­‐Fri.html#anchoreb80363f-­‐419e-­‐11de-­‐a1b3-­‐c771ef8db296>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  118	  Jen	  (n	  43).	  119	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  1.	  120	  For	  example,	  see	  a	  May	  2008	  Arabian	  Business	  article	  that	  makes	  an	  optimistic	  estimate	  about	  Middle	  East	  SWFs:	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in	  world	  growth,	  demand	  for	  oil	   fell	  which	  led	  to	  a	  sever	  drop	  in	  oil	  prices	  and	  other	  commodities	  (chart	  1.1).	  	  
Chart	  1.1:	  Spot	  oil	  price,	  Brent,	  USD	  (left)	  and	  monthly	  change	  (right)	  
	  (Steffan	  Kern,	  ‘State	  Investments	  During	  the	  Financial	  Crisis’	  (2009)	  Deutschebank	  7)	  	   As	  a	  result,	  economies	  that	  relied	  on	  oil	  sales	  declined121	  and	  some	  of	  them	  even	  recorded	  deficits.122	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  due	  to	  the	  fall	  in	  global	  demand	  and,	  thus,	   world	   trade,123	  export-­‐driven	   economies	   such	   as	   China	   where	   equally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Amy	  Glass	  and	  Dylan	  Bowman,	  ‘Mideast	  Wealth	  Fund	  Assets	  May	  Hit	  $7.5tn	  by	  ’15’,	  Arabian	  
Business,	  26	  May	  2008,	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/property/article/520273-­‐swfs-­‐to-­‐hit-­‐15-­‐trillion-­‐by-­‐2015>	  (accessed	  10	  June	  2009).	  121	  IMF,	  ‘IMF	  Sees	  Spending	  by	  Middle	  Eastern	  Oil	  Exporters	  Softening	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  Impact’	  (2009)	  Press	  Release	  No	  09/28,	  IMF	  <www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0928.htm>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012;	  Glen	  Carey,	  ‘Middle	  East	  Growth	  to	  Fall	  by	  50%	  This	  Year,	  IMF	  Says’	  Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  10	  May	  2009	  <http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=anDK9h5vLFlo>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  122	  Soren	  Billing,	  ‘Kuwait	  Economy	  will	  Contract	  4%	  this	  Year	  –	  NBK’,	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  28	  January	  2009)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/545032-­‐kuwait-­‐economy-­‐will-­‐contract-­‐4-­‐this-­‐year-­‐-­‐-­‐nbk>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  Daliah	  Merzaban,	  ‘Saudi	  and	  UAE	  Will	  Avoid	  Contraction	  –	  analysts’	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  21	  March	  2009)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/550314-­‐saudi-­‐and-­‐uae-­‐will-­‐narrowly-­‐avoid-­‐contraction-­‐-­‐-­‐analysts>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  Nadim	  Kawach,	  ‘Crisis	  Reverses	  Fiscal	  Euphoria	  in	  Gulf	  Nations’	  Emirates	  24/7	  (Dubai,	  27	  September	  2009)	  <http://staging.emirates247.com/2.273/uae-­‐economy/crisis-­‐reverses-­‐fiscal-­‐euphoria-­‐in-­‐gulf-­‐nations-­‐2009-­‐09-­‐27-­‐1.24625>	  19	  December	  2012.	  123	  According	  to	  the	  WTO	  report	  for	  2009,	  world	  trade	  in	  2008	  suffered	  a	  drop	  of	  10%,	  World	  Trade	  Organisation,	  ‘World	  Trade	  Report	  2009	  –	  Trade	  Policy	  Commitments	  and	  Contingency	  Measures’	  (2009)	  WTO,	  <www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report09_e.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  chart	  1.	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harmed.124	  The	   fall	   in	   the	   reserves	   of	   all	   those	   countries	   (see	   chart	   1.2)	   led,	  naturally,	  to	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  size	  of	  their	  SWFs.	  	  
Chart	  1.2:	  Foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  excl.	  gold	  in	  SDR	  tr.	  (left)	  and	  monthly	  change	  
in	  %	  (right)	  
	  (Kern,	  ‘State	  Investments’	  2009,	  7)	  	  As	  expected,	  the	  GFC	  affected	  in	  various	  ways	  both	  the	  investment	  behaviour	  of	   SWFs	   and	   the	   relative	   value	   of	   their	   assets.	   On	   one	   level,	   many	   SWFs	  reportedly	   halted	   all	   foreign	   investments	   and	   focused	   on	   reviving/bailing	   out	  their	   local	  economies.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  part	  of	  their	  retained	  stocks	  and	  other	  assets	   lost	   part	   of	   their	   value.	   Exceptionally	   there	  were	   also	   reported	   cases	   of	  sale	  of	  assets.125	  The	   first	   reports	   predicting	   the	   shrinking	   of	   SWFs	   appeared	   as	   early	   as	  September	   2007	   foreseeing	   lower	   prices	   of	   oil	   affecting	   Gulf	   economies	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  According	  to	  the	  WTO	  2009	  report,	  ‘exports	  of	  Chinese	  manufactured	  goods	  to	  the	  [USA]	  increased	  just	  1	  per	  cent	  over	  the	  previous	  year,	  after	  growth	  of	  14	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  third	  quarter’,	  ibid	  4.	  125	  Of	  the	  most	  known	  cases	  where:	  Chen	  Shiyin	  and	  Miles	  Weiss,	  ‘Singapore’s	  Temasek	  Sells	  Entire	  Stake	  in	  Bank	  of	  America’,	  
Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  14	  May	  2009)	  <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aXLFPg87qG10&refer=home>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013;	  Elaine	  Hardcastle,	  ‘Qatar	  Holdings	  Cuts	  Barclays	  Stake	  to	  5.8	  pc’	  Reuters	  (London,	  22	  April	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLM94046720090422>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	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future	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ‘overheating’	  of	  China’s	  economy.126	  Nearly	  a	  year	  later,	  the	  governor	  of	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  Al-­‐Suweidi	  publicly	  acknowledged	  for	  the	  first	  time	   that	   the	   Gulf	   economies	   are	   not	   immune	   to	   the	   global	   slowdown.127	  By	  November	   2008	   the	   first	   reports	   recording	   severe	   falls	   in	   the	   assets	   of	   SWFs	  surfaced:	   the	   CEO	  of	  Dubai	   International	   Capital	   Al-­‐Ansari,	   announced	   that	   his	  fund’s	  assets	  dropped	  as	  much	  as	  $3	  billion	  due	  to	  the	  GFC	  pushing	  down	  asset	  prices	  world	  wide.128	  As	  the	  recession	  deepened,	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  2009,	  CFR	  analysts	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  announced	  that,	  according	  to	  their	  estimates,	  ADIA	  may	  have	   lost	  $125	  billion	  in	  the	  global	  crush.129	  Soon	  after,	  in	  February,	  sources	  in	  Kuwait	  revealed	  that	   KIA’s	   assets	   fell	   $31	   billion	   in	   nine	   months,	   while	   official	   sources	   in	  Singapore	   announced	   an	   $81	   billion	   fall	   for	   Temasek	   Holdings130	  and	   in	   Abu	  Dhabi	  $3.2	  billion	   losses	  were	  reported	   for	  Mubadala	   in	  2008.131	  There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  SWFs	  were	  feeling	  the	  pinch	  of	  the	  global	  recession.132	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  The	  overheating	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  was	  likely	  to	  occur	  through,	  a	  sharp	  appreciation	  of	  the	  remniby	  (which	  would	  lead	  to	  fewer	  exports),	  or	  a	  rise	  in	  manufacturing	  goods	  prices	  or	  a	  protectionist	  backlash	  (or	  a	  combination	  of	  all	  those	  factors),	  Diana	  Choyleva,	  ‘View	  of	  the	  Day,	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  10	  September	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3cfb20cc-­‐5fd4-­‐11dc-­‐b0fe-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  127	  Sweidi,	  however	  noted	  that	  ‘as	  long	  as	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  did	  not	  drop	  below	  $60	  to	  80$	  per	  barrel,	  the	  UAE	  economy	  would	  be	  in	  good	  shape	  to	  survive	  the	  economic	  uncertainty’	  a	  claim	  that	  was	  later	  proved	  to	  be	  overly	  optimistic.	  Tom	  Arnold,	  ‘Gulf	  Not	  Immune	  to	  Global	  Slowdown’	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  28	  August	  2008)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/529276-­‐uae-­‐cenbank-­‐head-­‐sees-­‐oil-­‐price-­‐falling-­‐sharply>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  128	  Tom	  Arnold,	  ‘DIC	  Assets	  Drop	  as	  Much	  as	  $3bn	  Amid	  Crisis’	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  25	  November	  2008)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/539508-­‐al-­‐ansari-­‐crisis-­‐creating-­‐phenomenal-­‐opportunities-­‐>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  Note	  that	  DIC’s	  assets	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  oil-­‐prices	  as	  Dubai	  is	  not	  a	  petroleum	  exporting	  Emirate.	  129	  Arabian	  Business	  staff,	  ‘Abu	  Dhabi	  SWF	  ‘May	  Have	  Lost	  $125	  Billion’	  in	  Global	  Crash’	  Arabian	  
Business	  (Dubai,	  16	  January	  2009)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/543773-­‐abu-­‐dhabi-­‐swf-­‐may-­‐have-­‐lost-­‐125bn-­‐in-­‐global-­‐crash>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  130	  Voa	  News	  staff,	  ‘Economic	  Crisis	  Hits	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’,	  Voa	  News	  (Washington	  DC,	  10	  February	  2009)	  <www.voanews.com/content/a-­‐13-­‐2009-­‐02-­‐10-­‐voa49-­‐68796972/361319.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  John	  Burton,	  ‘Temasek	  Portfolio	  Falls	  31%’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  11	  February	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/65e2e766-­‐f7a1-­‐11dd-­‐a284-­‐000077b07658.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  131	  Mubadala,	  ‘Mubadala	  Annual	  Report	  2008’	  (2009)	  Mubadala	  19	  <http://mubadala.ae/images/uploads/Annual_Report_2008.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  132	  In	  this	  respect,	  see	  also	  the	  plans	  for	  creating	  a	  Malaysian	  investment	  fund	  that	  was	  finally	  agreed	  to	  be	  set	  up	  using	  borrowed	  money	  and	  not	  existing	  capital:	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According	   to	   an	   early	  2009	   report	  by	  CFR,	  ADIA,	   once	  believed	   to	  manage	  close	   to	   $900	   billion	   worth	   of	   assets,133	  was	   then	   estimated	   to	   manage	   funds	  below	   $300	   billion,	   while	   the	   accuracy	   of	   previous	   estimates	   was	   put	   into	  question.134	  SAMA,	  with	   assets	   totaling	   $500	   billion,	   according	   to	   the	   CFR	  was	  held	   to	   be	   the	   largest	   SWF	   in	   the	   Gulf,	   partly	   due	   to	   its	   more	   conservative	  portfolio	   that	   allowed	   it	   to	   avoid	   severe	   losses	   in	   the	   credit	   crunch. 135	  Concerning	  Gulf	  funds	  specifically,	  CFR	  calculated	  a	  total	  of	  $350	  billion	  of	  losses	  (which	  translates	  into	  a	  27%	  fall	  in	  their	  assets)	  and	  $111	  billion	  of	  losses	  for	  the	  Norwegian	   SWF	   (30%	   fall),	   between	   December	   2007	   and	   December	   2008.136	  Russia's	   Reserve	   Fund	   fell	   $5.8	   billion	   in	   May	   2009	   and	   according	   to	   Russian	  finance	  minister	  Alexei	  Kudrin,	  it	  could	  be	  ‘exhausted	  by	  the	  end	  of	  [2009]’.137	  Overall,	   SWF	   portfolios	   contracted	   18%	   between	   2007	   and	   2009,	   mainly	  because	  of	  a	  45%	  decline	  in	  the	  value	  of	  their	  equity	  portfolios	  (see	  chart	  1.3).138	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	   the	  above,	  SWFs	  could	  not	  be	  seen	  any	  more	  as	   institutions	  with	  very	  deep	  pockets,	  as	  they	  did	  until	  then.	  	  
Chart	  1.3:	  Decline	  of	  SWF	  portfolio	  values	  in	  USD	  tr.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Leslie	  Lopez,	  ‘Unease	  Over	  Wealth	  Funds’	  Malaysia	  Today	  (Kuala	  Lumpur,	  20	  April	  2009)	  <www.malaysia-­‐today.net/archives/20833-­‐unease-­‐over-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  133	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  3.	  134	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  1.	  135	  ibid.	  136	  ibid	  table	  1;	  see	  also,	  John	  Acher,	  ‘Norway	  Wealth	  Fund	  Q1	  Return	  Negative	  4.8pct’,	  Reuters	  (London,	  20	  May	  2009,	  <www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSOSN00219720090520	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  137	  Paul	  Abelsky,	  ‘Russia	  May	  Need	  to	  Borrow	  Abroad	  This	  Year,	  Trust	  Bank	  Says’	  Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  8	  June	  2009)	  <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=apple9cdEiqo#>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  The	  fund	  was	  finally	  not	  entirely	  depleted,	  Alistair	  Barr,	  ‘Market	  Rebound	  Plumps	  Sovereign-­‐Wealth	  Funds’	  Marketwatch	  (New	  York,	  10	  March	  2010)	  <www.marketwatch.com/story/market-­‐rebound-­‐plumps-­‐sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐2010-­‐03-­‐10>	  accessed	  10	  July	  2012.	  138	  Steffen	  Kern,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  –	  State	  Investments	  During	  The	  Financial	  Crisis’	  (2009)	  Deutschebank	  Research	  <www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-­‐PROD/PROD0000000000244283.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  4;	  David	  Oakley	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  Suffer	  Sharp	  Falls’	  Financial	  Times	  (London	  20	  July	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2caa6fb8-­‐7556-­‐11de-­‐9ed5-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	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  (Kern,	  ‘State	  Investments’	  2009,	  8)	  	  Despite	  the	  continuing	  market	  instability,	  assets	  under	  management	  of	  SWFs	  were	  estimated	   to	  have	   increased	  by	  9%	   in	  2011	   to	  around	  $4.8	   trillion,	  while	  another	  $7.2	  trillion	  were	  held	  to	  be	  under	  the	  management	  of	  other	  sovereign	  investment	   vehicles,	   such	   as	   pension	   reserve	   funds	   and	   development	   funds.139	  The	  SWF	  Institute	  made	  an	  estimate	  of	  $5,029	  trillion	  in	  May	  2012.140	  The	  rise	  of	  assets	  under	  management	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  number	  of	  new	  SWFs	  that	  were	  launched	   during	   2011,	   such	   as	   the	   Nigerian	   Sovereign	   Investment	   Authority	  (established	  in	  May	  2011)	  and	  the	  €4bn	  Italian	  Strategic	  Fund	  (launched	  in	  July	  2011).141	  The	   creation	   of	   new	   funds,	   however,	   does	   not	   suffice	   to	   explain	   this	  significant	  rise	  alone.	  Therefore,	  a	  part	  of	   it	   should	  be	  attributed	   to	  a	  return	   in	  global	  business	  activity	  and	  the	  rising	  price	  of	  oil	  in	  2011	  and	  2012.142	  In	  short,	  despite	   their	   dramatic	   fall	   during	   the	   GFC,	   SWFs	   verified	   a	   statement	   made	  during	  the	  worst	  part	  of	   the	  crisis	  by	  Ahmed,	  Director	  of	   the	  IMF's	  Middle	  East	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Marko	  Maslakovic,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2012)	  Financial	  Market	  Series,	  TheCityUK	  <www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/SWF-­‐2012.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  2–3. 140	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘Fund	  Rankings’	  (n	  43);	  The	  disparity	  between	  the	  various	  estimates	  is	  also	  due	  to	  different	  definitions	  given	  to	  SWFs	  as	  discussed	  above.	  141	  Other	  funds	  launched	  in	  2011	  include	  the	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  and	  Mongolia’s	  Fiscal	  Stability	  Fund,	  Maslakovic	  (n	  409)	  3.	  142	  Trading	  NRG,	  ‘Crude	  Oil	  Prices	  Yearly	  Report	  2011-­‐2012’	  (Trading	  NRG,	  January	  2012)	  <www.tradingnrg.com/crude-­‐oil-­‐price-­‐forecast-­‐spot-­‐oil-­‐outlook-­‐for-­‐2012-­‐analysis-­‐for-­‐2011/>	  accessed	  11	  July	  2012.	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and	  Central	  Asia	  Department,	  that	  ‘SWFs	  [had]	  a	  long-­‐term	  role	  to	  play’.143	  	  
iv. Future	  growth	  projections	  	   The	   degree	   to	   which	   SWFs	   will	   retain	   their	   strength	   will	   depend	   on	   a	  multitude	   of	   factors.	   These	   are	   the	   price	   trends	   of	   oil	   and	   other	   commodities;	  growth	   of	   Asian	   and	   other	   developing	   economies;	   international	   exchange	   rate	  policies	   as	   well	   as	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   global	   crisis	   and	   economic	   downturn.	  Regarding	   commodity-­‐based	  SWFs,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  make	  projections	  based	  on	  future	  oil	  prices.	  A	  2009	  CFR	  study,	  for	  example,	  evaluated	  a	  number	  of	  different	  scenarios	  for	  SWFs	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  estimated	  average	  oil	  prices	  for	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  It	  was	  reported	  that	  even	  if	  oil	  stabilises	  at	  $75	  a	  barrel	  until	  2014,	  the	  pace	   of	   foreign	   asset	   accumulation	   in	   the	   Gulf	   would	   slow	   substantially.144	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  ‘if	  oil	  averages	  $100	  or	  more	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years,	  the	  GCC’s	  assets	  will	  resume	  their	  rapid	  expansion	  and	  expand	  to	  $2.2trn	  by	  2012’.145	  Based	  on	  the	  data	  available	  for	  2012,	  this	  scenario	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  significantly	  surpassed.146	  	  
Chart	  1.4:	  Estimated	  stock	  of	  GCC	  foreign	  assets	  depending	  on	  oil	  prices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  Karen	  Remo-­‐Listana,	  ‘Regional	  SWFs’	  Global	  Role	  to	  Continue’	  Business	  24/7	  (Dubai,	  13	  May	  2009)	  <www.emirates247.com/eb247/economy/uae-­‐economy/regional-­‐swfs-­‐global-­‐role-­‐to-­‐continue-­‐2009-­‐05-­‐13-­‐1.32604>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  144	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  13.	  145	  ibid	  18.	  146	  TheCityUK	  projections	  made	  in	  February	  2012,	  for	  example,	  are	  for	  SWFs’	  assets	  to	  increase	  to	  around	  $5.2	  trillion	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2012,	  Maslakovic	  (n	  139)	  3. 
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  (Brad	  Setser	  and	  Rachel	  Ziemba,	   ‘GCC	  SWFs	  –	  Reversals	  of	  Fortune’	   (2009)	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations	  18)	  	   According	  to	  estimates	  made	  in	  2012	  by	  Castelli	  and	  Scacciavillani,	  by	  2016	  the	   assets	   managed	   by	   SWFs	   will	   be	   between	   USD	   8.6	   trillion	   and	   USD	   10.8	  trillion	  (reflecting	   three	  different	  return	  scenarios).147	  The	  growth	   in	   the	  assets	  managed	   by	   SWFs	   is	   determined	   by	   three	   factors:	   the	   return	   on	   the	   wealth	  accumulated,	   the	   fiscal	   policy	   framework	   adopted	   by	   the	   countries	   concerned	  and	  the	  new	  funds	  transferred	   from	  the	  current	  account	  surpluses.148	  Deutsche	  Bank’s	  analysts,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  shaved	  estimates	  for	  SWF	  growth	  to	  $7	  trillion	  by	  2019	  compared	  with	  forecasts	  of	  $10	  trillion	  by	  2016	  in	  a	  survey	  two	  years	  before.149	  	  
Chart	  1.5:	  SWF	  asset	  growth,	  based	  on	  past	  foreign	  exchange	  reserve	  growth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Massimiliano	  Castelli	  and	  Fabio	  Scacciavillani,	  The	  New	  Economics	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds,	  Wiley	  Finance,	  2012,	  67–74.	  148	  Their	  estimates	  are	  made	  at	  country	  level	  and	  one	  important	  observation	  concerns	  the	  increasing	  concentration	  of	  the	  assets	  managed	  by	  SWFs	  in	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  countries:	  Norway,	  UAE,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (which	  does	  not	  formally	  have	  a	  SWF),	  China,	  Kuwait,	  Qatar,	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore	  will	  account	  for	  85	  per	  of	  the	  total.	  ibid.	  149	  Kern	  (n	  138)	  10.	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  (Kern,	  ‘State	  Investments’	  2009,	  10)	  	  	  
2. Transparency	  	  Transparency,	  or	  the	  lack	  of	  it,	   for	  the	  past	  few	  years	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  cause	   of	   debate	   around	   SWFs.	   The	   issues	   arising	   from	   the	   opacity	   of	   SWFs	   is	  discussed	   in	   chapter	   3.	   This	   section	   examines	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘opacity’,	   while	  chapter	  3	  analyses	  in	  what	  circumstances	  this	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  concern.	  	  
i. Most	  SWFs	  typically	  reveal	  little	  if	  any	  information	  	   Lack	   of	   transparency	   is	   a	   relatively	   straightforward	  matter.	   As	   opposed	   to	  the	  majority	  of	   large	  market	   investors	  (such	  as	  commercial	  banks,	  pension	  and	  mutual	  funds),	  most	  SWFs	  do	  not	  issue	  public	  reports	  on	  their	  size	  and	  holdings,	  management	   personnel	   and	   management	   structures.	   In	   addition,	   SWFs	   rarely	  reveal	   their	  business	  plans	  or	   future	   intentions.	  More	   importantly,	  very	   little	   is	  known	   about	   how	  much	   governments	   intervene	   in	   the	   SWFs’	   decisions	   or	   the	  distinction	   between	   the	   rulers’	   private	   wealth	   and	   the	   funds	   held	   by	   each	  investment	  fund.150	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  See,	  for	  example	  Law	  No	  47	  of	  1972	  in	  Kuwait	  ‘Prohibiting	  and	  providing	  penalties	  for	  the	  disclosure	  of	  information’	  on	  the	  KIA,	  see:	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SWFs	  adapt	  their	  transparency	  levels	  based	  on	  the	  legal	  requirements	  of	  the	  jurisdictions	  where	  they	  invest	  in.	  Certain	  jurisdictions,	  for	  example,	  require	  the	  disclosure	  above	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  ownership	  and	  before	  a	  takeover.	  These	  rules	  are	  usually	  designed	  to	  allow	  shareholders	  to	  better	  observe	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  company	  and	  to	  make	  informed	  decisions	  critical	  to	  corporate	  events	  such	  as	  takeovers.	  The	  USA	  is	  a	  prime	  example,	  where	  the	  Securities	  Exchange	  Act	  of	  1968151	  requires	   disclosure	   of	   important	   information	   by	   anyone	   seeking	   to	  acquire	  more	   than	   5%	   of	   a	   company’s	   securities	   by	   direct	   purchase	   or	   tender	  offer.152	  Such	   an	   offer	   often	   is	   extended	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   gain	   control	   of	   the	  company.	  In	  addition,	  in	  the	  USA,	  the	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC),	  requires	   any	   institutional	   investors	   holding	   over	   $100	   million	   in	   USA-­‐listed	  securities	  to	  submit	  some	  sort	  of	  13F	  filing	  which	  later	  becomes	  public.153	  To	   this	   day	   there	   is	   no	   comprehensive	   list	   of	   what	   SWFs	   own,	   nor	   any	  mandatory	   reporting	   of	   their	   investment	   policies. 154 	  For	   this	   reason	   the	  California-­‐based	   ‘SWF	   Institute’	   established	   a	   ranking	   of	   SWFs’	   transparency	  level	   named	   the	   ‘Linaburg-­‐Maudell	   Transparency	   Index’	   (see	   below	   table	   1.3).	  This	  model	  uses	  a	  variety	  of	   criteria,	   such	  as	   the	  publication	  of	  audited	  annual	  reports,	  the	  application	  of	  ethical	  standards	  and	  the	  fund’s	  investment	  policies	  to	  rank	  a	  fund’s	  transparency	  from	  1	  to	  10.155	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Kuwait	  Investment	  Authority,	  ‘Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  of	  Information’	  (KIA,	  2008)	  <www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Tansparency/Pages/default.aspx>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  151	  15	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  78a	  et	  seq.	  152	  s	  13(d).	  This	  information	  must	  be	  filled	  in	  what	  is	  known	  a	  Schedule	  13D	  form.	  153	  Form	  13F—Reports	  Filed	  by	  Institutional	  Investment	  Managers	  (SEC)	  <www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012;	  In	  early	  2010,	  CIC	  was	  forced	  by	  the	  USA	  securities	  regulator	  to	  submit	  a	  similar	  filing	  which	  revealed	  a	  number	  of	  the	  fund’s	  strategic	  holdings,	  such	  as	  investments	  in	  American	  International	  Group,	  Apple	  and	  Citigroup,	  see:	  Rick	  Carew,	  ‘What	  CIC	  Disclosures	  Say	  About	  Its	  Strategy’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  9	  February	  2010)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704182004575054903625520956.html?mod=WSJ_Markets_LEFTTopNews>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  154	  As	  the	  situation	  continues	  since	  SWFs	  were	  first	  on	  the	  spotlight,	  Knowledge@Wharton,	  ‘A	  Closer	  Look	  at	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Secretive,	  Powerful,	  Unregulated	  and	  Huge’	  (2007)	  Wharton	  School	  -­‐	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1868>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013,	  2.	  155	  Each	  principle	  adds	  one	  point	  to	  the	  index,	  see,	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘Linaburg-­‐Maudell	  Transparency	  Index’,	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2008-­‐2012)	  <www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-­‐research/linaburg-­‐maduell-­‐transparency-­‐index/>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	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Today	  it	  is	  being	  agreed	  by	  nearly	  the	  entire	  literature	  on	  the	  subject	  that	  the	  opacity	  of	   SWFs	   is	   a	  negative	  phenomenon	  and	  must	  be	   corrected.156	  Although	  transparency	   and	   openness	   are,	   today,	   long	   established	   principles157	  and	   are	  applied	   today	   by	   the	   most	   part	   of	   market	   investors, 158 	  SWFs’	   lack	   of	  transparency	   allows	   them	   to	   invest	   without	   supervision	   and	   accountability	   (a	  more	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   the	   place	   and	   role	   of	   transparency	   in	   the	   debate	  about	   regulating	   SWFs	   takes	  place	   below	   in	   chapter	   4).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	  recognised	   that	   SWFs	   are	   not	   the	   only	   type	   of	   opaque	   investors.	   Other	  investment	  entities,	  such	  as	  hedge	  funds,	  did	  not	  abide	  by	  the	  generally	  accepted	  standards	  of	  transparency	  for	  a	  long	  period.	  Although	  smaller	  in	  size	  than	  SWFs	  and	  privately	  owned,	  there	  is	  no	  rationale	  why	  hedge	  funds	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  operate	   in	   obscurity	   while	   SWFs	   make	   the	   target	   of	   constant	   calls	   for	   more	  transparency.159	  SWFs	  often	  argue	  that	  maintaining	  secrecy	  is	  a	  way	  of	  protecting	  themselves	  and	   their	   investments	   from	   undue	   scrutiny	   and	   a	   way	   to	   engage	   in	   better	  competition	  with	  hedge	  funds.160	  In	  short,	  SWFs	  present	  an	  efficiency	  argument.	  The	   rationale	   for	   this	   is	   that	   glass-­‐like	   transparency	   could	   potentially	   prevent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  For	  a	  representative	  piece	  of	  literature	  see,	  Truman	  (n	  65);	  However,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	  SWF	  ‘lack	  of	  transparency	  cannot	  itself	  be	  the	  problem,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  greater	  transparency	  cannot	  itself	  be	  the	  solution’	  see,	  Ronald	  Gilson	  and	  Curtis	  Milhaupt,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Corporate	  Governance:	  a	  Minimalist	  Response	  to	  the	  New	  Merchantilism’	  (2008)	  Vol	  60(5)	  StanLRev	  <www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐and-­‐corporate-­‐governance-­‐minimalist-­‐solution-­‐new-­‐mercantilism>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  1361.	  157	  In	  this	  regard	  see,	  OECD	  Code	  of	  Liberalisation	  of	  Capital	  Movements,	  adopted	  in	  1961;	  OECD	  Declaration	  on	  International	  Investment	  and	  Multinational	  Enterprises	  issued	  in	  1976	  and	  revised	  in	  2000.	  158	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  deal	  with	  the	  merits	  of	  using	  transparency	  as	  a	  regulatory	  technique	  for	  the	  wider	  financial	  sector.	  For	  more	  information,	  however,	  on	  this	  subject	  see	  Avgouleas,	  who	  argues	  that	  using	  disclosure	  as	  a	  regulatory	  technique	  contains	  difficulties,	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  certainty	  that	  disclosed	  information	  will	  be	  used	  rationally	  by	  potential	  market	  participants	  so	  as	  to	  render	  market	  more	  efficient	  and	  decrease	  inherent	  market	  flaws.	  His	  argument	  is	  that	  greater	  disclosure	  requirements	  can	  be	  a	  strong	  supervisory	  tool	  only	  if	  it	  is	  used	  to	  supplement	  the	  impact	  of	  protective	  rules,	  Emilios	  Avgouleas,	  'What	  Future	  for	  Disclosure	  as	  a	  Regulatory	  Technique?:	  Lessons	  from	  Behavioural	  Decision	  Theory	  and	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis'	  in	  Iain	  MacNeil	  and	  Justin	  O’Brien	  (eds)	  The	  Future	  of	  Financial	  Regulation	  (Hart,	  2010)	  211-­‐31.	  159	  This	  issue	  is	  further	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  n	  286	  onwards.	  160	  ‘SWFs	  need	  to	  preserve	  their	  competitive	  advantage	  against	  an	  array	  of	  competitors	  that	  include	  hedge	  funds	  and	  others	  who	  face	  less	  pressure	  for	  disclosure.	  Therefore,	  SWFs	  need	  to	  find	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  reassuring	  stakeholders	  of	  their	  purely	  financially	  motivated	  objectives	  and	  not	  being	  front-­‐run	  by	  competitors’,	  Unnamed	  SWF	  officer	  (n	  74).	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funds	   from	   taking	   greater	   risks	   and	   accumulate	   greater	   returns,161	  or	   allow	  others	  to	  free	  ride	  on	  the	  investment	  strategies	  that	  they	  have	  adopted.162	  It	  has	  also	  been	  argued,	  however,	  that	  lack	  of	  transparency	  puts	  heavy	  demands	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  fund	  administration.	  Even	  where	  fund	  administration	  is	  solid,	  greater	  transparency	   would	   enhance	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	   fund	   serves	   its	   intended	  purposes	  and	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  of	  future	  governance	  problems.163	  The	   experience	   of	   large	   corporations	   in	   the	   industrialised	   world	  demonstrates	  that	  potential	  for	  error	  and	  abuse	  exists	  even	  in	  apparently	  highly	  rated	  and	  well-­‐managed	  organisations.	  In	  general	  terms,	  transparency	  facilitates	  the	  maintenance	  of	  openness	  to	  investment.	  As	  said	  by	  Lowery,	  ‘what	  may	  have	  been	  tenable	  in	  a	  world	  where	  SWFs	  manage	  only	  several	  hundred	  billion	  dollars	  may	  not	  be	  tenable	  in	  a	  world	  where	  [they]	  manage	  several	  trillion	  dollars’.164	  	  
Table	  1.3:	  2nd	  Quarter	  2009	  Linaburg	  Maduell	  Transparency	  Index	  rating	  1	  -­‐	  10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  William	  Miracky	  and	  Bernardo	  Bortolotti	  (eds),	  ‘Weathering	  the	  Storm:	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  in	  the	  Global	  Economic	  Crisis	  of	  2008’	  (2009)	  SWF	  Annual	  Report	  2008,	  Monitor	  Group	  <www.monitor.com/Expertise/BusinessIssues/EconomicDevelopmentandSecurity/tabid/69/ctl/ArticleDetail/mid/705/CID/20092005123158795/CTID/1/L/en-­‐US/Default.aspx>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  37.	  162	  Richard	  Epstein	  and	  Amanda	  Rose,	  ‘The	  Regulation	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  The	  Virtues	  of	  Going	  Slow’	  (2009)	  Vol	  76(1)	  UChiLRev	  128.	  163	  Lowery	  (n	  58);	  See	  above,	  n	  97,	  where	  the	  argument	  was	  made	  by	  Malan	  and	  Pringle,	  that	  creating	  a	  SWFs	  may	  be	  for	  the	  very	  reason	  of	  enhancing	  transparency.	  164	  ibid.	  
Definition	  and	  Characteristics	  of	  SWFs	  
	   50	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2009)165	  	  
ii. Democracy	  and	  accountability	  
	   There	  can	  be	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  level	  of	  transparency	  of	  a	  SWF	  depends,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  on	  the	  political	  system	  of	  the	  fund’s	  home	  country.	  As	  seen	  from	  table	  1.3,	  while	  funds	  in	  democratic	  countries	  such	  as	  Norway,	  Canada,	  Australia	  and	   the	  USA,	  are	  very	   transparent	  and	  accountable,	   those	   run	  by	  authoritarian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  n	  43;	  For	  a	  better	  view	  of	  the	  progress	  made	  by	  SWFs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transparency	  see,	  Truman	  (n	  82)	  tables	  3-­‐4	  and	  the	  SWF	  Institute	  website	  (n	  43).	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regimes	  such	  as	  the	  UAE,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  Qatar	  are	  not.	  Norway,	   for	   example,	   publishes	  monthly	   return	   figures	   for	   its	  Government	  Pension	   Fund	   and	   reveals	   its	   holdings	   on	   a	   quarterly	   basis.	   Its	   managers	   are	  directly	   accountable	   to	   Norway’s	   legislature,	   and	   therefore,	   the	   Norwegian	  people. 166 	  In	   a	   speech,	   the	   former	   finance	   Minister	   of	   Norway,	   Halvorsen	  explained	   the	   conditions	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   adoption	  of	   such	  high	   level	   of	  transparency	   by	   the	   Norwegian	   fund:	   ‘the	   high	   level	   of	   openness	   in	   the	  management	   of	   our	   sovereign	   wealth	   is	   not	   the	   result	   of	   pressure	   from	   the	  international	  community.	   Instead,	   it	   is	  a	  prerequisite	  of	  the	  fund’s	  existence’.167	  More	   specifically,	   according	   to	   Halvorsen,	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   transparency	   is	  ‘essential	   to	   be	   able	   to	   build	   and	   maintain	   support	   for	   the	   government’s	  management	   of	   the	   petroleum	   wealth’,	   which	   entails	   running	   large	   budget	  surpluses	  and	  building	  up	  substantial	  and	  very	  visible	  financial	  assets	  in	  order	  to	  meet	   large	   unfunded	   pension	   liabilities	   in	   years	   to	   come.168	  The	   Norwegian	  Minister	  emphasised	   in	  her	   speech	   that	   it	  would	  simply	  be	   ‘impossible’	   for	   the	  Norwegian	  government	  to	  put	  aside	  the	  equivalent	  of	  15%	  of	  GDP	  per	  year	  in	  a	  fund	   that	   is	   now	   100%	   of	   GDP	   and	   growing,	  without	   giving	   an	   account	   of	   the	  rationale	  for	  building	  up	  such	  substantial	  financial	  assets,	  and	  also	  providing	  the	  public	  with	  information	  on	  the	  management	  of	  that	  wealth.169	  The	  ADIA,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  one	  among	  the	  most	  secretive	  funds	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  its	  operations,	  and	  has	  never	  publicly	  announced	  fits	  size,	  holdings,	  or	  even	  the	  names	  of	  its	  top	  managers.	  As	  argued	  by	  Balin,	  ‘because	  [ADIA]	  is	  only	  accountable	   to	   the	   unelected	   Sheikh	   of	   Abu	  Dhabi,	   it	   has	   significant	   leeway	   in	  both	   its	   investments	  and	   its	   transparency’.170	  Balin	  concludes	  that,	   ‘viewing	  the	  list	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  SWFs—where	  approximately	  65%	  are	  undemocratic—it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  SWFs,	  on	  average,	  are	  highly	  opaque	  and	  have	  both	  loose	  oversight	  and	  lax	  domestic	  regulatory	  structures’.	  The	  same	  is	  also	  true	  of	  China,	  another	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  n	  264.	  167	  Kristin	  Halvorsen,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  OECD	  Forum	  2008	  -­‐	  Climate	  change,	  Growth,	  Stability,	  Norway’s	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  <www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/News/Speeches-­‐and-­‐articles/minister-­‐2/finansminister_kristin_halvorsen/2008/sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds.html?id=515179>	  accessed	  4	  May	  2013.	  168	  ibid.	  169	  ibid.	  170	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  8.	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example	  of	  an	  undemocratic	  country.	  As	  stated	  by	  Sasso,	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  Chinese	  corporate	  governance	  and	  the	  strong	  government	   influence	  on	  most	  Chinese	   investment	   vehicles	   ‘have	   already	   generated	   a	   reluctance	   in	   western	  countries,	  particularly	  the	  USA,	  to	  open	  up	  some	  of	  their	  markets’.171	  Judging	  from	  table	  1.3	  with	  the	  transparency	  scores,	  it	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  democratic	  states	  rate	  better	  than	  non-­‐democratic	  ones.172	  This	  fact	  easily	  leads	  to	   the	  conclusion	  that	   transparency	   for	  SWFs	   is	  a	  matter	  strongly	   linked	  to	   the	  political	  circumstances	  of	  each	  country.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  level	  of	  a	  SWF’s	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  is	  often	  determined	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  those	  principles	  also	  reflect	  a	  country’s	  political	  structure.	  	  
iii. There	  is	  a	  clear	  trend	  towards	  openness	  	   Regardless	  of	  their	  degree	  of	  openness,	  most	  SWFs	  admit	  that	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  are	  good	  governance	  principles	  and	  are	  eager	  to	  make	  proof	  of	   their	   commitment	   to	   them.	   In	   this	   context,	   many	   SWFs	   publicise	   their	  progress	  in	  moving	  towards	  greater	  transparency	  or	  demonstrate	  a	  willingness	  to	  do	  so.	  Overall,	   it	  can	  be	  said	   that	   there	   is	  a	  noticeable	   trend	  among	  SWFs	  to	  increase	  their	  transparency	  and	  abide	  by	  higher	  reporting	  standards.	  A	  major	  step	  in	  this	  direction	  was	  made	  when,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  February	  2008,	  the	   largest	  SWF	   in	   the	  world,	  ADIA,	   sent	  a	   letter	   to	  regulators	   in	  key	  countries	  specifying	   what	   its	   investment	   policies	   are	   and	   promising	   greater	   disclosure.	  Moreover,	   in	   March	   2008,	   representatives	   from	   the	   USA,	   Abu	   Dhabi,	   and	  Singapore	   met	   and	   agreed	   to	   adopt	   rules	   for	   SWF	   governance	   that	   included	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  As	  the	  author	  says	  about	  China’s	  State	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Investment	  Company	  (SFEIC),	  ‘relevant	  legislation	  needs	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  and	  a	  stricter	  management	  regime	  established	  to	  govern	  the	  fund.	  Considering	  the	  reserve	  fund’s	  enormous	  scale,	  China	  will	  have	  to	  clarify	  the	  fund’s	  different	  functions	  further	  and	  establish	  a	  rational	  fund	  allocation	  regime	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  system	  of	  transparent	  information	  disclosure	  in	  order	  to	  raise	  investment	  returns’.	  Lorenzo	  Sasso	  ‘New	  Trends	  in	  China's	  Foreign	  Investment	  Strategy’	  (2007)	  Vol	  47(3)	  Int'l	  Spectator	  399	  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932720701567604>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  172	  On	  this	  note,	  a	  graphic	  design	  by	  the	  CFR	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  SWF	  transparencies	  and	  their	  home	  countries	  form	  of	  government	  is	  available	  at,	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Transparency’	  (CFR	  -­‐	  Centre	  for	  Geoeconomic	  Studies,	  September	  2008)	  <blogs.cfr.org/geographics/2008/09/15/sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐and-­‐transparency/>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	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greater	   disclosure	   and	   transparency.173	  This	   was	   held	   to	   be	   a	  move	   similar	   to	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties,	  which	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  facilitated	  a	  reduction	  in	  trade	  barriers.174	  In	  2007,	  the	  Kuwaiti	  government	  repealed	  a	  law	  barring	  its	  SWF,	  KIA,	  from	  revealing	   its	   assets	   and	   the	   fund	   publicised	   its	   size	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   thirty	  years;	   its	   figure	   of	   $234	   billion	   was	   only	   half	   the	   size	   of	   most	   analysts’	  projections.175	  In	  January	  2009,	  the	  Libyan	  Investment	  Authority	  announced	  that	  it	   would	   start	   disclosing	   the	   details	   about	   its	   investment	   strategy	   to	   allay	  concerns	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  Europe	  about	  its	  intentions.176	  In	   Singapore,	   Temasek	   Holdings	   publishes	   an	   annual	   report	   containing	  details	  of	  its	  investments	  and	  its	  corporate	  governance	  structure	  is	  known.177	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  another	  Singaporean	   fund,	   the	  GIC	  Singapore,	  does	  not	  publish	  any	   information	   on	   its	   holdings.	   Amid	  mounting	   concerns	   about	   the	   secretive	  fund’s	  influence	  after	  high	  profile	  investments	  in	  UBS	  and	  Citigroup,	  in	  2008	  GIC	  promised	   greater	   disclosure	   about	   its	   activities.178 	  Nevertheless,	   the	   former	  deputy	   chairman	  of	  GIC,	  Tan,	  would	  not	  be	  drawn	  on	  what	   areas	  of	  disclosure	  GIC	   would	   move,	   arguing	   that	   this	   was	   a	   decision	   for	   the	   Singaporean	  government.	  For	   the	   time	  being,	  GIC	  has	   still	   to	   improve	   its	   transparency	   level	  and	  lags	  considerably	  behind	  Temasek.179	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173 WSJ	  Staff,	  ‘Code	  Set	  for	  State-­‐Run	  Funds	  Guidelines	  Address	  Fears	  Over	  Motives	  Behind	  Investments’,	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  21	  March	  2008)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120604168933252597.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  174	  Nancy	  Brune,	  ‘SWFs:	  Passive	  Investors	  or	  National	  Security	  threat?’	  in	  Al	  Mehaiza	  Myrna	  (ed),	  
The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Growth	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  (Arab	  Financial	  Forum,	  2009)	  86;	  It	  should,	  however,	  be	  mentioned	  that	  soon	  after	  this	  meeting,	  Temasek	  Holdings	  reported	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  SWF	  and	  as	  such	  it	  was	  not	  bound	  by	  any	  agreements.	  Temasek	  made	  this	  claim	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  does	  not	  receive	  additional	  funding	  from	  the	  government	  and	  does	  not	  require	  government	  approval	  to	  sell	  assets.	  Former	  US	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paulson	  replied	  that	  Temasek	  already	  provided	  more	  information	  that	  government-­‐run	  funds	  and	  implied	  that	  it	  was	  the	  GIC	  (second	  largest	  Singaporean	  fund)	  that	  needed	  to	  make	  more	  disclosures,	  Straits	  Times	  Staff,	  ‘Temasek	  Says	  it	  is	  Not’	  (n	  45).	  175	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  8.	  176	  Brune	  (n	  174)	  75.	  177	  Ananya	  Roy,	  ‘Temasek	  Gets	  Perfect	  10	  in	  Transparency’	  Asiaone	  Business	  (Singapore,	  9	  May	  2009)	  <www.asiaone.com/Business/News/Story/A1Story20090309-­‐127193.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  178	  Peter	  Tahl	  Larsen	  and	  Martin	  Dickson,	  ‘Singapore	  Fund	  Pledges	  Greater	  Transparency’	  
Financial	  Times	  (London,	  27	  January	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6d3187a-­‐cd40-­‐11dc-­‐9b2b-­‐000077b07658.html>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  179	  GIC’s	  transparency	  score	  in	  the	  SWF	  Institute	  website	  between	  2008	  and	  2009	  remained	  at	  6/10,	  while	  Temasek	  received	  a	  clear	  10/10,	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In	  March	  2009,	  as	  many	  as	  eleven	  SWFs	  of	   the	  oil-­‐rich	  Gulf	   improved	  their	  transparency	  scores	  on	  the	  Linaburg-­‐Maudell	  Transparency	  Index180	  (displayed	  at	  table	  1.3).	  A	  number	  of	  SWFs	  made	  considerable	  improvements,	  such	  as	  QIA,	  which	  increased	  its	  transparency	  score	  from	  one	  to	  five	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  (and	  moved	   up	   in	   rank	   from	   35	   to	   23).	   According	   to	   the	   same	   study,	   Mumtalakat	  Bahrain	  and	  Mubadala	  Development	  Company	  were	  voted	  the	  most	  transparent	  SWFs	  in	  the	  Gulf	  with	  a	  rating	  of	  7	  out	  of	  10,181	  being	  two	  of	  only	  15	  funds	  in	  that	  part	  of	  the	  world	  that	  achieved	  a	  score	  between	  7	  and	  10.	  Despite	   these	   improvements,	   transparency	   remains	   an	   important	   issue	   for	  SWFs	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  concerns	  relating	  to	  their	  opacity	  will	  not	  dissipate	  in	  the	  near	   future.182	  Although	   certain	   funds	   in	   the	   study	   improved	   their	   positions	  considerably,	  the	  progress	  made	  by	  some	  others	  was	  small,	  nearly	  insignificant.	  One	  of	  those	  cases	  is	  the	  Emirates	  Investment	  Authority,	  which	  moved	  up	  from	  a	  score	   of	   one	   to	   two	   to	   be	   ranked	   33rd	   among	   the	   45	   SWFs	   identified	   by	   the	  institute.183	  Furthermore,	  the	  scores	  of	  a	  number	  of	  high	  profile	  funds,	  such	  as	  the	  KIA,	  RAK	   Investment	   Authority	   and	   Saudi	   Arabian	   PIF	   remained	   unchanged	   in	   the	  year	  of	  the	  study	  (2007-­‐2008).	  The	  head	  of	  China	  Investment	  Corporation	  (CIC),	  Xiqing,	   has	   raised	   the	   issue	   of	   transparency	   in	   the	   past	   but	   hinted	   that	   it	   is	   a	  process	  that	  might	  take	  considerable	  time.	  As	  he	  said,	  ‘our	  government	  has	  never	  been	  transparent	  for	  5,000	  years,	  now	  we	  are	  told	  we	  need	  to	  be	  transparent	  and	  we	  are	  trying’.184	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘Fund	  Rankings’	  (n	  43).	  180	  n	  43,	  155.	  181	  Andy	  Sambidge,	  ‘Bahrain	  Company	  Wins	  Transparency	  Rating	  Boost’,	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  11	  March	  2012)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/549259-­‐bahrain-­‐company-­‐wins-­‐transparency-­‐rating-­‐boost>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  Yazad	  Darasha,	  ‘Gulf	  SWFs	  Openness	  Scores	  Increase’	  Zawya	  News	  (Dubai	  11	  March	  2009)	  <www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20090311031054/Gulf%20SWFs%20openness%20scores%20increase>	  accessed	  10	  June	  2009.	  182	  See	  a	  report	  by	  Oxford	  Analytica	  of	  September	  2007	  that	  comes	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion:	  Oxford	  Analytica,	  ‘INTERNATIONAL:	  SWFs	  Are	  Likely	  to	  Remain	  Opaque’	  Oxford	  Analytica	  (Oxford,	  29	  September	  2008)	  <www.alacrastore.com/storecontent/oxford/DB145840>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  183	  n	  43,	  155.	  184	  John	  Thornhill,	  ‘Chinese	  Fund	  Tries	  to	  Calm	  West’s	  Fears’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  3	  June	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/50946dc8-­‐3198-­‐11dd-­‐b77c-­‐0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012; 
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Judging	  from	  previous	  trends	  it	   is	  virtually	  certain	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  funds	  will	   continue	   in	   the	   future.185	  Given	   that	  most	   SWFs	   at	   the	  outset	  where	  considerably	  more	  opaque	  than	  today,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  newly	  created	  funds	   in	   the	   future	   will	   abide	   by	   transparency	   standards	   from	   the	   beginning.	  Presently,	   there	  are	  many	  countries	   contemplating	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	  SWF	  (including	  EU	  countries),	  while	  there	  are	  others	  that	  may	  be	  setting	  up	  smaller	  funds,	  additional	  to	  the	  ones	  they	  already	  operate.186	  In	   all,	   lack	   of	   transparency	   is	   today	   almost	   a	   synonym	   for	   SWFs	   and,	  although	   international	   pressure	   has	   forced	   some	   of	   them	   to	   make	   substantial	  progress,	   the	   overall	   image	   of	   SWFs	   remains	   rather	   obscure.	   Whether	   they	  originate	   from	   democratic	   or	   authoritarian	   regimes,	   SWFs	   are	   controlled	   by	  sovereign	  nations,	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  compel	  those	  nations	  to	  disclose	  information	  about	  their	  financial	  dealings.	  As	  a	  result,	  unless	  action	  is	  taken	  at	  an	  international	   level,	   opacity	   will	   always	   be	   associated	   with	   SWFs.	   This	   issue	   is	  reverted	   to	   at	   chapter	   3	   below	   whilst	   analysing	   issues	   of	   concern	   caused	   by	  SWFs’	  operations.	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  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘China	  CIC	  official	  says	  must	  boost	  transparency’	  Reuters	  (London,	  13	  March	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/privateEquityFinancialServicesAndRealEstate/idUSPEK16101020090313>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  185	  Japan,	  Taiwan,	  Thailand,	  Bolivia,	  Nigeria,	  Scotland,	  UK	  and	  Canada	  have	  initiated	  a	  debate	  to	  set	  up	  similar	  funds;	  For	  Thailand	  specifically,	  Stacy-­‐Marie	  Ishmael,	  ‘A	  Thai	  SWF?	  More	  if	  than	  when’	  (FT	  Alphaville,	  February	  2010)	  <http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/02/03/140026/a-­‐thai-­‐swf-­‐more-­‐if-­‐than-­‐when/>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  About	  Nigeria,	  see	  a	  presentation	  of	  its	  newly	  created	  SWF,	  SWF	  Institute,	  ‘Nigerian	  Soveregin	  Investment	  Authority’	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2012)	  <www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/excess-­‐crude-­‐account/>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  About	  India,	  Deepshikha	  Sikarwar	  &	  Dheeraj	  Tiwari,	  ‘India	  may	  get	  own	  version	  of	  sovereign	  wealth	  fund’	  Economic	  Times	  (New	  Delhi,	  24	  April	  2012)	  <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-­‐04-­‐24/news/31392796_1_sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐fund-­‐swf-­‐disinvestment-­‐proceeds>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012;	  and	  regarding	  Brazil	  see	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  and	  Business	  Affairs,	  ‘2012	  Investment	  Climate	  Statement	  -­‐	  Brazil’	  (USA	  Department	  of	  State,	  June	  2012)	  <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191115.htm>	  accessed	  19	  December	  2012.	  186	  For	  a	  list	  by	  Oxford	  Analytica	  of	  SWFs	  planned	  to	  be	  created	  in	  2009	  see,	  Oxford	  Analytica,	  ‘Wealth	  Funds	  Remain	  Popular’	  (2009)	  Oxford	  Analytica,	  Research	  Cap,	  <www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB151151>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	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   This	  first	  chapter	  touched	  upon	  the	  definition	  and	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  SWFs.	   It	  was	  established	   that	   there	   is	  no	  common	  definition	   for	  SWFs	  but	   that	  there	   are	   definitions	   provided	   by	   commentators	   and	   international	   regulatory	  bodies	   that	   can	   be	   widely	   used.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   accepted	  definition	   is	   the	   one	   provided	   by	   the	   EU	   Commission,	   as	   the	   main	   analysis	   is	  mainly	   carried	   out	   from	   an	   EU	   standpoint.	   However,	   where	   it	   is	   deemed	  necessary,	   other	   state-­‐owned	   entities	   going	   beyond	   the	   strict	   EU	   definition	   of	  SWFs	  are	  used	  as	  examples,	  such	  as	  SOEs.	  The	  rapidly	  growing	  size	  of	  SWFs	  was	  a	  matter	  that	  attracted	  much	  attention	  until	   the	   end	   of	   2008.	   Although	   SWFs	   still	   manage	   an	   abundance	   of	   assets	  worldwide	   and	   have	   considerable	   reserves,	   their	   size	   as	   well	   as	   their	   growth	  prospects	   have	   been	   greatly	   reduced.	   Much	   of	   their	   future	   development	   will	  depend	  on	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  on	  world	  aggregate	  demand.	  Lack	  of	  transparency	  is	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  in	  the	  future	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  attributes	  of	  SWFs.	  While	  most	  SWFs	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  transparency	   in	  the	   investment	  business,	  nevertheless,	   the	  majority	  of	   them	  do	  not	   disclose	   their	   sizes	   nor	   their	   management	   structures	   and	   business	   plans.	  Although	  many	  concrete	  steps	  have	  been	  taken	  on	  the	  part	  of	  SWFs	  to	  enhance	  their	   transparency	   and	   openness,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   this	   issue	   will	   be	   fully	  rectified	  in	  the	  future.	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  
–	  
The	  Investment	  Behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  	  	  	  	  	  INTRODUCTION	  	   Chapter	  1	  explored	  various	  definitions	  and	  the	  basic	  characteristics	  of	  SWFs.	  It	  was	  seen	   that	   the	   investment	  behaviour	  and	  strategy	  of	  a	  SWFs	  depend	   to	  a	  large	   extent	   on	   its	   objectives.	   The	   present	   chapter	   offers	   a	   complementary	  understanding	  of	   SWFs	  by	  analysing	   their	   investment	  behaviour	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  as	  well	  as	  under	  economic	  crises.	  The	  rationale	  for	  examining	  this	  characteristic	  of	  SWFs	  is	  to	  help	  alleviate	  the	  concerns	  of	  recipient	  countries	  and	  reduce	  protectionist	  pressures	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  inform	  them	  on	  how	  SWFs	  should	  be	  regulated.	  Moreover,	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  their	  role	  and	  practices	  could	   help	   countries	   managing	   SWFs	   to	   strengthen	   their	   domestic	   policy	  frameworks.	   The	   regulation	   of	   SWFs	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   analysis	   in	   the	   following	  chapters.	  Chapter	   2	   is	   divided	   in	   two	   parts.	   Part	   I	   examines	   SWFs’	   investment	  behaviour	  at	  times	  of	  economic	  growth,	  while	  Part	  II	  focuses	  on	  their	  behaviour	  at	   times	   of	   economic	   crisis.	   This	   is	   a	   necessary	   distinction	   as	   the	   investment	  behaviour	  and	  asset	  allocation	  of	  SWFs	  changes	  considerably	  depending	  on	  their	  home	   countries’	   and	   the	   global	   investment	   climate.	   Part	   I	   concentrates	   on	   the	  presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  western	  economies	  and	  provides	  some	  information	  on	  their	  sectoral	   and	   regional	  preferences.	  The	   sample	  period	   taken	   for	   this	  purpose	   is	  between	   2000	   and	   until	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2008.187	  In	   this	  context,	   the	  distinctive	   features	  of	  SWFs’	   investment	  behaviour	   is	  analysed,	  namely,	   their	   tendency	   for	   risk	  aversion,	   their	  passivity	   compared	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  The	  samples	  taken	  depend	  on	  the	  period	  where	  the	  relevant	  studies	  were	  conducted	  and	  do	  not	  always	  coincide.	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institutional	  investors	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  character	  of	  their	  investments.	  Finally,	  a	  brief	  comparison	  between	  SWFs	  and	  other	  investment	  entities,	  namely	  hedge	  funds	   and	   institutional	   investors,	   is	   offered	   to	   address	   a	   number	   of	   common	  features	  between	  different	  categories	  of	  investors.	  Part	   II	   analyses	   the	  behaviour	  of	   SWFs	  at	   times	  of	   global	   economic	   ‘crisis’.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2008.	  The	  section	  concentrates	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  crisis	  on	  the	  investment	  behaviour	   of	   SWFs.	   The	   conclusions	   of	   this	   chapter	   serve	   to	   explore	   below	   in	  chapter	  3	  the	  potential	  benefits	  and	  concerns	  posed	  by	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  in	  recipient	  economies.	  	  	  	   A. ASSET	  ALLOCATION	  AT	  TIMES	  OF	  ECONOMIC	  GROWTH	  	   	  Asset	   allocation	   depends	   heavily	   on	   the	   purpose	   for	   which	   the	   fund	   was	  established.	  Since	  SWFs	  serve	  a	  variety	  of	  purposes,	  the	  investment	  strategies	  of	  SWFs	  vary	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  stabilisation	  funds	  aim	  at	  offsetting	  government	  revenues	  at	  times	  of	  high	  price	  volatility	  of	  natural	  resources,	  therefore,	   it	   is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  they	  would	  allocate	  their	  funds	  more	  conservatively.	  The	  same	  strategy	  characterises	  public	  pension	  funds.	  In	  fact,	  many	  pension	  funds,	  and	  to	  some	   extent	   SWFs,	   tend	   to	   regulate	   their	   asset	   allocation	   to	   prevent	   the	  management	  of	  those	  funds	  from	  taking	  excessive	  risks.188	  Other	   funds	   avoid	   taking	   risks	   for	   ethical	   or	   religious	   reasons.	   SAMA	   and	  other	   funds	   from	   Saudi	   Arabia	   purse	   only	   investment	   strategies	   that	   are	  compliant	  with	   Islamic	  principles.	   For	   example,	   in	   Islamic	  banking	  and	   finance	  the	  importance	  of	  risk	  sharing	  as	  part	  of	  raising	  capital	  and	  the	  avoidance	  of	  riba	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  One	  example	  is	  Norway’s	  Government	  Pension	  Fund	  Global,	  which	  according	  to	  Norwegian	  laws	  must	  have	  a	  portfolio	  of	  40%	  fixed	  income	  and	  60%	  securities,	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  ‘Investment	  Strategy’	  (Norwegian	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  2009)	  <www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-­‐topics/The-­‐Government-­‐Pension-­‐Fund/investment-­‐strategy.html?id=429634>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	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(usury)	   and	  gharar	   (risk	  or	  uncertainty)	   are	   central.189	  As	   a	   result	   those	   funds	  typically	  allocate	  their	  assets	  more	  conservatively	  and	  they	  avoid	  excessive	  risks.	  For	   example,	   as	   far	   as	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   are	   concerned,	   these	  would	  involve	  both	  an	  element	  of	  riba,	   since	   returns	   interest	  based,	   and	  gharar	   since	  they	   are	   issued	   by	   financial	   intermediaries,	   the	   holder	   of	   the	   security	   has	   no	  control	  over	  or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  returns	  and	  they	  involve	  excessive	  leverage	  and	  risk.190	  Quite	  interestingly	  this	  policy	  is	  said	  to	  have	  shielded	  Saudi	  Arabia	  in	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  from	  suffering	  heavy	  losses.191	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  UAE	  funds	  invested	  heavily	  in	  financial	  instruments	  that	  promised	  higher	  returns	  or	  used	  higher	  leveraging,	  and	  were	  significantly	  more	  exposed	  to	  toxic	  assets,192	  thus	  bearing	  greater	  losses	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis.193	  As	   seen	   in	   chapter	   1,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   purposes	   of	   SWFs	   is	   to	   diversify	   a	  country’s	   economy.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   understandable	   why	   SWFs	   invest	   in	   the	  entire	   spectrum	   of	   the	   economy.	   Indeed,	   today	   SWFs	   have	   penetrated	   in	   all	  economic	   sectors	   but	   demonstrate	   a	   clear	   preference	   in	   banking	   and	   the	  financial	  sector	  in	  general.	  Real	  estate	  also	  figures	  among	  SWFs’	  preferred	  areas,	  but	   it	   is	   equally	   common	   for	   them	   to	   invest	   in	   companies	   operating	   in	  technology,	  aerospace,	  the	  car	  industry,	  telecommunications	  and	  even	  energy	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Marc	  Ross,	  ‘Working	  with	  Islamic	  finance’	  (Investopedia,	  2009)	  <www.investopedia.com/articles/07/islamic_investing.asp>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012;	  
Gharar	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘An	  Islamic	  finance	  term	  describing	  a	  risky	  or	  hazardous	  sale,	  where	  details	  concerning	  the	  sale	  item	  are	  unknown	  or	  uncertain.	  Gharar	  is	  forbidden	  by	  the	  Qur’an,	  which	  explicitly	  forbids	  trades	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  have	  excessive	  risk	  due	  to	  uncertainty’,	  Investopedia,	  ‘Gharar’	  (Investopedia)	  <www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gharar.asp>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012;	  Intrinsically,	  the	  limitation	  on	  Gharar	  is	  related	  to	  the	  Islamic	  prohibition	  on	  gambling.	  Unlike	  
Riba	  (which	  is	  an	  absolute	  prohibition)	  some	  level	  of	  risk	  remains	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  commercial	  life	  and	  risk	  allocation	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  Islamic	  finance;	  only	  disproportionate	  risk,	  speculative	  trading	  and	  transactions	  meeting	  exceeding	  limitations	  are	  considered	  Gharar,	  Christopher	  Richardson,	  ‘Islamic	  Finance	  Opportunities	  in	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Sector:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  an	  Emerging	  Field’	  (2006)	  Volume	  41,	  Number	  1,	  TexInt'l	  LJ,	  125,	  127.	  190	  An	  extension	  of	  the	  prohibition	  of	  Riba	  and	  Gharar	  prohibits	  investments	  in	  companies	  with	  heavy	  debt,	  Lu’ayy	  Minwer	  Al-­‐Rimawi,	  ‘Relevance	  of	  Shari’a	  in	  Arab	  securities	  regulation	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  Jordan	  as	  an	  Arab	  regulatory	  model’	  (2006)	  CompLaw,	  Vol	  27(8),	  228.	  191	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  19.	  192	  By	  ‘toxic	  asset’	  asset	  that	  becomes	  illiquid	  (cannot	  be	  sold)	  when	  its	  secondary	  market	  disappears.	  Such	  assets	  were	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  during	  the	  2007-­‐2009	  crisis.	  193	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  20.	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defence.	  Sometimes	  cases	  of	   investments	   in	   food	  retail	  or	  British	   football	  clubs	  also	  make	  the	  news.	  The	  first	  section	  involves	  a	  discussion	  of	  previously	  publicised	  cases	  of	  SWF	  investments	  as	  well	  as	  a	  presentation	  of	  actual	  stakes	  held.	  Then	  an	  analysis	  of	  their	  sectoral	  and	  regional	  preferences	  is	  provided,	  followed	  by	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  distinctive	  features	  of	  their	  investment	  behaviour.	  	  	  
1. The	  Presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  the	  West	  
	   To	  understand	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  the	  west,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	   consider	   first	   a	   number	   of	   notorious	   transactions	   by	   SOEs	   in	   American	   or	  European	  companies.	  It	  is	  those	  transactions	  (whether	  completed	  or	  attempted)	  that	  ‘triggered’194	  the	  debate	  on	  SWFs	  in	  these	  countries.	  Attention	   shifted	   to	   SOEs	   initially	   in	   2004	   when	   China’s	   Lenovo	   Group	  effectively	  took	  over	  IBM’s	  personal	  computer	  business.195	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  in	  July	   2005,	   CNOOC	  made	   an	   $18.5	   billion	   bid	   to	   buy	   USA	   oil	   major	   Unocal	   Oil	  Company.	   In	  August	  2005,	  CNOOC	  announced	  that	   it	  had	  withdrawn	   its	  bid	   for	  Unocal,	   citing	   political	   tension	   inside	   the	  USA.196	  However,	   it	  was	   the	   so-­‐called	  DPW	  deal	  in	  2005	  that	  sparked	  the	  greatest	  controversy	  around	  SWFs	  and	  SOEs.	  This	  case	  was	  an	  attempt	  on	  the	  part	  of	  DPW,	  a	  SOE	  owned	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Dubai,	  to	  acquire	  the	  Peninsular	  and	  Oriental	  Steam	  Navigation	  Company	  (P&O),	  domiciled	   in	   London,	   which	   was	   then	   the	   fourth	   largest	   port	   operator	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  By	  ‘trigger’	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  meant	  a	  transaction	  that	  initiates	  the	  debate	  in	  a	  country	  about	  foreign	  investments	  and	  culminates	  in	  legal	  action	  been	  taken	  that	  tightens	  foreign	  investment.	  195	  People’s	  Daily	  Staff,	  ‘China’s	  Lenovo	  Group	  acquires	  IBM’s	  PC	  business’	  People’s	  Daily	  (Beijing,	  8	  December	  2004)	  <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200412/08/eng20041208_166556.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  196	  Matt	  Pottinger	  and	  others,	  ‘Oil	  Politics:	  Cnooc	  Drops	  Offer	  for	  Unocal,	  Exposing	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  Tensions’	  (2005)	  China	  Institute,	  University	  of	  Alberta	  <www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/uofaengineer/article.cfm?article=43267&issue=36224>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  
The	  Investment	  Behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  
	   62	  
world,	  running	  major	  USA	  port	  facilities.	  The	  transaction	  was	  eventually	  blocked	  in	  March	  2006	  by	  the	  USA	  House	  Appropriations	  Committee.197	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  these	  events,	  SOEs	  and	  other	  state	  investment	  entities	  came	  under	   close	   scrutiny.	   In	   this	   context,	   in	   May	   2007	   Chinese	   government-­‐controlled	  CIC	  took	  the	  largest	  external	  stake	  (9.9%)	  in	  Blackstone	  Group	  LP	  in	  the	   form	   of	   non-­‐voting	   units.198	  The	   investment	   caused	   a	   stormy	   debate,199	  among	   other	   reasons,	   because	   Blackstone,	   indirectly	   through	   its	   holdings,	  was	  one	  of	   the	   largest	   employers	   in	   the	  USA.	   Similar	   investments	   continued	  on	   the	  same	  pace	  stirring	  up	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  western	  world.	  In	  June	  2007	  Delta	  Two	  –	  an	   investment	   vehicle	   owned	   by	   the	   Royal	   Family	   of	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Qatar	   –	  increased	   in	   the	   existing	   7.6%	   stake	   of	   in	   J	   Sainsbury	  plc	   to	   a	   total	   of	   25%	  by	  acquiring	   an	   additional	   $1.5	   billion	   stake,	  making	  Delta	   Two	   the	   largest	   single	  shareholder.200	  In	  addition,	  Gazprom,	  the	  Russian	  energy	  SOE	  has,	  at	  times,	  also	  caused	  concern	  over	  its	  tight	  grip	  of	  energy	  infrastructure	  across	  Europe.	  By	  the	  beginning	   of	   the	   2000s	  Gazprom	  managed	   to	   own	   substantial	   equity	   stakes	   in	  energy	  transportation,	  storage	  and	  trade	  companies	  in	  Germany,	  Finland,	  Greece,	  Poland,	   the	   Baltic	   and	   other	   ex-­‐Soviet	   countries201	  and	   has	   made	   its	   intention	  clear	   in	   the	   past	   that	   it	   intends	   to	   take	   a	   share	   of	   Europe’s	   downstream	   gas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  USA	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Committee	  on	  Appropriations,	  ‘Ammendment	  to	  Supplemental	  Appropriations	  Bill,	  2006’	  F:/MAS/MAS_679.XML,	  H.L.C.	  8	  march	  2006	  <http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/portamendlang.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  198	  Blackstone	  Group,	  ‘China’s	  State	  Investment	  Company	  to	  Acquire	  Non-­‐Voting	  Minority	  Stake	  in	  Blackstone’	  Blackstone	  Press	  Release,	  20	  May	  2007,	  <www.blackstone.com/news/press_releases/05-­‐20-­‐2007.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2009	  (inaccessible);	  Andrew	  Ross	  Sorkin	  and	  David	  Barboza,	  ‘China	  to	  Buy	  a	  Stake	  in	  Blackstone’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  21	  May	  2007)	  <www.nytimes.com/2007/05/21/business/worldbusiness/21yuan.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  199	  BBC	  News	  staff,	  ‘China	  Buys	  3bn	  in	  Blackstone	  Stake’	  BBC	  News	  (London,	  21	  May	  2009)	  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6675453.stm>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Donald	  Straszhelm,	  ‘China	  Buys	  Wall	  Street’	  Forbes	  (New	  York	  27	  December	  2007)	  <www.forbes.com/2008/12/26/straszheim-­‐china-­‐cic-­‐oped-­‐cx_dhs_1227straszheim.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  200	  The	  notification	  of	  the	  acquisition	  is	  available	  at,	  Announcements	  made	  to	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange,	  ‘J.	  Sainsbury	  Announces	  Holdings	  in	  Company’	  (SEC,	  2007)	  <http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/07/9999999997-­‐07-­‐029973>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012.	  201	  Svetla	  Trifonova	  Marinova	  and	  Marin	  Alexandrov	  Marinov,	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  in	  
Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (Ashgate	  Publishing,	  Aldershot	  2003)	  139-­‐140.	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pipelines.202	  The	  events	  described	  above	  have	  marked	  the	  debate	  on	  SWFs.	  Against	   this	  background,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  offer	  an	  image	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  western	  markets	  and	  provide	  an	  insight	  into	  their	  varying	  investment	  strategies	  (indicatively,	  see	  table	  2.1	  below).	  It	  ought	  to	  be	  stressed	  that	  these	  examples	  are	  only	   indicative.	   A	   significant	   part	   of	   SWFs’	   investments	   are	   made	   through	  intermediaries,	  such	  as	  mutual	   funds	  or	  hedge	  funds,	  thus	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  know	  the	  exact	  financial	  position	  of	  every	  fund.	  	  
Table	   2.1:	   Concentration	   of	   shareholdings	   –	  major	   SWF	   investments	   in	   financial	  
firms	  in	  2009	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Among	  others	  see,	  New	  Economist	  Staff,	  ‘Europe’s	  Gazprom	  Problem’	  (New	  Economist,	  30	  April	  2006)	  <http://neweconomist.blogs.com/new_economist/2006/04/europes_gazprom.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	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  (Kern,	  ‘State	  Investments’	  2009,	  26)	  	   As	  seen	  in	  table	  2.1,	  among	  western	  markets,	  the	  USA	  has	  been	  evidently	  the	  most	  preferred	  country	  for	  SWFs,	  followed	  by	  the	  UK,	  Australia	  and	  Switzerland.	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Italy,	  have	  also	  attracted	  considerable	  investments.	  Regional	   strategies	   vary	   among	   SWFs.	   ADIA,	   for	   example,	   primarily	   holds	  large	   stakes	   in	   the	   USA,	   in	   companies	   such	   as	   Ares	   Management	   LLC,	   Apolo	  Management	   LP	   and	   Citigroup. 203 	  The	   Libyan	   Investment	   Authority,	   with	  investments	   in	   Juventus	   Football	   Club	   and	  UniCredit,204	  has	  historically	   chosen	  Italy	   as	   its	   target	   market.	   QIA,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   appears	   to	   target	   almost	  exclusively	   the	   UK	  market.	   Namely,	   QIA	   holds	   stakes	   in	   Sainsbury	   (a	   sizeable	  27%),	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange,	  Chelsfield	  Partners	  and	  Barclays	  Bank.205	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  SWF	  News,	  ‘Abu	  Dhabi	  Investment	  Authority’,	  (SWF	  News,	  14	  January	  2009)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/abudhabiinvestmentauthority.php>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012.	  204	  SWF	  News,	  ‘Libyan	  Investment	  Authority’,	  (SWF	  News,	  28	  February	  2009)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/libyaninvestmentauthority.php>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012);	  205	  SWF	  News,	  ‘Qatar	  Investment	  Authority’	  (SWF	  News,	  2008-­‐2012)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/qatarinvestmentauthority.php>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012).	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Sectoral	  strategies	  also	  vary.	  With	  large	  stakes	  in	  Morgan	  Stanley,	  Blackstone	  Group,	  and	  a	  minor	  stake	   in	  Visa	  (all	  of	  which	   in	  the	  USA)206	  China’s	  CIC	   invest	  almost	   exclusively	   in	   finance,	   while	   another	   Chinese	   fund,	   SAFE,	   has	   favoured	  investments	  in	  energy	  (small	  stakes	  in	  French	  Total,	  Aviva,	  BP	  and	  Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  Plc).207	  Finally,	   the	   available	   evidence	   shows	   most	   funds	   prefer	   to	   control	   larger	  stakes	   in	   fewer	   companies,	   while	   others,	   such	   as	   SAFE	   and	   Norway’s	   GPFG,	  choose	   to	  disperse	   their	   investments	   in	  small	   stakes	  across	  a	   larger	  number	  of	  companies.	   SAFE’s	   known	   stakes	   average	   at	   around	  1%	  while	  Norway	   reports	  stakes	   averaging	   at	   1.5%	   in	   companies	   such	   as	   Alliant	   Techsystems,	   General	  Dynamics,	   Boeing,	   Honeywell,	   BAE	   Systems,	   EADS	   (Airbus),	   Finmeccanica,	  Safran,	  Thalys	  and	  Rio	  Tinto.208	  As	  a	  rule,	   the	   larger	  the	   investment	  a	  SWF	  makes,	   the	  more	   it	  succumbs	  to	  pressure	   for	   disclosure.	   For	   example,	   soon	   after	   Mubadala’s	   high	   profile	  investments	  in	  the	  USA,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Italy	  and	  after	  the	  sale	  of	  $1.75bn	  in	  bonds	  to	  international	  investors,	  securities	  regulations	  overseas	  required	  that	  it	  disclose	   its	   financials	  as	  part	  of	   that	  sale.209	  For	   this	  reason,	  many	  SWFs	  prefer	  smaller	   investments	   that	   do	   not	   involve	   compulsory	   disclosure	   of	   their	  identity.210	  As	   a	   result,	   for	   many	   funds	   the	   information	   available	   is	   extremely	  limited.	  Such	  funds	  are	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  PIF,	  the	  UAE’s	  RAK	  Investment	  Authority,	  Iran’s	  Oil	   Stabilisation	   Fund,	   Russia’s	  National	  Wealth	   Fund,	   Algeria’s	   Revenue	  Regulation	  fund	  and	  Malaysia’s	  Khazanah	  Nasional.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  SWF	  News,	  ‘China	  Investment	  Corporation’	  (SWF	  News,	  28	  November	  2009)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/chinainvestmentcorporation.php>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012.	  207	  SWF	  News,	  ‘State	  Administration	  for	  Foreign	  Exchange’	  (SWF	  News)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/safe.php>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012.	  208	  SWF	  News,	  ‘Government	  Pension	  Fund’	  (SWF	  News,	  24	  November	  2010)	  <www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/gpf.php>	  accessed	  5	  November	  2012.	  209	  According	  to	  Al	  Muhairi,	  securities	  regulations	  do	  not	  require	  that	  it	  release	  such	  statements.	  But:	  ‘It’s	  useful	  for	  our	  debt-­‐capital	  investors	  to	  know	  what	  to	  expect	  halfway	  through	  the	  year’;	  Wayne	  Arnold,	  ‘Assets	  Drive	  Mubadala	  Profit	  Surge’	  The	  National	  (Abu	  Dhabi,	  7	  September	  2009)	  <www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090907/BUSINESS/709079897>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  210	  This	  sealing	  is	  generally	  as	  low	  as	  5%	  (in	  the	  USA),	  below	  which	  companies	  are	  not	  compelled	  to	  reveal	  any	  information.	  This	  provision	  has	  allowed	  many	  SWFs	  to	  remain	  low	  profile,	  n	  598,	  One	  of	  the	  only	  funds	  that	  disclose	  small	  investments	  is	  the	  Norwegian	  fund,	  n	  208.	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Having	   discussed	   the	   background	   of	   SWFs’	   investments	   and	   the	   extend	   of	  their	  presence	  today	  in	  western	  markets,	  the	  next	  step	  is	  to	  offer	  an	  illustration	  of	  SWFs’	  investment	  patterns	  based	  on	  sectoral	  and	  regional	  preferences	  as	  well	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	  their	  distinctive	  investment	  characteristics.	  	  	  
2. Characteristics	   of	   SWFs’	   Investment	   Behaviour	   at	   Times	   of	   Economic	  
Growth	  (period	  from	  2000	  including	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2008)	  	   When	  executing	  their	  asset	  allocation,	  some	  SWFs	   invest	  solely	   in	  publicly-­‐listed	   financial	   assets,211	  while	   others	   invest	   across	   all	   major	   asset	   classes,	  including	   alternative	   investments. 212 	  Some	   SWFs	   take	   investment	   decisions	  based	   on	   market	   indices	   and	   sometimes	   they	   put	   additional	   caps	   on	   the	  maximum	   shareholding	   to	   ensure	   diversification.	   SWFs	   that	   aim	   to	   maximise	  absolute	   returns	   over	   longer	   time	   horizons	   may	   shift	   between	   different	   asset	  classes	  and	  acquire	   larger	  stakes	   in	  specific	   companies	   they	  deem	  profitable213	  (see	  charts	  2.1-­‐2.2	  below).	  	  
Chart	   2.1:	   Holdings	   of	   the	   Government	   of	   Singapore	   Investment	   Corporation	  
(representative	  of	  a	  ‘typical’	  SWF	  portfolio)	  
	  (Bryan	  Balin,	  ‘SWFs:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis’	  (2008)	  John	  Hopkins	  University	  6)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	  For	  example,	  bonds	  and	  equities.	  212	  An	  alternative	  investment	  is	  an	  investment	  that	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  three	  traditional	  asset	  classes	  of	  stocks,	  bonds	  and	  cash.	  These	  may	  include	  hedge	  funds,	  managed	  futures,	  real	  estate,	  commodities	  and	  derivatives	  contracts.	  For	  more	  see	  chapter	  6,	  n	  1235.	  213	  Mark	  Allen	  and	  Jaime	  Caruana,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  —	  A	  Work	  Agenda’	  (2008)	  IMF,	  9	  <www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  9.	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Chart	  2.2:	  SWF	  holdings	  from	  1986	  -­‐	  2010	  
	  (SWF	  Institute,	  SWFTD	  v2.0)	  214	  	   SWFs	  traditionally	  held	  dollar	  denominated	  assets.	  Between	  2002	  and	  2006	  the	  dollar	  share	  of	  SWFs	  decreased	  slightly	  as	  many	  diversified	  away	  from	  USA	  assets	   into	   the	   euro,	   the	   pound	   and	   emerging	   market	   assets.	   However,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   Gulf	   region’s	   purchases	   continued	   to	   be	   directed	   towards	   the	  dollar	   zone. 215 	  For	   example,	   SAMA’s	   dollar	   share	   is	   about	   80%,	   which	   is	  estimated	  to	  be	  the	  highest	  among	  the	  SWFs	  in	  the	  Gulf.216	  Fotak	  and	  others217	  and	  Kotter	  and	  Lel218	  undertook	  two	  separate	  studies	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  The	  SWF	  Transaction	  Database	  is	  a	  database	  product	  that	  tracks	  SWF	  transactions	  from	  1980	  till	  present.	  It	  reportedly	  contains	  over	  1,400	  recorded	  transactions	  in	  real	  estate,	  listed	  equities	  (open	  market	  purchases	  or	  deals),	  unlisted	  equities,	  and	  other	  unique	  acquisitions,	  SWF	  Transaction,	  ‘The	  Standard	  in	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Transaction	  Data’	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2008-­‐2012)	  <www.swftransaction.com/login/index.php>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  215	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  10.	  216	  John	  Sfakianakis,	  ‘Why	  Saudi	  Arabia	  Is	  Right	  Not	  To	  Revalue’	  Financial	  Times	  (London	  10	  October	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ba6456e-­‐775f-­‐11dc-­‐9de8-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  217	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  15,	  The	  authors	  collected	  investment	  dates,	  announcement	  dates,	  name	  of	  the	  acquiring	  fund,	  name	  of	  the	  acquired	  target,	  country	  of	  incorporation	  of	  the	  target	  and	  acquired	  share	  of	  equity	  from	  multiple	  sources:	  the	  Securities	  Data	  Company	  database,	  direct	  disclosures	  by	  SWFs,	  the	  financial	  press	  and	  web	  sites.	  Their	  final	  sample	  contains	  75	  investments	  that	  originate	  from	  16	  SWFs	  and	  are	  related	  to	  62	  target	  companies	  in	  23	  countries.	  Investments	  in	  their	  sample	  span	  the	  period	  1989-­‐2008.	  218	  Jason	  Kotter	  and	  Ugur	  Lel,	  ‘Friends	  or	  Foes?	  The	  Stock	  Price	  Impact	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Investments	  and	  the	  Price	  of	  Keeping	  Secrets’	  (2008)	  Number	  940,	  International	  Finance	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examine	   the	   impact	   of	   SWFs’	   investments	   in	   listed	   companies.	   In	   their	  conclusions	   they	   offer	   evidence	   on	   the	  mechanics	   of	   SWF	   investments.	   Kotter	  and	  Lel	  show	  that	  SWFs	  behave	  largely	  like	  institutional	  investors	  like	  Berkshire	  Hathaway	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  profit	  maximisation.219	  Fotak	  and	  others	  find	  that	  SWFs	  purchase,	  on	  average,	  almost	  19%	  of	  shares	  of	  the	  target	  company220	  and	  that	   a	   large	   number	   of	   acquisitions	   are	   clustered	   in	   the	   finance	   and	   banking	  sector,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  carried	  out	  through	  privately	  negotiated	  transactions.	  In	  addition,	   they	  also	  document	   that	  SWFs	   tend	   to	   invest	   in	   firms	  whose	  stock	  price	  has	  appreciated	  over	  the	  past	  sixty	  trading	  days.221	  Regarding	  the	  trading	  frequencies	   of	   SWFs,	   Fotak	   and	   others	   find	   that	   approximately	   half	   of	   their	  sample	  relates	  to	  the	  years	  2004-­‐2008,222	  while	  Kern	  notes	  that	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  all	  transactions	   reported	   have	   been	   undertaken	   between	   mid-­‐2007	   and	   2008.223	  This	  heightened	  activity	  reflects	  the	  growth	  of	  SWFs	  in	  size	  and	  number	  as	  well	  as	  a	  global	  increase	  in	  liquidity	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  presenting	  the	  global	  investment	  patterns	  of	  SWFs	  until	  the	  beginning	  of	  2008.	  Kern	  in	  his	  2008	  study224	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  the	   type	   of	   investments	  made	  by	   each	   type	   of	   fund	   (categorized	  by	   country	   of	  origin)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  regional	  preferences	  of	  each	  fund.	  Kern	  concludes,	  among	  other	   things	   that,	   (1)	   North	   American	   and	   EU	   firms	   are	   the	   prime	   targets	   of	  SWFs;	  (2)	  2007	  –	  2008	  has	  been	  their	  most	  active	  period	  to	  date	  worldwide;	  (3)	  in	  the	  EU,	  the	  UK	  is	  the	  prime	  investment	  target	  of	  such	  funds	  and	  that	  (4)	  while	  in	   the	   EU	   their	   investments	   are	   diversified,	   in	   the	   USA	   they	   focus	   mainly	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Discussion	  Papers	  <www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2008/940/ifdp940.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  9-­‐10,	  Kotter	  and	  Lel’s	  sample	  consists	  of	  163	  SWF	  investment	  announcements	  that	  are	  hand	  collected	  from	  searching	  the	  Factiva	  database	  from	  1980	  to	  2008.	  The	  announcement	  date	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  earliest	  press	  release	  in	  English.	  They	  collect	  information	  on	  both	  equity	  investments	  (145	  announcements)	  and	  joint	  ventures	  (18	  announcements)	  by	  SWFs.	  This	  search	  results	  in	  a	  total	  of	  271	  events.	  219	  ibid	  3.	  220	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  18,	  Other	  studies,	  however,	  give	  much	  larger	  average	  shares,	  see	  below	  n	  281,	  282.	  221	  ibid.	  222	  ibid	  15.	  223	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  7.	  224	  Kern	  presents	  a	  number	  of	  data	  and	  analyses	  based	  on	  transactions	  as	  reported	  by	  Dealogic	  in	  which	  at	  least	  one	  SWF	  participated	  as	  an	  acquirer	  of	  a	  minority,	  majority	  or	  100%	  stake	  in	  a	  company	  between	  1995	  and	  July	  31,	  2008.	  The	  data	  do	  not	  reflect	  all	  transactions	  undertaken	  by	  all	  SWFs	  (for	  example,	  the	  Norwegian	  SWFs	  was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  analysis),	  ibid	  6.	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financial	  products.225	  With	   regard	   to	   SWFs’	   regional	   preferences	   (see	   chart	   2.3	   below),	   SWFs	  primarily	   invest	   in	   North	   America	   and	   Europe.	   In	   particular,	   37%	   of	   the	   total	  transaction	   volume	   during	   the	   period	   studied	   is	   related	   to	   North	   American	  enterprises	   and	   32%	   to	   Europe-­‐based	   firms.226	  This	   tendency	   is	   largely	   due	   to	  the	  wider	  selection	  of	   investments	  offered	  as	  well	  as	   the	  higher	  rate	  of	  returns	  that	   characterise	   the	  North-­‐American	   and	   European	  markets.	   Asia	   also	   figures	  among	   the	   most	   preferred	   target	   regions,	   absorbing	   28%	   of	   the	   investments	  observed	  by	  Kern.227	  Among	  EU	  markets	  it	  is	  the	  UK	  economy	  that	  has	  attracted	  the	   highest	   volumes	   of	   investments,	   totaling	   $26	   billion	   between	   1995	   and	  2008,228	  with	   Germany	   as	   the	   second-­‐best	   with	   $5.1	   billion	   of	   SWF-­‐related	  investments.	  This	  figure	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  three	  major	  investments,	  namely	  by	   the	   Dubai	   cluster	   in	   car	   manufacturer	   Daimler	   in	   2005	   and	   in	   specialty	  alumina	  producer	  Almatis	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Deutsche	  Bank	  in	  2007.229	  	  
Chart	  2.3:	  SWF	  regional	  distribution	  of	  assets	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  ibid	  6-­‐9.	  226	  ibid	  7;	  This	  is	  also	  confirmed	  from	  the	  regional	  asset	  allocation	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  GPFG	  fund,	  for	  which	  there	  is	  sufficient	  information:	  among	  its	  equity	  holdings,	  15%	  is	  invested	  in	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific,	  50%	  in	  Europe	  and	  Central	  Asia,	  32%	  in	  North	  America	  and	  the	  rest	  in	  Latin	  America,	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  34.	  227	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  7.	  228	  ibid	  8.	  229	  ibid.	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(Kern,	  ‘SWF	  and	  Foreign	  Investment	  Policies’	  (2008)	  Deutschebank	  4)	  	  Financial	   institutions	   are	   generally	   the	   main	   beneficiaries	   of	   SWFs	   (see	  charts	   2.4-­‐2.7	   below).	   At	   $60	   billion,	   investments	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   have	  been	  the	  dominant	  theme	  in	  the	  USA	  market.230	  There	  may	  be	  many	  reasons	  for	  this	  preference.	  Many	  countries	  operating	  SWFs,	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  or	  Asia,	  tend	  to	  have	   largely	  developed	  banking	  sectors,	   and	   thus	  consider	   finance	  a	  natural	  choice	   for	   their	   investments.231	  Real	   estate	   and	   other	   sectors	   follow,	   but	   at	   an	  extremely	   wide	   interval.	   Those	   are	   real	   estate232	  and	   construction	   with	   $17	  billion	   worth	   of	   investments, 233 	  commodities	   and	   energy	   with	   $13	   billion,	  services	  and	  retail	  with	  $11	  billion,	  technology	  with	  $9	  billion	  and	  infrastructure	  and	  transportation	  with	  $9	  billion	  between	  1995	  and	  2008.234	  	  
Chart	   2.4:	   Investments	   with	   SWF	   participation	   in	   the	   EU	   by	   sector	   of	   recipient	  
companies	  (1995	  –	  2008)	  
	  (Simone	  Mezzacapo,	   ‘European	   Economy	   –	   The	   so-­‐called	   SWFs’	   (2009)	   European	   Commission	  102)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  ibid.	  231	  Massimiliano	  Castelli,	  ‘[SWFs]	  Review	  of	  Policy	  and	  Regulatory	  Developments’	  (2008)	  UBS	  2-­‐3.	  232	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  volumes	  of	  investments	  made	  by	  SWFs	  in	  the	  real	  estate	  market	  see,	  Deloitte	  Touche	  Tohmatsu,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Real	  Estate	  Partners	  in	  Growth?’	  (2009)	  Deloitte	  <www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-­‐UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_re_sovereignrealestatepartners_040809.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  figures	  3-­‐4.	  233	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  8.	  234	  ibid;	  It	  is	  also	  stated	  by	  Kern	  that	  Asian	  enterprises	  have	  been	  the	  most	  preferred	  targets	  of	  state	  investments,	  mainly	  reflecting	  intra-­‐regional	  diversification.	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Chart	   2.5:	   Investments	   with	   SWF	   participation	   in	   the	   US	   by	   sector	   of	   recipient	  
companies	  (1995	  –	  2008)	  
	  (Mezzacapo	  103)	  	   	  
	  
Chart	  2.6:	  Ten	  largest	  transactions:	  sector	  distribution	  –	  deal	  volume	  2007	  -­‐	  2008	  
	  (Mezzacapo	  100)	  	  
Chart	  2.7:	  Ten	  largest	  transactions:	  sector	  distribution	  –	  deal	  value	  2007	  -­‐	  2008	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  (Mezzacapo	  101)	  	   Having	  made	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  usual	  investment	  patterns	  of	  SWFs,	  the	  next	   step	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   most	   distinctive	   features	   of	   their	   investment	  behaviour.	  These	  are	  in	  particular	  their	  tendency	  for	  risk	  aversion,	  their	  passive	  stance	  and	  their	  long-­‐term	  investment	  outlook.	  	  
i. SWFs	  are	  relatively	  risk	  averse	  investors	  	  Given	   their	   objectives	   to	   support	   their	   countries	   macroeconomic	   policies,	  most	   SWFs	   seek	   to	   maximise	   their	   returns	   in	   their	   investments	   by	   overall	  remaining	  largely	  risk	  averse.	  This	  usually	  means	  investing	  in	  low-­‐risk	  holdings,	  such	   as	   USA	   government	   bonds,	   buying	   small	   stakes	   in	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  companies	  and	  using	  low	  leverage.235	  While	  SWF	  have,	  at	  times,	  exhibited	  an	  impressive	  sophistication,	  very	  often	  they	  engage	  in	  a	  simple	  form	  of	  ‘trend	  chasing’.236	  Bernstein	  and	  others	  support	  this	   claim	  based	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘they	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   invest	   at	   home	  when	  domestic	   equity	   prices	   are	   higher,	   and	   invest	   abroad	   when	   foreign	   prices	   are	  higher’.237	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  In	  the	  field	  of	  finance,	  leverage	  is	  normally	  defined	  by	  relating	  some	  measure	  of	  a	  firm’s	  indebtedness	  to	  the	  size	  of	  its	  overall	  asset	  base.	  As	  the	  term	  would	  suggest,	  leverage	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  firms	  can	  magnify	  the	  results	  of	  the	  activities	  undertaken	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  owners.	  Peter	  Newman,	  Murray	  Milgate	  and	  John	  Eatwell,	  ‘The	  New	  Palgrave	  Dictionary	  of	  Money	  and	  Finance’	  (Macmillan	  Press,	  1992)	  574.	  236	  Bernstein	  and	  others	  (n	  100)	  28.	  237	  ibid.	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According	   to	   Balin,	   to	   meet	   the	   objectives	   of	   stabilising	   pension	   fund	  obligations	   and	   government	   revenues,	   countries	   tend	   to	   invest	  ‘countercyclically’,	  i.e.	  taking	  stakes	  in	  industries	  and	  countries	  that	  perform	  best	  when	   the	  SWF	  holding	  county’s	  economy	   is	  performing	  poorly.238	  For	  example,	  Norway	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  invest	  primarily	  in	  banking,	  technology,	  and	  industrial	  companies,	   and	   avoid	   investments	   in	   natural	   resources.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  Singapore	  and	  Malaysia	  tend	  to	  invest	  more	  actively	  in	  natural	  resources.	  Stabilisation	   funds	   also	   seek	   higher	   allocations	   of	   lower-­‐risk	   equities	   and	  bonds.	   This	   is	   to	   be	   expected	   considering	   that,	   during	   times	   of	   worldwide	  economic	  slumps,	   low-­‐risk	  securities	  are	   the	  only	  ones	   that	  hold	   their	  value.239	  The	  same	  also	  applies	  to	  funds	  that	  aim	  at	  generating	  long-­‐term	  savings	  (savings	  funds).	  KIA,	  for	  example,	  was	  for	  long	  known	  to	  run	  a	  very	  low	  risk	  portfolio	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  responsible	  for	  Kuwait’s	  ‘Fund	  for	  Future	  Generations’.240	  Some	  countries,	   like	  Singapore	  and	  South	  Korea,	  aim	  at	  developing	  specific	  industries	   and	   encourage	   the	   transfer	   of	   technology	   to	   native	   firms.241	  As	   a	  result,	  Singaporean	  and	  South	  Korean	  funds	  often	  target	  the	  equity	  of	  companies	  that	   can	   carry	   out	   their	   goals	   and	   tend	   to	   avoid	   risky	   assets	   and	   yield	   quick	  returns. 242 	  Moreover,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   certain	   SWFs	   avoid	   high-­‐risk	  investments	   because	   these	   do	   not	   conform	  with	   the	   ethical	   objectives	   of	   their	  governments.	   For	   example,	   Saudi	   Arabia	   avoids	   investment	   strategies	   that	   go	  against	   established	   Islamic	   principles.243	  As	   a	   result	   SAMA	   has	   invested	   the	  heavy	  bulk	  of	  its	  assets	  in	  USA	  bonds	  and	  relied	  less	  on	  external	  borrowing,	  a	  fact	  that	  served	  it	  well	  during	  in	  the	  subsequent	  economic	  slump.244	  Other	   funds,	   however,	   did	   not	   follow	   equally	   low	   risk	   policies.	   Examples	  include	  ADIA	  and	  other	  Emirati	  funds.	  This	  is	  seen,	  first,	  in	  their	  asset	  allocation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  6.	  239	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  11.	  240	  Since	  2007,	  however,	  it	  was	  believed	  to	  have	  increased	  investments	  in	  risky	  assets	  such	  as	  equities,	  alternatives	  (e.g.	  hedge	  funds)	  and	  its	  general	  exposure	  to	  emerging	  markets,	  while	  reducing	  its	  USA	  fixed	  income	  portfolio,	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  23.	  241	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  4-­‐5.	  242	  China’s	  CIC	  avoids,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy	  to	  invest	  in	  sensitive	  foreign	  transportation,	  energy	  and	  telecommunications	  firms,	  Brune	  (n	  174)	  74.	  243	  See	  above,	  footnote	  190.	  244	  Sfakianakis	  (n	  216).	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With	   far	   less	   oil	   than	   the	   Saudis,	   Abu	   Dhabi	   had	   a	   larger	   and	   more	   dynamic	  external	   portfolio	   and	   ADIA’s	   wealth	   was	   invested	   in	   assets	   that	   were	   highly	  correlated	  with	  global	  growth.245	  Secondly,	  although	  ADIA	  itself	  did	  not	  take	  on	  much	   debt,	   some	   of	   the	   smaller	   Abu	  Dhabi	   funds	   did,	   as	  well	   as	  many	   of	   Abu	  Dhabi	  private	  or	  semi-­‐private	  firms.	  Dubai,	  without	  much	  oil	  to	  begin	  with,	  relied	  much	  more	  heavily	  on	  external	  borrowing.	  By	   the	  end	  of	  2008,	   its	  government	  and	   ruling	   family-­‐sponsored	   firms	   had	   accumulated	   $80	   billion	   in	   debts.246	  Investment	   vehicles	   such	   as	   Isthimar	   and	   DIC	   had	   invested	   abroad,	   mainly	   in	  global	   blue	   chips, 247 	  which	   subsequently	   suffered	   significant	   losses.	  Furthermore,	   these	   vehicles	   were	   funded	   from	   the	   proceeds	   of	   Dubai’s	   other	  investments,	  including	  the	  domestic	  property	  market	  (where	  prices	  fell	  in	  2008).	  Overall,	   Dubai	   entities	   had	   far	   more	   short-­‐term	   external	   debts	   than	   liquid	  external	  assets.248	  In	   addition,	   although	   the	   examples	   of	   SWFs	   relying	   on	   debt	   remain	  exceptional,	  SWFs	  invest	  highly	  in	  hedge	  funds	  and	  other	  leveraged	  institutions.	  An	   IMF	  survey	  of	   global	   sovereign	   funds	   suggests	   that	  20%	  (about	   five)	  of	   the	  twenty-­‐six	   funds	   surveyed	   invest	   in	   leveraged	   funds.249 	  Setser	   and	   Ziemba	  assumed	   that	   these	   five	   include	  most	   of	   the	   Gulf	   funds	   as	   well	   as	   Singapore’s	  GIC.250	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  According	  to	  the	  CFR,	  ADIA	  viewed	  itself	  as	  a	  pure	  portfolio	  manager	  that	  seeks	  (not	  always	  successfully)	  the	  highest	  risk-­‐adjusted	  return,	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  20.	  246	  While	  the	  UAE	  as	  a	  whole	  had	  racked	  up	  $100	  billion	  of	  external	  debt,	  ibid.	  247	  A	  Blue	  Chip	  is	  ‘A	  stock	  issue	  by	  a	  company	  […]	  with	  high	  standing	  because	  of	  its	  earnings	  record.	  Such	  shares	  are	  chosen	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  Financial	  Times,	  Dow	  Jones	  and	  other	  shares	  indices’.	  Donald	  Rutherford,	  Routledge	  Dictionary	  of	  Economics,	  Routledge,	  Second	  Edition,	  2002,	  51.	  248	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  20.	  249	  IWG	  Secretariat,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Current	  Institutional	  and	  Operational	  Practices’	  (2008)	  International	  Working	  Group	  <www.iwg-­‐swf.org/pubs/eng/swfsurvey.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  16.	  250	  Setser	  and	  Ziemba	  (n	  43)	  n	  22;	  Moreover,	  in	  June	  and	  July	  2009	  China’s	  CIC	  and	  Korea’s	  KIC	  respectively	  announced	  that	  they	  also	  aimed	  to	  invest	  in	  hedge	  funds,	  Tom	  Cahill,	  ‘China’s	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Aims	  to	  Invest	  in	  Hedge	  Funds’	  Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  17	  June	  2009)	  <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ai5PLqcRXWyc>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Drew	  Carter,	  'Fund	  Profile:	  South	  Korea'	  Pensions	  and	  Investments	  (london,	  13	  July	  2009)	  <www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090713/PRINTSUB/307139994/1007/INTERNATIONAL&AssignSessionID=27336015277141>	  accessed	  13	  January	  2012;	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A	   survey	   by	   Norton	   Rose	   LLP	   on	   SWFs	   and	   the	   global	   private	   equity	  landscape	  shows	  that	  some	  41%	  of	  non-­‐SWF	  respondents	  saw	  the	  funds	  as	  more	  risk	  averse	  than	  private	  equity,	  while	  36%	  saw	  them	  as	  less	  risk	  averse	  and	  23%	  judged	  they	  had	  a	  similar	  risk	  profile.	  Of	  the	  SWF	  respondents	  a	  majority	  (71%)	  believed	  they	  had	  a	  similar	  risk	  profile	  to	  private	  equity.251	  	  
ii. SWFs	  are	  passive	  investors	  	   The	  available	  evidence	  on	  SWFs	  suggests	  that	  they	  generally	  have	  no	  desire	  to	   impact	  on	  company	  decisions,	  which	  would	   label	  them	  ‘passive’	   investors.252	  Firstly,	  most	  SWFs,	  even	   the	   largest	  ones,	  have	  outsourced	   the	  management	  of	  their	  assets	  and	  often	  vote	  by	  proxy.	  This	  may	  happen	  because,	  although	  public	  sector	   investment	   managers	   have	   significant	   experience	   in	   fixed-­‐income	  markets,	   they	  often	  have	   limited	  capacity	   for	   investment	   in	  other	  asset	  classes,	  such	  as	  equities.	  Thus,	   the	  SWFs	  rely	  on	  external	   fund	  managers	   to	   implement	  their	  strategic	  asset	  allocation	  in	  areas	  where	  their	  capacity	  is	  limited.253	  This	   method	   is	   said	   to	   be	   very	   effective	   in	   heading	   off	   potential	   political	  backlash	  and	  concerns	  over	  their	  motives.	  ADIA	  has	  reportedly	  long	  outsourced	  the	  management	  of	  70%	  -­‐	  80%	  of	   its	   assets	   to	   foreign	  money	  managers,	  while	  KIA	  outsources	  at	  least	  50%.254	  In	  addition,	  many	  SWFs	  –	  particularly	  the	  bigger	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  It	  was	  also	  said	  by	  Sen,	  economist	  at	  Barclays	  Capital	  that	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  SWFs	  ‘will	  employ	  a	  variety	  of	  strategies	  to	  get	  to	  commodities,	  not	  just	  buying	  the	  commodities	  directly	  but	  going	  via	  hedge	  funds	  to	  gain	  exposure	  in	  commodities	  markets’,	  John	  Irish,	  ‘Qatar	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Delays	  Investments	  for	  Six	  Months’,	  Arabian	  Times	  (Dubai,	  12	  March	  2009)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/549441>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  251	  Norton	  Rose	  LLP	  surveyed	  113	  respondents	  (comprised	  of	  SWFs	  and	  investors,	  private	  equity	  managers	  and	  funds,	  financial	  institutions	  and	  corporate	  entities)	  in	  March	  and	  April	  2008	  to	  gather	  and	  summarise	  the	  views	  of	  those	  closest	  to	  the	  SWF	  market,	  Ian	  Moore	  and	  Jennifer	  Choi,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  the	  Global	  Private	  Equity	  Landscape	  Survey’	  (2009)	  Norton	  Rose	  <www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/15287/sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐and-­‐the-­‐global-­‐private-­‐equity-­‐landscape-­‐survey>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  252	  For	  more	  see,	  Michael	  Madormo,	  ‘The	  New	  Foreign	  Menace?	  SWFs	  and	  [USA]	  National	  Security’	  (2008)	  Stimson	  Centre	  <www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-­‐new-­‐foreign-­‐menace-­‐sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐and-­‐us-­‐national-­‐security/about/staff.cfm?page=15>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  253	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  9.	  254	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  ‘winning	  business	  from	  [SWFs]	  requires	  more	  work	  than	  for	  typical	  institutional	  clients.	  Training	  and	  educating	  the	  fund’s	  staff	  often	  is	  expected	  to	  come	  with	  managing	  the	  assets.	  The	  funds	  also	  expect	  more	  disclosure	  about	  the	  money	  manager’s	  own	  business’,	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ones	  –	  avoid	  taking	  active	  management	  roles.	  China’s	  CIC	  has	  a	  stated	  policy	  to	  take	  no	   seats	  or	  only	  non-­‐voting	   seats	  on	   the	  boards	  of	   its	  purchases.255	  It	   has	  also	   been	  mentioned	   before	   that	   CIC	   purchased	   in	   2007	   a	   stake	   in	   Blackstone	  without,	  however,	  acquiring	  voting	  rights,	  while	  in	  late	  2007	  it	  acquired	  a	  stake	  in	   Morgan	   Stanley	   pledging	   to	   be	   a	   passive	   investor.256	  Another	   characteristic	  example	   is	   the	  case	  of	  KIA,	  which,	   in	   the	   late	  1980s,	  attained	  a	  participation	  of	  nearly	   22%	   in	   British	   Petroleum	   (BP).	   Subsequently,	   an	   inquiry	   by	   the	   British	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission	  called	  upon	  the	  KIA	  to	  divest	  below	  9.9%	  by	  October	  1989.	  Although	  it	  had	  communicated	  to	  the	  British	  government	  that	  it	  did	  not	  aim	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  management	  of	  BP,	  the	  KIA	  responded	  to	  the	  regulatory	  pressure	  by	  considerably	  lowering	  its	  interests	  in	  BP.257	  Certain	  studies,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Kotter	  and	  Lel	  and	  Fotak	  and	  others,	  show	  that	   SWFs	   do	   not	   improve	   firm	   value	   in	   the	   long	   run,258	  which	   suggests	   that	  shareholder	  activism	  is	  not	  common	  among	  SWFs.	  This	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  SWFs	  investments	   are	   associated	   with	   deteriorating	   values,	   but	   rather,	   that	   their	  investments	   have	   no	   substantial	   effect	   on	   operational	   performance	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Jay	  Cooper,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  Hires	  No	  Cinch’	  Pensions	  and	  Investments	  (London,	  17	  Mar.	  2008,	  <www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080317/PRINTSUB/529010448&AssignSessionID=173359561655636>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Nevertheless,	  a	  modest	  tendency	  in	  favour	  of	  in-­‐house	  asset	  management	  can	  be	  discerned.	  According	  to	  the	  IMF,	  ADIA,	  has	  now	  established	  in-­‐house	  capacity	  and	  operate	  as	  highly	  professional	  investment	  managers	  and	  rely	  less	  on	  external	  managers	  than	  in	  its	  past.	  The	  same	  applies	  for	  other	  funds,	  such	  as	  the	  large	  Norwegian	  and	  Singaporean	  SWFs,	  while	  it	  is	  mostly	  the	  newest	  SWFs	  that	  rely	  on	  external	  managers,	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  8.	  255	  However,	  it	  is	  stressed	  by	  critics	  that	  even	  if	  CIC’s	  international	  investments	  are	  genuinely	  based	  on	  commercial	  considerations	  alone,	  critics	  posit	  that	  China’s	  use	  of	  some	  portion	  of	  SWF	  assets	  for	  politically	  driven	  domestic	  investments	  undermines	  the	  country’s	  claim	  that	  the	  CIC	  is	  a	  passive	  global	  investor,	  Brune	  (n	  174)	  73.	  256	  CIC	  reported	  its	  ownership	  stake	  in	  Morgan	  Stanley	  on	  a	  Schedule	  13G,	  which	  is	  reserved	  only	  for	  passive	  investors,	  James	  Ballard,	  ‘Morgan	  Stanley	  complicates	  Chinese	  investment’	  Westlaw	  Business	  (London,	  7	  September	  2010)	  <http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2010/09/20100902_0028.aspx?cid=&src=&sp=>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012. 257	  Sven	  Behrendt,	  ‘When	  Money	  Talks:	  Arab	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  in	  the	  Global	  Public	  Policy	  Discourse’	  (2008)	  Carnegie	  Papers	  No	  12,	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace	  <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_sovereign_wealth_funds.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  6.	  258	  ‘Long	  run’,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  above	  studies	  is	  taken	  as	  1	  –	  3	  years	  after	  the	  investment,	  Kotter	  and	  Lel	  (n	  218)	  5.	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corporate	   governance	   outcomes. 259 	  As	   Rose	   notes,	   while	   passivity	   reduces	  political	  and	  security	  risks	  it	  also	  comes	  with	  risks,	  namely	  it	  may	  ‘lower	  overall	  shareholder	  monitoring,	  thereby	  increasing	  agency	  costs’.260	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   SWFs	   could	   be	   held	   to	   owe	   a	  fiduciary	   towards	   their	   beneficiaries.	   This	   argument,	   made	   by	   Rozanov,	   holds	  that	  in	  the	  event	  where	  the	  share	  price	  of	  a	  company	  invested	  drops	  dramatically	  and	   its	   management	   continues	   to	   underperform,	   then	   a	   domestic	   authority	  charged	  with	   overseeing	   the	   SWF	   (but	   also	   the	  media	   and	   the	   general	   public)	  would	  question	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  fund.261	  As	  a	  result,	  SWFs	  may	  feel	  compelled	  in	  the	  future	  to	  increase	  their	  activism	  as	  shareholders	  as	  a	  way	  of	  fulfilling	  their	  duties	  towards	  their	  beneficiaries.	  At	  a	  theoretical	  level	  this	  argument	  may	  have	  some	   basis.	   As	   opposed	   to	   other	   bodies,	   however	   (such	   as	   institutional	  investors),	   SWFs	   lack	   the	   express	   fiduciary	   contacts	   between	   them	   and	   their	  beneficiaries.	   The	   identity	   of	   the	   beneficiaries	   is	   not	   made	   clear	   in	   Rozanov’s	  paper,	   although	   it	   can	   be	   understood	   that	   a	   SWF’s	   ultimate	   beneficiary	   is	   the	  citizen	   of	   the	   sovereign.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   all	   known	   cases	   it	   is	   practically	  impossible	  for	  private	  citizens	  to	  challenge	  the	  voting	  record	  or	  the	  investment	  decisions	   of	   SWFs.	   It	   is	   stated,	   for	   example,	   in	   Norway’s	   Government	   Pension	  Fund	   Act	   of	   2005262	  that	   the	   GPFG	   itself	   ‘has	   no	   rights	   or	   obligations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  private-­‐sector	   entities	   or	   public	   authorities	   and	   may	   not	   institute	   legal	  proceedings	   or	   be	   subjected	   to	   legal	   proceedings’.263	  It	   is	   usually	   an	   official	  authority’s	   task	   to	   supervise	   the	   activities	   of	   a	   SWF	   and	   ensure	   that	   the	   fund	  respects	   its	   investment	   mandate	   and	   all	   other	   legal	   requirements.264	  In	   any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  259	  ibid. 260	  Paul	  Rose,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Active	  or	  Passive	  Investors?’	  (2008)	  118	  Yale	  LJ	  <http://yalelawjournal.org/the-­‐yale-­‐law-­‐journal-­‐pocket-­‐part/scholarship/sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds:-­‐active-­‐or-­‐passive-­‐investors?/>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  118;	  An	  agency	  relationship	  is	  defined	  through	  ‘an	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  contract	  in	  which	  one	  or	  more	  persons	  (the	  principal(s))	  engage	  another	  person	  (the	  agent)	  to	  take	  actions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  principal(s).	  The	  contract	  involves	  a	  delegation	  of	  some	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  to	  the	  agent.	  Agency	  costs	  are	  the	  total	  costs	  of	  structuring,	  administering	  and	  enforcing	  such	  contracts’,	  Newman,	  Milgate	  and	  Eatwell	  (n	  235)	  27.	  261	  Andrew	  Rozanov,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Active	  Ownership’	  in	  Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  39.	  262	  No.	  123	  of	  21	  December	  2005.	  263	  Section	  6.	  264	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  supervisory	  framework	  applied	  to	  Norway’s	  GPFG:	  Norges,	  ‘Governance	  Model	  Supervision’	  (Norges	  Bank	  Investment	  Management)	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event,	   it	   would	   still	   be	   difficult	   to	   envisage	   a	   scenario	   whereby	   a	   supervisory	  authority	  could	  intervene	  in	  the	  investment	  behaviour	  or	  the	  voting	  record	  of	  a	  SWF	   in	   company	  meetings,	  where	   the	  SWF	   in	  question	   respects	   its	   investment	  mandate	  and	  the	  general	  laws	  regulating	  its	  behaviour.	  For	  such	  a	  possibility	  to	  materialise,	  first,	  additional	  fiduciary	  ties	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  SWFs,	  such	  as	  in	  the	   kind	   of	   The	   responsibilities	   of	   Institutional	   Shareholders	   and	   Agents	   –	  
Statement	   of	   Principles,265	  and	   the	   Stewardship	   Code266	  applied	   to	   institutional	  investors	  in	  the	  UK,	  or	  establishing	  some	  form	  of	  ‘prudent	  man’	  standard,	  as	  it	  is	  required	  from	  pension	  funds	  in	  the	  USA.267	  Nonetheless,	   it	   is	  believed	  by	  Brune	  that	  the	  GFC	  might	  encourage	  SWFs	  to	  take	  on	  more	  active	  management	   roles	   to	  ensure	  higher	   returns.	  This	   is	  partly	  because,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  political	  leadership	  in	  their	  home	  states	  may	  be	   less	  willing	   to	   trust	  western	  management	  without	  any	   involvement	  on	   their	  part. 268 	  Although	   many	   SWFs	   deny	   any	   likelihood	   of	   change	   in	   corporate	  strategies	   with	   regard	   to	   activism,269	  Rozanov	   argues	   that	   it	   would	   be	   to	   the	  advantage	   of	   SWFs	   to	   establish	   relationships	   and	   develop	   a	   dialogue	   with	  institutional	   investors	   and	   activist	   hedge	   funds	   to	   promote	   their	   mutual	  interests.270	  In	   the	  next	  chapter	   the	   issue	  of	   shareholder	  activism	   is	  dealt	  with	  again	   in	  the	   context	   of	   analysing	   the	   benefits	   and	   concerns	   posed	   by	   the	   SWFs’	  investment	  behaviour.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  a	  stronger	  activism	  from	  SWFs	  can	  have	  a	  beneficial	   impact	   on	   companies	   that	   receive	   their	   investments	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <www.nbim.no/en/About-­‐us/governance-­‐model/supervision/>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012;	  This	  may	  be	  even	  more	  difficult	  in	  the	  prevailing	  undemocratic	  and	  unaccountable	  political	  context	  of	  many	  countries	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis.	  265	  ‘The	  responsibilities	  of	  Institutional	  Shareholders	  and	  Agents	  –	  Statement	  of	  Principles’	  Institutional	  Shareholders	  Committee,	  <www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/isc_statement_of_principles.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013.	  266	  n	  1163.	  267	  Under	  the	  Employee	  Retirement	  Income	  Security	  Act	  of	  1974,	  §	  404(a).	  268	  Brune	  (n	  174)	  86,	  Rozanov	  (n	  261)	  39.	  269	  Gokhan	  Afyonoglu	  and	  others,	  ‘The	  Brave	  New	  World	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2010)	  Wharton	  Leadership	  Center,	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  44.	  270	  Rozanov	  (n	  261)	  42. 
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increasing	  takeover	  premiums271	  and	  contributing	  with	  valuable	  know	  how	  and	  ideas.272	  	  
iii. SWFs	  are	  long-­‐term	  investors	  	   SWFs	   are	   generally	   said	   to	   be	   long-­‐term	   investors.	   However,	   what	  constitutes	   ‘long-­‐term’	   is	   subject	   to	   interpretation.	   The	   Oxford	   Dictionary	   of	  Finance	   and	   Banking	   provides	   different	   definitions	   to	   the	   term,	   depending	   on	  where	  it	  applies:	  while	  a	  ‘long-­‐term	  bond’	  may	  denote	  one	  that	  does	  not	  mature	  in	  less	  than	  1	  year,	  ‘long-­‐term	  debt’	  describes	  loans	  and	  debentures	  that	  are	  not	  due	  for	  repayment	  for	  at	  least	  10	  years.273	  Long-­‐term	  investment,	  however,	  may	  extend	   to	   a	   period	   of	   30	   years	   or	   more.274	  This	   important	   point	   is	   picked	   up	  again	  in	  chapter	  3	  when	  examining	  the	  impact	  of	  SWFs	  on	  financial	  markets.	  Whether	  a	  SWF	  chooses	  a	   long-­‐term	  or	  medium-­‐term	  strategy	  depends	  on	  the	   type	   of	   the	   fund.	   For	   example,	   savings	   funds	   and	   pension	   funds	   set	   more	  long-­‐term	  goals	  because	   they	  are	   intended	   for	   future	  generations.	   Stabilisation	  funds,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   intended	   for	   risk	  management	   and	   not	   for	   long-­‐term	  purposes.	  As	  a	  result,	  most	  stabilisation	  funds	  have	  short	  to	  medium	  term	  goals.	  However,	  as	  said	  above,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  determine	  which	  funds	  are	  purely	  ‘stabilisation	  funds’,	  let	  alone	  what	  counts	  as	  ‘long’	  or	  ‘short-­‐term’.	  It	  is	  a	  widely	  accepted	  fact,	  however,	  that	  SWFs	  generally	  retain	  their	  assets	  despite	  short-­‐term	  price	  fluctuations.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  examples	  of	  the	  sort	   include	  KIA’s	  7.1%	  stake	   in	  Daimler	  AG—making	  the	  KIA	  one	  of	  the	  single	  largest	   shareholders	   of	   the	   German	   car	   manufacturer—that	   dates	   back	   to	   an	  investment	  made	  in	  1969.275	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  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  (n	  389)	  and	  the	  ‘MidAmerican	  case’	  n	  392,	  438.	  272	  n	  440.	  273	  John	  Smullen	  and	  Nicolas	  Hand,	  The	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  Finance	  and	  Banking,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005,	  248.	  274	  As	  it	  is	  said,	  ‘the	  media	  frequently	  advises	  people	  to	  “invest	  for	  the	  long	  term”,	  but	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  investment	  is	  long	  term	  is	  very	  subjective.	  A	  day	  trader,	  for	  example,	  would	  define	  ‘long	  term’	  much	  differently	  than	  a	  buy-­‐and-­‐hold	  investor,	  who	  would	  consider	  anything	  less	  than	  several	  years	  to	  be	  short-­‐term	  trading,’	  Investopedia,	  ‘Long	  Term’	  (Investopedia)	  <www.investopedia.com/terms/l/longterm.asp>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  275	  Behrendt	  (n	  257)	  6.	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During	   the	   abovementioned	   survey	   by	   Norton	   Rose,	   71%	   of	   SWF	  respondents	  said	   they	   regarded	   themselves	   as	   longer-­‐term	   investors	   than	  private	   equity	   firms.276	  This	   is	   almost	   exactly	   the	   same	   percentage	   as	   all	   non-­‐SWF	   respondents	   when	   they	   were	   asked	   directly	   if	   they	   thought	   SWF	  investments	  were	  longer-­‐term	  than	  traditional	  private	  equity	  investments.	  When	  asked	   to	   explain	   their	   answer	   to	   this	   question,	   typical	   views	   included	  observations	   that	   SWFs	   had	   longer	   ‘time	   horizons’	   and	   that	   they	   were	   not	  engaged	  in	  ‘active	  management’.277	  	  
iv. Although	  they	  acquire	   large	  stakes,	  most	  SWFs	  do	  not	  pursue	  takeover	  
policies	  in	  western	  countries	  	   Most	   of	   the	   transactions	   executed	   by	   SWFs	   involve	   large	   stakes.278	  This,	  however,	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   SWFs	   typically	   follow	   outright	   takeover	   policies.	  Regarding	   the	   western	   world,	   in	   particular,	   takeovers	   are	   rare. 279 	  Past	  experience	   shows	   that	   SOEs	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   attempt	   a	   takeover	   than	   SWFs	  themselves,	  but	  since	  popular	  perceptions,	  and	  sometimes	  policy	  makers,	  tend	  to	  link	  SOEs	  to	  SWFs,	  the	  later	  have	  also	  acquired	  a	  reputation	  for	  pursuing	  similar	  policies.280	  According	   to	   a	   study	   by	   Bernstein	   et	   al.,	   the	   average	   acquisition	   stake	   of	  SWFs	   is	   substantial	   (56.59%).	   In	   more	   detail,	   the	   average	   stake	   of	   Middle	  Eastern	   funds	   is	  much	   larger	   (62.2%)	   than	   that	   of	   the	  western	   funds	   (25.7%),	  with	  Asia	  being	  between	   the	   two.281	  Similarly,	  data	  collected	  by	  Monitor	  Group	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  Moore	  and	  Choi	  (n	  251).	  277	  ibid.	  278	  See	  above	  at	  Table	  2.1.	  279	  Most	  of	  the	  transactions	  in	  which	  SWFs	  acquired	  a	  majority	  stake	  occurred	  in	  emerging	  markets, Nancy	  Brune,	  ‘Preliminary	  thoughts	  on	  SWFs’,	  in	  Myrna	  (n	  174)	  29;	  
Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  19.	  280	  See	  Chapter	  1,	  Traynor	  (n	  73).	  281	  Bernstein	  and	  others	  (n	  100)	  15-­‐16.	  Alhtough	  Fotak	  and	  others	  in	  their	  study	  give	  a	  much	  smaller	  average	  acquisition	  stake,	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  18.	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indicates	  that	  since	  2000,	  SWFs	  have	  acquired	  controlling	  stakes	  in	  half	  of	  their	  transactions.282	  The	  evidence	  submitted	  by	  Truman	  in	  2007	  before	  the	  USA	  Senate	  seems	  to	  confirm	   that	  Middle	   Eastern	   funds	   are	  more	   keen	   on	  making	   takeovers.	   As	   he	  said,	   ‘at	   present,	   the	   SWFs	   of	   only	   8	   of	   the	   24	   countries	   follow	   investment	  strategies	   involving	   the	   acquisition	   of	   significant	   or	   controlling	   stakes	   in	  companies:	   Brunei,	   Canada,	   China,	   Kuwait,	  Malaysia,	   Qatar,	   Singapore,	   and	   the	  UAE	   and,	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   Canada	   and	   Malaysia,	   the	   companies	   involved	   are	  domestic’.283	  Finally,	   the	  extent	  of	   SWFs’	   investment	  policies	  also	  depends	  on	   the	   target	  sector.	   While	   companies	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   rarely	   raise	   objections	   to	   the	  investments	  of	  SWFs,284	  investments	  in	  manufacturing	  companies	  usually	  fuel	  a	  stronger	   backlash	   and	   national	   strategic	   companies	   (such	   as	   telecoms,	   energy	  etc.)	  often	  encounter	  strong	  governmental	  opposition.285	  These	  different	  stances	  reflect	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   types	   of	   investments	   may	   have	   national	   security	   or	  political	  implications,	  but	  are	  also	  determined	  by	  other	  concurrent	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  public	  opinion	  or	  workers’	  opposition	  etc.	  	  	  
3.	  SWFs	  compared	  	  
i. SWFs	  vs.	  Hedge	  Funds	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  William	  Miracky	  and	  others,	  ‘Assessing	  the	  Risks:	  The	  Behaviours	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  in	  the	  Global	  Economy’	  (2008)	  Monitor	  Group	  <www.altassets.com/pdfs/Monitor_SWF_Report.pdf>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2009	  (registration-­‐based)	  5.	  283	  Truman	  (n	  82)	  7.	  284	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  USA,	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Investment	  and	  National	  Security	  Act	  establishing	  a	  formal	  review	  process	  for	  foreign	  investments	  suspected	  of	  compromising	  national	  security	  (see	  below	  n	  959)	  explicitly	  deleted	  financial	  services	  from	  the	  list	  of	  proscribed	  sectors.	  285	  For	  such	  examples	  see,	  OECD,	  ‘More	  Governments	  Invoke	  National	  Security	  to	  Restrict	  Foreign	  Investment.	  OECD	  adopts	  guidelines	  to	  avoid	  protectionist	  use	  of	  security	  measures’	  2009	  OECD	  <www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/moregovernmentsinvokenationalsecuritytorestrictforeigninvestmentoecdadoptsguidelinestoavoidprotectionistuseofsecuritymeasures.htm>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	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SWFs	   present	   differences	   and	   similarities	   to	   other	   investment	   vehicles,	  notably	   hedge	   funds.	   A	   hedge	   fund	   is	   a	   unit	   trust	   that	   is	   subject	   to	  minimum	  regulation,	  typically	  a	  partnership	  or	  mutual	   fund	  that	  attempts	  to	  obtain	  gains	  by	   exploiting	   market	   anomalies.286	  These	   funds	   are	   often	   high-­‐return	   and	   are	  regarded	  as	  speculative.	  Since	  hedge	  funds	  and	  SWFs	  today	  face	  similar	  calls	  for	  regulations,	  a	  brief	  comparison	  between	  SWFs	  and	  hedge	  funds	  can	  help	  us	  put	  SWFs	  more	  in	  perspective.287	  SWFs,	   as	  mentioned	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   are	   considerably	   larger	   than	   all	   of	  the	  world’s	  hedge	  funds	  combined.	  Specifically,	  until	  the	  beginning	  of	  2009,	  they	  were	   estimated	  by	  Teslik	   to	   have	   twice	   the	   size	   of	   the	  world’s	   hedge	   funds.288	  However,	   hedge	   funds	   use	   excessive	   leverage	   while	   SWFS	   are	   relatively	  unleveraged	  therefore,	  the	  comparison	  is	  somewhat	  misleading.	  SWFs	  are	  comparable	  to	  hedge	  funds	  because	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  similar	  issues,	  such	   as	   lack	   of	   transparency.289 	  Neither	   the	   size	   nor	   the	   exact	   investment	  positions	  of	  hedge	  funds	  are	  publically	  available,	  a	  fact	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  take	  additional	  risks	  in	  their	  investment	  strategies	  and	  compete	  more	  effectively	  with	  other	  investors.	  This	  feature	  creates	  concerns	  over	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  hedge	  funds	  in	  the	  financial	  system.290	  This	  was	  confirmed	  by	  a	  former	  Director	  at	  the	  SEC,	  Thomsen	  who	  said,	  SWFs,	  like	  hedge	  funds,	  are	  relatively	  opaque	  and	  they	  have,	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   substantial	   assets,	   substantial	   power	   in	   financial	  markets.291	  However,	  as	  she	  said,	  SWFs,	  unlike	  hedge	  funds,	  ‘have	  power	  derived	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  Smullen	  and	  Hand	  (n	  273)	  195.	  287	  This	  comparison,	  therefore,	  can	  be	  useful	  later	  when	  discussing	  the	  most	  appropriate	  regulatory	  response	  to	  SWFs.	  288	  Teslik	  (n	  115).	  289	  And	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  discussion	  on	  additional	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds,	  raised	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  has	  similarities	  with	  the	  SWFs	  debate.	  290	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  ‘De	  Larosiere	  Report’	  on	  financial	  supervision	  in	  the	  EU:	  ‘hedge	  funds	  can	  add	  to	  the	  leverage	  of	  the	  system	  and,	  given	  the	  scale	  at	  which	  they	  can	  operate,	  should	  a	  problem	  arise,	  the	  concentrated	  unwinding	  of	  their	  positions	  can	  cause	  major	  dislocations’,	  De	  Larosiere	  and	  others,	  ‘High	  level	  Group	  on	  Financial	  Supervision	  in	  the	  EU’	  (2009)	  DG	  Internal	  Market,	  European	  Commission	  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  24.	  291	  Linda	  Chatman	  Thomsen,	  ‘Testimony	  Before	  the	  [USA]-­‐China	  Economic	  and	  Security	  Review	  Commission’	  (2008)	  SEC	  <www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts020708lct.htm>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	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from	  being	   governmental	   entities,	  which	  may	   give	   them	   access	   to	   government	  officials	  and	  information	  that	  is	  not	  available	  to	  other	  investors’.292	  SWFs	  and	  hedge	   funds	  present	   some	  structural	   similarities:	  most	  SWFs	  are	  not	   subject	   to	   investment	   rules	  with	   respect	   to	   certain	  asset	   types	  or	   currency	  exposures,	  as	   they	  are	  known	   for	  pension	  or	   investment	   funds.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  range	   of	   their	   investment	   options,	   SWFs	   are,	   therefore,	  more	   similar	   to	   hedge	  funds	  than	  to	  the	  regulated	  fund	  industry.293	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  SWFs	  and	  hedge	  funds	   differ	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   different	   ownership	   status.	   State	   ownership	   of	  SWFs	  makes	  them	  part	  of	  a	  country’s	  wider	  macroeconomic	  objectives	  and	  thus	  increases	   their	   responsibility	   but	   may	   also	   include	   non-­‐commercial	  considerations	   behind	   their	   investments.	   Hedge	   funds,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	  driven	  by	  purely	  economic	  motivations	  and,	  therefore,	  aim	  at	  generating	  short-­‐term	  profits.	  SWFs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  aim	  at	  medium	  to	  long-­‐term	  returns.	  As	  a	  result,	   SWFs	   are	   long-­‐term	   investors	   (also	   called	   ‘buy-­‐and-­‐hold’)	   while	   hedge	  funds	  are	  more	  volatile,	  short-­‐term	  investors.	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  comparing	  their	  direct	  transactions,	  hedge	  funds,	  although	  smaller,	  have	  a	  much	  stronger	  impact	  on	  stock	  markets	  than	  SWFs	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  cause	  imbalances	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  system.294	  However,	  as	  said	  above,	  SWFs	  invest	  frequently	  via	   hedge	   funds	   thus	   providing	   considerable	   liquidity	   for	   the	   transactions	  performed	  by	  hedge	  funds	  and	  other	  investment	  vehicles.295	  Overall	   then,	   although	   SWFs	   and	   hedge	   funds	   have	   similarities,	   their	  differences	   of	   ownership	   status,	   use	   of	   leverage	   and	   investment	   behaviour	  suffice	   to	   place	   them	   in	   different	   categories.	   However,	   both	   entities’	   lack	   of	  transparency	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  similar	  considerations	  for	  regulators	  dealing	  with	  them.	   Those	   issues	   are	   dealt	   with	   below	   when	   analysing	   possible	   regulatory	  frameworks	  for	  SWFs.	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  292	  ibid.	  293	  Such	  as	  mutual	  funds,	  pension	  funds	  and	  insurance	  companies,	  for	  example,	  n	  1062.	  294	  See	  here	  where	  Benhua,	  Deputy	  Administrator	  of	  SAFE,	  argues	  that	  the	  investment	  strategies	  of	  hedge	  funds	  entail	  greater	  risks	  than	  those	  of	  companies	  like	  SAFE,	  CSC	  staff,	  ‘Chinese	  SWF:	  We	  Behave	  Better	  Than	  Hedge	  Funds’,	  China	  Stakes	  (Shanghai	  9	  January	  2009)	  <www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=140>,	  (accessed	  1	  July	  2009).	  295	  n	  240,	  250.	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   Institutional	   investors	   are	   often	   mentioned	   together	   with	   SWFs	   in	   a	  comparative	   approach.296	  The	   term	   ‘institutional	   investors’	   usually	   denotes	   a	  large	  pool	  of	  investment	  funds.	  These	  can	  be	  pension	  funds,	  mutual	  funds,	  money	  managers,	   insurance	   companies,	   investment	   banks,	   commercial	   trusts	   or	  endowment	   funds.297	  It	  was	   reported	   by	  Davis	   that	   the	   assets	   held	   in	   1998	   by	  institutional	   investors	   in	   the	  UK	  amounted	   to	   $2.742	   trillion	  (representing	  197%	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP)	  and	  in	  the	  USA	  to	  $14.967	  trillion	  (176%	  of	  GDP).298	  In	  2000	  claims	  by	   institutional	   investors	  amounted	  to	  121%	  of	  the	  GDP	  of	  the	  G7	  countries.299	  The	  size	  of	  institutional	  investors’	  holdings	  often	  draws	  comparisons	  with	  that	  of	  SWFs.300	  Their	   appearance	   in	   the	   1960s	   brought	   changes	   to	   the	   notions	   of	  shareholding,	   the	   bulk	   of	   which	   until	   then	   was	   dispersed	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  individual	   investors.	   The	   effect	   of	   institutional	   investing	   was	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   re-­‐concentration	   of	   shareholding	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   fewer	   investors.301	  In	   this	   sense	  their	   impact	  presents	   similarities	  with	   that	  of	   SWFs,	   as	   the	   later	   also	   lead	   to	   a	  higher	   concentration	   of	   shareholding,	   although	   this	   time	   on	   behalf	   of	  governments.302	  Another	  similarity	  between	  the	  two	  entities	   is	   that	   they	  both	  manage	   large	  sums	  of	  money	  as	  intermediaries	  (i.e.	  they	  act	  as	  a	  middleman	  between	  investors	  and	   firms	   that	   raise	   funds).	   Institutional	   investors	  manage	   their	   funds	   for	   the	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  See	  above	  n	  286	  onwards.	  297	  Ben	  McClure,	  ‘Institutional	  Investors	  and	  Fundamentals:	  What’s	  the	  Link?’,	  (Investopedia)	  <www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/101503.asp>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012.	  298	  Philip	  Davis,	  ‘Institutional	  Investors,	  Financial	  Market	  Efficiency,	  and	  Financial	  Stability’	  (2003)	  Vol	  08	  No	  1/2003,	  European	  Investment	  Bank	  Papers	  <www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2003_v08_n01_en.pdf#page=76>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  80,	  table	  5.	  299	  ibid	  80,	  table	  4.	  300	  For	  more	  recent	  size	  figures	  of	  individual	  institutional	  investors	  and	  a	  comparative	  table	  with	  those	  of	  SWFs	  see:	  Hao	  Jiang,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Institutional	  Investors	  in	  Corporate	  Financing’	  (2007)	  QFinance	  <www.qfinance.com/financing-­‐best-­‐practice/the-­‐role-­‐of-­‐institutional-­‐investors-­‐in-­‐corporate-­‐financing?page=1>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  figure	  1.	  301	  Paul	  Davies,	  ‘Institutional	  Investors	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  in	  Theodor	  Baums,	  Richard	  Buxbaum	  and	  Klaus	  Hopt,	  Institutional	  Investors	  and	  Corporate	  Governance	  (de	  Gruyter,	  1994).	  302	  Lawrence	  Summers,	  ‘Funds	  That	  Shake	  Capitalist	  Logic’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  29	  July	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/bb8f50b8-­‐3dcc-­‐11dc-­‐8f6a-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	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benefit	  of	  their	  contributors	  while	  SWFs	  manage	  their	  reserves	  for	  their	  ultimate	  beneficiaries,	  their	  home	  countries’	  citizens.	  However,	  as	  it	  was	  explained	  above,	  while	   institutional	   investors	   are	  usually	   tied	  by	   concrete	   fiduciary	  duties,	   such	  ties	  are	  absent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs.	  SWF	  and	  institutional	  investors,	  given	  their	  large	  stakes	  under	  their	  control,	  both	  have	  the	  ability	  as	  well	  as	  the	  incentive	  to	  impact	  on	  company	  decisions.303	  However,	  while	  SWFs	  so	  far	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  management	  of	  companies,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	  with	   institutional	   investors.	   As	  Davies	   noted	   in	  2003,	  ‘shareholder	  activism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  institutions	  is	  now	  a	  bigger	  part	  of	  the	  corporate	   scene	   than	   it	   was,	   say,	   20	   years	   ago,	   and	   it	   is	   an	   activity	   which	   is	  crucially	  underpinned	  by	  the	  rights	  of	  shareholders	  at	  general	  meetings’.304	  Most	  intervention	  by	  individual	  investors	  is	  said	  to	  take	  place	  in	  private	  (and	  hence	  is	  difficult	   to	   detect)	   and	   only	   moves	   to	   the	   public	   arena	   if	   private	   pressure	   is	  unsuccessful.305	  	  The	   second	   part	   now	   turns	   to	   SWFs’	   investment	   behaviour	   at	   times	   of	  economic	   crisis.	   For	   this	  purpose,	   the	   sample	   taken	   is	   the	   economic	   crisis	   that	  began	   in	   the	   USA	   with	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   real	   estate	   market	   in	   2007	   but	   its	  effects	  were	  felt	  globally.	  This	  part	  begins	  by	  describing	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  global	   economic	   crisis	   and	   how	   it	   affected	   SWFs	   in	   particular.	   Later	   comes	   an	  analysis	   of	   various	   types	   of	   strategies	   deployed	  by	   SWFs	  during	   this	   period	   of	  crisis.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  303	  See	  Berle	  and	  Means’	  study	  which	  holds	  that	  smaller	  shareholders	  have	  fewer	  incentives	  to	  make	  use	  of	  their	  corporate	  governance	  rights,	  Adolf	  Berle	  and	  Gardiner	  Means,	  The	  Modern	  Corporation	  and	  Private	  Property,	  Hartcourt,	  Brace	  and	  Court	  Inc,	  revised	  ed	  New	  York,	  1968.	  304	  Paul	  Davies,	  Gower	  and	  Davies’	  Principles	  of	  Modern	  Company	  Law,	  sweet	  and	  Maxwell,	  London,	  2003,	  338;	  Richard	  Parnham,	  ‘German	  Lawyers	  Learn	  the	  Art	  of	  Shareholder	  Activism’	  (2001)	  EuroLaw	  8;	  Bo	  Gong,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Institutional	  Shareholder	   Activism	  in	  Corporate	  Governance:	  a	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  China	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (2012)	  Comp	  Law,	  172-­‐174;	  Ryan	  Bolger,	  ‘Canada	  Signals	  “Sea	  Change”	  in	  Global	  Shareholder Activism’	  (2012)	  IFLRev	  30(16)	  12.	  305	  ibid	  338.	  
The	  Investment	  Behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  
	   86	  
	  
	   B. ASSET	  ALLOCATION	  AT	  TIMES	  OF	  ECONOMIC	  ‘CRISIS’	  	  	  
1. The	  ‘Global	  Financial	  Crisis’	  	   The	  origins	  of	  the	  GFC	  lied	  in	  the	  bubble	  formed	  in	  the	  housing	  markets	  as	  home	  prices	  across	  the	  country	  increased	  each	  year	  from	  the	  mid	  1990s	  to	  2006	  moving	  out	  of	   line	  with	   fundamentals	   like	  household	   income.	  The	  rapid	   rise	  of	  lending	   by	   financial	   intermediaries	   to	   subprime	   borrowers	   was	   one	   of	   the	  factors	   that	   helped	   inflate	   the	   housing	   price	   bubble.	   In	   March	   2007	   a	   larger	  number	  of	  foreclosures	  in	  the	  USA	  caused	  a	  decline	  of	  house	  prices	  and	  a	  general	  collapse	  of	  the	  housing	  market,	  known	  as	  the	  ‘sub-­‐prime	  mortgage	  crisis’.306	  This	  development	   had	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	   investment	   banks	   and	   hedge	   funds	   that	  had	  invested	  heavily	  in	  mortgage	  backed	  securities.307	  With	  the	  help	  of	  financial	  innovation	   these	   securities	  had	  been	  repackaged	  and	  resold	   to	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  investors,	   thus	   sending	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   crash	   across	   the	   entire	   financial	  sector.308	  This	   outcome,	   in	   turn,	   caused	   a	   credit	   crunch309	  primarily	   affecting	  highly	   leveraged	   financial	   institutions	   such	   as	   Bear	   Stearns	   and	   Lehman	  Brothers.310	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  number	  of	  investment	  banks	  where	  either	  sold	  at	  fire-­‐sale	   prices	   or	   became	   commercial	   banks.311	  It	   was,	   however,	   the	   collapse	   of	  Lehman	   Brothers,	   the	   fourth	   largest	   American	   bank,	   in	   September	   2008	   that	  became	   the	   defining	   moment	   of	   the	   2008	   stock-­‐market	   crash,	   as	   it	   led	   to	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  Ben	  Bernanke,	  ‘Speech	  at	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  Chicago’s	  43rd	  Annual	  Conference	  on	  Bank	  Structure	  and	  Competition’,	  Chicago,	  17	  May	  2007,	  <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013.	  307	  John	  Hull,	  ‘The	  Credit	  Crunch	  of	  2007:	  What	  Went	  Wrong?	  Why?	  What	  Lessons	  Can	  Be	  Learned?’	  Rothman	  School	  Research	  Paper,	  2-­‐7.	  308	  Martin	  Baily,	  Robert	  Litan	  and	  Matthew	  Johnson,	  ‘The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Financial	  Crisis’	  (2008)	  Fixing	  Finance	  Series	  –	  Paper	  3,	  Brookings	  Institute	  <www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/11/origin%20crisis%20baily%20litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012,	  22-­‐23,	  29-­‐30.	  309	  By	  credit	  crunch	  is	  meant	  a	  liquidity	  crisis.	  310	  Stephen	  Labaton,	  ‘Agency’s	  ’04	  rule	  Let	  Banks	  Pile	  Up	  New	  Debt’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  2	  October	  2008)	  <www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  311	  ibid.	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widespread	   losses	   to	   the	   global	   financial	  markets.312	  The	   subsequent	   recession	  led	  to	  low	  consumer	  sentiment	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  other	  countries	  which,	  naturally,	  dropped	   the	   demand	   for	   imported	   goods,	   thus	   affecting	   export-­‐driven	   Asian	  economies.313	  In	  addition,	   it	   lowered	  demand	  for	  oil	   thus	  harming	  oil-­‐exporting	  Gulf	  economies314	  (see	  chart	  1.1	  above).	  Although	  the	  USA	  government,	  together	  with	   other	   governments,	   devised	   a	   bailout	   plan315	  to	   assist	   the	   financial	   sector	  and	  help	  the	  credit	  system	  function	  properly,	  financial	  tremors	  continued.	  SWFs	  were	  affected	  in	  multiple	  ways	  by	  the	  above	  developments.	  Because	  of	  the	  devaluation	  of	   listed	  companies’	  shares	  SWFs	  immediately	  incurred	  serious	  paper	   losses	  on	   their	   investments.316	  Losses	   in	   alternative	   investments	   such	  as	  real	  estate	  and	  hedge	  funds	  also	  hurt	  SWFs	  in	  which	  they	  had	  equally	  invested.	  Finally,	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   recession	   and	   the	   drop	   in	   demand	   for	   oil	   and	   Asian	  exports	   also	   reduced	   the	   reserves	   of	   the	   home	   countries	   of	   many	   SWFs	   (see	  chart	  1.2	  above).	  Although	  the	  exact	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  GFC	  cannot	  be	  easily	  pinpointed,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis	  this	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2008.317	  It	  was	  during	  this	  period	  when	  publicly-­‐reported	  collective	  SWF	  financial	   investments	  plummeted	  mainly	  because	  of	   the	   collapse	  of	  Bear	  Stearns	   in	  mid-­‐March.318	  As	  regards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  crisis,	  due	  to	  continued	  market	  instability	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  312	  Stephen	  Stewart,	  ‘World’s	  Financial	  Markets	  in	  Crisis	  After	  Lehman	  Brothers	  Collapse’	  Daily	  
Record	  (Glasgow,	  16	  September	  2008)	  <www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-­‐world-­‐news-­‐/2008/09/16/world-­‐s-­‐financial-­‐markets-­‐in-­‐crisis-­‐after-­‐lehman-­‐brothers-­‐collapse-­‐86908-­‐20738635>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Carick	  Mollenkamp,	  ‘Lehman's	  Demise	  Triggered	  Cash	  Crunch	  Around	  Globe’	  WSJ	  (New	  York,	  29	  Septempber	  2008)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122266132599384845.html>	  accessed	  7	  June	  2013.	  313	  Such	  as	  China	  and	  South	  Korea,	  Barbary	  and	  Chin	  (n	  318)	  37.	  314	  Oil	  prices	  fell	  from	  a	  high	  of	  $147	  a	  barrel	  in	  July,	  to	  $60	  a	  barrel	  three	  months	  later,	  and	  closed	  2008	  at	  only	  $38	  a	  barrel,	  ibid.	  315	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  USA,	  this	  was	  the	  Troubled	  Assets	  Relief	  Program,	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘ToubledAsset	  Relief	  Program’	  (USA	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury)	  <www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-­‐stability/pages/default.aspx>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  316	  The	  ten	  largest	  bank	  investments	  between	  September	  2007	  and	  January	  2009,	  worth	  $56.9	  billion,	  by	  March	  2009	  were	  collectively	  worth	  a	  mere	  $15.7	  billion,	  implying	  an	  apparent	  loss	  of	  73%	  of	  initial	  value,	  in	  barely	  one	  year,	  Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  53.	  317	  Although	  as	  far	  as	  the	  USA	  is	  concerned,	  the	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research	  declared	  December	  of	  2007	  as	  the	  official	  start	  of	  the	  recession,	  Afyonoglu	  and	  others	  (n	  269)	  44.	  318	  Victoria	  Barbary	  and	  Edward	  Chin,	  ‘The	  rise	  and	  Retreat	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’,	  in	  Myrna	  (n	  174)	  34.	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establish.	   However,	   it	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   from	   the	   third	   quarter	   of	   2009	   an	  increase	   in	   the	   activity	   of	   SWFs	   was	   observed.319	  Although	   their	   performance	  and	  investment	  behaviour	  had	  not	  returned	  to	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  levels,	  it	  was	  during	  this	  period	  that	  SWFs	  were	   largely	  considered	  to	  have	   ‘returned	  to	  the	   fray’.320	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  sample	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  in	  times	  of	  crisis	   shall	  be	   the	  period	  between	   the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2008	  until	   (including)	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2009	  (see	  also	  chart	  2.8	  below).	  	  
Chart	  2.8:	  SWF	  investments	  by	  target	  sector	  in	  2008	  (billion	  USD)	  
	  (Myrna	  (n	  174)	  34)	  	   Having	  established	  the	  meaning	  and	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  the	  GFC,	  the	  next	  step	  is	   to	   give	   a	   general	   background	   on	   the	   effect	   that	   this	   crisis	   had	   on	   the	  investment	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  Effects	  of	  the	  GFC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  319	  IMF,	  ‘World	  Economic	  Outlook	  2009	  –	  Sustaining	  the	  Recovery’	  (2009)	  World	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Surveys,	  IMF.	  320	  Lina	  Saigol,	  ‘Wealth	  Funds	  Return	  to	  the	  Fray’,	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  3	  August	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2cf63c4-­‐7fc3-­‐11de-­‐85dc-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	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At	  times	  of	  economic	  downturn,	  the	  investment	  strategies	  of	  SWFs	  are	  put	  to	  the	   test,	   i.e.	  most	  SWFs	  are	  called	   to	  revive	   the	   local	  economies	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	   financial	   reserves	   they	   had	   accumulated	   in	   the	   past.	   Therefore,	   sovereign	  funds	  may	   be	   used	   to	   stimulate	   aggregate	   demand	   or	   to	   bail	   out	   the	   banking	  sector,	  while	  stabilisation-­‐type	  funds	  are	  used	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	   low	  prices	  of	  natural	  resources.	  Of	  course,	  as	  with	  normal	  times,	  the	  investment	  strategies	  of	  SWFs	   in	   recessions	   also	   vary	   greatly	   between	   them.	   Certain	   funds	   simply	  slowdown	   or	   even	   halt	   all	   FDI	   activity	   and	   focus	   solely	   on	   domestic	   issues.	  Because,	   of	   the	   secrecy	   surrounding	   the	   behaviour	   of	   most	   SWFs	   there	   is	   no	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  exact	  investment	  patterns	  for	  SWFs	  at	  times	  of	  crisis.	  It	   should	  also	  be	  emphasised	   that	   since	   the	   large	  majority	  of	  SWFs	  are	   still	  new	  and	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  is	  the	  first	  to	  put	  SWFs	  under	  strain,	  there	  is	  no	   precedent	   on	   the	   strategies	   of	   SWFs	   at	   times	   of	   crisis.	   There	   is,	   however,	  sufficient	   information	   on	   their	   reaction	   to	   the	   deteriorating	  market	   conditions	  that	  followed	  the	  property	  bubble	  burst	  of	  2007	  which	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  draw	  valuable	  conclusions.	  Until	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2008,	  SWFs	  seemed	  to	  have	  survived	  the	  negative	  effects	   of	   the	   property	   bubble	   burst	   in	   the	   USA.321	  The	   credit	   crunch	   that	  followed	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   housing	  market	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   2007	  made	   it	  difficult	   for	   a	   number	   of	   high	   profile	   financial	   institutions	   to	   obtain	   credit	   and	  many	   fell	   in	   urgent	   need	   of	   capital.322	  Under	   these	   circumstances,	   financial	  institutions	  normally	  draw	  capital	   from	  their	  shareholders.	  This	  time,	  however,	  they	   decided	   to	   address	   themselves	   to	   SWFs	   mainly	   because	   of	   their	   large	  available	   reserves	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   financial	   sector.	   Drawing	   funds	   from	   SWFs	  would	  also	  allow	  banks	  in	  the	  west	  to	  avoid	  the	  lengthy	  procedural	  requirements	  of	  convening	  an	  extraordinary	  meeting	  of	  shareholders.323	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  321	  Thorolb	  Barker	  described	  their	  behaviour	  as	  a	  ‘masochistic	  streak’	  noting	  that	  they	  had	  ‘the	  stomach	  for	  serious	  losses’,	  Thorolb	  Barker,	  ‘On	  Wall	  Street:	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  to	  Drive	  Hard	  Bargain’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  16	  November	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2535fffe-­‐947a-­‐11dc-­‐9aaf-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  322	  Such	  capital	  is	  also	  usually	  needed	  for	  reputational	  reasons,	  because	  investors	  needed	  to	  have	  the	  assurance	  that	  the	  companies	  they	  invest	  in	  are,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be,	  financially	  sound.	  323	  For	  the	  UK,	  these	  are	  found	  at	  sections	  302-­‐333	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  2006.	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Thus,	   in	   the	  course	  of	  a	   few	  months,	  by	   the	   first	  quarter	  of	  2008	  SWFs	  had	  substantially	  increased	  their	  presence	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  EU	  through	  their	  high-­‐profile	   investments	   in	  various	   financial	   institutions.324	  In	   January	  2008	  Morgan	  Stanley	  analysts	  pointed	  out	  that	  93%	  of	  $75	  billion	  invested	  in	  western	  financial	  companies	   until	   then	   had	   come	   from	   five	   states:	   Singapore,	   China,	   Dubai,	   Abu	  Dhabi	   and	   Kuwait.325	  Drezner	   estimated	   that	   between	   March	   2007	   and	   June	  2008	   SWFs	   injected	   a	   total	   of	   $59	   billion	   in	   troubled	   western	   financial	  institutions,326	  while	   figures	   from	  Dealogic	  put	   the	  value	  of	  cross-­‐border	  equity	  investments	  by	  SWFs	  in	  2009	  until	  June	  at	  $21.1	  billion.327	  As	   the	   crisis	  deepened	   towards	   the	   second,	  but	  more	   intensely	   in	   the	   third	  and	  fourth	  quarters	  of	  2008,	  more	  companies	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA	  operating	  in	  all	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy,	   such	   as	   the	   car-­‐making	   industry,328	  experienced	  severe	   difficulties	   and	   began	   to	   seek	   capital	   from	   SWFs	   to	   keep	   themselves	  afloat.	  But	  by	  then,	   the	  price	  of	  oil	  as	  well	  as	   the	  growth	  rates	  of	  countries	   like	  China,	  Russia	  and	  Singapore	  had	  fallen	  sharply,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  inflows	  of	  cash	  into	   SWFs’	   reserves.	   Moreover,	   most	   SWFs	   had	   already	   made	   serious	   paper	  losses	  on	  their	  previous	  investments.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	  Examples	  include,	  David	  Wigton,	  ‘Citi	  and	  Merrill	  in	  SWF	  talks’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  10	  January	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d2e101a-­‐bfb0-­‐11dc-­‐8052-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Henry	  Sender,	  ‘Kuwait	  Set	  to	  Invest	  as	  Merrill	  Seeks	  $4bn’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  13	  January	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/00f57f02-­‐c20b-­‐11dc-­‐8fba-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Peter	  Larsen,	  ‘Sovereign	  Funds	  Win	  Beneficial	  Terms’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  15	  January	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cd48d84-­‐c3a6-­‐11dc-­‐b083-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  325	  Peter	  Larsen,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Goes	  in	  to	  Western	  Reserves’	  Financial	  Times	  (London	  16	  January	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a996fcfe-­‐c3d6-­‐11dc-­‐b083-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  326	  Daniel	  Drezner,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  the	  (In)security	  of	  global	  Finance’	  (2008)	  Vol	  62(1)	  Journal	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  115.	  327	  Andrew	  Peaple,	  ‘Are	  Sovereign	  Funds	  Ready	  to	  Spread	  the	  Wealth	  Again?’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	  (New	  York,	  20	  June	  2009)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124546040327333239.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  328	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘Daimler	  Held	  Talks	  with	  China	  Wealth	  Fund:	  Report’	  Reuters	  (London,	  21	  April	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/euPrivateEquityNews/idUSTRE53K3TC20090421>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘Lower	  Saxony	  Open	  to	  Arab	  Investor	  in	  Volkswagen’,	  Reuters	  (London,	  4	  May	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAndRetailNews/idUSL431770920090504>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	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As	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  GFC,	  in	  global	  recessions	  the	  strategies	  of	  SWFs	  can	  generally	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   categories,	   sometimes	   applied	   separately	   and	  sometimes	  in	  combination:	  First,	  certain	  SWFs	  stop	  investing	  abroad	  (and	  in	  rare	  cases	   they	   even	   sell	   assets).	   Second,	   most	   funds	   apply	   their	   funds	   to	   bail	   out	  domestic	  economies,	  and	  third,	  a	  number	  of	  them	  seek	  opportunities	  for	  further	  investments	  abroad.	  Many	  SWFs	  followed	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  above	  strategies,	  either	   simultaneously	   or	   consecutively,	   depending	   on	   the	   financial	   situation	   of	  each	  individual	  SWF.	  The	   first	   confirmation	   that	   SWFs	   were	   under	   strain	   came	   with	   the	  announcements	   of	  modification	   of	   their	   foreign	   investment	   plans,	   and	   for	   this	  reason,	  this	  type	  of	  behaviour	  is	  dealt	  with	  first.	  	  
i. Interruption	  or	  modification	  of	  foreign	  investment	  plans	  	   Amid	   an	   uncertain	   economic	   environment	   caused	   by	   the	   declining	   share	  values	  of	  major	  investment	  banks	  such	  as	  Citigroup,	  and	  having	  endured	  severe	  losses,	   the	  majority	  of	  SWFs	  decided	  that	  FDI	   in	  western	  financial	   firms	  should	  be	   brought	   to	   a	   halt.	   Indeed,	   as	   the	   share	   values	   of	   major	   western	   financial	  companies	   were	   decreasing,	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   certain	   SWFs	   had	   been	  reviewing	  their	  earlier	  investments	  in	  those	  companies,329	  while	  others	  became	  the	  targets	  of	  criticisms	  in	  their	  home	  countries	  for	  buying	  shares	  shortly	  before	  their	  values	  plummeted.330	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  329	  For	  example,	  ADIA's	  returns	  as	  a	  bondholder	  at	  Citigroup	  had	  been	  unaffected	  by	  continuing	  troubles	  in	  the	  company,	  but	  the	  dramatic	  fall	  in	  Citi’s	  share	  price	  had	  eroded	  the	  conversion	  value	  of	  the	  mandatory	  convertible	  bonds.	  In	  the	  original	  deal	  with	  ADIA,	  the	  Citi	  securities	  were	  to	  be	  converted	  into	  common	  stock	  at	  a	  price	  between	  $31.83	  and	  $37.24	  a	  share	  between	  March	  2010	  and	  September	  2011.	  Citi,	  at	  the	  time,	  traded	  at	  $1.50	  a	  share,	  Stanley	  Carvalho,	  ‘Abu	  Dhabi	  Reviewing	  Citigroup	  Investment:	  Sources’	  Reuters	  (London,	  1	  March	  2012)	  <www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE52012320090301?sp=true>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  See	  also,	  John	  Burton,	  ‘Singapore	  Sovereign	  Fund	  invested	  “Too	  Early”	  in	  Citigroup	  and	  UBS’	  Financial	  
Times	  (London,	  5	  March	  2012)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6bf45310-­‐0926-­‐11de-­‐b8b0-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  330	  For	  example,	  Ulf	  Laessing	  and	  Rania	  El-­‐Gamal,	  ‘KIA	  to	  Boost	  Investments	  on	  Local	  Bourse’	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  16	  September	  2008)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/property/article/531170-­‐kuwaits-­‐kia-­‐to-­‐boost-­‐investments-­‐on-­‐local-­‐bourse>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	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As	  a	  result,	  SWFs	  gradually	  altered	  their	  investments	  policies.	  Funds	  from	  the	  Gulf	  or	  Asia	  gradually	  slowed	  down	  or	  completely	  stopped	  investing	  in	  the,	  once	  lucrative,	  western	  financial	  sector.331	  Certain	  funds,	  such	  as	  GIC	  Singapore,	  which	  was	  estimated	  by	  analysts	  in	  late	  2007	  to	  have	  had	  an	  asset	  value	  of	  $300bn,	  in	  March	  2009	  according	  to	  Singapore’s	  Prime	  Minister,	  cut	   the	  equity	  position	   in	  its	  portfolio	  from	  60%	  to	  about	  45%	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  downturn	  in	  the	  global	  economy.332 	  It,	   moreover,	   announced	   that	   in	   the	   future	   it	   would	   be	   more	  cautious	  and	  take	  fewer	  risks.333	  The	  overall	  volumes	  of	  transactions	  confirm	  the	  above	  contention.	  During	  the	  second	  quarter	  2008,	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bear	  Sterns,	  only	  $3.6	  billion	  were	  invested	   by	   SWFs	   globally,	  while	   it	   is	   indicative	   that	   the	   third	   quarter	   saw	   no	  investments	  in	  USA	  and	  EU	  financial	  companies	  at	  all.334	  In	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  of	  2008	   SWFs	   gradually	   shifted	   away	   from	  western	  markets	   and	  moved	   towards	  emerging	   ones.	   The	   latter	   received	   over	   70%	  of	   SWFs’	   investments	   in	   the	   last	  quarter	  of	  2008.335	  As	  Monitor	  Group	  notes,	   from	   July	   to	   the	  end	  of	  September	  2008,	   ‘twenty-­‐one	   of	   the	   thirty-­‐nine	   SWF	   transactions	   were	   in	   emerging	  markets,	  and	  these	  were	  spread	  across	  a	  range	  of	  sectors,	   including	   industrials	  and	   aerospace,	   in	   addition	   to	   their	  mainstays	   of	   financials	   and	   energy’.336	  The	  downturn	  continued	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2009,	  during	  which	  only	  $6.8	  billion	  were	  recorded	  in	  SWF	  investments337	  (see	  charts	  2.9	  and	  2.10	  below).	  	  
Chart	  2.9:	  SWF	  cross	  border	  activity	  2000	  –	  2008	  (end	  of	  May)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  331	  Marc	  Roche,	  ‘Les	  Fonds	  Souverains	  du	  Moyens-­‐Orient	  Battent	  en	  Retraite’	  Le	  Monde	  (Paris,	  29	  November	  2008)	  <www.lemonde.fr/la-­‐crise-­‐financiere/article/2008/11/29/les-­‐fonds-­‐souverains-­‐du-­‐moyen-­‐orient-­‐battent-­‐en-­‐retraite_1124920_1101386.html>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012;	  Nick	  Ray,	  ‘It’s	  Too	  Dangerous	  to	  Invest,	  Says	  Head	  of	  Dubai	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund’,	  The	  Times	  (London,	  28	  January	  2009)	  <http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/wef/article5604067.ece>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  332	  Burton	  (n	  329).	  333	  Neil	  Chatterjee	  and	  Kevin	  Lim,	  ‘Singapore's	  GIC	  Will	  Be	  Cautious,	  Take	  Few	  Risks’,	  Reuters	  
INDIA	  (Hyderabad,	  8	  June	  2009)	  <http://in.reuters.comarticlePrint?articleId=INSGC00117420090608>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  334	  Brune	  (n	  279)	  35.	  	  335	  Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  5.	  336	  ibid	  15.	  337	  ibid.	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  (Marco	  Maslakovic,	  ‘SWFs	  2009’	  (2009)	  IFSL	  Research	  2)	  	  
Chart	  2.10:	  SWF	  Money	  Never	  Sleeps	  II	  -­‐	  Data	  from	  the	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund	  
Institute’s	  Transaction	  Database	  v2.0	  (Data	  in	  Billions	  USD)	  
	  SWFTD	  v2.0	  	   Despite	   the	   general	   decline,	   a	   number	   of	   SWFs	   reportedly	   increased	   their	  exposure	   in	   the	   commodities	   market. 338 	  The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   because	  commodities	  prices	  have	  been	  low	  for	  some	  time	  but,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  stocks	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  338	  Such	  as	  energy,	  water	  and	  food,	  John	  Irish,	  ‘Qatar	  SWF	  Delays	  Investments	  for	  Six	  Months’	  Arabian	  Times	  (Dubai,	  12	  March	  2009)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-­‐s-­‐swf-­‐delays-­‐investments-­‐for-­‐six-­‐months-­‐79089.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  It	  is	  also	  stated	  in	  the	  article	  that	  QIA	  intends	  to	  preserve	  its	  dollar	  denominated	  bonds	  in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  but	  it	  could	  not	  guarantee	  that	  it	  would	  not	  shift	  towards	  the	  euro	  in	  the	  future.	  
The	  Investment	  Behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  
	   94	  
financial	  companies,	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  gain	  more	  value	  quicker	  in	  the	  near	  future.339	  A	   final	   type	  of	   strategy	   that	  was	   applied	   in	   response	   to	   the	   crisis	   is	   that	   of	  asset	  sales.	  As	  seen	  earlier,	  SWFs	  typically	   invest	  with	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  and	  early	   sales	   of	   assets	   are	   exceptional.	  Nevertheless,	   a	   few	   cases	  were	   observed.	  Such	   was	   the	   case	   of	   Temasek	   Holdings’	   sale	   of	   its	   entire	   stake	   in	   Bank	   of	  America	  in	  March	  2009	  after	  the	  value	  of	  its	  holding	  in	  the	  investment	  bank	  fell	  when	   it	   was	   merged	   with	   Bank	   of	   America	   in	   January	   2009. 340 	  Temasek	  defended	  the	  sale	  stating	  that	  their	  ‘investment	  thesis	  had	  changed	  from	  Merrill’s	  specific	  businesses	  to	  a	  more	  diversified	  linkage	  to	  the	  broader	  USA	  economy’.341	  Temasek	  said	  that	  its	  intention	  was	  to	  ‘rebalance	  its	  portfolio	  when	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  investment	  and	  risk	  environment	  had	  changed’.342	  Two	   further	   cases	   of	   QIA	   and	   Abu	   Dhabi’s	   International	   Petroleum	  Investment	   Co	   (IPIC)	   involved	   a	   sale	   of	   Barclays	   shares.	   In	   April	   2009	   Qatar	  Holding,	  the	  biggest	  shareholder	  in	  the	  Barclays,	  and	  an	  arm	  of	  QIA,	  said	  it	  sold	  35	   million	   shares	   in	   the	   British	   bank	   to	   cut	   its	   stake	   to	   5.8%	   from	   just	   over	  6%.343	  The	  sale	  was	  ‘a	  part	  of	  a	  volatility-­‐driven	  portfolio	  management	  strategy	  which	   it	   applies	   to	   a	   small	   part	   of	   its	   aggregate	   holding’.344	  Qatar,	   however,	  stated	  that	  it	  would	  remain	  supportive	  of	  Barclays	  in	  the	  future.345	  A	  few	  months	  later,	   in	  May-­‐June	  2009,	  PCP	  Gulf	   Invest,	  owned	  by	  Abu	  Dhabi’s	   IPIC	  sold	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  As	  they	  did	  sharply	  by	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2009.	  Generally	  speaking,	  commodities	  do	  badly	  during	  crises	  but	  they	  are	  the	  first	  to	  pick	  up,	  IMF	  ‘Western	  Hemisphere:	  Crisis	  Averted	  –	  What	  Next?’	  (2009)	  Regional	  Economic	  Outlook	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2009/WHD/eng/wreo1009.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  1.	  340	  Chen	  Shiyin	  and	  Miles	  Weiss,	  ‘Singapore’s	  Temasek	  Sells	  Entire	  Stake	  in	  Bank	  of	  America’	  
Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  14	  May	  2009)	  <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aXLFPg87qG10&refer=home>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  341	  John	  Burton,	  ‘Temasek	  Defends	  BofA	  Stake	  Sale’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  22	  May	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b9500486-­‐4686-­‐11de-­‐803f-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  342	  ibid.	  343	  Steve	  Slater	  and	  Elaine	  Hardcastle,	  ‘Qatar	  Holdings	  Cuts	  Barclays	  Stake	  to	  5.8	  pct’	  Reuters	  (London,	  22	  April	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLM94046720090422>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  344	  ibid.	  345	  Emirates	  Business	  Staff,	  ‘Qatari	  SWF	  to	  Remain	  “Supportive”	  of	  Barclays’,	  Zawya	  News	  (Dubai,	  5	  June	  2009)	  <www.zawya.com/printstory.cfm?storyid=ZAWYA20090605054243&l=054200090605>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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than	   1.3	   billion	   Barclays	   shares,	   seven	   months	   after	   helping	   the	   British	   bank	  avoid	   a	   government	   bailout.346 	  As	   opposed	   to	   Qatar’s	   sale,	   which	   incurred	  serious	  losses,	  IPIC	  had	  made	  a	  good	  profit	  from	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  share	  price	  and	  was	   ‘cashing	   in’.347	  The	   sale	  was	   said	   to	   have	   caused	   a	   14%	   drop	   in	   Barclay’s	  share	  price.348	  These	   abovementioned	   instances	   of	   early	   sales	   are	   rare	   (see	   below,	   table	  2.2).	   Taking	   2008	   as	   a	   benchmark,	   investments	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   still	  dominated	  the	  overall	  picture.	  According	  to	  Monitor	  Group,	  in	  2008	  the	  financial	  sector	  accounted	  for	  28%	  of	  the	  SWFs	  deals,	  worth	  75%	  of	  the	  total	  value.349	  	  
Table	  2.2:	  Major	  divestments	  by	  SWFs	  
	  	  (Kern,	  ‘State	  Investments’	  2009,	  28)	  	  
ii. Shifting	  focus	  on	  domestic	  issues	  	   Another	  practice	  applied	  by	  most	  SWFs	  during	  the	  period	  studied	  was	  to	  shift	  their	  attention	  to	  internal	  issues	  and	  apply	  their	  reserves	  to	  stimulate	  domestic	  economies.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   diversification	   of	   a	   country’s	   risk	   and	   revenue	  stabilisation	  sometimes	  may	  be	   the	  primary	  objective	  of	  a	  SWF.	   In	   those	  cases,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	  Jon	  Menon	  and	  Andrew	  MacAskill,	  ‘Barclays’	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Holders	  Make	  $2.4	  Billion	  in	  Sale’	  
Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  2	  June	  2009)	  <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=adDEuHEpBJyA&pid=20601087>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2009.	  347	  ibid.	  348	  Peter	  Larsen	  and	  Kate	  Burgess,	  ‘Barclays	  Falls	  14%	  After	  IPIC	  Sells	  its	  Stake’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  3	  June	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4938e46-­‐4fd5-­‐11de-­‐a692-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012. 349	  Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  11.	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therefore,	  applying	  the	  fund’s	  reserves	  domestically	  is	  part	  of	  the	  fund’s	  original	  purpose.	  This	  is,	  for	  example,	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Russian	  Stabilisation	  Fund.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   some	   SWFs	   accumulate	   funds	   for	   different	   purposes	   and	   their	  mandate	   does	   not	   include	   reviving	   economy	   or	   bailing	   out	   domestic	  companies.350	  Therefore,	   applying	   funds	   in	   this	   way	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   deviation	  from	   their	   pure	   profit	   maximisation	   objectives	   in	   favour	   of	   broader	  macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   stabilisation	   objectives.	   These	   cases	   prove	   that	  governments	   can	   be	   quite	   flexible	   as	   to	   how	   to	   use	   their	   SWFs	   to	   achieve	  multiple	  objectives.	  One	   salient	   example	   is	   Norway’s	   GPFG.	   Although	   its	   name	   indicates	   that	   is	  intended	  to	  cover	  pension	  liabilities,	  in	  practice	  it	  behaves	  just	  like	  most	  wealth	  accumulation	   state-­‐funds.	   During	   the	   crisis,	   it	   was	   stated	   by	   the	   Norwegian	  Prime	  Minister	  that	  the	  country	  had	  held	  back	  and	  been	  restrictive	  in	  its	  use	  of	  oil	  revenues	  in	  strong	  times,	  but	  they	  ‘could	  start	  and	  spend	  more	  now	  that	  [they	  saw]	  a	  downturn	  coming’.351	  According	  to	  Ziemba,	  Norway’s	  stance	  was	  already	  expansionary	  as	   its	   fiscal	  rule	  allows	   it	   to	  spend	  up	  to	  4%	  of	   the	  GPFG’s	  assets	  (the	  assumed	  return	  on	  investment	  in	  most	  years)	  to	  meet	  its	  non-­‐oil	  deficit.352	  Although	  the	  Norwegian	  government	  had	  already	  applied	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  stimulus	  money	   from	  their	  SWF,	  additional	   funds	  were	  decided	  to	  be	  drawn	  on	  mainly	  for	  pump-­‐priming,	  focusing	  on	  public	  building	  works	  supporting	  local	  governments	   and	   labour	   market	   measures. 353 	  Thus,	   in	   January	   2009	   the	  Norwegian	   government	   announced	   a	   20	   billion	   kroner	   (£2.112	   billion)	   fiscal-­‐stimulus	   plan	   that	   included	   spending	   on	   infrastructure	   projects	   and	   tax-­‐reliefs	  for	   businesses.	   Furthermore,	   in	   February	   2009,	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   unveiled	   a	  100	  billion	  kroner	  (£10,565	  billion)	  plan	  to	  inject	  capital	  into	  the	  country’s	  banks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350	  These	  are,	  for	  example,	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  KIA,	  whose	  purpose	  is	  mainly	  to	  save	  funds	  for	  future	  generations	  and	  the	  Norwegian	  and	  Irish	  funds	  that	  is	  officially	  classified	  as	  pension	  funds.	  351	  David	  Ibison,	  ‘Norwegians	  to	  Combat	  Turmoil	  by	  Spending	  Oil	  Wealth’,	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  18	  December	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/718c48a4-­‐ca48-­‐11dd-­‐93e5-­‐000077b07658.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  352	  Rachel	  Ziemba,	  ‘Raiding	  The	  Sovereign	  Rainy	  Day	  Fund’	  (RGE	  Analysts	  EconoMonitor,	  2008)	  <www.economonitor.com/analysts/2008/12/16/raiding-­‐the-­‐sovereign-­‐rainy-­‐day-­‐fund/>	  accessed	  7	  November	  2012;	  Also	  note	  that	  the	  Norwegian	  fund	  is	  precluded	  from	  investing	  locally.	  353	  ibid.	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and	   lend	  directly	   to	  banks	  and	  other	  businesses	  by	  buying	   corporate	  bonds.354	  Unlike	   other	   European	   countries,	   which	   had	   to	   take	   on	   more	   debt	   to	   fund	  increased	  government	  spending,	  Norway	  was	  able	  to	  tap	  its	  oil	  revenue	  by	  using	  the	  reserves	  of	  its	  SWF.	  These	  measures,	  however,	  did	  not	  prevent	  Norway	  from	  falling	  into	  recession	  in	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2009,355	  but	  the	  stimulus	  money	  is	  said	   to	   have	   helped	   Norway	   minimise	   the	   contraction	   to	   a	   0.4%	   in	   the	   first	  quarter	  of	  2009.356	  Other	  countries	  have	  also	  made	  use	  of	   the	  SWFs’	   considerable	   resources	   to	  offset	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   in	   their	   country.	   According	   to	   Oxford	  Analytica,	   SWFs	   have	   been	   used	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   purposes.	   Russia	   planned	  drawing	  on	  its	  Reserve	  Fund	  to	  cover	  the	  government	  budget	  deficit	  of	  roughly	  $75	  billion	  for	  2009.	  Singapore	  also	  drew	  down	  on	  past	  reserves	  managed	  by	  GIC	  for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   country’s	   history,	   while	   it	   also	   considered	   briefly,	   but	  finally	  rejected,	   the	   idea	  of	  setting	  up	  a	   ‘Temasek	  II’	   fund	  to	  help	   local	   firms.357	  Gulf	   countries	   followed	   a	   similar	   route.	   The	   government	   of	   Kuwait	   issued	   a	  resolution	  to	  support	  and	  eventually	  boost	  the	  Kuwaiti	  economy,	  and	  assigned	  to	  KIA	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   buying	   domestic	   bank	   shares	   to	   help	   boost	   bank	  capitalisation	  and	  confidence	  in	  Kuwait.358	  QIA	  also	  said	  it	  would	  buy	  10-­‐20%	  of	  local	  banks’	  equity	  portfolios	  in	  a	  $5bn	  plan.359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354	  Paul	  Hannon,	  ‘Norway	  Unveils	  Bank	  Aid	  Package	  Government	  to	  Inject	  Capital	  into	  Banks,	  Buy	  Corporate	  Bonds’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  2	  February	  2012)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123411883915260951.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  355	  MENAFN	  Staff,	  ‘Norway	  Falls	  Into	  Recession	  in	  Q1’,	  MENAFN	  (Amman,	  19	  May	  2009)	  <www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093249652>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  356	  Continued	  investments	  in	  the	  energy	  industry	  have	  cushioned	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  global	  recession	  in	  Norway.	  The	  country’s	  coalition	  government	  said	  in	  May	  2009	  that	  it	  would	  spend	  more	  of	  its	  oil	  wealth	  this	  year	  to	  help	  stimulate	  the	  economy	  and	  create	  jobs,	  see	  Matthew	  Saltmarsh,	  ‘Norway	  Slides	  Into	  Recession’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  19	  May	  2009)	  <www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/business/global/20kroner.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  357	  Saeed	  Azhar,	  ‘Singapore	  PM	  Kills	  “Temasek	  II”	  Idea	  to	  Help	  Local	  Firms’	  Reuters	  INDIA	  (Hyderabad,	  27	  May	  2009)	  <http://in.reuter.com/articlePrint?articleId=INSIN31135020090527>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  358	  Karen	  Remo-­‐Listana,	  ‘Regional	  SWFs’	  Global	  Role	  to	  Continue’	  Emirates	  Business	  24/7	  (Dubai,	  13	  May	  2009	  <www.emirates247.com/eb247/economy/uae-­‐economy/regional-­‐swfs-­‐global-­‐role-­‐to-­‐continue-­‐2009-­‐05-­‐13-­‐1.32604>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  The	  USA	  Department	  of	  States	  mentions	  that:	  ‘the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  announced	  in	  December	  2009	  that	  the	  Kuwait	  Investment	  Authority	  would	  set	  up	  a	  KD	  1.5	  billion	  ($5.4	  billion)	  fund	  to	  invest	  in	  Kuwaiti	  equities	  listed	  on	  the	  bourse,	  though	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  that	  investment	  are	  unclear’,	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During	   the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2008,	  domestic	   investment	  by	  SWFs	  made	  up	  10%	  of	  all	  transactions.360	  By	  the	  final	  quarter	  this	  figure	  rose	  to	  over	  40%,	  thus	  reversing	   for	   the	   first	   time	   since	   2002	   a	   trend	   of	   declining	   domestic	  investments.361	  After	   discussing	   the	   first	   two	   types	   of	   responses	   to	   the	   crisis,	   it	   is	   time	   to	  examine	   the	   cases	   where	   the	   crisis	   created	   new	   investment	   opportunities	   for	  SWFs	  in	  western	  countries	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  This,	  equally	  important,	  strategy	  is	  analysed	  next.	  	  
iii. Investing	  against	  the	  flow	  	   Although	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   most	   SWFs	   incurred	   losses	   during	   the	  recession,	   even	   then	   some	   continued	   to	   demonstrate	   a	   strong	   appetite	   for	  investments.	   Indeed,	   the	   lost	   value	  of	   global	   equities	   and	   the	  drop	   in	  property	  prices	   was	   said	   to	   have	   created	   new	   opportunities	   for	   many	   SWFs	   to	   expand	  their	  investments	  in	  areas	  that	  might	  have	  not	  been	  possible	  before.362	  This	   type	   of	   strategy	   concerned	   primarily	   funds	   originating	   from	   China.	  Chinese	   funds,	  and	   in	  particular	  CIC,	  had	  abstained	   for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	   time	  from	   making	   large	   investments	   in	   Europe	   and	   other	   western	   countries.	   The	  reason	   for	   this	   approach	   was	   the	   increased	   scepticism	   in	   Europe	   over	   the	  potential	   political	   motivations	   behind	   Chinese	   investments.	   As	   a	   result,	  according	  to	  Jiwei,	  Chairman	  of	  CIC, before	  and	  during	  the	  worst	  part	  of	  the	  crisis	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  accessed	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  (registration-­‐based).	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  Robin	  Wiggelsworth,	  ‘Qatari	  Bail-­‐Outs	  Boost	  Local	  Bourse’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  10	  June	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/758b6a38-­‐55cc-­‐11de-­‐ab7e-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  360	  Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  15.	  361	  ibid.	  362	  This	  strategy	  explained	  here	  differs	  from	  the	  one	  described	  above	  whereby	  SWFs	  intervened	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  to	  ailing	  financial	  institutions.	  Since	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis	  most	  SWFs’	  had	  yet	  to	  incur	  losses,	  expansion	  of	  investments	  was	  a	  more	  normal	  practice	  for	  them.	  The	  investments	  studied	  above	  took	  place	  much	  later	  and	  despite	  the	  heavy	  losses	  suffered	  by	  SWFs	  in	  their	  portfolios.	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CIC	   focused	   primarily	   on	   emerging	   markets	   and	   thus	   managed	   to	   avoid	   the	  losses	  suffered	  by	  SWFs	  that	  had	  invested	  in	  western	  companies.363	  Amid	   the	   recession,	   however,	   western	   government	   and	   markets	   softened	  their	  hard	  stance	  against	  SWF	  investments.	  The	  call	  for	  foreign	  funds	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  western	  world	  combined	  with	  plunging	  share	  prices	  allowed	  Chinese	   funds	   to	   expand	   their	   operations	   once	   again.364	  Examples	   include	   CIC	  helping	  the	  Morgan	  Stanley	  property	  fund	  reach	  its	  fundraising	  target	  in	  March	  2009, 365 	  offering	   to	   buy	   more	   Morgan	   Stanley	   assets	   in	   June	   2009366 	  and	  preparing	   to	   buy	   out	   many	   of	   Deutschebank’s	   non	   performing	   assets. 367	  Moreover,	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  diversify	  its	  investments,	  CIC	  within	  months	  bought	  stakes	   in	   a	   Canadian	   miner368	  and	   an	   Australian	   property	   trust,369	  and	   even	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  363	  As	  he	  characteristically	  said,	  ‘officials	  in	  Europe	  told	  me	  they	  wanted	  me	  to	  state	  clearly	  that	  we	  wouldn't	  take	  stakes	  of	  more	  than	  10%,	  or	  ask	  for	  voting	  rights	  …	  so	  I	  said	  fine,	  if	  Europe	  doesn't	  want	  me,	  I	  won't	  go.	  So	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  these	  financial	  protectionists,	  because	  as	  a	  result,	  we	  didn't	  invest	  a	  single	  cent	  in	  Europe’,	  Jason	  Dean,	  ‘China	  Wealth	  Fund	  to	  Boost	  Investments’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  20	  April	  2012)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124006120569931959.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Tom	  Mitchell,	  ‘China	  Set	  to	  Invest	  Again	  in	  Europe’,	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  20	  April	  2012)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f6d62f6-­‐2d43-­‐11de-­‐8710-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘Daimler	  Held	  Talks	  with	  China	  Wealth	  Fund’	  Reuters	  (London,	  21	  April	  2012)	  <www.reuters.com/article/euPrivateEquityNews/idUSTRE53K3TC20090421>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  364	  ibid.	  This	  section	  may	  also	  include	  the	  failed	  bid	  by	  Chinese	  SOE	  Chinalco	  for	  a	  10%	  stake	  of	  Anglo-­‐Australian	  group	  Rio	  Tinto,	  Sundeep	  Tucker,	  ‘Rio	  Seeks	  $19bn	  China	  Cash	  Injection’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  11	  February	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2c6042c4-­‐f849-­‐11dd-­‐aae8-­‐000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Peter	  Smith,	  ‘Chinalco	  to	  Restructure	  Rio	  Tinto	  Deal’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  21	  May	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82e39c72-­‐45ec-­‐11de-­‐803f-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  365	  George	  Chen	  and	  Megan	  Davies,	  ‘M.	  Stanley	  Property	  Fund	  Raises	  $6	  Billion,	  CIC	  Helps’	  
Reuters	  (London,	  31	  March	  2009)	  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS/idUKHKG17951420090331>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  366	  AFP	  Staff,	  ‘China	  Fund	  May	  Increase	  Stake	  in	  Morgan	  Stanley’	  Agence	  France-­‐Presse	  (Paris,	  2	  June	  2009)	  <www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iwr3uU1lvl2knhYy0I0czf2CF1Lg?docId=CNG.4cf6e513b17fd262624674c44c552414.761&index=0>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  367	  TradingMarkets	  staff,	  ‘China	  Investment	  Corp.	  Likely	  to	  Resume	  Overseas	  Investment’	  
TradingMarkets	  News	  (Jersey	  City,	  21	  May	  2009)	  <www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%20News/2339510/>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2009	  (registration-­‐based).	  368	  Rob	  Wilson	  and	  Jeffrey	  Hodgson,	  ‘Cash	  Rich	  China	  Eyes	  Canada's	  Rich	  Resources’	  Reuters	  (London,	  13	  July	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN1315366120090713>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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British	  drink	  maker	  Diageo.370	  It,	  finally,	  also	  participated	  in	  the	  massive	  bailout	  of	  the	  Canary	  Warf	  in	  London.371	  Nevertheless,	   Chinese	   funds	   also	   faced	   challenges	   during	   the	   downturn,	  especially	   through	   their	   past	   investments	   in	   USA	   government	   bonds	   and	   as	   a	  result	  of	  the	  recession	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  stimulus	  packages	  used	  to	  revive	  the	  economy	   China	   became	   worried	   over	   the	   value	   of	   its	   holdings.	   In	   particular,	  China	   feared	   that	  heavy	  borrowing	  and	   fiscal	   stimulus	   in	   the	  USA	  would	  cause	  subsequently	  interest	  rates	  to	  rise	  and,	  thus,	  erode	  the	  value	  of	  their	  held	  bonds.	  In	  this	  context,	  in	  March	  2009	  at	  a	  news	  conference,	  the	  Chinese	  Premier	  Jiabao	  called	   on	   the	   President	   of	   the	   USA	   to	   ‘maintain	   its	   good	   credit,	   to	   honor	   its	  promises	  and	  to	  guarantee	  the	  safety	  of	  China’s	  assets’.372	  Other	  funds,	  especially	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	  have	  equally	  used	  the	  economic	  downturn	   to	   increase	   their	   investments	   despite	   their	   losses.	   Al	   Ansari,	   CEO	   of	  DIC,	  had	  already	  stated	  in	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  that	  DIC	  was	  facing	  serious	  economic	  challenges,	   but	   he	   would	   still	   consider	   the	   ‘phenomenal’	   acquisition	  opportunities	   that	   would	   arise	   in	   the	   next	   one	   to	   two	   years	   as	   asset	   prices	  declined.373	  By	  the	  same	  period,	  and	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  their	  high	  profile	  investments	  into	  Barclays	  and	  Manchester	  City	  Football	  Club,	  investors	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  prepared	  to	   inject	  billions	  of	  dollars	   into	  British	  companies,	  mainly	   in	  shipping	  and	  property	  but	  also	  in	  the	  football	  industry.374	  The	   above	   investments	   do	   not	   suggest	   that	   SWFs	   are	   ‘recession-­‐proof’,	   but	  rather	  that	  opportunity	  costs	  created	  by	  all	  time	  low	  equity	  prices	  urged	  them	  to	  invest	   despite	   their	   heavy	   losses.	   In	   other	   words,	   those	   investments	   were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	  AFP	  staff,	  ‘China's	  SWF	  Invests	  in	  Diageo’	  Agence	  France-­‐Presse	  (Paris,	  20	  July	  2009)	  <www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gpkmQ1QzB_X9hllZLTZnEU8Cvvxw>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  370	  ibid.	  371	  Daniel	  Thomas,	  ‘China	  Aids	  Canary	  Wharf	  Owner’	  Financial	  Times	  29	  August	  2012	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33296250-­‐93d7-­‐11de-­‐9c57-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  372	  Michael	  Wines,	  ‘China’s	  Leader	  Says	  He	  Is	  “Worried”	  Over	  [USA]	  Treasuries’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  13	  March	  2009)	  <www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/world/asia/14china.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  373	  Tom	  Arnold,	  ‘DIC	  Assets	  Drop	  as	  Much	  as	  $3bn	  Amid	  Crisis’	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  25	  November	  2012)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/539508>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2009.	  374	  Roger	  Blitz	  and	  George	  Parker,	  ‘Middle	  East	  Investors	  Eye	  Europe’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  6	  November	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b06cf842-­‐ac44-­‐11dd-­‐bf71-­‐000077b07658.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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strategic,	  meaning	   that	   they	  were	  not	   intended	   to	  bring	   immediate	  returns	  but	  were	  expected	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  future	  (thus	  fitting	  with	  SWFs’	  long-­‐term	  outlook).	  These	   investments	   became	   a	   precious	   source	   of	   capital	   for	   many	   western	  companies	   during	   the	   recession.	   This	   and	   other	   benefits	   brought	   by	   the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  are	  dealt	  with	  at	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  post	  crisis	  (end	  of	  2009	  onwards)	  
	   At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  it	   is	  still	  early	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  post-­‐crisis	  scenario.	  As	  a	  sovereign	   debt	   crisis	   is	   still	   affecting	   Eurozone	  members375	  and	   the	   USA	   post-­‐crisis	   recovery	   is	   still	   fragile, 376 	  resulting	   economic	   instability	   and	   market	  uncertainty	   preclude	   safe	   predictions	   about	   the	   future	   behaviour	   of	   market	  actors.	  Nevertheless,	  certain	  estimates	  are	  possible.	  Analysts,	   for	  now,	  do	  not	  expect	  dramatic	  changes	   in	   the	   future	  as	   regards	  the	   investment	   behaviour	   of	   SWFs.	   Monitor	   Group	   asserts	   that,	   although	  MENA377	  SWFs	  have	  made	  small	  adjustments	  strategies,	  the	  financial	  crisis	  may	  not	  have	  had	  a	  long-­‐lasting	  effect	  on	  their	  investment	  behaviour.378	  It	  is	  believed	  by	  Smith	  that	  once	  financial	  stability	  returns,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  this	  increasingly	  important	   pool	   of	  money	  will	   again	   be	   deployed	   in	   the	  west	   as	  well	   as	   in	   the	  east.379	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  SWFs	  could,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis,	  become	  more	  activist	  to	   ensure	   the	   continued	   profitability	   of	   their	   investments.	   In	   this	   case,	   SWFs	  could	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   future	   becoming	  more	   engaged	   in	   the	   supervision	   of	   the	  management	   of	   the	   companies	   they	   invest	   in	   and	   use	   their	   voting	   power	   in	  company	  meetings	  more	  proactively.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  375	  See	  for	  example,	  IMF,	  ‘Europe	  Navigating	  Stormy	  Waters’	  (2011)	  Regional	  Economic	  Outlook,	  IMF	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/eur/eng/pdf/ereo1011.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  1-­‐22.	  376	  Craig	  Elwell,	  ‘Economic	  Recovery:	  Sustaining	  [USA]	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  a	  Post-­‐Crisis	  Economy’	  (2012)	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41332.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  4-­‐19. 377	  Middle-­‐East	  and	  North	  Africa.	  378	  Miracky	  and	  Bortolotti	  (n	  161)	  34-­‐37.	  379	  Pamela	  Ann	  Smith,	  ‘SWFs	  Reassess	  Their	  Strategies’	  The	  Middle	  East,	  No.	  396	  (London,	  January	  2009).	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Several	   signs	   suggest	   that	   SWFs	   may	   become	   more	   willing	   to	   engage	   in	  partnerships	   and	   joint	   ventures	   with	   other	   investors	   to	   carry	   out	   their	  projects.380	  One	   of	   the	   leading	   reasons	   cited	   for	   this	   trend	   is	   the	   advantage	   of	  being	  able	   to	  use	  a	  partner’s	   local	  knowledge.381	  Another	   important	  motivation	  might	  be	  a	  desire	  to	  diversify	  risk.	  Finally,	   lately	   SWFs	   appear	   to	   have	   increased	   their	   investments	   in	   the	  renewable	  energy	  sector.	  This	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  obtain	  commercial	  as	  well	   as	  general	   environmental	  benefits	   through	   their	   investments.	   It	   is	   said,	  for	   example,	   that	   certain	   countries	   could	   kick-­‐start	   green	   energy	   projects	   and	  then	  invite	  SWFs	  to	  contribute.382	  Such	  a	  contribution	  would	  be	  invaluable	  as	  the	  world	  is	  said	  to	  face an	  annual	  funding	  gap	  of	  around	  $150	  billion	  on	  projects	  to	  cut	   carbon	   dioxide	   emissions.383	  The	   increasing	   interest	   of	   SWFs	   in	   the	   sector	  could	  help	  fill	  this	  gap	  especially	  if	  the	  performances	  of	  the	  renewables	  begin	  to	  match	  that	  of	  other	  asset	  classes.384	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  a	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  accessed	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  Reuters	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  accessed	  15	  July	  2012.	  381	  Natsuko	  Waki,	  op.	  cit.	  382	  Sang	  Yonk	  Park	  and	  Leslie	  Young,	  ‘Greening	  SWFs’	  The	  Wall	  Street	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  (New	  York,	  1	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  accessed	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  July	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It	  was	  seen	  that,	  SWFs,	  through	  their	  investments,	  have	  a	  strong	  presence	  in	  western	  markets,	  although	  some	  of	  the	  most	  notorious	  investments	  –	  finalised	  or	  intended	  –	  by	  foreign	  sovereigns	  did	  not	  originate	  from	  SWFs	  but,	  rather,	   from	  SOEs.	  SWFs’	   investment	   strategies	   are	   generally	   quite	   sophisticated	   although	  sometimes	   they	   are	   limited	   to	   ‘trends	   chasing’	   and	   invest	   largely	   in	   financial	  assets	   but	   also	   in	   alternative	   investments.	   Their	   regional	   preferences	   clearly	  favour	   the	   developed	  world,	   they	   are	   relatively	   risk	   averse	   and	  mostly	   favour	  long-­‐term	  investments.	  SWFs	  usually	  opt	  for	  a	  passive	  stance	  but	  there	  are	  also	  examples	  of	  active	  sovereign	  investors	  with	  beneficial	  results.	  SWFs	  share	  many	  similarities	  with	  other	  types	  of	   investors,	  such	  as	  hedge	  funds	  and	  institutional	  investors,	   although	   their	   size	   and	   ownership	   status	   renders	   SWFs	   a	  distinguished	  class	  of	  investor.	  The	  GFC	  offers	  a	  unique	  case	  study	  of	  the	  investment	  strategies	  of	  SWFs	  and	  can	  help	  understand	  more	  about	   their	  behaviour	  at	   time	  of	  economic	  slump.	   It	  also	  contributed	  to	  changing	  many	  of	  the	  general	  perceptions	  about	  SWFs.	  First,	  during	   the	   crisis	   some	   SWFs	   either	   modified	   or	   completely	   interrupted	   their	  investment	   plans,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   even	   sold	   assets.	   Second,	   they	   invested	  much	  of	  their	  large	  reserves	  domestically	  to	  counteract	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  their	   home	  markets.	   Third,	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   SWFs,	   despite	   their	   heavy	  losses	   saw	   financial	   opportunities	   arising	   and	   thus	   expanded	   their	   foreign	  investments.	   In	   some	   cases	   these	   investment	   strategies	   changed	   overtime	   or	  overlapped	  with	  one	  another.	  In	   the	   future,	   no	   dramatic	   change	   of	   SWFs’	   investment	   strategies	   are	  expected,	   although	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   they	   will	   increase	   their	   shareholder	  activism	   to	  ensure	   the	  continued	  profitability	  of	   their	   investments.	   In	  addition,	  SWFs	   appear	   to	   invest	   more	   frequently	   in	   the	   form	   of	   partnerships	   and	   joint	  ventures.	   Green	   energy	   projects	   are	   also	   attracting	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   SWF	  investments.	  Providing	   an	   analysis	   of	   SWFs’	   investment	   strategies	   was	   necessary	   to	  examine	  the	  benefits	  as	  well	  as	  the	  main	  issues	  of	  concern	  that	  derive	  from	  those	  strategies	  for	  recipient	  countries.	  The	  next	  chapter	  examines	  all	  those	  issues,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  possible	  rationale	  for	  regulating	  SWFs.	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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
-­‐	  
SWFs:	  Potential	  Benefits	  and	  Challenges	  	  	  	  	  INTRODUCTION	  	   Analysing	  the	  investment	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  in	  chapter	  2	  was	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	   issues	  that	  surround	  SWFs	  and	  examine	  the	  case	   for	  regulating	  them.	   First,	   a	   better	   comprehension	   of	   the	   role	   and	   practices	   of	   SWFs	   can	  alleviate	   concerns	   in	   recipient	   economies	   and	   reduce	   protectionist	   pressures.	  Second,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  for	  recipient	  economies	  to	  have	  a	  realistic	  view	  of	  the	  potential	   benefits	   and	   challenges	   that	   FDI	   can	  bring	   to	   their	   economies.	   Third,	  SWFs	   themselves	   need	   to	   have	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   those	   issues	   so	   that	  they	  can	  improve	  their	  internal	  governance.	  The	   present	   chapter	   aims	   at	   identifying	   the	   main	   benefits	   and	   special	  challenges	   that	   flow	   from	   the	   investments	   of	   SWFs,	   with	   particular	   focus	   on	  western	   economies.	   As	   it	   is	   generally	   accepted,	   regulation	   is	  warranted	  where	  the	   costs	   of	   market	   imperfections	   and	   failures	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   costs	   of	  regulation	   itself.385	  Applying	   this	   principle	   to	   the	   case	   of	   SWFs,	   it	   becomes	   essential	   to	  examine	  what	  market	  imperfections	  or	  failures,	  if	  any,	  exist	  in	  the	  first	  place.386	  Moreover,	   the	   analysis	   in	   the	   present	   chapter	   can	   be	   of	   interest	   not	   only	   to	  policymakers	  but	  also	   to	   the	  general	  public	  and	  western	  media	  as	   these	  actors	  often	  fuel	  popular	  backlash	  and	  drive	  regulators	  to	   introduce	  measures	  against	  SWFs.	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  David	  Llewellyn,	  ‘The	  Economic	  Rationale	  for	  Financial	  Regulation’	  (1999)	  Occasional	  Paper	  Series	  1,	  FSA,	  6.	  386	  This	  is	  also	  called	  ‘risk	  assessment’,	  meaning	  identifying	  and	  assessing	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  specific	  areas	  where	  detriment	  to	  consumers	  and	  firms	  is	  likely	  to	  arise;	  the	  economic	  benefits	  can	  then	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  on	  the	  different	  risks	  identified,	  Isaac	  Alfon	  and	  Peter	  Andrews,	  ‘Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  in	  Financial	  Regulation’	  (1999)	  Financial	  Services	  Authority,	  Occasional	  Paper	  Series	  3,	  20.	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The	  present	  chapter	  deals,	   firstly,	  with	   the	  general	  benefits	  brought	  by	   the	  SWFs’	  investments,	  such	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  liquidity	  in	  financial	  systems	  and	  their	  stabilisation	  at	  times	  of	  crisis.	  The	  following	  section	  goes	  on	  to	  analyse	  the	  potential	  costs	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  such	  investments.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  chapter	  aims	  to	  examine	  the	  merit	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  favour	  of	  or	  against	  SWFs,	   before	   discussing	   what	   is	   their	   practical	   value.	   This	   exercise	   leads	   to	   a	  conclusion	  based	  on	  whether	  the	  benefits	  or	  the	  costs	  exceed	  one	  another.	  	  	  
1. Benefits	  Brought	  by	  the	  Operation	  of	  SWFs	  
	  
i. SWFs	  as	  special	  foreign	  investors	  	  One	  obvious	  benefit	  of	  SWFs	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  offer	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  FDI.	   In	   this	  way,	   SWFs	  benefit	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	  global	   capital	  market	  and	  provide	  funding	  for	  global	  investment.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  may	  have	  a	  stabilising	  effect	  on	   national	   economies:	   as	   noted	   by	   a	   study	   focusing	   on	   the	   USA	   economy,	  between	  November	  1982	  through	  to	  December	  2007	  large	  oversees	  capital	  was	  available	  and	  the	  economy	  was	  in	  recession	  only	  4.6%	  of	  the	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  between	  1945	  through	  to	  1982,	  foreign	  capital	  was	  generally	  unavailable,	  and	  recession	  counted	  for	  22.4%	  of	  the	  time.387	  Stability	   in	   the	   international	   financial	   system	   can	   also	   be	   reinforced	   by	  SWFs’	  longer-­‐term	  strategic	  outlook.	  As	  seen	  from	  practice,	  long-­‐term	  investors	  with	  no	  imminent	  call	  on	  their	  assets,	  and	  with	  mainly	  unleveraged	  positions,	  as	  SWFs	   are,	   are	   able	   to	   resist	   market	   downturns	   for	   longer	   or	   even	   go	   against	  market	  trends.388	  Other	  potential	  benefits	  derive	   from	  the	  extraordinary	  size	  and	  strength	  of	  SWFs	  as	  investors.	  According	  to	  an	  analysis	  by	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris,	  SWFs	  can	  be	  more	  pro-­‐active	  in	  the	  takeover	  market	  and	  block	  value-­‐reducing	  acquisitions	  by	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  Will	  (n	  549).	  388	  See	  also,	  Tao	  Sun	  and	  Heiko	  Hesse,	  ‘SWFs	  and	  Financial	  Stability—An	  Event	  Study	  Analysis’	  (2009)	  WP/09/239,	  Monetary	  and	  Capital	  Markets,	  IMF	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09239.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013,	  3.	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the	   companies	   they	   invest	   in.	   Because	   of	   their	   interest	   in	   stock	   returns,	   SWFs	  stay	  away	  from	  strategies	  that	  purely	  pursue	  value-­‐destroying	  consolidation	  and	  scale.389	  SWFs	   can	   also	   contribute	   to	   increase	   the	   takeover	   premiums390	  in	   the	  companies	   where	   they	   invest. 391 	  This	   was	   illustrated	   by	   the	   case	   of	   the	  opposition	  between	  the	  Norwegian	  SWF	  and	  MidAmerican	  during	  the	  latter’s	  bid	  for	  Constellation,	  where	  the	  Fund	  pressed	  the	  bidder	  to	  make	  a	  higher	  offer.392	  As	   this	   case	   showed,	   SWFs	   can	  be	  powerful	   enough	   to	   exert	   external	   pressure	  even	  as	  non-­‐controlling	  shareholders.	  Potentially,	   SWFs	   can	   be	   efficient	   internal	   corporate	   governance	  mechanisms,	   and	   reduce	   agency	   costs	   that	   flow	   from	   the	   gap	   between	  shareholders	   and	   top	   executives.393	  This	   argument	   is	   based	   on	   a	   shareholder	  theory	   by	   Shleifer	   and	   Vishny.394	  As	   they	   pointed	   out,	   small	   shareholders	   lack	  incentives	   to	  monitor	  managerial	  performance	  while	   large	   shareholders	  would	  offer	  a	  partial	  solution	  to	  the	  free-­‐rider	  problem	  and	  greatly	  improve	  monitoring.	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  claim	  [above]	  that	  this	  contention	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs.	  As	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  legal	  system,	  one	  expects	  the	  value	  effect	  of	  SWFs	  to	  be	  larger	  when	  they	  invest	  in	  companies	  coming	  from	  countries	  with	  a	  weaker	  legal	   system.	  However,	   the	  analysis	  by	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  on	  SWF	  holdings	   in	  the	  five	  years	  preceding	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  SWF	  premium	  is	  the	  same	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  level	  of	  the	  country	  of	  origin’s	  investor	  protection.395	  Unlike	   other	   types	   of	   institutional	   investors,	   SWFs	   provide	   guaranteed	  capital	   in	   case	   of	   future	   funding	   needs	   and	   therefore	   reduce	   the	   uncertainty	  regarding	   the	   firm’s	   future	   financing	   ability.	   SWFs	   have	   two	   particular	  advantages	  when	  compared	  to	  regular	  institutional	  investors,	  they	  are	  larger	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  389	  Nuno	  Fernandes	  and	  Arturo	  Bris,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Revalued’	  (2009)	  KPMG/Financial	  Times	  8	  <www.kpmg.com.cn/en/virtual_library/Risk_advisory_services/Managing_downturn4.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  8.	  390	  A	  premium	  is	  essentially	  the	  surplus	  paid	  by	  the	  bidder	  for	  each	  share.	  391	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  (n	  389)	  8.	  392	  In	  late	  2008,	  Norway’s	  Government	  Pension	  Fund	  opposed	  MidAmerican’s	  bid	  for	  Constellation,	  where	  the	  Fund	  had	  a	  4.8%	  stake.	  MidAmerican	  Energy	  Company’s	  bid	  was	  interestingly	  backed	  by	  Constellation’s	  management	  itself.	  However	  Norway’s	  SWF	  considered	  the	  price	  insufficient	  and	  has	  brought	  MidAmerican	  to	  court.	  393	  For	  an	  explanation	  of	  ‘agency	  costs’,	  see	  n	  260.	  394	  Andrei	  Shleifer	  and	  Robert	  Vishny,	  ‘Large	  Shareholders	  and	  Corporate	  Control’	  (1986)	  Volume	  94(4)	  JPolEcon,	  461.	  395	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  (n	  389).	  
SWFs:	  Potential	  Benefits	  and	  Challenges	  
	   107	  
are	   still	   relatively	   underexposed	   to	   equities:	   As	   SWFs	   have	   access	   to	   massive	  funds,	  the	  market	  rewards	  the	  unlimited	  access	  to	  capital	  of	  the	  firms	  where	  they	  invest.396	  Current	  estimates	  by	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	   suggest	   that	  SWFs	  have	  not	  invested	  heavily	   in	  equities,	  particularly	  as	  compared	  to	  most	  pension	  funds	  or	  other	   institutional	   investors.397	  Hence,	   it	   is	   expected	   that	   SWFs	  will	   eventually	  increase	   their	   exposure	   to	   equities	   in	   the	   coming	   years	   to	   about	   40%.398	  The	  same	   assumption	   is	   shared	   by	   Clark	   and	   Monk	   whose	   research	   showed	   that	  SWFs	   will	   increase	   their	   allocation	   in	   equities	   in	   the	   years	   following	   their	  study.399	  SWFs	   make	   companies	   more	   valuable	   because	   they	   reduce	   firms’	   cost	   of	  capital,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  commanding	  lower	  risk	  premiums.400	  The	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  sovereign	   funds	   is	   to	   invest	   in	  risk-­‐free	   instruments,	   like	  USA	  bonds,	  as	  had	  been	  their	  common	  practice	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Furthermore,	  relative	  to	  their	  size,	  a	   single	   SWF	   stake	   represents	   a	   small	   percentage	  of	   their	   total	   assets	   anyway,	  and	  the	  marginal	  investor	  of	  the	  firms	  where	  they	  invest	  becomes	  a	  more	  global,	  international,	  less	  risk-­‐averse	  investor.401	  According	   to	   a	   European	   Commission	   Communication,	   another	   important	  benefit	   of	   SWFs,	   relates	   to	   the	   euro	   currency:	   given	   the	   tendency	   towards	   a	  diverse	   range	   of	   investment,	   SWF	   investments	   could	   support	   the	   international	  role	   of	   the	   euro	   over	   the	   medium	   term.402	  As	   the	   Communication	   states,	   for	  foreign	   exchange	   reserves,	   the	   goal	   is	   liquid	   and	   safe	   assets	   denominated	   in	   a	  currency	  with	  low	  foreign	  exchange	  conversion	  costs	  –	  which	  tends	  to	  favour	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  396	  For	  example,	  both	  studies	  by	  Fotak	  et	  al.	  and	  Kotter	  and	  Lel	  find	  that	  on	  the	  announcement	  date	  of	  the	  SWF	  offer	  the	  value	  of	  the	  company’s	  stock	  reacts	  positively,	  Kotter	  and	  Lel	  (n	  218)	  4;	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  17.	  397	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  (n	  389)	  8.	  398	  ibid.	  399	  Gordon	  Clark	  and	  Ashby	  Monk,	  ‘The	  Oxford	  Survey	  of	  SWFs’	  Asset	  Managers’	  (2009)	  	  	  Centre	  for	  Employment,	  Work	  and	  Finance,	  University	  of	  Oxford	  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1432078>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  12.	  400	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  (n	  389)	  8.	  A	  risk	  premium	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  ‘the	  amount	  of	  income	  given	  up	  to	  leave	  a	  person	  indifferent	  between	  a	  risky	  choice	  and	  a	  certain	  one’,	  Rutherford	  (n	  247)	  488.	  401	  Nuno	  Fernandes	  ‘Sovereign	  Possibilities’	  (2010)	  International	  Corporate	  Governance	  Network,	  ICGN	  Yearbook	  2010	  <bettergovernance.com.br/Uploads/Docs/AR16032011-­‐76993.pdf>	  (accessed	  6	  November	  2013)	  24.	  402	  Commission	  (n	  1)	  4.	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USA	   dollar.	   SWFs,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   ‘have	   more	   freedom	   to	   choose	   their	  investments.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  mean	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  the	  euro	  assets	  than	  now	  is	  the	   case	   for	   reserves’.403	  However,	   while	   an	   increased	   international	   use	   of	   the	  euro	  would	  definitely	   bring	  benefits,	   a	   hasty	   shift	   towards	   the	  EU	   currency	  by	  SWFs	   could	   put	   unwelcome	   upward	   pressure	   on	   the	   euro.	   In	   particular,	   an	  excessive	  appreciation	  of	   the	  Euro,	  especially	  during	  a	  recession,	  could	  entail	  a	  drop	  in	  exports	  and	  industrial	  production	  and	  thus	  should	  be	  avoided.404	  Additionally,	  SWF	  investments	  yield	  considerable	  benefits	  for	  the	  developing	  world.	   In	   fact,	   SWFs	   could	   become	  major	   actors	   of	   development	   finance.	   As	   it	  was	   estimated	   by	   the	   OECD	   in	   April	   2008	   (however	   under	   different	   size	   and	  growth	  estimates	  for	  SWFs),	   if	   funds	  chose	  to	  allocate	  10%	  of	  their	  portfolio	  to	  emerging	   and	  developing	   economies	   over	   the	  next	   decade,	   this	   could	   generate	  inflows	   of	   $1.400	   billion,	   more	   than	   all	   OECD	   countries’	   aid	   to	   developing	  economies	  put	  together.405	  Overall,	   as	   noted	   by	   the	   former	   EU	  Trade	   Commissioner	   Peter	  Mandelson,	  ‘we	   should	   be	   much	   more	   worried	   if	   these	   investors	   were	   not	   interested	   in	  Europe.	   If	   they	  did	  not	  rate	   the	  euro	  as	  a	  safe	  reserve	  currency.	   If	   they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  invest	  in	  euro-­‐denominated	  assets.	  Our	  response	  should	  emphasise	  the	  positive	  rather	  than	  the	  paranoid’.406	  	  
ii. Stabilising	  western	  economies	  	   The	   GFC	   has	   helped	   to	   underline	   the	   potential	   benefits	   of	   SWFs	   as	   a	  stabilising	   force.	   Problems	   in	   credit	   markets	   since	   the	   end	   of	   2007	   have	  squeezed	   liquidity	   in	   several	   key	   financial	  markets	   and	   increased	   pressure	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  403	  ibid.	  404	  ibid.	  Additionally,	  a	  study	  by	  London	  Business	  School	  and	  ABN	  Amro	  Bank	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  strong	  currencies	  do	  not	  favour	  great	  stock	  market	  returns,	  Lynn	  Caprenter,	  ‘Currency	  Strength	  Can	  Sap	  Returns’	  Inflationdata	  (Richmond,	  7	  September	  2011)	  <http://inflationdata.com/articles/2011/09/17/currency-­‐strength-­‐can-­‐sap-­‐returns/>	  accessed	  12	  May	  2013.	  	  405	  Javier	  Santiso,	  ‘Sovereign	  Development	  Funds’	  (2008)	  Policy	  Insights	  No.	  58	  OECD	  Development	  Centre	  <www.oecd.org/development/perspectivesonglobaldevelopment/40040692.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  May	  2013,	  1-­‐2.	  406	  Peter	  Mandelson,	  ‘Putting	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  in	  Perspective’	  Speech	  08/155,	  28	  March	  2008	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐08-­‐155_en.htm>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012.	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the	   capital	   base	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   As	   it	   is	   was	   also	   recognized	   by	   the	  European	  Commission,	   several	  of	   these	   institutions	  have	  recapitalised	  with	   the	  help	   of	   investment	   from	   SWFs. 407 	  SWF	   investments	   has	   thus	   helped	   to	  strengthen	   the	   global	   banking	   system	   and	   to	   underpin	   confidence	   in	   the	  international	  financial	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	   IMF	   estimated	   that	   by	   February	   2008	   SWFs	   invested	   over	   $35	   billion	  into	   large	  banks.408	  Concerning	  financial	   institutions	  in	  particular,	   it	   is	  reported	  by	   IFSL	   that	   since	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   sub-­‐prime	   crisis	   in	   2007	   and	   until	   April	  2008,	   SWFs	   invested	  between	  $60	  and	  $92	  billion	   in	   return	   for	   large	  minority	  stakes	   in	   financial	   institutions.	   Of	   those	   investments,	   ‘over	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   the	  capital	   invested	   in	   foreign	   financial	   institutions	   in	   2007	   and	   early	   2008	   came	  from	  Asian	  SWFs	   (13%	   from	  China),	  with	  Middle	  Eastern	  SWFs	  generating	   the	  remainder’.409	  These	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   facilitated	   the	   re-­‐stocking	   of	   the	   capital	  bases	  of	   important	  banks	  and	  helped	  minimise	  the	  impact	  on	  credit	  markets	  of	  large	  bank	  losses,	  and	  safeguard	  the	  continuation	  of	  bank	  lending.	  Very	  importantly,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  SWFs	  may	  have	  even	  contributed	  to	  global	  economic	   recovery	   by	   reinvigorating	   international	   investment. 410 	  Various	  analysts	  took	  a	  similar	  position	  based	  on	  the	  observation	  that	  SWFs	  returned	  to	  making	   high	   profile	   acquisitions	   in	   the	   middle	   and	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   2009	  combined	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  oil	  prices	  had	  then	  stabilised	  at	  $70	  a	  barrel.411	  This	  belief	   was	   also	   nurtured	   by	   the	   expectation	   that	   SWFs	   would	   increase	   their	  allocation	   of	   equities	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   crisis	   within	   the	   next	   few	   years	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407	  Commission	  (n	  1)	  4.	  408	  Notably	  in	  Citigroup,	  Merrill	  Lynch,	  Morgan	  Stanley	  and	  UBS,	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  10.	  409	  Marko	  Maslakovic,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  2008’	  (2008)	  IFSL	  Research	  <www.ifsl.org.uk/upload/CBS_Sovereign_Wealth_Funds_2008.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  July	  2009,	  2	  (registration-­‐based).	  410	  Sven	  Behrent,	  ‘Reformed	  SWFs	  Could	  Help	  Economic	  Recovery’	  (2009)	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22978&prog=zgp&proj=zme&zoom_highlight=Wealth+Funds>	  accessed	  12	  May	  2013.	  411	  WJS	  Staff	  ‘Are	  SWFs	  Ready	  to	  Spread	  the	  Wealth	  Again?’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  20	  June	  2009)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124546040327333239.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Sundeep	  Tucker,	  ‘SWF	  Set	  to	  Revive	  Investing’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  16	  February	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/d112c57e-­‐fc51-­‐11dd-­‐aed8-­‐000077b07658.html>	  accessed	  24	  December	  2012.	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(mentioned	  above).412	  Interestingly,	   given	   that	   SWFs	   seek	   to	   maintain	   a	   low	   profile,	   this	  acknowledgment	  of	  their	  positive	  impact	  can	  make	  them	  feel	  uncomfortable.	  As	  mentioned	   by	   a	   SWF	   official	   ‘whether	   SWFs	   are	   criticised	   of	   hiding	   political	  motivations	   or	   are	   described	   as	   charitable	   organisations,	   the	   same	   answer	  applies,	  SWFs	  are	  profit	  maximising	  firms,	  nothing	  more’.413	  	  	  
1. Risks	  Posed	  by	  the	  Operation	  of	  SWFs	  	   Although	   SWF	   investments	   do	   bring	   undeniable	   benefits,	   they	   also	  sometimes	  become	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  for	  recipient	  countries.	  It	  is	  accepted	  by	  a	  large	   part	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	   that	   the	   state-­‐owned	   character	   of	   SWFs,	  combined	   with	   their	   lack	   of	   transparency	   may	   create	   a	   number	   of	   risks	   that	  should	   be	   acknowledged	   and,	   if	   necessary,	   rectified	   through	   a	   regulatory	  response	  in	  order	  for	  SWF	  investments	  to	  continue	  to	  flow	  into	  the	  EU	  and	  other	  western	  countries.	  However,	   before	   expanding	   on	   those	   potential	   risks,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   put	  forward	  a	  number	  of	  considerations	   that	  sometimes	   lie	  behind	   those	  concerns.	  These	   are	   dealt	  with	   separately	   because	   they	   are	   not	   risks	   as	   such,	   but	   rather	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  shaping	  certain	  attitudes	  towards	  SWFs.	  The	   first	   consideration	   is	   that	   SWFs,	   as	   state-­‐owned	   entities,	   challenge	  western	   perceptions	   of	   private	   enterprise	   capitalism.	   Throughout	   the	   20th	  century	  western	   governments	   have	   encouraged	   the	   idea	   –	   in	   certain	   countries	  more	  than	  others	  –	  that	  private	  enterprise	  is	  the	  most	  effective	  form	  of	  company	  and	   that	   management	   by	   the	   state	   more	   often	   appears	   to	   be	   ineffective.	   As	   a	  result,	  many	  western	  governments	  have	  since	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  embarked	  upon	   the	  privatisation	  of	   state-­‐owned	  companies	  operating	   in	  many	  fields	  of	   the	  economy.	  This	  process	  was	  possibly	  also	   led	  by	   the	  belief	   that	   the	  management	   state-­‐owned	   companies	   can	   never	   fully	   escape	   from	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  412	  Clark	  and	  Monk	  (n	  399)	  12;	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris(n	  389)	  8.	  413	  Unnamed	  SWF	  officer	  (n	  74).	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influences	  or	  discard	  political	  considerations.414	  In	  this	  sense,	  their	  privatisation	  could	  increase	  their	  independence	  and	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  focus	  better	  on	  profit	  maximisation.	  The	  very	  existence	  of	  SWFs	  (or	  SOEs	  too	  for	  that	  matter)	  presents	  a	  challenge	  to	   this	   long	  established	  belief.	  Firstly,	  SWFs	  are	  completely	  owned	  by	   the	  state	  and	  yet	  they	  often	  exhibit	  the	  same	  level	  of	  sophistication	  and	  a	  similar	  focus	  on	  profitability	   as	   one	   would	   expect	   from	   private	   owned	   investment	   vehicles.	  Secondly,	   through	   their	   investments,	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs	   originating	   from	  developing	  countries	  raise	  questions	  as	   to	  why	   they	  would	  be	  more	  capable	   to	  participate	   in	   the	   operation	   of	  western	   companies	   since	  western	   governments	  themselves	   chose	   to	   abstain	   from	   this	   business	   and	   entrust	   them	   to	   private	  actors.	   In	   a	   2007	   article,	   former	   USA	   Treasury	   Secretary	   Summers,	   described	  SWFs	   as	   the	   ‘principal	   irony	  of	   the	   international	   financial	   system’	  pointing	  out	  that	  formerly	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  in	  the	  west	  are	  now	  slowly	  coming	  under	  the	   control	   of	   foreign	   governments.415	  The	   question	   therefore	   remains:	   Since	  committed	  free-­‐market	  governments	  chose	  to	  privatise	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  in	   the	   first	   place,	   how	   can	   it	   be	   that	   the	   international	   financial	   system	   drives	  those	  companies	  once	  again	  under	  government	  control?	  The	   second	   consideration	   that	   ought	   to	   be	   stated	   is	   that	   the	   numerous	  investments	   by	   SWFs	   reveal	   an	   underlying	   concern	   that	  western	   countries	   do	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  414	  It	  is	  stated	  for	  example	  by	  an	  OECD	  paper	  that:	  ‘when	  governments	  undertake	  commercial	  activities,	  they	  remain	  answerable	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  societal	  pressures	  that	  their	  governance	  structures	  are	  designed	  to	  take	  into	  account.	  For	  this	  reason,	  governments	  may	  encounter	  difficulties	  in	  making	  credible	  commitments	  to	  pursue	  only	  ‘commercial’	  objectives,	  since	  their	  raison	  d’être	  involves	  being	  sensitive	  to	  political	  pressures	  and	  to	  pursuing	  non-­‐commercial	  objectives’.	  Kathryn	  Gordon	  and	  April	  Tash,	  ‘Foreign	  Government-­‐Controlled	  Investors	  and	  Recipient	  Country	  Investment	  Policies:	  A	  Scoping	  Paper’	  (2009)	  OECD	  10	  <www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/42022469.pdf>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012,	  13.	  415	  Summers	  (n	  302);	  This	  process	  has	  also	  been	  described	  as	  ‘cross-­‐border	  nationalisation’,	  or	  ‘nationalisation	  through	  the	  back	  door’,	  Steven	  Weisman,	  ‘Concern	  about	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  Spreads	  to	  Washington’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  20	  August	  2007)	  <www.nytimes.com/2007/08/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-­‐wealth.4.7186699.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Philip	  Whyte	  and	  Katinka	  Barysch,	  ‘What	  Should	  Europe	  Do	  About	  [SWFs]?’	  (2007)	  Issue	  56,	  CER	  BULLETIN	  <www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-­‐article/2007/what-­‐should-­‐europe-­‐do-­‐about-­‐sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds>	  accessed	  12	  May	  2013;	  Jeffrey	  Garten,	  ‘The	  Unsettling	  Zeitgeist	  of	  State	  Capitalism’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  14	  January	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/f0f2a32e-­‐c2d6-­‐11dc-­‐b617-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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not	   generate	   enough	   wealth	   to	   compete	   with	   other	   economies	   of	   the	   world,	  leaving	  them	  no	  other	  option	  but	  to	  sell	  debt	  or	  rely	  on	  capital	  inflows	  in	  order	  to	  finance	   their	   budgets.	   Today,	   it	   becomes	   increasingly	   obvious	   that	   the	  productivity	   of	   many	   western	   economies	   can	   no	   longer	   outperform	   the	  productivity	   and	   competitiveness	   of	   Asian	   economies	   and	   no	  western	   country	  can	  match	  the	  revenues	  produced	  by	  oil	  exporting	  countries	  (see	  chart	  1.3).416	  In	  short,	   this	   is	   an	   argument	   relating	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	   viability	   of	   western	  economies.	  	  
Chart	  3.1:	  Official	  reserves	  held	  by	  central	  banks,	  
USD	  tr.	  (left)	  and	  %	  of	  total	  USD	  (right)	  6.4	  tr.	  at	  end	  of	  2007	  
	  (Kern,	  ‘SWFs	  and	  Foreign	  Investment	  Policies’	  2008,	  5)	  	   The	   current	   account	   deficits417 	  and	   budget	   deficits418 	  recorded	   in	   many	  western	   economies	   mean	   that	   those	   governments	   rely	   on	   debt	   or	   foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  416	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  official	  reserves	  of	  developing	  and	  industrialised	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  information	  on	  current	  account	  balances	  see:	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  5-­‐6.	  417	  A	  current	  account	  is	  a	  ‘sub-­‐account	  of	  a	  nation’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  accounts	  consisting	  of	  visible	  and	  invisible	  trade	  plus	  private	  and	  official	  current	  transfers;	  capital	  flows	  are	  in	  the	  separate	  capital	  account’,	  Rutherford	  (n	  247)	  126;	  Developed	  countries	  today,	  as	  a	  group,	  run	  progressively	  larger	  current	  account	  deficits	  while	  the	  developing	  world,	  as	  a	  whole	  records	  current	  account	  surpluses,	  Bank	  of	  England,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Global	  Imbalances’	  (2008)	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  Q2,	  Bank	  of	  England	  <www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/quarterlybulletin/qb080207.pdf>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012,	  196.	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investment	  inflows	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  afloat.419	  As	  opposed	  to	  nations	  owning	  SWFs	  that	  typically	  enjoy	  budget	  and	  current	  account	  surpluses,	  western	  nations	  rely	  on	   those	   SWFs	   to	   finance	   their	   deficit	   by	   buying	   government	   debt	   or	   rely	   on	  them	   to	   invest	   in	   local	   economies	   by	   purchasing	   domestic	   equities.420	  Behind	  some	   of	   the	   usual	   criticisms	   on	   SWFs,421	  it	   is	   not	   very	   difficult	   to	   discern	   an	  underlying	   concern	   that	   it	   is	   simply	   not	   a	   sustainable	   solution	   for	   western	  governments	  to	  sell	  debt,	  or	  sell	  equity	  only	  to	  keep	  their	  finances	  afloat.	  In	  brief,	  this	   situation	   is	   seen	   as	   challenging	   standard	   economic	   theory	   stating	   that	  financial	   capital	   should,	   on	   net,	   flow	   from	   richer	   developed	   countries	   to	   less	  wealthy	   developing	   and	   emerging	   countries.422	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   above,	   the	  current	   economic	   crisis	   has	   exposed	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   western	   economies,	  while	  the	  rescuing	  intervention	  of	  SWFs	  highlighted	  the	  concerns	  relating	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  western	  economies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  418	  A	  budget	  deficit	  is	  the	  excess	  of	  government	  expenditure	  over	  government	  income,	  which	  must	  be	  financed	  either	  by	  borrowing	  or	  by	  printing	  money.	  Smullen	  and	  Hand	  (n	  273)	  51.	  419	  See	  for	  example,	  Andrew	  Hay	  and	  Manuel	  Maria,	  ‘Spain	  Wants	  SWF	  to	  Help	  Cover	  its	  Debt’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  20	  October	  2008)	  <www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-­‐peseta.4.17111262.html?_r=1&scp=33&sq=Sovereign%20Wealth%20Funds&st=cse>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012,	  David	  Oakley	  and	  Gillian	  Tett,	  ‘SWFs	  Courted	  in	  Debt	  Sales’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  24	  March	  2010)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e344b88a-­‐376d-­‐11df-­‐9176-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  420	  The	  sale	  of	  national	  debt	  finances	  the	  fiscal	  deficit.	  In	  the	  USA	  this	  is	  done	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  Treasury	  bonds.	  In	  the	  last	  years	  Asian	  governments	  (notably	  China)	  and	  various	  SWF	  holder	  countries,	  such	  as	  OPEC	  members,	  Brazil	  and	  Russia	  have	  been	  the	  biggest	  buyers	  of	  USA	  Treasury	  bonds	  thus	  becoming	  crucial	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  the	  USA	  budget,	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘Major	  Foreign	  Holders	  of	  Treasury	  Securities’	  (USA	  Treasury,	  2012)	  <www.treasury.gov/resource-­‐center/data-­‐chart-­‐center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012.	  421	  	  For	  example,	  Garten	  (n	  415);	  Other	  criticisms	  of	  this	  kind	  suggest	  their	  reserves	  are	  ‘illegitimate’	  because	  they	  are	  created	  through	  currency	  depreciation,	  John	  Vail,	  ‘A	  Passage	  to	  the	  West	  for	  SWFs’,	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  31	  October	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/774dcdd2-­‐8753-­‐11dc-­‐a3ff-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  10;	  Some	  use	  provocative	  statements	  exaggerating	  their	  size	  and	  power,	  Steven	  Weisman,	  ‘[USA]	  Fears	  Overseas	  Funds	  Could	  Buy	  up	  America’	  <www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-­‐wealth.1.7195120.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  422	  Simone	  Mezzacapo,	  ‘European	  Economy	  –	  The	  so-­‐called	  [SWFs]:	  Regulatory	  issues,	  financial	  stability	  and	  prudential	  supervision’	  (2009)	  European	  Commission,	  Economic	  Papers	  378	  <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15064_en.pdf>	  accessed	  21	  February	  2013,	  34.	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Thirdly,	  it	  is	  also	  essential	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘politically	  motivated	  investment’.	  As	   this	   term	   is	  used	   repeatedly	   in	   the	   analysis	  below,	   it	  would	  be	  useful	   to	   clarify	   it	   first.	   A	   politically	   motivated	   investment	   is	   essentially	   any	  investment	  that	  is	  not	  motivated	  solely	  by	  financial	  gain	  (whether	  short	  or	  long	  term).	   For	   example,	   the	   Agreement	   on	   Principles	   for	   Sovereign	   Wealth	   Funds	  between	   the	   governments	   of	   Abu	   Dhabi,	   Singapore	   and	   the	   USA	   contains	   the	  commitment	   that	   ‘SWFs’	   investment	   decisions	   should	   be	   based	   solely	   on	  commercial	   grounds,	   rather	   than	   to	   advance,	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   the	  geopolitical	   goals	   of	   the	   controlling	   government’.423	  Such	   an	   investment,	  which	  may	   take	  many	   forms,	   aims	   to	   benefit	   the	   government	  making	   it	   often	   at	   the	  expense	   of	   its	   country’s	   public	   financial	   reserves.	   It	   could,	   for	   example,	   be	   an	  attempt	  to	  support	   the	  ailing	  company	  of	  a	   foreign	  political	  ally	  or	   to	   influence	  the	   governance	   of	   a	   high	   profile	   foreign	   corporation.	   Alternatively,	   it	   may	   be	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  obtain	  a	  degree	  of	  leverage	  in	  the	  political	  leadership	  of	  a	  foreign	  country,	  or	  in	  the	  opposite	  sense,	  a	  foreign	  investment	  may	  then	  lead	  a	  government	  to	  seek	  special	  treatment	  of	  a	  company	  it	  has	  invested	  in,	  in	  return	  for	  political	  support.	  Specific	  examples,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  effects	  of	  such	  a	  strategy	  are	   set	  out	   in	  more	  detail	  below.	  At	   this	  point,	   it	   suffices	   to	   say	   that	  politically	  motivated	  investments,	  if	  they	  ever	  occur,	  can	  have	  potentially	  adverse	  effects	  to	  the	  countries	  that	  receive	  them.	  Having	  made	  the	  above	  observations,	  the	  concrete	  concerns	  posed	  by	  SWFs’	  investments	  are	  examined	  next.	  Those	  concerns	  have	  attracted	  much	  attention	  in	  the	  past	  and	  have	  been	  analysed	  extensively	  by	  a	   large	  volume	  of	   literature.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  while	  some	  are	   justified,	  many	  were	  exaggerated	  or	  subsequently	  proved	  to	  be	  unfounded.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  the	  main	  issues	  identified	  by	  the	  literature	  are	  grouped	  into	  five	  different	  groups,	  the	  merits	  of	  each	  are	  examined	  in	  turn.	  	  
i. Risks	  associated	  with	  the	  motivations	  behind	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  423	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘Treasury	  Reaches	  Agreement	  on	  Principles	  for	  [SWF]	  Investment	  with	  Singapore	  and	  Abu	  Dhabi’	  Press	  Release,	  hp-­‐881,	  20	  March	  2008,	  <www.treasury.gov/press-­‐center/press-­‐releases/Pages/hp881.aspx>	  accessed	  9	  May	  2013.	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Some	   of	   the	   existing	   theories	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   shareholder	  size	  and	  corporate	  governance	  could	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  risks	  involved	  when	  SWFs	  control	  large	  stakes	  in	  western	  firms.	  In	  a	  1986	  article,	  Shleifer	  and	  Vishny	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  small	  shareholders	  lack	  incentives	  to	  monitor	  managerial	  performance	   and	   they	   relate	   this	   to	   a	   free-­‐rider	   problem.424	  They	   suggest	   that	  the	  presence	  of	  large	  shareholders	  would	  offer	  a	  partial	  solution	  to	  the	  free-­‐rider	  problem	  and	  greatly	  improve	  monitoring.425	  Stulz,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   1988	   presented	   a	   model	   arguing	   against	   the	  positive	   relationship	   between	   ownership	   concentration	   and	   firm	  performance.426	  Based	   on	   his	  model,	   although	   higher	   ownership	   concentration	  leads	   to	   higher	   profitability	   because	   of	   reduced	   agency	   costs,	   as	   ownership	  concentration	  increases	  the	   largest	  owners	  gain	   incentives	  to	   impose	  goals	  and	  priorities	   not	   necessarily	   consistent	   with	   maximisation	   of	   its	   portfolio	  companies’	   value.	   Thus,	   ultimately	   the	   efficiency	   of	   corporate	   governance	  mechanisms	   is	   impaired,	   leading	   to	   increasing	   agency	   costs427	  and	   declining	  firms/shares	   value	   and	   possibly	   squeezing	   out	   minority	   shareholders.	   This	  model	   was	   subsequently	   confirmed	   by	   Morck,	   Shleifer	   and	   Vishny	   in	   a	   1989	  study.428	  The	   above	   theory	   can	   be	   easily	   applied	   to	   the	   case	   of	   SWFs.	   Indeed,	   such	  funds,	  given	  their	  large	  investments	  and	  strong	  financial	  backing	  have	  in	  theory,	  the	   capacity	   of	   imposing	   their	   own	   goals	   and	   priorities	   on	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  shareholder	   body.	   The	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   foreign	   state-­‐owned	   entities	   might	  imply	   that	   they	   will	   not	   necessarily	   pursue	   the	   same	   objectives	   as	   traditional	  private	   investors.	   Their	   opacity	   (and	   therefore	   the	   impossibility	   of	   others	  scrutinising	   their	   decision-­‐making	   strategies)	   can	   give	   rise	   to	   suspicions	   that	  SWFs	  could	  use	  their	  voting	  power	  or	  promote	  members	  to	  the	  company	  boards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  424	  Shleifer	  and	  Vishny	  (n	  394)	  463.	  425	  ibid	  474-­‐477.	  426	  René	  Stulz,	  ‘Managerial	  Control	  of	  Voting	  Rights’	  (1988)	  Vol	  20	  JFE	  40-­‐50.	  427	  This	  may	  be	  because	  their	  assets	  allocation	  and	  management	  are	  not	  always	  necessarily	  driven	  by	  risk-­‐adjusted	  profit	  maximisation	  motives,	  and/or	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  low	  transparency	  breeding	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  their	  behaviour	  as	  shareholders.	  428	  Morck	  Randall,	  Andrei	  Shleifer	  and	  Robert	  Vishny,	  ‘Alternative	  Mechanisms	  for	  Corporate	  Control’	  (1989)	  Vol	  79(4)	  AER	  842.	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to	  advance	  the	  financial,	  or	  even	  political,	  interests	  of	  foreign	  governments	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  shareholders	  and	  ultimately	  the	  company	  itself.	  A	   response	   to	   this	   argument	   is	   also	   the	   one	   put	   forward	   by	   Pistor	   that,	  although	  ownership	  of	  a	  domestic	   firm	  by	  a	   foreign	  entity	  may	  generally	  come	  with	  important	  powers	  over	  that	  firm	  (such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  appoint	  and	  dismiss	  management),	   such	   ownership	   may	   not	   necessarily	   come	   with	   ‘control’.429	  In	  particular,	   the	   theory	   of	   ‘separation	   of	   ownership	   and	   control’430	  may	   explain	  how	   share	   ownership	   in	   companies	   with	   dispersed	   shareholding,	   may	   not	  necessarily	   convert	   shareholders’	  de	  jure	   rights	  over	  management	  with	  defacto	  control.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  notions	  of	  control	  retained	  in	  many	  SWF	  holding	   countries,	   such	   as	   China,	   where	   a	   level	   of	   influence	   over	   senior	   fund	  officials	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  may	  be	  entirely	  unexportable	  in	  western	   legal	   systems	   and	   business	   practices.431	  An	   indication	   of	   the	   above	   is	  China’s	  reluctance	  so	  far	  to	  demand	  the	  right	  to	  appoint	  board	  members	   in	  the	  management	  of	  Blackstone.432	  Thus	   the	  key	  question	  becomes	  whether	   SWFs	   can	  use	   their	   voting	  power	  and	  whether	   they	   can	   act	   as	   fiduciary	   agents	   and	   directors	   on	   boards	   for	   the	  financial	  and	  economic	  well-­‐being	  of	  a	  company.	  It	  was	  noted	  by	  Cabrera	  that,	  in	  such	  cases,	  it	  might	  become	  necessary	  to	  ‘put	  firewalls	  to	  keep	  [companies]	  from	  political	  interference’.433	  As	  he	  says,	  activism	  scares	  recipient	  countries,	  whereas,	  ‘activism	   plus	   transparency	   adds	   value’.434	  Activism,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   voting	   at	  general	  meetings	  or	  seeking	  board	  changes,	  however,	  could	  help	  firms	  improve	  shareholder	  value	  by	  embracing	  a	  longer-­‐term	  perspective	  than	  that	  adopted	  by	  other	  activist	   investors,	   such	  as	  hedge	   funds.	   In	  addition,	  more	  participation	   in	  corporate	   governance	   from	   these	   funds	   may	   also	   lead	   them	   to	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  429	  Katharina	  Pistor,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Neither	  Market	  Investors	  Nor	  “Imperialist	  Capitalists”	  –	  A	  Response	  to	  Heike	  Schweitzer’,	  in	  Ulf	  Bernitz	  and	  Wolf-­‐Georg	  Ringe	  (eds),	  
Company	  law	  and	  Economic	  Protectionism:	  New	  Challenges	  to	  European	  Integration,	  (OUP,	  2010)	  291,	  294-­‐5.	  430	  Adolf	  Berle	  and	  Gardiner	  Means,	  The	  Modern	  Corporation	  and	  Private	  Property,	  Council	  for	  Research	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	  MacMillan	  Co	  1932.	  431	  Pistor	  (n	  429)	  294-­‐5.	  432	  n	  198.	  433	  Angel	  Cabrera,	  President	  of	  Thunderbird	  School	  of	  Global	  Management	  in	  Arizona,	  see	  Natsuko	  Waki,	  ‘They're	  Back:	  Sovereign	  Funds	  Want	  to	  Be	  Heard’	  Reuters	  (London,	  29	  January	  2010)	  <www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60S01R20100129>	  accessed	  12	  July	  2012.	  434	  ibid.	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accountability	   and	   transparency,	   thus	  helping	   them	   to	  become	  better	   accepted	  by	  recipient	  countries.435	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  SWFs’	  investment	  behaviour	  undertaken	  in	  chapter	  2	  can	  serve	  to	  discard	  this	  concern.	  As	  seen	  above,	  most	  of	  the	  available	  evidence	  suggests	   that	  SWFs	  are	   largely	  passive	   investors	  with	  no	  willingness	   to	   impact	  on	   company	   decisions.	   First,	   it	   is	   very	   common	   among	   the	   largest	   SWFs	   to	  outsource	   the	  management	  of	   their	   assets	   to	   independent	  managers	  and	  many	  choose	  to	  vote	  by	  proxy	  to	  give	  up	  board	  seats	  or	  even	  voting	  rights.436	  Second,	  the	  limited	  evidence	  on	  shareholder	  activism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  SWFs	  has	  so	  far	  been	  positive.	   It	   is	  believed,	   in	  particular,	   that	  SWF	  activism	  can	  contribute	   towards	  increasing	   the	   takeover	   premiums	   in	   the	   companies	  where	   they	   invest.437	  One	  example	  is	  Norway’s	  GPFG	  which	  opposed	  in	  late	  2008	  a	  bid	  by	  MidAmerican	  for	  Constellation,	   where	   the	   Fund	   had	   a	   4.8%	   stake.	   MidAmerican’s	   (a	   unit	   of	  Buffett’s	   Berkshire	   Hathaway	   Inc.)	   bid	   was	   interestingly	   backed	   by	  Constellation’s	  management	  itself.	  However	  Norway’s	  SWF	  considered	  the	  price	  insufficient	   and	   has	   since	   brought	   MidAmerican	   to	   court.438	  This	   example	   of,	  non-­‐controlling,	   shareholder	   activism	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   weight	   of	   SWFs	   in	  defending	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   companies	   they	   invest	   in.	   Another	   example	   of	   a	  company	   where	   a	   more	   active	   role	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   SWF	   has	   brought	  considerable	   benefits	   to	   the	   target	   firm	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Marfin	   Popular	   Bank,	   a	  former	  	  Greek	  based	  bank	  controlled	  in	  part	  by	  Dubai	  Group	  Ltd.439	  According	  to	  Bouloutas,	  ‘SWFs	  make	  very	  good	  investors	  because	  of	  their	  know-­‐how	  and	  their	  assistance	   in	   establishing	   good	   corporate	   governance’.440	  Although	   the	   official	  position	  of	  both	  Marfin	  and	  Dubai	  Holdings	  is	  that	  the	  latter	  does	  not	  intervene	  in	  management	   decisions,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   SWFs’	   presence	   in	   a	   company’s	  meetings	  can	  play	  a	  beneficial	  role	  by	  ‘offering	  valuable	  ideas	  and	  material’.441	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  Pistor	  (n	  429)	  294-­‐5.	  436	  And	  as	  seen	  by	  the	  China	  –	  Blackstone	  case,	  n	  198.	  437	  Fernandes	  and	  Bris	  (n	  389).	  438	  ibid	  8.	  439	  See	  below	  n	  917	  for	  more	  details	  on	  the	  links	  between	  Marfin	  Popular	  bank	  and	  the	  Dubai	  based	  fund.	  440	  Statement	  by	  Efthimios	  Bouloutas,	  former	  CEO	  Marfin	  Popular	  Bank,	  Athens	  (personal	  communication	  20	  December	  2008).	  441	  ibid.	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Moreover,	  one	  should	  not	   forget	   the	   legal	  protections	   that	  are	   in	  place,	   for	  example,	   under	   English	   company	   law	   the	   duties	   of	   directors	   are	   owed	   to	   the	  corporation	  and	  the	  shareholders	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  not	  to	  the	  ones	  who	  by	  contract	  or	  voting	  power	  placed	  the	  director	  on	  the	  board.442	  Alternatively,	  one	  might	  say	  that	   influencing	   corporate	   governance	   for	   their	   own	  benefit	   is	   unlikely,	   simply	  because	  it	  would	  imply	  that	  SWFs	  run	  their	  portfolios	  inefficiently.443	  The	   abovementioned	   study	   by	   Fotak	   and	   others	   constitutes	   an	   additional	  argument	   in	   favour	   of	   supporting	   greater	   SWF	   activism.	   In	   their	   analysis,	   the	  authors	  find	  an	  average	  abnormal	  return	  of	  +1%	  for	  targets	  on	  the	  day	  in	  which	  the	   SWF	   investments	   are	   announced.444	  However,	   over	   two	   years	   after	   the	  transaction,	  the	  abnormal	  buy-­‐and-­‐hold	  returns	  average	  -­‐41%.445	  They	  find	  that	  this	  effect	   is	  not	   related	   to	   the	   size	  of	   equity	   stake	  purchased	  by	   the	  SWF,	  and	  also	   does	   not	   differ	   across	   the	   various	   SWFs.	   They	   interpret	   the	   results	   as	  indicative	  of	  the	  additional	  agency	  costs	  that	  the	  SWF	  imposes	  on	  the	  companies,	  causing	   a	   deterioration	   of	   performance, 446 	  which	   implies	   that	   shareholder	  activism	  from	  SWFs	  might	  not	  only	  be	  welcome,	  but	  also	  needed.	  Overall,	  although	  the	  shareholder	  theory	  could	  in	  theory	  apply	  to	  SWFs	  and	  exacerbate	   concerns	  over	   their	   impact	   on	  host	   companies,	   the	   evidence	   shows	  that	   SWFs	   generally	   avoid	   the	   practice	   of	   influencing	   company	   decisions.	  Additionally,	   the	   few	   examples	   of	   SWF-­‐specific	   activism	   prove	   to	   be	   rather	  beneficial,	   an	  argument	   that	  may	  be	  used	   to	  encourage	  more	  activism	  on	   their	  behalf	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
ii. The	  motivations	   behind	   the	   investments	   of	   SWFs	   and	   national	   security	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  The	  rule	   in	  Percival	  v	  Wright	   [1902]	  2	  Ch	  401	  now	  given	  statutory	   force	  by	  virtue	  of	   s	  170	  which	  establishes	  that	  directors	  owed	  their	  duty	  to	  the	  company	  of	  which	  they	  are	  directors.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  shareholders	  themselves	  have	  no	  cause	  of	  action	  against	  directors	  for	  breach	  of	  their	  duties.	  Only	  the	  company	  has	  a	  cause	  of	  action,	  John	   Lowry	   and	   Arad	   Reisberg,	   Pettet’s	   Company	   Law:	   Company	   Law	  &	   Corporate	   Finance,	   4th	  edition,	  Pearson	  2012,	  158.	  443	  Zhao	  Feng,	  ‘How	  Should	  [SWFs]	  Be	  Regulated?’	  (2009)	  Vol	  3(2)	  BrookJ	  CorpFin	  &	  ComL	  496.	  444	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  4.	  445	  ibid.	  446	  However,	  since	  deteriorating	  firm	  performance	  is	  not	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  investment	  it	  may	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  ‘additional	  agency	  cost’	  effect	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  larger	  the	  stake	  acquired	  by	  the	  SWF.	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   An	  extension	  of	   the	  previous	  concern	   is	   the	  risk	  of	  political	   interference	   in	  the	  investment	  decisions	  of	  SWF	  managers	  and	  that	  investment	  decisions	  will	  be	  based	   on	   political	   rather	   than	   purely	   economic	   criteria.	   While	   the	   previous	  section	  related	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  SWF	  on	  the	  recipient	  company,	  this	  section	  deals	  with	   the	  potential	   harm	  on	   the	   recipient	   country/government	  which	   can	  raise	   issues	   of	   national	   security.	   This	   concern	   is	   exacerbated	   when	   funds	  originate	   from	  geopolitical	  rivals	   to	  the	  west,	  such	  as	  China,	  Russia	  and	  Iran	  or	  when	   foreign	   state-­‐owned	   funds	   invest	   in	   sensitive	   sectors	   (energy,	   defence,	  telecoms	  etc).	  As	  with	  the	  previous	  scenario,	  this	  theory	  again	  would	  imply	  that	  SWFs	   would	   run	   their	   portfolios	   inefficiently,	   meaning	   that	   they	   would	   make	  financially	   detrimental	   investment	   decisions	   with	   the	   prospect	   of	   extracting	  some	  sort	  of	  political	  gain.	  This	   is	   where	   the	   opaque	   nature	   of	   SWFs	   becomes	   more	   relevant.	   In	  particular,	  the	  absence	  of	  clear	  reports	  on	  the	  management	  structures,	  names	  of	  top	  managers,	  investment	  plans,	  size	  and	  financial	  assets	  held	  by	  SWFs,	  makes	  it	  impossible	   for	   recipient	   governments	   to	   ascertain	   the	   degree	   of	   government	  interference	  in	  the	  decisions	  of	  SWFs.	  This	   concern	   becomes	   more	   alarming	   if	   one	   considers	   the	   potential	  detrimental	   results	   of	   politically	   motivated	   investments	   by	   SWFs.	   Among	   the	  potential	   risks	   often	   reported	   is	   the	   danger	   of	   stealing	   critical	   information	   or	  critical	   technology,	   shipping	   jobs	  abroad,	   influencing	   the	  corporate	  governance	  or	   taking	   control	   of	   national	   strategic	   companies	   with	   potentially	   devastating	  effects	   for	   recipient	   countries.447	  Other	   fears	   expressed	   at	   times	   seem	   highly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  447	  These	  positions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  entire	  literature,	  either	  as	  rightful	  arguments	  or	  referred	  to	  critically,	  see	  for	  example,	  Summers	  (n	  302);	  Weisman	  (n	  415);	  Garten	  (n	  415);	  Joshua	  Aizenman	  and	  Reuven	  Glick,	  ‘[SWFs]:	  Stumbling	  Blocks	  or	  Stepping	  Stones	  to	  Financial	  Globalization?’	  (2007)	  Number	  2007-­‐38 Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  San	  Francisco	  <www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2007/el2007-­‐38.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013,	  2-­‐3;	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  7-­‐8;	  IFLR	  staff,	  ‘Panic’	  (2008)	  IFLRev	  <www.iflr.com/Article/1976753/Panic.html>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012,	  and	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  review,	  see:	  Gordon	  and	  Tash	  (n	  414)	  11-­‐18.	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speculative,	  for	  example,	  during	  the	  DWP	  case448	  USA	  Congressmen	  and	  Senators	  from	   both	   parties	   brought	   up	   the	   risk	   of	   terrorists	   being	   smuggled	   into	   USA	  territory	   from	   the	  Middle	   East.449	  Similarly,	   in	   a	   2007	   article,	   Steven	  Weisman	  warned	   about	   the	   potential	   detrimental	   effect	   of	   SWFs	   on	   a	   recipient	  government	  due	   to	  political	  motives:	   ‘some	  experts	  would	  wonder	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  China	  took	  over	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company	  and	  pressed	  for	  changes	  in	  prescription	   drug	   programs’.450	  In	   any	   event,	   the	   potential	   risks	   therefore,	   can	  range	  from	  small	  nuisances	  to	  concerns	  about	  national	  security.	  It	   is	  not	  always	  clear	  which	  companies	  are	  considered	  of	   ‘national	  strategic	  importance’	  and	  surely	  these	  may	  vary	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  these	  are	  usually	  companies	  operating	  in	  the	  fields	   of	   energy,	   defence,	   transport	   and	   telecoms	   (or	   whenever	   national	  networks	  are	  involved),	  as	  well	  as	  technology	  and	  major	  manufacturers.	  In	  this	  regard,	   in	   the	   last	   few	   years,	   European	   governments	   have	   at	   times	   expressed	  fears	   that	   Gazprom’s	   extensive	   investments	   into	   European	   energy	  infrastructure 451 	  may	   render	   European	   countries	   more	   vulnerable	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Russia.452	  Past	   examples	   such	   as	   DIC’s	   and	   Russian	   state-­‐controlled	   bank	   OAO	  Vneshtorgbank	   investments	   into	   EADS,	   Abu	   Dhabi’s	   investments	   into	   AMD,453	  rumours	   as	   to	   possible	   takeovers	   of	   Germany’s	   Volkswagen, 454 	  as	   well	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  448	  n	  936	  onwards.	  449	  Carl	  Levin,	  ‘Opening	  remarks	  at	  Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  Briefing	  on	  Port	  Security’,	  News	  Release,	  23	  February	  2006	  <http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=251838>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012;	  Stephen	  Zunes,	  ‘The	  Dubai	  Ports	  World	  Controversy:	  Jingoism	  or	  Legitimate	  Concerns?’	  FPIF	  
Policy	  Report	  (Washington	  DC,	  13	  March	  2006)	  <www.fpif.org/articles/the_dubai_ports_world_controversy_jingoism_or_legitimate_concerns>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013.	  450	  Weisman	  (n	  415).	  451	  For	  example,	  Danny	  Fortson,	  ‘Gazprom	  Plots	  UK	  Expansion,	  but	  Buying	  Centrica	  Is	  a	  Pipe	  Dream’	  The	  
Independent	  (London,	  2	  June	  2008	  <www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/gazprom-­‐plots-­‐uk-­‐expansion-­‐but-­‐buying-­‐centrica-­‐is-­‐a-­‐pipe-­‐dream-­‐838164.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  452	  Traynor	  (n	  74);	  Weisman	  (n	  415).	  453	  AMD	  is	  a	  computer	  technology	  company	  and	  the	  world	  second	  largest	  computer	  chip	  maker,	  Don	  Clark,	  ‘Abu	  Dhabi	  Doubles	  Down	  on	  AMD	  Investment’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  8	  October	  2008)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122335835617410929.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  454	  For	  more	  on	  this	  case	  see	  n	  876	  onwards.	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MIG’s455	  aggressive	  policy	   towards	  Greece’s	   telecommunications	  operator,	  have	  at	   times	   caused	   national	   debates	   linking	   the	   operation	   of	   SWFs	  with	   issues	   of	  national	  and	  economic	  security.	  Those	  national	  security	  arguments	  put	  forward	  are	  often	  over-­‐exaggerated.	  Even	   if	   assumed	   that	   a	   SWF	   invests	   in	   a	   company	   operating	   in	   a	   sensitive	  industry,456	  such	   as	   aviation	   or	   energy,	   existing	   laws	   will	   in	   most	   conceivable	  cases	  protect	  the	  public	  from	  any	  misconduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  fund.457	  In	  most	  western	  governments	   (and	   surely	   in	  all	   of	   those	   that	   are	   taken	  as	   case	   studies	  and	  are	  examined	  in	  the	  following	  chapters)	  there	  is	  a	  sufficient	  legal	  framework	  as	  well	   as	   special	   agencies	   regulating	   investments	   that	  may	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  national	  security.458	  In	  most	  of	  these	  countries	  there	  are	  also	  operating	  agencies	  in	   the	   field	  of	  energy,	   transport,	   telecommunications,	  and	  the	   like,	   that	  oversee	  the	   management	   of	   those	   companies	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   public. 459	  Nevertheless,	   national	   security	   issues	   at	   times	   may	   still	   be	   used	   by	   elected	  representatives	  for	  no	  reason	  other	  than	  to	  reap	  personal	  political	  gains	  or	  they	  can	   be	   evoked	   by	   the	   media	   or	   the	   wider	   public	   in	   order	   to	   disguise	   pure	  xenophobia.	  Paraphrasing	  Johnson:	  national	  security	  can	  be	  the	  last	  refuge	  of	  the	  scoundrel.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  duty	  falls	  upon	  a	  national	  government	  to	  scrutinise	  all	  situations	  that	  could	  genuinely	  raise	  issues	  of	  national	  security.	  For	  example,	  all	  national	   agencies	   should	   be	   aware	   of	   how	   far	   has	   a	   SWF	   obtained	   control	   of	  strategic	  or	  other	  important	  companies.	  They	  should	  also	  be	  aware	  of	  how	  much,	  through	  its	  shares,	  it	  can	  exercise	  political	  influence	  on	  the	  decisions	  and	  future	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  455	  As	  said	  above	  MIG,	  a	  Greek	  private	  equity	  firm,	  is	  largely	  controlled	  by	  Dubai	  Holdings.	  For	  the	  relation	  between	  MIG	  and	  Dubai	  Holdings	  see	  n	  917.	  456	  However	  rare	  a	  scenario,	  according	  to	  Brune	  ‘inside	  OECD	  countries,	  controlling	  stake	  deals	  in	  sensitive	  sectors	  accounted	  for	  2%	  by	  number	  and	  4%	  by	  value,’	  Brune	  (n	  279)	  29.	  457	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  USA,	  see	  Federal	  Aviation	  Act	  of	  1958	  Pub	  L	  No	  85-­‐726,	  72	  Stat	  731,	  para	  101;	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act	  of	  1954	  Pub	  L	  No	  83-­‐703,	  68	  Stat	  919,	  937	  para	  103(d),	  codified	  at	  42	  USC,	  para	  2133.	  	  458	  The	  best	  known	  example	  being	  the	  USA	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (CFIUS),	  chapter	  5,	  n	  954	  onwards.	  459	  In	  the	  UK,	  for	  instance,	  under	  the	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  telecommunications	  are	  regulated	  by	  Ofcom,	  who	  ensures	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  communication	  providers	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  consumers,	  see	  Ofcom,	  <www.ofcom.org.uk>	  accessed	  21	  February	  2013.	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development	  of	  those	  companies.	  This	  duty	  may	  also	  extend	  to	  other	  important	  firms	  such	  as	  financial	  institutions	  and	  large	  manufacturing	  companies.	  Concrete	  past	  examples	  can	  serve	  to	  put	  the	  perceived	  risks	  into	  context.	  In	  a	  study	   by	   Bernstein	   and	   others.	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   some	   of	   Singapore’s	  investments	   in	   China	   and	   India	  were	   interpreted	   as	   forging	   strategic	   ties	  with	  the	   city-­‐state’s	   larger	   and	   more	   powerful	   neighbours rather	   than	   seeking	  financial	   returns.460	  The	   same	   study	   also	   claimed	   that	   political	   considerations	  have	   led	   to	   the	   abandonment	   of	   prescient	   investment	   strategies,	   as	   when	   the	  Norway’s	   GPFG	   caused	   uproar	   in	   2006	   by	   shorting	   the	   shares	   of	   Icelandic	  banks.461 	  Fotak	   and	   others	   also	   mention	   the	   examples	   of	   Singaporean	   and	  Korean	   SWFs	   making	   investments	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   executing	   technology	  transfers	   for	  the	  benefit	  of	   their	  home	  countries.462	  Similarly,	  an	  OECD	  study	  in	  2009	  referred	  to	  an	  agreement	  by	  Mubadala	  Investment	  Company,	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  hospital	  in	  the	  Japanese	  city	  of	  Kobe	  through	  which	  it	  intended	  to	  gain	  improved	  access	  to	  medical	  technologies	  and	  provide	  training	  for	  its	  domestic	  doctors.	  All	  the	  above	  investment	  advanced	  both	  public	  and	  commercial	  objectives.463	  Other	   examples	  with	   a	   stronger	   element	  of	  political	   interference	  have	   also	  been	  recorded.	  Such	   is	   the	  2006	  purchase	  by	  Temasek	  Holdings	  of	  a	  stake	   in	  a	  company	  owned	  by	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Thailand,	  Thaksin	  Shinawatra.	  The	   subsequent	  demonstrations	  were	   so	   severe	   that	   they	   led	   to	   the	  ousting	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  a	  few	  months	  later	  in	  a	  military	  coup.464	  China,	  moreover,	  was	  held	   to	   have	   used	   its	   reserves	   in	   SAFE	   to	   sway	   Costa	   Rica	   to	   give	   up	   its	  diplomatic	   ties	   with	   Taiwan.465	  According	   to	   Andrew	   Batson,	   the	   agreement	  provided	   that	   China	   would	   buy	   $300	   million	   bonds	   from	   Costa	   Rica	   and	   the	  latter,	   in	   return,	   would	   switch	   diplomatic	   recognition	   to	   Beijing	   from	   Taiwan.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  460	  Bernstein	  and	  others	  (n	  100)	  29.	  461	  ibid.	  462	  Which	  however	  where	  made	  in	  full	  knowledge	  and	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  recipient	  government,	  see	  chapter	  1,	  n	  99.	  463	  Gordon	  and	  Tash	  (n	  414)	  9.	  464	  Fotak,	  Bortolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  51)	  7;	  Weisman	  (n	  415).	  465	  Andrew	  Batson,	  ‘China	  Used	  Reserves	  to	  Sway	  Costa	  Rica’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  13	  September	  2008)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122121919505927749.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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Such	   practices,	   known	   as	   ‘checkbook	   diplomacy’,466	  are	   common	   for	   both	   self-­‐governed	  Taiwan	  and	  China,	  who	  considers	  Taiwan	  to	  be	  part	  of	  its	  territory.467	  Therefore,	   although	   there	   are	   specific	   examples	   of	   politically	   motivated	  decisions	   on	   the	   part	   of	   SWFs,	   these	   are	   extremely	   limited	   and	   none	   of	   them	  have	   raised	   particular	   concerns,	   i.e.	   none	   involved	   the	   ownership	   of	   national	  strategic	  companies	  or	  other	  issues	  of	  national	  security.	  The	   record	   of	   SWFs	   so	   far	   shows	   that	   the	   only	   cases	   of	   concrete	   political	  interference	  in	  investment	  decisions	  concern	  domestic	  investments	  made	  mainly	  during	   the	  ongoing	  economic	  crisis	   to	  bail	  out	   local	  economies.	  But	  an	  obvious	  question	   might	   then	   arise:	   if	   SWFs	   clearly	   make	   ‘political’	   investments	  domestically,	   how	   can	   it	   be	   guaranteed	   that	   they	   will	   not	   also	   make	   them	   in	  foreign	  markets?	  None	  of	  the	  available	  literature	  can	  offer	  a	  satisfactory	  answer	  to	   this	   question.	   It	   may,	   however,	   be	   sufficient	   to	   say	   that	   nothing	   so	   far	   has	  indicated	  a	  desire	  by	  SWFs	  to	  make	  politically	  motivated	  investments	  overseas.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  as	  Bernstein	  et	  al.	  report,	  when	  politicians	  are	   involved,	   funds	  invest	  more	  in	  their	  home	  country	  (44%	  of	  the	  deals	  in	  the	  sample),	  relative	  to	  funds	  without	  politicians	  involved	  (only	  31%	  of	  the	  transactions).468	  In	  fact,	  until	  today	   there	   is	  no	  significant	  example	  of	  a	  politically	  motivated	   investment	   in	  a	  foreign	  country	  that	  could	  raise	  serious	  concerns.469	  Strategic	  investments	  may	  certainly	  occur	  but	  this	  should	  not	  be	  something	  alarming.	  Backer	  cites	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  fund	  making	  investments	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  466	  ibid,	  The	  term	  generally	  denotes	  using	  international	  financial	  investments	  to	  promote	  foreign	  policy	  objectives.	  467	  Another	  cited	  example	  of	  a	  politically	  driven	  decision	  is	  that	  of	  Norway,	  who	  in	  2007	  pulled	  its	  investment	  out	  of	  Wal-­‐Mart,	  citing	  accusations	  that	  it	  has	  violated	  child-­‐labour	  laws	  and	  scuttled	  efforts	  by	  employees	  to	  unionise,	  Weisman	  (n	  421);	  It	  should	  be	  stated	  here	  that,	  although	  Weisman	  sees	  this	  investment	  decision	  as	  essentially	  ‘political’	  (and	  in	  the	  broad	  sense	  it	  may	  be)	  it	  could	  also	  be	  taken	  as	  part	  of	  Norway’s	  policy	  to	  simply	  avoid	  morally	  controversial	  investments.In	  the	  same	  way	  as	  certain	  funds	  may	  avoid	  excessive	  risk-­‐taking	  because	  of	  religious/ethical	  reasons,	  Simon	  Chesterman,	  ‘The	  Turn	  to	  Ethics:	  Disinvestments	  from	  Multinational	  Corporations	  for	  human	  Rights	  Violations	  –	  The	  Case	  of	  Norway’s	  SWF’	  (2008)	  23	  American	  University	  International	  Law	  Review	  588-­‐593.	  468	  Bernstein	  and	  others	  (n	  100)	  15.	  469	  See	  also:	  Nicholas	  Pettifer,	  ‘Stop	  Panicking	  Over	  Sovereign	  Funds’	  (2008)	  IFLRev	  <www.iflr.com/Article/1983181/Stop-­‐panicking-­‐over-­‐sovereign-­‐funds.html>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012.	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India	  during	   the	  crisis,	  when	  most	   investors	  were	  withdrawing	   funds	   from	  the	  Indian	   market.470	  This	   may	   certainly	   be	   a	   ‘strategic’	   investment,	   but	   it	   is	   not	  tantamount	   to	   a	   ‘politically	   motivated’	   investment.	   As	   he	   states,	   ‘saying	   that	  states	   invest	   to	   promote	   political	   aims	   is	   somewhat	   dubious.	   Investors	  sometimes	   invest	   strategically	   with	   incremental	   gains,	   states	   may	   do	   the	  same’.471	  Therefore,	   there	   is	   nothing	   unique	   about	   this	   behaviour.	   In	   a	   similar	  tone,	  Epstein	  and	  Rose	  argue	  that	  most	  foreseeable	  cases	  where	  the	  investment	  decisions	  of	  SWFs	  might	  involve	  some	  political	  consideration	  are	  not	  significant	  and	  may	  be	  allowed.472	  In	  their	  view,	  a	  USA-­‐based	  pension	  fund	  should	  be	  able	  to	  invest	   their	  workers’	   income	  and	  vote	   their	   shares,	   to	  maximise	   some	  political	  choice	  that	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  endorsed.473	  This	  same	  logic	  could	  apply	  to	  SWFs	  as	  well.	  In	   any	   event,	   the	   unique	   scrutiny	   under	   which	   SWFs	   operate	   makes	   it	  unlikely	  that	  a	  SWF	  will	  purport	  to	  exert	  political	  influence	  in	  the	  future.474	  If	   it	  did	   so,	   the	   imminent	   backlash	   by	   governments,	   international	   bodies	   and	   the	  business	  community	  at	   large	  would	  certainly	  damage	  the	  fund’s	  reputation	  and	  close	   most	   of	   its	   business	   opportunities	   in	   the	   future.	   It	   is,	   therefore,	   in	   the	  interest	  of	  the	  foreign	  funds	  to	  avoid	  any	  behaviour	  that	  might	  send	  the	  wrong	  signal	  to	  recipient	  countries	  and	  target	  companies.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   above,	   the	   demands	   directed	   to	   SWFs	   to	   increase	   their	  transparency	   levels	   may	   also	   dissipate	   the	   concerns	   of	   target	   countries.	   For	  example,	  since	  ADIA	  published	  some	  information	  about	  its	  governance	  structure,	  it	   is	   possible	   for	   companies	   and	   governments	   to	   understand	   better	   how	   it	  conducts	   its	   business	   strategies	   and	   reduce	   the	   fear	   of	   politically	   motivated	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  Lary	  Cata	  Backer,	  ‘[SWFs]	  and	  the	  Financial	  Crisis:	  Norwegian	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds,	  India,	  and	  the	  Rising	  Private	  Power	  of	  Public	  Organizations’	  (Law	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Day,	  2008)	  <http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds-­‐and-­‐financial.html>	  accessed	  8	  November	  2012. 471	  ibid.	  472	  Epstein	  and	  Rose	  (n	  162)	  125.	  473	  The	  writers	  give	  the	  example	  of	  the	  California	  Public	  Employee’s	  Retirement	  System	  that	  entertained	  proposals	  not	  invest	  in	  specific	  countries	  or	  to	  funnel	  investments	  into	  firms	  that	  hire	  workers	  from	  disadvantaged	  countries,	  ibid.	  474	  Paul	  Rose,	  ‘Sovereigns	  as	  Shareholders’	  (2008)	  87	  N.C.L.Rev	  102-­‐166,	  who	  observes	  that	  SWFs	  operate	  under	  unique	  scrutiny	  and	  that	  the	  suspicion	  surrounding	  them	  causes	  them	  to	  act	  ‘hypercautiously’.	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decisions.	  At	  this	  stage,	  it	  is	  known	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Abu	  Dhabi	  may	  create	  a	  mandate	  within	  an	  asset	  class	  (for	  example	  the	  ‘Italian	  market’,	  or	  ‘real	  estate’),	  but	  it	  falls	  upon	  the	  manager	  to	  decide	  how	  the	  asset	  allocation	  will	  be	  executed	  because	   the	   benchmark	   of	   his	   performance	   is	   defined	   according	   to	   a	   national	  index	   (for	   example,	   the	   S&P500	   Index,	   or	   the	  MSCI	   Index).475	  This	   benchmark	  will	   eventually	   also	   determine	   the	   bonus	   that	   the	   manager	   will	   receive.	   If	  political	   involvement	   was	   more	   intrusive	   it	   would	   become	   impossible	   for	  managers	   to	   execute	   their	   best	   performance	   and	   this	   would	   jeopardise	   their	  salary	  bonus.476	  Despite	  this	  limited	  information	  disclosed	  by	  ADIA,	  the	  fund	  still	  remains	   a	   largely	   secretive	   SWF	   and	   substantially	   more	   progress	   will	   be	  required	   for	   it	   to	   reach	   the	   transparency	   level	   of	   the	   Norwegian	   fund	   or	  Temasek. 477 	  The	   above	   example,	   however,	   makes	   clear	   how	   increased	  transparency	  alone	  can	  serve	   to	  dissipate	  concerns	  and	  shows	   that	  most	  SWFs	  have	  failed	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  better	  communications	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  governments	  should	  not	  be	  fearful	  of	  their	  investments.	  Today,	   most	   commentators	   and	   public	   officials	   focus	   less	   on	   the	   risks	   of	  political	  interference	  while	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  that	  were	  expressed	  in	  the	  past	  either	   now	   seem	   exaggerated	   or	   were	   subsequently	   proved	   unfounded.	   This	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  because	  SWFs	  have	  convinced	  national	  governments	  to	  the	   opposite,	   but	   rather	   because	   the	   ongoing	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	   need	   for	  external	  capital	  does	  not	  leave	  much	  room	  for	  criticisms	  on	  SWFs.478	  In	  short,	  the	  current	  situation,	  does	  not	  allow	  western	  governments	  to	  be	  too	  sceptical	  as	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  foreign	  investments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  475	  A	  benchmark	  is	  ‘1.	  a	  standard	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  performance	  of	  an	  investment	  or	  portfolio.	  2.	  A	  standard	  specification	  of	  contract,	  for	  example	  a	  futures	  contract.	  3.	  A	  base	  price	  or	  interest	  rate’,	  Smullen	  and	  Hand	  (n	  273)	  39.	  476	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Investment	  Authority,	  ‘An	  Introduction	  to	  ADIA’	  (2009)	  ADIA,	  Governance	  6.	  477	  The	  example	  of	  Temasek	  also	  demonstrates	  how	  transparency	  can	  dissipate	  concerns.	  In	  2008,	  the	  management	  of	  Temasek	  sent	  its	  executive	  director,	  Israel,	  to	  a	  USA	  Congressional	  Hearing	  to	  impress	  upon	  lawmakers	  how	  the	  fund	  is	  insulated	  from	  political	  interfering.	  	  Israel	  noted	  that	  Temasek	  has	  an	  independent	  eight-­‐member	  majority	  in	  its	  board	  supplemented	  by	  an	  international	  advisory	  panel	  including	  famous	  personalities	  from	  the	  field	  of	  investment	  banking,	  Simon	  Claude	  Israel,	  ‘Testimony	  before	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Committee’	  (2008)	  USA	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  478	  Veljko	  Fotak	  and	  William	  Megginson,	  ‘Are	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  Welcome	  Now?’	  (2009)	  Columbia	  FDI	  Perspectives,	  No	  9,	  Vale	  Columbia	  Centre	  <http://vcc.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/FotakandMegginson-­‐Final.pdf>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012,	  1-­‐3.	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It	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  speculate	  what	  the	  attitude	  of	  governments	  and	  analysts	  will	  be	   in	   the	   future.	   That	   said,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   once	   the	   financial	   crisis	   is	   over	   the	  debate	  over	  national	   security	  and	  SWFs	  will	   revive	  again.	  As	  Epstein	  and	  Rose	  argue,	  ‘after	  the	  dust	  settles	  on	  Wall	  Street,	  and	  the	  blame	  game	  begins	  in	  earnest	  Washington,	   SWFs	   will	   in	   all	   likelihood	   find	   themselves	   in	   the	   regulatory	  crosshairs	  once	  again’.479	  	  
iii. Risks	  associated	  with	  undue	  leverage	  	   Politically	  motivated	  investments	  are	  not	  the	  only	  concerns	  expressed	  by	  the	  literature	  on	  SWFs.	  Through	  their	   investments	  SWFs	  may	  also	  obtain	  an	  undue	  leverage	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   target	   countries,	   for	   example,	   in	   foreign	   policy	  negotiations.480	  The	   ‘undue	   leverage’	   hypothesis	   could	   take	   large	   proportions	   and	   may	  appear	  more	  realistic	  than	  the	   ‘national	  security’	  theories	  discussed	  above.	  One	  can	   imagine	   for	   example,	   a	   Middle	   Eastern	   state	   demanding	   from	   the	   USA	  government	   favourable	   tax	   cuts	   for	   its	   companies	   in	   the	  USA,	   in	   return	   for	   its	  support	   in	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   peace	   talks	   or	   for	   assistance	   in	   Iraq	   or	   Afghanistan.	   It	  would	   also	   not	   be	   unrealistic	   to	   imagine	   the	   difficult	   position	   of	   EU	   Member	  States	  or	  the	  European	  Commission	  during	  negotiations	  with	  China	  on	  measures	  to	   tackle	   climate	   change,	   if	   China	   controls	   a	   significant	   portion	   of	   EU	   national	  economies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  479	  Epstein	  and	  Rose	  (n	  162)	  113;	  It	  was	  also	  stated	  by	  Liqun’s	  (Chairman	  of	  the	  CIC’s	  Supervisory	  Board	  and	  Deputy	  Chairman	  of	  the	  International	  Forum	  of	  SWFs)	  that	  ‘misgivings	  about	  SWFs	  are	  likely	  to	  rekindle	  as	  economies	  recover	  and	  the	  credit	  crunch	  becomes	  less	  of	  a	  problem.	  The	  mood	  would	  probably	  swing	  back	  […]	  SWFs’	  relevance	  to	  global	  stability	  does	  not	  guarantee	  their	  status	  as	  a	  guest	  of	  honor	  in	  some	  of	  the	  economies	  where	  they	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  solution,	  not	  part	  of	  the	  problem’,	  Jin	  Liqun,	  ‘SWFs	  Serve	  as	  a	  Stabilizing	  Force’	  China	  Daily	  (Beijin,	  9	  June	  2010)	  <www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-­‐06/09/content_9952379.htm>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  480	  Or	  as	  described	  by	  O’Brien,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  exercise	  of	  	  ‘soft	  political	  power’,	  Justin	  O’Brien,	  ‘Barriers	  to	  Entry:	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  and	  the	  Regulation	  of	  [SWFs]’	  (2008)	  Vol	  42(4)	  International	  Lawyer	  1231	  <www.law.berkeley.edu/files/REVISEDBERKELEYOBRIENpdf.pdf>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012,	  6.	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A	  more	  concrete	  example	  is	  the	  following:	  The	  USA	  relies	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  China	  buying	  its	  federal	  debt	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  its	  deficit.481	  According	  to	  Brad	  Setser’s	  estimates,	  the	  majority	  of	  USA	  equity	  in	  China	  are	  held	  by	  SAFE,	  a	  well	  known	  SWF.482	  It	   is	   indicative	   that	  when,	   former	  Presidential	   candidate	  Hillary	  Clinton,	   was	   asked	   why	   do	   the	   USA	   not	   take	   a	   tougher	   stance	   on	   China	   she	  replied,	   ‘how	  do	  you	  get	  tough	  on	  your	  banker?’483	  Later	  in	  February	  2010,	  and	  following	  a	  disputed	  arms	  sale	  by	  the	  USA	  to	  Taiwan,	  a	  Chinese	  official,	  Gen.	  Luo,	  was	   quoted	   saying,	   ‘we	   could	   sanction	   them	   using	   economic	   means,	   such	   as	  dumping	   some	  USA	   government	   bonds’.484	  A	   closer	   look,	   however,	   to	   the	   facts	  surrounding	   USA	   government	   bonds	   indicates	   that	   the	   threat	   of	   selling	   such	  bonds	  is	  not	  a	  realistic	  one.	  Indeed,	   if	  Chinese	  officials	  started	  selling	  their	  USA	  assets	  and	  touched	  off	  a	  run	  on	  the	  dollar,	   their	  vast	  remaining	  dollar	  holdings	  would	   plummet	   in	   value.485	  This	   lack	   of	   incentive,	   also	   known	   as	   the	   modern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  481	  See	  the	  list	  of	  largest	  buyers	  of	  USA	  Treasury	  securities	  at:	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘Major	  Foreign	  Holders	  of	  Treasury	  Securities’	  (USA	  Treasury,	  16	  October	  2012)	  <www.treasury.gov/resource-­‐center/data-­‐chart-­‐center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  482	  Brad	  Setser,	  ‘SAFE	  Seems	  to	  Have	  Started	  Buying	  [USA]	  Equities	  in	  the	  Spring	  of	  2007,	  and	  Didn’t	  Stop	  Until	  July	  2008’	  (Follow	  the	  Money,	  15	  March	  2009)	  <http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/03/15/safe-­‐seems-­‐to-­‐have-­‐started-­‐buying-­‐us-­‐equities-­‐in-­‐the-­‐spring-­‐of-­‐2007-­‐and-­‐didnt-­‐stop-­‐until-­‐july-­‐2008/>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012;	  Brad	  Setser,	  ‘Did	  SAFE	  Really	  Buy	  that	  Many	  [USA]	  (and	  Global)	  Equities?’	  (Follow	  the	  Money,	  19	  March	  2009)	  <http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/03/19/did-­‐safe-­‐really-­‐buy-­‐that-­‐many-­‐us-­‐and-­‐global-­‐equities/>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012;	  It	  was	  also	  confirmed	  in	  the	  Financial	  Times	  that	  ‘the	  bulk	  of	  SAFE’s	  holdings	  remain	  in	  USA	  Treasury	  bills	  and	  much	  of	  the	  loss	  on	  riskier	  assets	  will	  be	  offset	  on	  gains	  on	  long	  term	  bills’,	  Jamil	  Anderlini,	  ‘China	  Lost	  Billions	  in	  Diversification	  Drive’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  15	  March	  2009)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/11fa4136-­‐119f-­‐11de-­‐87b1-­‐0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  Finally,	  Teslik	  confirms	  that	  in	  ‘as	  investors	  spooked	  by	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  poured	  money	  into	  [government-­‐backed	  assets,	  like	  Treasury	  bills]	  as	  a	  safe	  haven’,	  Teslik	  (n	  115).	  483	  Clinton	  made	  financial	  independence	  from	  China	  a	  central	  theme	  in	  her	  Presidential	  bid.	  She	  also	  claimed	  that	  America	  was	  undergoing	  a	  ‘slow	  erosion	  of	  [its]	  own	  economic	  sovereignty’.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  former	  former	  USA	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paulson	  and	  Governor	  of	  the	  USA	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Bernanke,	  she	  warned	  	  that	  if	  ‘China	  or	  Japan	  made	  a	  decision	  to	  decrease	  their	  massive	  holdings	  of	  [USA]	  dollars,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  currency	  crisis	  and	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  to	  raise	  interest	  rates	  and	  invite	  conditions	  for	  a	  recession’,	  Tom	  Curry,	  ‘Clinton	  Sounds	  the	  China	  Alarm	  as	  an	  ’O8	  issue’	  MSNBC	  (New	  York,	  2	  March	  2007)	  <www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17403964/>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  484	  Bill	  Gertz,	  ‘Chinese	  See	  [USA]	  Debt	  as	  Weapon	  in	  Taiwan	  Dispute’	  Washington	  Times	  (Washington	  DC,	  10	  February	  2010)	  <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/10/chinese-­‐see-­‐us-­‐debt-­‐as-­‐weapon/>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  485	  And	  could	  at	  the	  same	  time	  appreciate	  the	  Chinese	  remnibi	  against	  the	  dollar,	  thus	  harming	  China’s	  exports	  to	  the	  USA.	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‘balance	  of	  financial	  terror’,486	  has	  guaranteed	  that	  China	  will	  not	  sell	  USA	  asset	  and	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  China’s	  bond	  holdings	  grant	  it	  an	  ‘undue	  leverage’	  over	  the	  USA	  may	  be	  exaggerated	  at	  times.	  Until	   now,	   and	   to	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   international	   academic	   and	  media	  community,	   there	   has	   not	   been	   any	   serious	   case	   of	   a	   threat	   or	   exercise	   of	  leverage	   against	   a	   recipient	   economy	   of	   SWF	   investments.	   That	   said,	   Clinton’s	  above	  statement	  must	  be	  taken	  seriously	  because	  it	  consists	  of	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  actual	  degree	  of	  influence	  of	  one	  country	  on	  another	  through	  the	  means	  of	  its	  SWF.	  American	  financial	  dependence	  on	  China	  is	  a	  fact.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  fact	  that	  many	  third	   country	   investors	   control	   significant	   stakes	   in	   some	  of	   the	  most	   valuable	  companies	   in	   the	   western	   world.	   This	   development	   might	   not	   entail	   national	  security	  risks,	  but	  may	  reduce	  the	  political	  bearing	  of	  many	  western	  states.	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  a	  national	  or	  international	  measure	  or	  any	  kind	   of	   regulatory	   framework	   could	   reverse	   this	   trend	  of	   growing	   influence	   of	  developing	   countries	   over	  western	  ones.	   It	  would,	   indeed,	   be	  difficult	   to	   argue	  under	   any	   circumstances	   that	   state	   protectionism	   can	   offer	   a	   satisfactory	  solution	  to	  this	   issue.487	  Instead	  of	  opting	  for	  more	  protectionism,	  governments	  that	   face	   similar	   problems	   should	   prioritise	   reforms	   to	   adjust	   their	   current	  account	  or	   fiscal	  deficit	  and	   thus	  reduce	   their	  need	   for	   foreign	  capital.488	  While	  doing	   so,	  maintaining	   an	  open	   economy	   towards	   SWFs	  must	   remain	   a	   priority	  for	  any	  government.489	  	  
iv. Risks	  associated	  with	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  on	  the	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  486	  Rich	  Miller	  and	  Simon	  Kennedy,	  ‘G-­‐20	  Plans	  to	  End	  “Financial	  Balance	  of	  Terror”	  After	  Summit’	  Bloomberg	  (New	  York,	  27	  September	  2009)	  <http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVpPMKLa50rc>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  487	  As	  put	  by	  Epstein	  and	  Rose,	  ‘although	  the	  growth	  of	  SWFs	  may	  be	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  weakened	  position	  of	  the	  [USA]	  in	  the	  global	  economy,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  cause—and	  increased	  regulation	  of	  SWFs,	  not	  the	  cure’,	  Epstein	  and	  Rose	  (n	  162)	  113.	  488	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Truman,	  they	  should	  avoid	  the	  ‘understandable	  temptation	  to	  try	  to	  use	  international	  assets	  to	  promote	  domestic	  economic	  development	  objectives’,	  Truman	  (n	  82)	  6.	  489	  For	  example,	  see:	  Commission	  (n	  1)	  2,	  6-­‐8.	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There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   analysts	   who	   focus	   on	   the	   macroeconomic,	   rather	  than	  political,	  risks	  arising	  from	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	  These	  mainly	  consist	  of	   arguments	   relating	   to	   economic	   stability,	   but	   the	   experience	   of	   SWFs	   so	   far	  has	   shown	   that	   SWFs	   offer	  more	   benefits	   to	   the	   international	   financial	   system	  than	  they	  present	  risks.	  The	   first	   economic	   argument	   against	   SWFs,	   as	   formulated	   by	   Blundell-­‐Wignall	  and	  others,	  holds	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  excessive	  global	  liquidity	  caused	  by	  SWFs	   can	   cause	   asset	   bubbles.490	  Fixed	   exchange	   rates	   in	   the	   face	   of	   capital	  inflows	   lead	   to	   foreign	   exchange	   accumulation	   and	   easier	   domestic	   monetary	  conditions.491	  This	  can	  contribute	  to	  local	  asset	  bubbles.	  The	  global	  investment	  of	  the	   reserves	   of	   one	   country	   may	   affect	   prices	   in	   other	   financial	   markets.	  Kambayashi	  has	  also	  offered	  support	  for	  the	  above	  theory.492	  A	  similar	  argument	  is	   given	   by	   Kern	   who	   is	   mostly	   concerned	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   SWFs	   on	   the	  decisions	  of	  other	  investors.	  As	  he	  puts	  it:	  	  ‘it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  that	  an	  individual	  transaction	  undertaken	  by	  one	  SWF	  may	   lead	   to	   herding	   behaviour	   by	   other	   market	   participants,	   resulting	   in	  excessive	   capital	   movement	   and	   price	   and	   rate	   changes	   for	   the	   security	  concerned	  as	  well	  as	  –	  if	  contagion	  effects	  occur	  –	  for	  correlated	  assets’.493	  	  	  Herding	   behaviour	   generally	   occurs	   when	   competitive	   conditions	   may	  induce	  banks	  to	  behave	  in	  line	  with	  other	  banks	  and	  incur	  excessive	  risk	  in	  the	  process	  and	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  often	  precedes	  bank	  crises.494	  The	  likelihood	  of	  herding	  increases	  if	  a	  transaction	  is	  undertaken	  by	  an	  opaque	  fund.	  Kern’s	  fear	  is	   that	   such	   herding	   behaviour	   caused	   by	   SWFs	   can	   destabilise	   regional	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  490	  Blundell-­‐Wignall,	  Hu	  and	  Yermo	  (n	  75)	  12.	  491	  Reflected	  in	  the	  encouragement	  of	  low	  interest	  rates	  and	  low	  leverage.	  492	  Satoshi	  Kambayashi,	  ‘The	  World's	  Most	  Expensive	  Club’	  The	  Economist	  (London,	  24	  May	  2007)	  <www.economist.com/node/9230598>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  493	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  11;	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  13;	  Krishna	  Guha,	  ‘Warning	  Over	  SWFs’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  22	  June	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7963f2f2-­‐2021-­‐11dc-­‐9eb1-­‐000b5df10621.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012,	  warning	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  increased	  volatility	  of	  financial	  markets.	  494	  Llewellyn	  (n	  385)	  27-­‐28.	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segmental	  parts	  of	   the	   financial	   industry	  or	   even	   financial	  markets	  on	  a	   global	  scale.495	  Truman	  has	  also	  acknowledged	  in	  his	  testimony	  before	  the	  USA	  Senate	  that	  the	  most	  serious	  risk	  brought	  by	  SWFs	  is	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  stability	  of	  the	   countries	   accumulating	   these	   huge	   stocks	   of	   international	   assets. 496	  According	   to	   Truman,	   there	   is	   an	   understandable	   temptation	   to	   try	   to	   use	  international	   assets	   to	   promote	   domestic	   economic	   development	   objectives.	  However,	   ‘doing	   so	   is	   essentially	   impossible	  without	  undermining	  or	   reversing	  the	   fiscal,	   monetary,	   and	   exchange	   rate	   policies	   that	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   initial	  accumulations	  of	  the	  external	  assets’.497	  With	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  exchange	  rate	   policies,	   such	   reversals	   are	   likely	   to	   boost	   inflation,	   create	   wasteful	  distortions	   in	  domestic	  economies,	  and	  contribute	  to	  slower,	  not	   faster,	  growth	  and	  development.498	  Another	   perceived	   danger	   relating	   to	   investments	   of	   a	   large	   scale,	   such	   as	  those	  by	   SWFs,	   is	   the	  possibility	   in	  which	   investors,	   all	   of	   a	   sudden,	  massively	  withdraw	   their	   funds	   from	   one	   country.	   This	   situation	   can	   materialise	   as	   a	  reaction	   to	   a	   foreseeable	   political	   or	   economic	   instability	   or	   simply	   because	  investors	   chose	   to	   seek	   investment	   opportunities	   elsewhere.	   The	   immediate	  result	   of	   such	   action	   would	   be	   a	   depreciation	   of	   share	   prices	   as	   well	   as	   a	  	  devaluation	  the	  recipient	  country’s	  currency	  which	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  past	  in	  a	  number	   of	   East	   Asian	   countries	   and	   earlier	   in	   several	   Latin	   American	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  495	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  11.	  496	  Truman	  (n	  82)	  6.	  497	  ibid.	  498	  ibid.	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countries.499	  If	   such	   outflows	   occurred	   during	   a	   recession500	  it	  would	   force	   the	  country’s	  central	  bank	  to	  raise	  interest	  rates	  to	  attract	  capital	  inflows.501	  Herd	   behaviour	   and	   lack	   of	   transparency	   into	   the	   market,	   have	   been	  contributory	  factors	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  that	  began	  in	  2007	  with	  the	   collapse	  of	   the	   subprime	  mortgage	  market	   and	  peaked	   towards	   the	   end	  of	  2008	   and	   until	   2009	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	   Lehman	   Brothers	   in	   the	   USA.502	  In	  particular,	   the	   inability	   of	   regulators	   to	   oversee	   and	   warn	   of	   the	   alarming	  behaviour	  of	   financial	   firms	  pre-­‐crisis	   (and	   their	   limited	   tools	   in	   responding	   to	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  crisis),	  have	  demonstrated	  the	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  financial	  stability	  within	  today’s	  powerful	  financial	  markets.	  For	  the	  two	  types	  of	  risks	  described	  above	  (the	  creation	  of	  asset	  bubbles	  and	  the	   risk	   of	   collective	   withdrawal	   of	   investments)	   it	   not	   very	   easy	   to	   give	   a	  satisfactory	   answer.	   	   However,	   one	   could	   point	   at	   certain	   facts	   on	   SWFs	   that	  mitigate	   the	   likelihood	   of	   such	   risks	   materialising.	   First,	   it	   should	   be	  remembered	  that	  the	  capital	  markets	  of	  most	  western	  economies	  are	  quite	  large	  and	  host	  sizeable	  market	  players,	  big	  enough	  to	  dwarf	  the	  SWF	  investments.503	  This	   is	   especially	   true	   in	   those	   economies	   that	   receive	   the	   majority	   of	   SWF	  investments	   (USA,	  UK,	  Germany,	   France,	   Switzerland	  and	  Australia),	  which	   are	  too	   large	   to	   anticipate	   that	   a	   simple	   combination	   of	   investments	   by	   SWFs	   (or	  their	  withdrawal)	  could	  possibly	  cause	  macroeconomic	  distortions.	  An	  empirical	  study	  conducted	  for	  the	  IMF	  in	  October	  2009	  examined	  financial	  stability	  issues	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  499	  See	  for	  example,	  the	  case	  of	  Mexico,	  where	  the	  collective	  withdrawal	  of	  foreign	  investments	  between	  1993	  and	  1994,	  following	  the	  assassination	  of	  two	  prominent	  political	  figures,	  caused	  a	  severe	  stock-­‐market	  crash,	  Sebastian	  Edwards	  and	  Moises	  Naim,	  ‘Mexico	  1994:	  Anatomy	  of	  an	  Emerging-­‐Market	  Crash’	  	  (1998)	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  international	  Peace;	  The	  later	  example	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  crisis	  (1997)	  should	  in	  a	  large	  measure	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  panic	  reaction	  and	  herd	  behavior	  of	  foreign	  investors.	  Examples	  include	  Hong	  Kong,	  Thailand,	  Malaysia,	  Indonesia,	  Laos,	  the	  Philippines	  and	  South	  Korea,	  Frederick	  Mishkin,	  ‘Lessons	  from	  the	  Asian	  crisis’	  (1999)	  Vol	  18(4)	  JIMF	  709.	  500	  As	  certain	  examples	  were	  recorded	  during	  the	  GFC	  in	  mid	  2009,	  see	  chapter	  1,	  n	  340	  onwards.	  501	  James	  Jackson,	  ‘Foreign	  Ownership	  of	  [USA]	  Financial	  Assets:	  	  Consequences	  of	  Withdrawal’	  (2008)	  USA	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  <www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-­‐34213879_ITM>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013,	  4.	  502	  A	  summary	  of	  the	  GFC	  is	  provided	  in	  chapter	  2,	  n	  306	  onwards.	  503	  See	  table	  1.2	  in	  chapter	  1,	  where	  the	  size	  of	  SWFs	  was	  compared	  to	  other	  larger	  private	  institutional	  investors.	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that	  arise	  from	  the	  increased	  presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  markets.504	  It	   equally	   concluded	   that	   there	   is	  no	   significant	  destabilizing	  effect	  of	  SWFs	  on	  equity	  markets.	  As	  regards	  ‘herding’	  in	  particular,	  as	  the	  recent	  experience	  in	  the	  market	  for	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   proves,	   it	   cannot	   be	   excluded	   that	   SWFs	   may	  contribute	   to	   such	   behaviours	   that	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   asset	  bubbles.	   It	   must	   be	   emphasised,	   however,	   that	   such	   risks	   are	   inherent	   in	   the	  operation	  of	   free	  markets.	   It	   is	  the	  objective	  of	  market	  regulators	  to	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  such	  outcomes	  by	  supervising	  the	  development	  of	  the	  market	  as	  a	  whole	  including	  in	  their	  consideration	  of	  SWFs	  as	  much	  as	  any	  other	  type	  of	   investor.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  SWFs	  alone	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  large	  or	  numerous	   to	   have	   a	   definitive	   contribution	   to	   ‘herding	   behaviour’,	   let	   alone	  create	  one.	  Second,	   as	   regards	   the	   risk	   of	   a	   massive	   outflow	   of	   capital,	   it	   should	   be	  remembered	   that	   SWFs	   are	   mostly	   long-­‐term	   investors	   and	   they	   have	   the	  resources	   and	   the	   financial	   backing	   to	  withstand	   harsher	   economic	   conditions	  than	  most	  investors.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  example	  of	  Japan,	  where	  ADIA	  had	   invested	   since	   the	   1970s	   and	   continued	   to	   invest	   during	   the	   difficult	  economic	  times	  of	  the	  1990s.505	  When	  the	  global	  equity	  market	  fell	  again	  sharply	  in	   Japan	   between	   2000	   and	   2002,	   the	   Norwegian	   GPFG	   was	   a	   large	   buyer	   of	  global	  equities.506	  The	  same	  has	  occurred	  lately	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  caused	  by	  the	  2007	  property	  bubble.	  Despite	  their	  losses,	  most	  SWFs	  continued	  to	  invest	  in	  financial	  markets	   (sometimes	   alongside	   bailing	   out	   their	   domestic	   economies)	   and,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   they	   may	   have	   even	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   reviving	   of	   the	  American	  and	  European	  economies.	  Later	  on,	  during	  the	  European	  debt	  crises	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  504	  This	  conclusion	  was	  based	  on	  166	  publicly	  traceable	  events	  collected	  on	  investments	  and	  divestments	  by	  major	  SWFs	  during	  the	  period	  of	  1999-­‐2009.	  It	  evaluated	  the	  short-­‐term	  financial	  impact	  of	  SWFs	  on	  selected	  public	  equity	  markets	  in	  which	  they	  invest.	  The	  impact	  is	  further	  analysed	  on	  different	  sectors	  (financial	  and	  non	  financial),	  actions	  (buy	  and	  sell),	  market	  types	  (developed	  and	  emerging	  markets),	  countries,	  and	  level	  of	  corporate	  governance	  (high	  and	  low).	  Sun	  and	  Hesse	  (n	  388)1.	  505	  Emily	  Thornton	  and	  Stanley	  Reed,	  ‘Inside	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Investment	  Authority’	  Businessweek	  (New	  York,	  6	  June	  2008)	  <www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2008/gb2008065_742165.htm>	  accessed	  20	  December	  2012.	  506	  Bank	  of	  England,	  (n	  417)	  199.	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2010	  which	  ultimately	  affected	  all	  members	  of	  the	  single	  European	  currency,507	  SWFs	   remained	   in	   the	   Eurozone	   market.	   The	   president	   of	   CIC,	   for	   instance,	  reassured	   EU	   governments	   in	   2010	   that	   ‘CIC	   will	   keep	   its	   investment	   level	   in	  Europe’	  and	  that	  ‘short	  term	  fluctuations	  won’t	  bring	  serious	  effect	  on	  [them]’.508	  Moreover,	  in	  2011	  following	  a	  downgrade	  of	  USA	  debt	  by	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s,509	  it	  was	   confirmed	  by	   Slyngstad	   the	  head	  of	  Norway’s	   SWF,	   that	   the	  downgrade	  rating	  the	  USA	  received	  ‘had	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  way	  the	  fund	  views	  investments	  in	  the	  country’.510	  As	  this	  recent	  experience	  showed	  in	  practice,	  the	  extremely	  limited	  cases	  of	  asset	   sales,	   are	   by	   no	   means	   enough	   to	   characterize	   the	   general	   behavior	   of	  SWFs	  and	  should	  not	  be	  a	  cause	  for	  concern.	  Therefore,	  the	  danger	  of	  collective	  withdrawal	  of	   funds	  should	  not	  apply	   to	  SWFs.	  For	  some	   this	  was	  an	  expected	  development,	  since	  it	  is	  generally	  admitted	  that	  collective	  maneuvering	  of	  funds	  primarily	  harm	  foreign	  investors	  themselves	  because	  a	  huge	  supply	  of	  securities	  in	  the	  market	  will	  instantly	  reduce	  their	  gains	  from	  liquidation.511	  In	  short,	  SWFs’	  investment	   criteria	   and	   financial	   backing	   are	   enough	   to	   discard	   any	   argument	  based	  on	  ‘herding	  behaviour’	  whether	  concerning	  inflows	  or	  outflows	  of	  capital.	  A	  final	  risk	  concerning	  the	  USA	  is	  that	  SWFs	  could	  cause	  a	  spike	  in	  the	  USA	  interest	   rates.	   This	   fear	   follows	   a	   traditional	   argument	   which	   holds	   that	   a	  continuation	  of	   the	   large	  current-­‐account	  deficits	  will	   eventually	  boost	   interest	  rates	   further	  as	   foreigners	  become	  sated	  with	  USA	  assets	   (bonds	   in	  particular)	  and	  stop	  increasing	  the	  share	  of	  their	  portfolios	   invested	  there.512	  One	  example	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  507	  See	  n	  375.	  508	  Jamil	  Anderlini	  and	  David	  Oakley,	  ‘China	  Fund	  “Very	  Concerned”	  on	  Shaky	  Eurozone’,	  
Financial	  Times	  (London,	  27	  May	  2010)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b23c824-­‐6983-­‐11df-­‐8ae3-­‐00144feab49a.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  509	  Walter	  Brandimarte	  and	  Daniel	  Bases,	  ‘[USA]	  Loses	  Prized	  AAA	  Credit	  Rating	  from	  S&P’	  
Reuters	  (London,	  6	  August	  2011)	  <www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/06/us-­‐usa-­‐debt-­‐downgrade-­‐idUSTRE7746VF20110806>	  accessed	  17	  July	  2012.	  510	  SWF	  Institute	  staff,	  ‘Norway	  SWF	  Chief	  Not	  Worried	  About	  [USA]	  Downgrade’	  (SWF	  Institute,	  2011)	  <www.swfinstitute.org/swf-­‐article/norway-­‐swf-­‐chief-­‐not-­‐worried-­‐about-­‐u-­‐s-­‐downgrade/>	  accessed	  17	  July	  2012.	  511	  Feng	  (n	  443)	  495.	  512	  Congressional	  Budget	  Office,	  ‘Causes	  and	  Consequences	  of	  the	  Trade	  Deficit:	  an	  overview’	  (2000)	  Congressional	  Budget	  Office	  <www.cbo.gov/publication/12139>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2012,	  14;	  see	  also,	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concerning	   the	   USA	   is	   the	   possibility	   that	   foreign	   investors	   such	   as	   China	  will	  stop	  investing	  in	  USA	  government	  debt.	  Whether	  a	  rise	  in	  interest	  rates	  might	  be	  desirable	  or	  not,	  Balin	  believes	   that	  such	  a	  scenario	   is	  not	   realistic.	  As	  he	  says,	  Although	   SWFs	   will	   allow	   countries	   to	   diversify	   their	   holdings	   of	   foreign	  securities	  away	  from	  USA	  government	  bonds,	  future	  global	  reserve	  growth	  apart	  from	   the	   growth	   of	   SWFs	   (assuming	   global	   growth)	   is	  more	   than	   adequate	   to	  absorb	  the	  anticipated	  disbursement	  of	  USA	  government	  bonds	  at	  their	  current	  prices	   in	   the	   years	   to	   come.513	  Thus,	   SWFs	   alone	   cannot	   cause	   a	   spike	   in	   USA	  interest	  rates.	  	  
v. Risk	  of	  increased	  protectionism	  	   Two	   articles	   by	   Sesit514	  and	   Lynch515 	  warned	   in	   2007	   of	   the	   increased	  danger	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  financial	  protectionism	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  SWFs.	  Since	   then,	   a	   number	   of	   commentators	   have	   dealt	  with	   this	   risk516	  since,	   for	   a	  period	  of	  time,	  it	  appeared	  that	  governments	  were	  either	  taking	  the	  possibility	  of	  raising	   barriers	   seriously,	   or	   were	   tightening	   up	   the	   conditions	   for	   foreign	  investors	  to	  operate	  in	  their	  market.	  For	   the	   time	   being,	   since	   the	   recent	   effects	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	  protectionist	  attitudes	  towards	  SWFs	  have	  been	  temporarily	  silenced.517	  There	  is	  no	   other	   rationale	   for	   this	   change	   of	   attitude,	   other	   than	   that	   in	   the	   face	   of	  economic	  instability,	  countries	  choose	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  direct	  benefits	  of	  FDI	  and	  put	  the	  political	  considerations	  of	  those	  investments	  aside.	  It	  is	  understandable,	  however,	  that	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  policymakers	  have	  also	  a	  duty	  to	  see	  beyond	  the	  immediate	   economic	   benefits	   of	   FDI	   and	   assess	   its	   wider	   political	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  David	  Lynch,	  ‘[USA]:	  Secretive	  Global	  Funds	  May	  Hurt	  Treasuries	  Market’,	  USA	  Today	  (Tysons	  Corner,	  21	  June	  2007)	  <www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-­‐06-­‐21-­‐cash-­‐usat_N.htm>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012,	  warning	  of	  a	  decline	  in	  demand	  for	  USA	  Treasury	  bonds.	  513	  Balin	  (n	  88)	  12.	  514	  Michael	  Sesit,	  ‘[SWFs]	  are	  Starting	  to	  Dominate	  Global	  Finance’,	  International	  Herald	  Tribune	  (Neuilly-­‐sur-­‐Seine,	  18	  June	  2007)	  in	  Fotak,	  Botrolotti	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  52)	  n	  13. 515	  Lynch	  (n	  512).	  516	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  14,	  Castelli	  (n	  231)	  8.	  517	  Fotak	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  478)	  1-­‐3.	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macroeconomic	   impact. 518 	  Eliminating	   all	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   SWF	  investments	   may	   be	   difficult	   but	   if	   left	   completely	   unaddressed	   it	   might	   fuel	  concerns,	  and	  could	  as	  a	  result	  force	  national	  governments	  to	  resort	  once	  again	  to	  protectionism	  in	  the	  future.519	  Indeed,	  the	  rise	  of	  protectionist	  attitudes	  until	  before	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  seen	  as	  mainly	  caused	  by	  the	  opaque	  nature	  of	  SWFs.520	  As	  SWFs	  continue	  their	  shopping	  spree	  in	  financial	  assets	  without	  substantially	  improving	  transparency,	  protectionist	  voices	  could	  arise	  again	  once	  national	  governments	  and	  the	  general	  public	  perceive	  the	  crisis	  to	  be	  over.	  All	  of	  these	  elements	  are	  likely	  to	  fuel	  again	  the	   same	   debate	   on	   economic	   patriotism	   as	   they	   did	   before	   the	   crisis.	   This	  tendency	   may	   be	   more	   likely	   in	   countries	   that	   have	   traditionally	   exhibited	  protectionist	   attitudes,	   such	   as	   France 521 	  and	   southern	   EU	   Members, 522 	  or	  countries	  where	  national	  security	  is	  more	  often	  part	  of	  the	  political	  debate,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  USA.523	  Additionally,	   the	  effects	  of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   calls	   for	  tighter	   regulation	   in	   the	   entire	   financial	   sector,524	  could	   also	   be	   extended	   to	  cover	   the	   transactions	  of	  SWFs	  as	  well.	  Although	   the	  case	   for	   regulating	  hedge	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  518	  For	  more	  details	  see:	  Gordon	  and	  Tash,	  ‘Foreign	  Government-­‐Controlled	  Investors	  and	  Recipient	  Country	  Investment	  Policies’	  (n	  414)	  8-­‐19.	  519	  An	  OECD	  paper	  published	  during	  the	  crisis	  warned	  of	  those	  risks	  ‘Faced	  with	  rising	  public	  fear	  and	  distrust,	  governments	  are	  now	  necessarily	  focused	  on	  restoring	  national	  economic	  and	  employment	  growth	  and	  financial	  stability.	  Although	  they	  recognise	  that	  open	  markets	  will	  ultimately	  contribute	  to	  a	  sustainable	  recovery,	  domestic	  economic	  and	  political	  pressures	  might	  make	  them	  less	  mindful	  of	  their	  international	  commitments	  to	  openness.	  In	  this	  context,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  countries	  will	  be	  tempted	  to	  adopt	  “beggar	  thy	  neighbour”	  policies,	  including	  investment	  protectionism	  in	  various	  guises’,	  OECD,	  ‘Building	  Trust	  and	  Confidence	  in	  International	  Investment:	  Report	  by	  Countries	  Participating	  the	  “Freedom	  of	  Investment”	  Process’	  (2009)	  OECD	  12.	  520	  See	  the	  literature	  commenting	  on	  the	  threats	  and	  risks	  of	  SWFs,	  Weisman	  (n	  415).	  Garten	  (n	  414).	  IFLR	  staff	  (n	  447).	  521	  Where	  notions	  such	  as	  ‘economic	  patriotism’	  are	  still	  prevalent,	  chapter	  5,	  n	  828.	  522	  See	  the	  Index	  of	  World	  Economic	  Freedom	  by	  the	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  The	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  ‘Explore	  the	  Data’	  (The	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  2012)	  <www.heritage.org/index/explore?src=home>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013.	  523	  See	  above	  the	  characteristic	  examples	  of	  DPW	  (n	  935	  onwards)	  and	  Unocal	  (n	  545	  and	  934)	  cases.	  524	  One	  example	  being	  the	  Larosiere	  report,	  De	  Larosiere	  and	  others	  (n	  290)	  59-­‐68.	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funds	  and	  investment	  banks	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs,525	  the	  latter	  may	  also	  come	  under	  the	  recent	  demands	  for	  more	  transparency	  in	  the	  financial	  system.	  In	  other	  words,	  lack	  of	  transparency	  of	  SWFs	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  even	   less	   acceptable	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   conditions	   that	   led	   to	   the	   financial	  crisis.	  These	  demands	  may	  originate	  from	  international	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  or	  the	  EU,	  or	  may	  come	  from	  individual	  states.	  In	   short,	   the	   debate	   on	   SWFs	  may	   take	   a	   different	   form	   or	   shape,	   but	   the	  nature	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  SWFs	  will	  continue	  to	  attract	  attention	  and	  even	  cause	  controversy.	  The	  issue	  of	  protectionism	  regulation	  and	  national	  responses	  is	  analysed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  For	  the	  moment	  it	  suffices	  to	  say	  that	  protectionism	  is	  an	  undesirable	  response	  and	  often	  it	  reflects	  misinformed	  perceptions	   about	   SWFs.	   From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   national	   governments	   some	  form	  of	   regulation	  may	   sometimes	  be	  warranted	   to	   address	   genuine	   concerns.	  The	  necessity	  (or	  not)	  of	  regulation	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
	  
	  
	  CONCLUSION	  	  This	   chapter	   aimed	   at	   identifying	   the	  main	   issues	   that	   revolve	   around	   the	  investments	  of	   SWFs	  with	  a	   specific	   emphasis	  on	  western	  countries.	  While	   the	  benefits	   brought	   in	   the	   system	   appear	   to	   be	   tangible,	   expressed	   concerns	   are	  often	  theoretical	  or	  over-­‐exaggerated.	  In	   particular,	   it	   was	   shown	   that	   SWFs	   can	   be	   quite	   beneficial	   to	   recipient	  economies,	   particularly	   because	   of	   their	   size	   and	   long-­‐term	   investment	  behaviour.	  Additionally,	   their	   investments	  proved	   to	  be	  very	   important	   for	   the	  most	   part	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   so	   far	   and	  may	   have	   even	   contributed	   to	   the	  stabilisation	  of	  western	  economies.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  SWFs	  also	  give	  rise	  to	  some	  concerns.	  One	  such	  concern	  is	  whether	   they	   are	   likely	   to	   use	   their	   voting	   power	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   other	  shareholders	   and	   the	   company	   as	   a	   whole.	   A	   further	   key	   concern	   extends	   to	  whether	  SWFs	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  national	  security.	  It	  has	  been	  seen	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  525	  These	  are	  touched	  upon	  in	  chapter	  4,	  n	  1058.	  
SWFs:	  Potential	  Benefits	  and	  Challenges	  
	   137	  
there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  SWFs	  could	  constitute	  any	  serious	  threat.	  In	  fact,	  an	  analysis	  of	  their	  investment	  behaviour	  suggests	  that	  SWFs	  are	  generally	  passive	   and	   with	   no	   intention	   to	   act	   in	   politically	   controversial	   ways.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   question	   remains	   as	   to	   whether	   some	   individual	   SWFs	   use	  their	   financial	   ties	   as	   an	   undue	   leverage	   against	   some	   other	   country	   to	   obtain	  political	  benefits.	  The	  potential	  risks	  of	  SWFs	  can	  also	  be	  of	  an	  economic	  nature.	  Experts	  have	  in	  the	  past	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	   ‘herding	  behaviour’	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  asset	   bubbles	   or	   causing	   a	   currency	   depreciation	   if	   they	   collectively	  withdraw	  their	   investments.	  These	   threats,	  however,	  are	  based	  on	  hypothetical	  scenarios	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  coincide	  the	  SWFs’	  reputation	  as	  long-­‐term	  investors.	  In	  any	  event,	  SWFs	  do	  not	  act	  in	  concert	  and	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  single	  or	  a	  few	  SWFs	  alone	  are	  sufficient	  to	  disrupt	  a	  country’s	  entire	  economy.	  Nevertheless,	  many	  of	   the	  above	  risks,	   if	   left	  completely	  unaddressed,	  may	  fuel	  protectionist	  tendencies	  in	  many	  western	  countries	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	  All	   in	   all,	   after	   taking	   into	   account	   all	   issues	   discussed	   above,	   it	   becomes	  obvious	  that	  the	  benefits	  originating	  from	  those	  investments	  clearly	  outstrip	  the	  perceived	  risks.	  This	  conclusion	  should	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	   for	  discussion	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  regulating	  SWFs	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
-­‐	  
Regulation	  of	  SWFs:	  
The	  Avoidance	  of	  Investment	  Protectionism	  
	  
	  
	  INTRODUCTION	  	  	   Chapter	   2	   analysed	   the	   investment	   behaviour	   of	   SWFs.	   Its	   findings	   were	  used	  in	  chapter	  3	  to	  discuss	  the	  benefits	  of	  and	  concerns	  about	  SWFs	  as	  the	  base	  for	   their	   regulation.	   This	   chapter	   examines	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   rationale	   for	  regulating	   SWFs	   and	   goes	   on	   to	   present	   and	   scrutinise	   various	   regulatory	  proposals.	  Economic	   protectionism	   exists	   in	   many	   areas	   of	   economic	   activity.	   It	   is	  especially	  prevalent	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  ownership	  of	  domestic	  corporate	  assets	  and	  the	   screening	   of	   foreign	   investments.	   While	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   achieve	   consensus	  among	   governments	   and	   commentators	   against	   the	   adoption	   of	   investment	  protectionist	   measures,	   determining	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   rationale	   for	  regulating	  SWFs	  is	  more	  controversial.	  If	   it	   is	  accepted	  that	  SWFs	  do	  pose	  risks	  (and	  thus	  costs)	   to	  national	  security	  and	  systemic	  stability,	   then	  a	  rationale	   for	  regulation	  is	  easier	  to	  establish.	  If,	  however,	  those	  threats	  are	  not	  genuine	  (and	  hence	  the	  regulatory	  costs	  unjustified),	  a	  very	  limited	  form	  of	  regulation	  aiming	  to	   address	   protectionist	   pressures	   and	   maintain	   consumer/corporate	   market	  confidence	  could	  suffice.	   It	   is	  argued	  that	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  countries	  managing	  huge	   SWFs	   could	   exert	   political	   leverage	   over	   countries	   in	   which	   they	   invest.	  However,	   this	   risk	   cannot	   be	   tackled	   by	   a	   simple	   regulatory	   instrument,	   the	  ambit	  of	  which	  must	  be	  limited	  to	  securing	  financial	  stability	  or	  national	  security.	  Nor	  could	  such	  an	  instrument	  reverse	  the	  growing	  world	  influence	  of	  developing	  nations.	  In	  establishing	  a	  rationale	  for	  regulation,	  a	  central	  aspect	  of	  the	  discussion	  is	  the	   place	   and	   role	   of	   transparency.	  While	  many	   authors	   believe	   that	   the	  main	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object	   of	   legislation	   should	   be	   to	   tackle	   the	   opacity	   of	   SWFs	   (either	   as	   an	  intermediate	  aim,	  or	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  itself),	  others	  deem	  that	  opacity	  is	  not	  the	  problem	  and,	  thus,	  tackling	  it	  would	  be	  futile.	  The	  position	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that,	  while	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  are	  sound	  principles	  in	  themselves,	  SWFs	  should	   be	   allowed	   to	   derogate	   from	   it	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   their	   immediate	  competitors	   are	   allowed	   to	   do	   so.	   In	   other	   words,	   transparency	   in	   financial	  markets	  should	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  competitive	  neutrality.	  Regulatory	   proposals	   relating	   to	   SWFs	   can	   be	   grouped	   into	   three	   broad	  categories.	  First,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  advocate	  restricting	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  either	   by	   imposing	   investment	   caps,	   or	   removing	   entire	   sectors	   from	   their	  investment	   ambit.	   A	   second	   group	   supports	   imposing	   softer	   restrictions	   upon	  SWFs	   to	   create	   incentives	   for	   them.	   Third,	   some	   argue	   that	   the	   best	   solution	  would	  be	  to	  impose	  mandatory	  reporting	  requirements	  on	  SWFs.	  	  A	   different	   view,	   which	   is	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   the	   final	   chapter,	  encourages	  SWFs	   to	  deliberate	  and	   find	  adequate	  solutions	  by	   themselves	   (the	  option	  of	  ‘self-­‐regulation’).	  An	  analysis	  of	  all	  those	  models	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  theory,	  implementation	  and	  costs	  will	  reveal	  that	  none	  of	  the	  above	  proposals	  deals	  satisfactorily	  with	  the	  rising	  influence	  of	  SWFs.	  	  	  
1.	  The	  Rationale	  for	  Regulation	  
	  
i. The	  avoidance	  of	  investment	  protectionism	  
	   ‘Protection’	  in	  the	  economic	  sense	  is	  defined	  as:	  	   ‘The	  imposition	  of	  tariffs,	  quotas,	  or	  other	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  to	  restrict	  the	  inflow	  of	  imports.	  Non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  have	  included	  restrictive	  licensing,	  discriminating	   government	   procurement	   programs,	   subsidies,	   custom	  clearance	   delays,	   health	   and	   safety	   and	   environmental	   regulations	   and	  export	   quotas	   to	   maintain	   supplies	   to	   the	   domestic	   market.’526	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  Protectionism	  is	  an	  old	  concept	  that	  has	  existed	  in	  various	  forms	  throughout	  history.	   It	   is	   said,	   for	   example,	   that	   during	   their	   early	   stages	   of	   development,	  now-­‐developed	  countries	  systematically	  discriminated	  against	  foreign	  investors.	  They	  used	  an	  array	  of	   tools	   to	   retain	   the	  ownership	  of	   their	  national	   industry,	  including	   limits	   on	   ownership;	   performance	   requirements	   on	   exports,	  technology	  transfer	  or	  local	  procurement;	  insistence	  on	  joint	  ventures	  with	  local	  firms;	   and	   barriers	   to	   ‘brownfield	   investments’	   through	   mergers	   and	  acquisitions.527	  As	  argued	  by	  Chang,	  only	  when	  domestic	  industry	  has	  reached	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  sophistication,	  complexity,	  and	  competitiveness	  do	  the	  benefits	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  liberalisation	  of	  FDI	  appear	  to	  outweigh	  the	  costs.528	  Modern	   views	   of	   protectionism	  derive	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   from	  Keynes,	  who	  noted	  that	  ‘the	  policy	  of	  an	  increased	  national	  self-­‐sufficiency	  is	  to	  be	  considered,	  not	   as	   an	   ideal	   in	   itself,	   but	   as	   directed	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   environment	   in	  which	   other	   ideals	   can	   be	   safely	   and	   conveniently	   pursued’.529	  Indeed,	   Keynes	  became	   convinced	   that	   the	   retention	   of	   private	   enterprises	   is	   compatible	  with	  greater	   material	   well-­‐being	   only	   if	   the	   interest	   rate	   is	   reduced	   towards	   a	  vanishing	  point.	  But,	  as	  he	  stated,	  a	  system	  by	  which	  the	  rate	  of	  interest	  finds	  a	  uniform	   level,	   after	   allowing	   for	   risk	   and	   the	   like,	   throughout	   the	  world	  under	  the	  operation	  of	  normal	   financial	   forces,	   is	  most	  unlikely	   to	  occur.	  Accordingly,	  Keynes	   was	   persuaded	   that	   ‘economic	   internationalism	   embracing	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  of	  loanable	  funds	  as	  well	  as	  of	  traded	  goods’	  may	  result	  in	  a	   ‘much	   lower	  degree	  of	  material	  prosperity	   than	  could	  be	  attained	  under	  a	  different	   system’. 530 	  It	   was	   noted	   by	   Keynes,	   however,	   that	   a	   deliberate	  movement	  towards	  greater	  national	  self-­‐sufficiency	  and	  economic	  isolation	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  526	  Graham	  Bannock	  and	  Ron	  Baxter,	  The	  Penguin	  Dictionary	  of	  Economics	  (Penguin	  Books,	  2011)	  315.	  527	  For	  more,	  see:	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang,	  ‘Regulation	  of	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  Historical	  Perspective’	  (2004)	  Vol	  16(3)	  The	  EJDR,	  687.	  528	  ibid.	  529	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  ‘National	  Self-­‐Sufficiency’	  (1933)	  Vol	  22(4)	  Yale	  Review	  755.	  530	  ibid.	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make	   the	   task	   of	   economic	   policy	   easier,	   ‘in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   can	   be	   accomplished	  without	  excessive	  economic	  cost’.531	  A	  number	  of	  protectionist	  measures	  emerged	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	   crisis.	   In	  particular,	   it	  was	  reported	  by	   the	  World	  Bank	   that	  17	  out	  of	  the	  G20	   countries532	  had	   implemented	   a	   total	   of	   fourty-­‐seven	  measures	  whose	  effect	  was	  to	  restrict	  trade	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  countries.533	  Others	  resorted	  to	   sector-­‐specific	   bailout	   programs	   to	   support	   crisis-­‐hit	   industries,	   such	   as	  automobile	   firms. 534 	  Programs	   that	   distort	   resource	   allocation	   and	   prove	  disadvantageous	  for	  other	  sectors	  and	  competitors	  in	  other	  countries	  effectively	  amount	  to	  trade	  barriers.535	  Protectionism	   may	   be	   motivated	   by	   political,	   or	   short-­‐term	   economic	  considerations;536	  however,	   it	   often	   comes	   at	   a	   significant	   economic	   cost	   to	  national	  welfare.	  One	  such	  cost	  is	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  caused	  by	  restrictions	  to	  free	   trade,	   borne	   by	   consumers	   and	   society	   as	   a	   whole.537	  It	   is	   estimated	   that	  trade	  restrictions	  raise	  the	  cost	  of	  imported	  goods	  in	  the	  USA	  by	  20%	  on	  average,	  and	  raise	  the	  price	  of	  comparable	  domestically	  produced	  goods	  by	  10%	  to	  14%	  because	   of	   reduced	   price	   competition.538	  For	   example,	   a	   Brookings	   Institution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  531	  ibid.	  532	  G20	  is	  an	  abbreviated	  name	  for	  the	  Group	  of	  Twenty	  Finance	  Ministers	  and	  Central	  Bank	  Governors	  (nineteen	  countries	  plus	  the	  European	  Union),	  who	  periodically	  confer	  at	  summits	  since	  their	  initial	  meeting	  in	  2008.	  533	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  monitoring	  list	  of	  trade	  and	  trade-­‐related	  measures,	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  officials	  have	  proposed	  or	  implemented	  roughly	  78	  trade	  measures.	  Of	  these,	  66	  involved	  trade	  restrictions.	  Elisa	  Gamberoni	  and	  Richard	  Newfarmer,	  ‘Trade	  Protection:	  Incipient	  but	  Worrisome	  Trends’,	  
VOX	  EU,	  2	  Mar	  2009,	  <www.voxeu.org/article/trade-­‐protection-­‐incipient-­‐worrisome-­‐trends>,	  (accessed	  18	  September	  2010).	  534	  Wolf-­‐Georg	  Ringe	  and	  Ulf	  Bernitz,	  ‘Company	  Law	  and	  Economic	  Protectionism	  –	  An	  Introduction’	  in	  Ringe	  and	  Bernitz	  (eds)	  (n	  429)	  2;	  One	  example	  being	  the	  German	  government’s	  national	  car	  scrappage	  scheme,	  labelled	  as	  an	  ‘environmental	  bonus’.	  535	  ibid.	  536	  Such	  as	  the	  preservation	  of	  employment,	  see	  Messerlin,	  who	  attempts	  to	  estimate	  the	  cost	  of	  protectionism	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  concludes	  that	  protection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  tariffs	  and	  non-­‐trade	  barriers	  is	  too	  costly	  an	  instrument	  for	  ‘saving’	  jobs.	  Only	  a	  few	  jobs	  –	  roughly	  3	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  jobs	  existing	  in	  the	  sectors	  studied	  –	  are	  estimated	  to	  have	  been	  possibly	  saved	  by	  the	  high	  protection	  granted	  to	  these	  sectors.	  The	  combination	  of	  high	  costs	  of	  protection	  for	  EC	  consumers	  and	  few	  jobs	  saved	  leads	  to	  an	  astronomical	  average	  annual	  cost	  per	  job	  saved:	  roughly	  EUR	  220,000,	  or	  ten	  times	  the	  European	  average	  wage	  of	  the	  sectors	  involved.	  Patrick	  Messerlin,	  Measuring	  the	  Costs	  of	  Protection	  in	  Europe	  –	  European	  Commercial	  Policy	  in	  
the	  2000s	  (Institute	  for	  International	  Economics,	  2001)	  41.	  537	  See	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  Rose	  Friedman,	  ‘Free	  to	  Choose’	  Harcourt,	  1980,	  41.	  538	  Robert	  McGee,	  ‘The	  Philosophy	  of	  Trade	  Protectionism,	  Its	  Costs	  and	  Its	  Implications’	  (1996)	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study	   estimated	   that	   ‘voluntary’	   export	   restrictions	   on	   automobiles	   cost	  consumers	  about	  $14	  billion	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,539	  while	  on	  a	  cost	  per	  auto	  basis,	  one	  study	  estimated	  that	  import	  quotas	  added,	  on	  average,	  $2,400	  to	  the	  price	  of	  a	  Japanese	  car.540	  The	  abovementioned	  costs	  are	  not	  borne	  by	  consumers	  alone,	  local	  businesses	  and	  industries	  obtain	  products	  at	  higher	  prices,	  thus	  subjecting	  their	  business	  activities	  to	  additional	  monetary	  burdens:	  a	  study	  of	  the	  pre-­‐1985	  restraint	   agreement	  between	   the	  USA	  and	   the	  European	  Community	  estimated	  that	   the	   induced	   increase	   in	   the	   price	   of	   imported	   steel	   was	   30%.541 In	   short,	  restricting	  trade	  can	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  allocative,	  productive	  and	  dynamic	  efficiency:	  consumers	   (and	  businesses	  alike)	  are	  not	  able	   to	  purchase	  products	  or	   services	   at	   the	   lowest	   prices	   or	   benefit	   from	   wider	   consumer	   choice	   and	  innovative	   products/services.542	  Moreover,	   the	   promotion	   of	   national	   products	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  foreign	  competitors543	  can	  prove	  dangerous,	  as	  it	  is	  said	  to	  ‘run	  the	  risk	  of	  encouraging	  retaliation	  and	  severely	  constrain	  supply	  chains	  that	  use	  imported	  goods’.544	  Takeover	   barriers	   are	   equally	   economically	   harmful	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	  are	   often	   designed	   to	   ring-­‐fence	   weak	   and	   inefficient	   management	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	  shareholders	  and/or	  to	  protect	  a	  few	  shareholders	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  rest.545	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  economy	  foregoes	  the	  efficiencies	  associated	  with	  open	  markets.	  In	  addition,	  political	  opposition	  to	  cross-­‐border	  M&A	  can	  impose	  monetary	  costs	  on	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  domestic	  firms.	  To	  demonstrate	  those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No.	  10	  Dumont	  Institute	  for	  Public	  Policy	  Research	  12.	  539	  See	  Clifford	  Winston,	  ‘Blind	  Intersection?	  Policy	  and	  the	  Automobile	  Industry’	  (1987)	  Brookings	  Institution,	  summarised	  in	  Thomas	  Hopkins,	  Cost	  of	  Regulation,	  a	  Rochester	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  Working	  Paper,	  December,	  1991,	  at	  B8-­‐9.	  540	  Robert	  Crandall,	  ‘The	  Effects	  of	  [USA]	  Trade	  Protection	  for	  Autos	  and	  Steel’	  (1987)	  Brookings	  Institution	  <www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/1987%201/1987a_bpea_crandall>	  accessed	  18	  January	  2013,	  271-­‐288.	  541	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  steel	  industry	  receives	  protection,	  steel-­‐using	  industries	  have	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  their	  steel.	  Gary	  Clyde	  Hufbauer,	  Diane	  Berliner	  and	  Kimberly	  Ann	  Elliott,	  ‘Trade	  Protection	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  31	  Case	  Studies’	  (Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics,	  1986)	  179-­‐181.	  542	  Paraphrasing	  Lianos	  on	  the	  positive	  impact	  of	  promoting	  trade,	  Ioannis	  Lianos,	  ‘Efficient	  Restrictions	  of	  Trade	  in	  the	  EU	  Law	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market:	  Trust,	  Distrust	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  Economic	  Integration’	  (2010)	  EBOR	  709.	  543	  Such	  as	  the	  ‘buy	  American’	  clause	  included	  in	  stimulus	  packages,	  Ringe	  and	  Bernitz	  (n	  429)	  2.	  544	  ibid.	  545	  Crispin	  Waymouth,	  ‘Is	  “Protectionism”	  a	  Useful	  Concept	  for	  Company	  Lawyers?’	  in	  Bernitz	  and	  Ringe	  (eds)	  (n	  429)	  49.	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costs,	   Won	   and	   Wang	   have	   examined	   the	   case	   of	   Congress’s	   opposition	   to	  CNOOC’s	  proposal	  to	  acquire	  Unocal	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  2005.546	  As	  they	  indicate,	  the	  share	  prices	  of	  both	  firms	  suffered	  a	  significant	  setback	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  anti-­‐CNOOC	   events.	   While	   an	   equal-­‐weighted	   portfolio	   of	   13	   USA	   oil	   refining	  companies	  (excluding	  Chevron)	  showed	  an	  average	  decline	  of	  nearly	  $7.9	  billion	  in	  its	  market	  value	  per	  event,	  another	  equal-­‐weighted	  portfolio	  of	  66	  USA	  oil	  and	  gas	  exploration	  companies	  (excluding	  Unocal)	  registered	  a	  decline	  of	  some	  $1.9	  billion	  on	  average	  per	  event.547	  As	  they	  mention,	  these	  two	  portfolios	  lost	  a	  total	  of	  nearly	  $59	  billion	  in	  their	  market	  values,	  which	  exceeded	  the	  GDP	  of	  Kuwait	  in	  2005.548	  In	   short,	   takeover	   protectionism	   can,	   similar	   to	   trade	   protectionism,	  compromise	  social	  welfare	  as	  well	  as	  an	  economy’s	  growth	  prospects.	  Investment	   protectionism	   may	   also	   have	   detrimental	   effects	   on	   national	  welfare.	  A	   comparative	   analysis	  of	   the	  USA	  economy	  between	   two	  periods	   can	  serve	   to	   prove	   this	   point.	   In	   the	   later	   period,	   between	   November	   1982	   and	  December	  2007,	  large	  overseas	  capital	  was	  available	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  economy	  was	   in	   recession	   only	   4.6%	   of	   the	   time.549	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   the	   period	  between	   1945	   and	   1982,	   foreign	   capital	   was	   generally	   unavailable,	   and	   the	  economy	  was	   in	   recession	   for	   22.4%	   of	   that	   time.550	  More	   recently,	   the	   global	  financial	  crisis	  showed	  FDI	  not	  only	  as	  useful	  as	  a	  stabilising	  force	  post-­‐crisis	  but	  also	  as	  possibly	  contributing	  to	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  economy.551	  As	   far	  as	   industry	  bailouts	  are	  concerned,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  add	   that	   these	  are	  accomplished	  with	  the	  use	  of	  public	   funds,	   forcing	  national	  governments	  to	  run	  high	  fiscal	  deficits.	  Although	  maintaining	  fiscal	  deficits	  is	  often	  the	  norm	  for	  many	  countries,	   this	  proves	  problematic	  when	  those	  deficits	  become	  excessive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  546	  Kam-­‐Ming	  Wan	  and	  Ka-­‐fu	  Wong,	  ‘Economic	  Impact	  of	  Political	  Barriers	  to	  Cross-­‐Border	  Acquisitions:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  CNOOC’s	  Unsuccessful	  Takeover	  of	  Unocal’	  (2009)	  J	  CORP	  FINANC	  15,	  447;	  To	  quantify	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  CNOOC	  case,	  the	  authors	  examine	  the	  share	  price	  reaction	  of	  numerous	  USA	  oil	  companies	  to	  the	  events	  pertaining	  to	  a	  political	  challenge	  against	  CNOOC’s	  proposal	  to	  acquire	  Unocal.	  Their	  sample	  firms	  comprise	  companies	  in	  the	  USA	  oil	  refining	  and	  oil	  and	  gas	  exploration	  industries.	  For	  more	  on	  those	  events,	  see	  (n	  934).	  547	  ibid	  5.	  548	  ibid	  5-­‐6.	  549	  George	  Will,	  ‘Investors	  We	  Need	  Not	  Fear’	  Washington	  Post	  (Washington,	  3	  February	  2008)	  B07.	  550	  ibid.	  551	  Chapter	  3,	  n	  407	  onwards.	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In	  particular,	  high	  fiscal	  deficits	  were	  perceived	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis552	  currently	  experienced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  Eurozone	  member	  countries.553	  Judging	  from	  these	  outcomes,	  Keynes’s	  ‘excessive	  cost’	  (referred	  to	  above)	   becomes	  more	   relevant.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   this	   excessive	   cost	   is	   not	  always	  obvious	  at	  an	  early	  stage,	  when,	  for	  example,	  countries	  take	  the	  decision	  to	  execute	  large	  bailouts.554	  In	  this	  context	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  national	  champion	  argument.	  The	  term	  ‘national	  champion’	  usually	  refers	  to	  companies	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  particular	   treatment	   from	  governments	  because	  of	  some	  national	  dimension	  to	  their	  operation.555	  A	  government	  may	  wish	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  management	  of	  assets,	   which	   they	   deem	   of	   strategic	   national	   importance	   by	   restricting	   the	  control	  of	   these	  assets	  by	  foreign	   individuals	  or	  entities.	  Suedekum	  argues	  that	  globalisation	   and	   trade	   integration	   seem	   to	   reinforce	   the	   case	   for	   promoting	  national	  champions.556	  He	  notes	  that	  even	  a	  protectionist	  government	  ‘may	  allow	  a	   foreign	   takeover	   if	   trade	   openness	   is	   low,	   because	   the	   consumer	   gain	   from	  vanishing	  transport	  costs	  is	  most	  substantial’.557	  Yet,	  as	  trade	  becomes	  freer,	  the	  domestic	   competition	   agency	   opts	   for	   the	   national	   champion	   beyond	   a	   certain	  point,	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   a	   buyout	   of	   domestic	   producer	   surplus	   by	   a	   foreign	  corporation. 558 	  Governments	   may,	   through	   the	   system	   of	   incentives	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  552	  For	  more	  see,	  Roberto	  De	  Santis,	  ‘The	  Euro	  Area	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Crisis:	  Safe	  Haven,	  Credit	  Rating	  Agencies	  and	  the	  Spread	  of	  the	  Fever	  from	  Greece,	  Ireland	  and	  Portugal’	  (2012)	  Working	  Paper	  Series,	  No	  1419,	  European	  Central	  Bank	  <www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1419.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013.	  553	  This	  matter	  is	  also	  dealt	  with	  in	  chapter	  5	  n	  913	  onwards,	  where	  the	  situation	  of	  Greece	  is	  examined.	  554	  This	  point	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  risk	  of	  causing	  a	  debt	  crisis	  (by	  handing	  out	  bailouts)	  is	  preferable	  to	  letting	  the	  recession	  devastate	  the	  industry	  in	  question.	  But	  the	  point	  raised	  here	  is	  that	  government	  bailouts,	  intended	  to	  fend	  off	  national	  industries	  from	  foreign	  competitors,	  when	  carried	  out	  by	  governments	  with	  deep	  structural	  macroeconomic	  imbalances,	  can	  trigger	  negative	  consequences	  that	  go	  far	  beyond	  the	  risk	  to	  the	  industry	  initially	  perceived.	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  debt	  crises	  currently	  suffered	  by	  many	  Eurozone	  members.	  555	  For	  instance,	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  industry	  concerned	  or	  simply	  because	  its	  assets	  at	  located	  within	  the	  country.	  Damien	  Neven,	  ‘Onwership,	  Performance	  and	  National	  Champions’	  (2008)	  European	  Commission,	  DG	  Competition,	  <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/opnc.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013,	  1.	  556	  Jens	  Suedekum,	  ‘National	  Champion	  Versus	  Foreign	  Takeover’	  (2007)	  Discussion	  Paper	  Series,	  IZA	  DP	  No.	  2960,	  26.	  557	  ibid.	  558	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constraints,	   ensure	   that	   domestic	   shareholders	   are	   more	   aligned	   with	   the	  policies	  of	  government.	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  government	  may	  provide	  state	  aid	  or	  adapt	  regulations	  to	  achieve	  its	  desired	  outcome.559	  This	  policy	  is	  questionable.	  Firstly,	  it	   takes	   an	   extremely	   paternalistic	   view	   of	   an	   infallible	   government	   whose	  policies	   always	   enhance	  national	  welfare.	   Secondly,	   it	   endorses	   an	  opaque	  and	  arbitrary	  use	  of	  state	  aid	  policy	  and	  government	  regulation.	  Thirdly,	   this	  policy	  rests	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   shareholders	   are	   affected	   by	  their	   nationality.	   However,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   prove	   that	   domestic	   shareholders’	  concerns	  differ	  from	  foreign	  ones	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  firm’s	  long-­‐term	  profitability	  and	   viability.560	  Neven	   finds	   that	   the	   multinational	   character	   of	   a	   firm	   may	  matter	   more	   for	   growth	   and	   productivity	   than	   the	   actual	   nationality	   of	   the	  shareholders.561	  But,	   as	   he	   says,	   the	   growth	   of	   multinational	   firms	   requires	  access	   to	   foreign	   assets,	   so	   a	   presumption	   against	   government	   interference	  remains. 562 	  Arguably,	   local	   managers	   and	   shareholders	   may	   have	   a	   better	  understanding	   of	   local	   culture	   and	   customs,	   but	   foreign	   ones	  may	   understand	  foreign	  clients	  better.	  Still,	   there	  are	  more	   than	   just	  market-­‐based	  arguments	   against	   investment	  protectionism:	  political	  arguments	  also	  play	  a	  role.	  In	  particular,	  western	  states	  need	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  global	  economic	  power	  equation	  is	  rebalancing:	  the	  west	   is	  no	   longer	   the	  uncontested	  dominant	  player	   in	  global	   financial	  markets.	  The	  emergence	  of	  SWFs	   is	  no	  passing	  phenomenon	  but	  a	  permanent	   feature	  of	  the	  international	  financial	  order.	  Securing	  access	  to	  capital	  from	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  other	  emerging	  economies	  has	  become	  a	  substantial	  challenge	   for	  western	  economic	  diplomacy.563	  Formulating	  the	  proper	  regulatory	  response	  requires	  striking	  a	  fine	  balance	  between	   the	   need	   for	   foreign	   capital	   and	   the	   danger	   of	   foreign	   governments	  interfering	  in	  certain	  sectors	  of	  the	  national	  economy.	  It	  is	  difficult,	  in	  this	  sense,	  to	   predict	   when	   a	   regulatory	   response	   may	   go	   too	   far	   and	   become	   (or	   be	  perceived	  as)	  overly	  protectionist.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  downside	  of	  protectionism	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  Neven	  (n	  555)	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was	  when	  China	  suspended	  investments	  in	  Europe	  before	  the	  financial	  crisis.564	  Similarly	  wary	  of	  protectionism,	  Nair	  argued	  that	  India	  should	  not	  create	  a	  SWF	  with	   the	   aim	   of	   investing	   India’s	   surplus	   in	   energy	   abroad,	   on	   the	   assumption	  that	   SWFs	   generally	   face	   protectionism	   and	   political	   backlash	   throughout	   the	  world.565	  In	  short,	  Nair	  believes	  a	  SWF	  for	  India	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  bring	  problems	  rather	   than	   benefits.566	  Similar	   claims	   have	   been	  made	   by	   the	   Governor	   of	   the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.567	  Finding	  where	  the	  red	  line	  lies	  for	  each	  potential	  (benign)	  investor	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task	  either.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  understandable	  why,	  as	  long	  as	  SWF	  investments	  are	  not	  examined	   from	   a	   public	   policy	   perspective,	   concerns	   about	   them	   will	   persist,	  resulting	   in	  mounting	  pressure	  on	  national	  governments	   to	  adopt	  protectionist	  measures.568	  Indeed,	  protectionist	  attitudes,569	  obvious	  until	   the	   financial	   crisis,	  were	  seen	  as	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  opaque	  nature	  and	  difficulty	  of	  determining	  the	   investment	  motives	   of	   SWFs.570	  As	  Kern	  notes,	   ‘there	   should	  be	  no	  naivety	  about	  it,	  strategic	  interests	  should	  be	  protected’.	  The	  question	  then	  becomes:	  is	  regulation	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  these	  aims?	  	  
ii. The	  rationale	  for	  regulatory	  intervention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  564	  n	  364.	  565	  Nair,	  a	  senior	  fellow	  at	  the	  Wharton	  Financial	  Institutions	  Center,	  supports	  this	  view	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  India	  should	  diversify	  its	  excess	  reserves	  in	  energy,	  a	  sector	  tightly	  protected	  by	  governments	  from	  foreign	  investments.	  He	  cites	  the	  examples	  of	  Venezuela	  and	  the	  USA	  Vinay	  Nair	  ,	  ‘Should	  India	  Set	  up	  a	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Fund?	  It’s	  a	  Bad	  Idea’	  (India,	  
Knowledge@Whartoni)	  27	  march	  2008,	  <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4272>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012.	  566	  ibid.	  567	  The	  National	  staff,	  ‘UAE’s	  Banking	  Chief	  Predicts	  Tighter	  Regulations’	  Gulf	  Base	  (Abu	  Dhabi,	  25	  May	  2010)	  	  <www.gulfbase.com/site/interface/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?n=137592>	  accessed	  24	  September	  2012.	  568	  A	  paper	  published	  by	  the	  OECD	  during	  the	  crisis	  warned	  of	  this	  risk:	  ‘Faced	  with	  rising	  public	  fear	  and	  distrust,	  governments	  are	  now	  necessarily	  focused	  on	  restoring	  national	  economic	  and	  employment	  growth	  and	  financial	  stability.	  Although	  they	  recognize	  that	  open	  markets	  ultimately	  contribute	  to	  a	  sustainable	  recovery,	  domestic	  economic	  and	  political	  pressures	  might	  make	  them	  less	  mindful	  of	  their	  international	  commitments	  to	  openness.	  In	  this	  context,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  countries	  will	  be	  tempted	  to	  adopt	  ‘beggar	  thy	  neighbor’	  policies,	  including	  investment	  protectionism	  in	  various	  guises’,	  OECD,	  ‘Building	  Trust	  and	  Confidence’	  (n	  519)	  12.	  569	  For	  such	  examples,	  OECD,	  ‘More	  Governments	  Invoke	  National	  Security’	  (n	  285).	  570	  See	  n	  519;	  Allen	  and	  Caruana	  (n	  213)	  16.	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   Having	   established	   the	   broad	   principles	   that	   must	   shape	   the	   regulatory	  response	   to	  SWFs,	   the	  next	  step	   is	   to	  establish	  a	  rationale	   for	  regulating	  SWFs.	  History	   has	   been	   dominated	   by	   the	   clash	   between	   economists	   who	   consider	  market	   forces	   to	   be	   largely	   sufficient	   to	   regulate	   the	   behaviour	   of	   market	  participants,571	  and	   those	  who	   see	   regulation	  as	   an	  alternative	   to	   the	   failure	  of	  market	   forces	   to	  produce	  a	   socially	  optimal	  outcome.572	  Regulation,	   itself,	   does	  not	  come	  without	  costs,	  nor	  is	  it	  panacea	  to	  every	  inefficient	  market	  outcome.	  It	  is	  essential,	  therefore,	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  regulatory	  rationale,	  to	  expose	  the	  elements	  that	  make	  regulation	  necessary.	  The	  background	  to	  this	  discussion	  was	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  3	  which	  examined	  the	  benefits	  and	  concerns	  associated	  with	   SWFs.	   The	   present	   discussion	   uses	   the	   conclusions	   from	   chapter	   3	   to	  establish	  a	  rationale	  for	  regulation.	  The	   adoption	   of	   financial	   regulation	   is	   a	   process	   that	   is,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	  reactionary	   to	   financial	   crises.	   According	   to	   Brunnermeier	   and	   others	   ‘when	  everyone	   is	   calling	   for	   more	   regulation,	   for	   example,	   as	   now,	   in	   a	   post-­‐crisis	  setting,573	  it	  is	  not	  needed	  at	  all,	  since	  bank	  managers	  are	  timid	  and	  risk	  averse.	  When	  regulation	  is	  needed	  no	  one	  wants	  it,	  because	  asset	  prices	  are	  rising,	  there	  is	   a	  boom,	  everyone	   is	  optimistic	   and	   regulation	   just	   gets	   in	   the	  way’.574	  In	   the	  case	  of	  regulating	  SWFs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  demonstrated	  before	  and	  after	  the	  start	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   regulation	   is	   more	   popular	   when	   the	   economy	   is	  performing	   well,	   when	   company	   managers	   and	   governments	   can	   afford	   to	   be	  more	  selective	  about	  the	  origin	  of	  foreign	  investments	  and	  the	  reserves	  of	  SWFs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  571	  Such	  economists	  are	  Friedman	  of	  the	  Monetarist	  school,	  Stigler	  and	  Posner	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  and	  Hayek	  of	  the	  Austrian	  School.	  These	  economists	  believe	  that	  government	  intervention	  creates	  more	  problems	  than	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  solving,	  Howard	  Davies,	  ‘Financial	  Regulation:	  Why	  Bother?’	  (1999)	  Society	  of	  Business	  Economists	  Lecture,	  Financial	  Services	  Authority;	  Milton	  Friedman,	  Capitalism	  and	  Freedom:	  Fortieth	  Anniversary	  Edition	  (Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises,	  The	  Historical	  Setting	  of	  the	  Austrian	  School	  of	  Economics	  (Ludwig	  von	  Mises	  Institute,	  2007).	  572	  Paul	  Krugman	  and	  Robin	  Wells,	  Economics	  Worth	  Publishers,	  3rd	  Edition,	  New	  York	  2012;	  Steven	  Schwarcz,	  ‘Regulating	  Complexity	  in	  Financial	  Markets’	  87(2)	  WULRev,	  211.	  573	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  GFC,	  chapter	  2,	  n	  306	  onwards;	  Markus	  Brunnermeier	  and	  others,	  ‘Geneva	  Reports:	  the	  Fundamental	  Principles	  of	  Financial	  Regulation’	  (2009)	  Geneva	  Reports	  on	  the	  World	  Economy	  11,	  ICMB,	  CEPR 36.	  574	  ibid.	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grow	  at	  a	  faster	  pace.575	  During	  downturns,	  however,	  when	  foreign	  investments	  become	   crucial	   for	   the	   economy,	   hardly	   any	   government	   or	   company	  manager	  discusses	  regulation.	  As	  to	  the	  time	  when	  regulation	  is	  more	  needed,	  there	  is	  no	  definitive	   distinction	   between	   times	   of	   growth	   and	   times	   of	   crisis,	   since	   the	  perceived	   risks	   of	   SWFs	   exist	   independently	   of	   the	   state	   of	   the	   recipient	  economy.	  Arguably,	  regulation	  is	  pertinent	  at	  all	  times,	  but	  especially	  at	  times	  of	  crisis	   when	   governments	   are	   more	   willing	   to	   set	   aside	   national	   security	   and	  other	   concerns,	   as	   they	   are	  more	   desperate	   for	   foreign	   capital.	   Screening	   SWF	  investments	  during	   an	   economic	  downturn,	   however,	   could	   come	  at	   extremely	  high	  cost	  for	  the	  domestic	  economy.	  Therefore,	  during	  recessions,	  the	  immediate	  national	   interest	   dictates	   that	   SWFs	   remain	   unregulated,	   even,	   perhaps,	   at	   the	  cost	  of	  possible	  future	  national	  security	  risks.576	  When	   using	   the	   concept	   of	   regulation,	   distinctions	   must	   be	   established	  between	  regulation,	  monitoring	  and	  supervision.	  While	  regulation	   is	  defined	  as	  the	   establishment	   of	   specific	   rules	   of	   behaviour,	  monitoring	   means	   observing	  whether	   the	   rules	   are	   obeyed,	   and	   supervision	   refers	   to	   the	   more	   general	  observation	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	   financial	   firms.577	  Although	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs	  both	  regulation	   and	  supervision	   are	   important,	   the	  main	   focus	  of	   this	   section	   is	  regulation.	  Before	   any	   basis	   for	   regulating	   SWFs	   can	   be	   established,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  perceived	  objectives	  of,	  the	  rationale	  for	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	   regulating.	   An	   objective	   refers	   to	   ‘the	   outcome	   that	   regulation	   is	   trying	   to	  secure’,	  rationale	  determines	  ‘why	  regulation	  is	  necessary	  if	  the	  objectives	  are	  to	  be	   achieved’	   while	   the	   reasons	   concern	   ‘why,	   in	   practice,	   regulation	   takes	  place’.578	  Thus,	   the	  objectives	  of	  wider	   financial	   regulation	  might	  be,	   for	  example,	   to	  sustain	  systemic	  stability,	  to	  maintain	  the	  soundness	  and	  safety	  of	  financial	  firms	  or	   to	   protect	   consumers.	   The	   economic	  nature	   of	   those	   objectives	   implies	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  575	  As	  it	  was	  argued,	  for	  instance,	  at	  n	  478.	  576	  See	  formerly	  concerned	  governments,	  when	  the	  recession	  struck,	  set	  aside	  their	  concerns	  over	  national	  security	  and	  actively	  sought	  investments	  by	  SWFs,	  see	  Fotak	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  478).	  577	  Llewellyn	  (n	  385)	  6.	  578	  ibid	  8.	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regulation	   ultimately	   aims	   to	   improve	   national	   welfare.	   However,	   it	   was	   seen	  above579	  that	  regulating	  economic	  activity,	  such	  as	  trade	  or	  FDI,	  can	  run	  counter	  to	   national	   welfare.	   The	   explanation	   for	   this	   apparent	   contradiction	   is	   that	  regulating	   trade	   or	   FDI	   (and	   thus	   giving	   rise	   to	   protectionism)	   can	   impede	  healthy	  economic	  activity	  and	  thus	  be	  welfare	  reducing.	  Regulating	  the	  financial	  sector,	   however,	   might	   address	   problematic	   activity,	   protect	   society	   from	  recessions	   and	   maintain	   national	   welfare.	   By	   extension,	   it	   is	   understood	   that	  trade	  and	  FDI	  can	  increase	  total	  welfare	  (defined	  as	  the	  surplus	  consumers	  and	  producers	  benefit	  from	  while	  conducting	  an	  economic	  activity)	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  whereas	   an	   unregulated	   financial	   sector	   can	   increase	   total	  welfare	   only	   in	   the	  short	   term.	   In	   the	   longer	   term,	   the	   financial	   sector,	   if	   left	   unregulated,	   will	  succumb	   to	   the	   boom	   and	   bust	   cycle,	   threaten	   financial	   stability	   and	   produce	  losses	  for	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Thus,	   the	   objectives	   of	   regulating	   the	   wider	   financial	   sector	   are	   mainly	  economic.	   The	   existing	   arguments	   for	   regulating	   SWFs,	   however,	   are	   both	  political	   and	   economic.	   As	   seen	   in	   chapter	   3,	   the	   objectives	   behind	   regulating	  SWFs	   are	   not	   only	   the	  maintenance	   of	   financial	   stability	   and	   the	   protection	   of	  individual	  firms	  and	  minority	  shareholders,	  but	  also	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  national	  security	   and	   assets.580	  It	   is	   crucial	   to	   note	   that	   the	   objectives	   of	   regulation	   are	  determined	  with	  relation	   to	   the	  perceived	   threats	   inherent	   in	   the	  way	  markets	  operate	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   regulation.	   Therefore,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	  credible	   basis	   for	   the	   abovementioned	   risks,	   regulation	   becomes	   unnecessary	  and	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  regulating	  SWFs	  is	  defeated.581	  According	   to	   Llewellyn,	   there	   are	   seven	   components	   of	   the	   economic	  rationale	   for	   regulation	   and	   supervision	   in	   banking	   and	   financial	   services.582	  These	   are	   discussed	   below	   and	   their	   applicability	   to	   the	   case	   of	   SWFs	   is	  considered	  (see	  also	  table	  4.1	  below).	  For	  this	  purpose,	  the	  main	  risks	  caused	  by	  SWFs	  are	  considered,	  examining	  their	  applicability	  to	  the	  various	  components	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  banking	  and	  financial	  services.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  579	  n	  549	  onwards.	  580	  n	  447	  onwards.	  581	  As	  seen	  in	  chapter	  3	  with	  regard	  to	  national	  security	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  national	  assets.	  582	  Llewellyn	  (n	  385)	  9-­‐10.	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The	   first	   component	   is	   the	   potential	   systemic	   problems	   associated	   with	  
externalities	   (a	   particular	   form	   of	   market	   failure).	   This	   point	   is	   intended	   to	  address	   the	   systemic	   risks	   caused	   by	   the	   behaviour	   of	   financial	   institutions.	  Systemic	   risks	   that	   flow	   from	   externalities	   usually	   describe	   the	   economically	  rational	  behaviour	  of	   a	   financial	   firm,	  which,	   if	   adopted	  by	  all	   firms,	  will	   cause	  the	   banking	   system	   to	   collapse.583	  This	   threat	   is	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	  inherent	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  because	  of	  the	  links	  between	  the	  firms	  operating	  in	  it	  and	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  other	  sectors,	  such	  as	  manufacturing.584	  In	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs,	  such	  a	  threat	  is	  present	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  SWFs	  might	  contribute	  to	  the	   creation	   of	   asset	   bubbles	   or	   where	   they	   collectively	   withdraw	   their	  investments.	   It	  was	   seen	   in	   chapter	  3	   that	   the	   likelihood	  of	   such	   threats	   being	  realised	   is	   very	   limited	   and	   SWFs	   should	   not	   require	   separate	   consideration	  from	   other	   investment	   vehicles	   in	   the	   general	   context	   of	   financial	   regulation.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  deem	  such	  a	  threat	  to	  be	  real.585	  The	   second	   component	   of	   the	   rationale	   for	   regulation	   is	   the	   correction	   of	  other	  market	  imperfections	  and	  failures.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  are	  inherent	  costs	  in	   the	   market,	   such	   as	   information	   problems,	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   and	   agency	  problems	   that	   are	   not	   taken	   into	   account	   by	   the	   relevant	   actors	   when	  determining	  the	  price	  for	  their	  transactions.586	  In	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs,	  this	  rationale	  appears	   to	   be	   more	   topical;	   it	   was	   seen	   in	   chapter	   3	   that	   such	   information	  asymmetries,	   mainly	   supported	   by	   the	   opacity	   of	   SWFs,	   raise	   questions	   as	   to	  their	  behaviour	  as	  shareholders	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  political	  interference.587	  There	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  case	  for	  arguing	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  internal	  costs	  in	  the	  transactions	  of	  SWFs	  that,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  regulation,	  are	  not	  accounted	  for.	  The	   third	   rationale	   identified	   by	   Llewellyn	   is	   the	   need	   for	  monitoring	   of	  financial	  firms	  and	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  that	  exist	  in	  this	  activity.	  This	  rationale	  does	  not	  necessarily	  relate	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  regulation.	  Instead,	  it	  requires	  that	  all	  firms	  observe	  the	  rules	  laid	  down	  by	  market	  regulators,	  whether	  they	  concern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  583	  Brunnermeier	  and	  others	  (n	  572)	  13-­‐23.	  584	  ibid.	  585	  Which	  justifies,	  in	  their	  eyes,	  the	  regulatory	  proposals	  put	  forward	  (see	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  3,	  n	  490).	  586	  Llewellyn	  (n	  385)	  21.	  587	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  3,	  at	  118	  onwards,	  on	  national	  security	  and	  political	  leveraging.	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financial	   stability,	   national	   security	   or	   investor	   protection.	   This	   rationale	  suggests	  that	  established	  rules	  are	  meaningless	  unless	  the	  regulator	  establishes	  the	  method,	  scale	  and	  frequency	  of	  monitoring	  financial	  firms’	  compliance	  with	  them.	  As	  such,	  monitoring	   is	  a	   fundamental	  principle	  of	  any	   form	  of	   regulation	  and	  it	  applies	  to	  financial	  firms	  and	  SWFs	  alike.	  The	  fourth	  component	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  financial	  regulation	  is	  the	  need	  for	  consumer	   confidence	   (which	   also	   has	   a	   positive	   externality).	   In	   general	   terms	  this	  means	  that,	  because	  of	  regulation,	  consumers	  are	  confident	  that	  their	  rights	  and	  interests	  are	  duly	  protected	  and,	  therefore,	  undertake	  more	  transactions	  and	  increase	   liquidity	   into	  the	  market.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs,	  regulation	  could	  ensure	  that	   parties	   on	   the	   other	   side	   of	   a	   transaction	   involving	   a	   SWF	   (whether	  companies,	  a	  shareholder	  or	  entire	  countries)	  will	  be	  protected	  from	  any	  abuse	  by	   such	   a	   fund.	   Regulation	   could,	   based	   on	   this	   argument,	   reduce	   popular	   or	  business	  backlash	  to	  sensitive	  SWF	  investments.	  The	   fifth	   component	   is	   the	  potential	   for	  Grid	  Lock.	   This	   term	  describes	   the	  situation	  where	  all	  firms	  know	  how	  they	  should	  behave	  towards	  customers	  but,	  nevertheless,	   adopt	   hazardous	   strategies	   because	   they	   secure	   short-­‐term	  advantages	  and	  the	  detection	  of	  such	  hazardous	  behaviour	  is	  only	  possible	  in	  the	  long	   run.588	  SWFs,	   assisted	   by	   their	   opacity,	   could	   engage	   in	   such	   a	   behaviour	  and	  hide	  political	  agendas	  behind	  their	   investments.	  However,	   it	  was	  argued	  in	  chapter	  3	  that	  such	  a	  threat	  is	  limited	  and	  should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  The	  risk	  of	  moral	  hazard	  is	   listed	  as	   the	  sixth	  rationale	   for	  regulation.	  This	  point	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  revealed	  preference	  of	  governments	  to	  create	  safety	  net	   arrangements,	   such	   as	   lender	   of	   last	   resort,	   deposit	   insurances,	   and	  compensation	  schemes.	  This	  element	  has	  no	  relevance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs.	  Finally,	   Llewellyn	   states	   consumer	   demand	   for	   regulation	   as	   the	   final	  component	  of	   the	  rationale.	  This	  aims	  at	  creating	  a	  degree	  of	  assurance	  among	  consumers,	  as	  well	  as	  encouraging	  lower	  transactions	  costs	  (for	  example,	  saving	  costs	   in	  investigating	  the	  position	  of	  financial	   firms).	  This	  applies	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs	   if	   the	   recipient	   companies	   and	   countries	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   the	  consumers.	   A	   graphic	   representation	   of	   this	   analysis	   is	   provided	   at	   table	   4.1	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  588	  Llewellyn	  (n	  385)	  27.	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Table	  4.1:	  Summary	  of	  SWF	  perceived	  risks	  	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  
	  Each	  risk	  identified	  leads	  to	  its	  own	  type	  of	  cost.	  However,	  the	  risk	  of	  market	  imperfections	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  different	  kinds	  of	  risks,	  each	  involving	  its	  own	  costs.	  	   	  As	  seen	  from	  the	  discussion	  above,	  the	  majority	  of	  rationales	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  wider	  banking	  and	  financial	  sector	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  case	  of	  regulating	  SWFs.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  SWFs	  should	  be	  regulated	  to	  deal	  with	   the	   risks	   of	   externalities,	   market	   imperfections	   and	   Grid	   Lock,	   to	   boost	  consumer	   confidence	   and	   address	   consumer	   demand	   for	   regulation,	   and	   to	  enable	   monitoring.	   However,	   the	   underlying	   premises	   of	   these	   rationales	   are	  disputed	   by	   various	   commentators.	   For	   example,	   various	   experts	   in	   the	   field	  contest	   the	   risks	   SWFs	   bring	   on	   systemic	   stability 589 	  (Llewellyn’s	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  589	  An	  empirical	  study	  conducted	  for	  the	  IMF	  in	  2009	  examined	  financial	  stability	  issues	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  increased	  presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  global	  financial	  markets.	  It	  concludes	  that	  there	  is	  ‘no	  significant	  destabilizing	  effect	  from	  SWFs	  on	  equity	  markets,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  anecdotal	  evidence’,	  Sun	  and	  Hesse	  (n	  388)	  4.	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component)	   or	   political	   interference 590 	  (part	   of	   the	   second	   ‘market	  imperfections’	  component).	  In	  the	  event	  where	  such	  risks	  are	  not	  substantial,	  but	  merely	   theoretical	   or	   unlikely	   to	   occur,	   then	   the	   rationale	   for	   regulating	   SWFs	  does	  not	  hold.591	  Another	  view	  would	  hold	  that	  a	  number	  of	  risks	  undoubtedly	  exist	  but	  there	  is	  disagreement	  as	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  give	  rise	  to	  costs	  in	  the	  financial	  system.	   Those	   risks,	   mainly	   systemic	   stability	   risks,	   and	   various	   market	  imperfections	   (such	   as	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   their	   behaviour	   as	   shareholders	   and	  the	   danger	   of	   hidden	   political	   motives),	   arise	   because	   of	   SWFs’	   lack	   of	  transparency.	  The	  perceived	  costs	  that	  flow	  from	  those	  risks	  may	  vary.	  They	  may	  amount	   to	   compromising	   national	   security,	   disrupting	   the	   functioning	   of	  international	   markets	   or	   damaging	   companies	   through	   the	   abuse	   of	   voting	  power	   in	   shareholders’	   meetings.	   Somewhat	   lesser,	   they	   may	   consist	   in	   the	  exercise	  of	  political	  leveraging,	  affect	  market	  confidence	  (by	  causing	  uncertainty)	  or	   provoke	   a	   protectionist	   backlash	   in	   recipient	   countries.592	  Based	   on	   the	  analysis	  carried	  out	  in	  chapter	  3,	  this	  thesis	  holds	  that	  the	  costs	  at	  the	  higher	  end	  of	   the	   spectrum	   are	   not	  within	   the	   realm	   of	   possibility,	   and,	   thus,	   they	   do	   not	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  regulation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  costs	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	   the	   spectrum	   can	   be	   legitimate	   concerns	   and	   thus	   deserve	   consideration.	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case	   that	   all	   of	   these	   problems	   can	   be	   resolved	  easily	  or	  even	  at	  all.	  International	  influence	  and	  leverage	  are	  as	  old	  as	  politics.593	  Consumer/corporate	   confidence	   in	   the	  market	   for	   SWF	   investment	  may	   be	   an	  achievable	  goal	  for	  regulation,	  but	  reversing	  international	  political	  power	  is	  not.	  Thus,	   the	   question	   is	   whether	   the	   abovementioned	   market	   imperfections	  necessarily	  warrant	  the	  adoption	  of	  regulation	  or	  whether	  the	  market	  response	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  590	  For	  example,	  Truman	  states	  that	  ‘these	  risks’,	  meaning	  the	  risk	  of	  political	  interference,	  ‘are	  largely	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  hypothetical’,	  Truman	  (n	  82)	  4.	  591	  Applying	  the	  terminology	  used	  above,	  if	  rationale	  determines	  ‘why	  regulation	  is	  necessary	  if	  the	  objectives	  are	  to	  be	  achieved’,	  then	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  current	  structure	  is	  sufficient	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  of	  stability	  and	  security	  without	  further	  regulation.	  592	  Regarding	  the	  risk	  of	  extracting	  technology,	  see	  the	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  3	  (n	  605)	  as	  to	  why	  this	  should	  not	  constitute	  a	  concern.	  593	  Pistor,	  discussing	  the	  many	  ‘gracious’	  investments	  by	  SWF	  to	  distressed	  western	  financial	  institutions,	  argues	  that	  SWF	  holding	  countries	  view	  themselves	  as	  being	  politically	  and	  economically	  intertwined	  with	  western	  countries,	  ‘and	  their	  relative	  autonomy	  depends	  on	  arrangements	  that	  mitigate	  their	  dependence’,	  Pistor	  (n	  429)	  296.	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to	   market	   imperfections	   can	   be	   cost-­‐effectively	   replaced	   or	   improved	   by	  government.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   argued	   by	  Mezzacapo	   that,	   although	  markets	   do	   not	  necessarily	   provide	   first-­‐best	   incentives	   to	   behave	   as	   efficiently	   as	   possible,	  (sometimes)	   they	   could	   however	   provide	   very	   good	   incentives. 594 	  Thus,	  Mezzacapo	  argues	   that,	  when	  searching	   for	  an	  appropriate	  market	   response	   to	  market	   imperfections,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   determine	   the	   incentives	   of	   the	   various	  market	  participants.	  As	  stated	  above,	  the	  market	  imperfections	  created	  by	  SWFs	  (and	   the	   subsequent	   costs)	   are	   rooted	   in	   the	   SWFs’	   lack	   of	   transparency.	  Therefore,	   a	   clear	   incentive	   is	   created	   for	   SWFs	   themselves	   to	   build	   trust,	   but	  also	  more	   particularly,	   to	   devise	   rules,	   institutions	   and	   behaviours	  minimising	  the	   costs	   flowing	   from	   the	   opacity	   of	   SWFs.595	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   recipient	  governments	  and	  companies	  welcoming	  FDI	  have	  a	  clear	   incentive	   to	  maintain	  an	  open	  economy,	  whilst	  ensuring	  the	  protection	  of	  vital	  national	  and	  economic	  interests.	  	  
iii. ‘Transparency’	  at	  the	  centre-­‐stage	  of	  the	  discussion	  	   If	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	   regulation	   of	   SWFs	   ultimately	   leads	   to	   the	   topic	   of	  transparency,	  this	  is	  because	  making	  SWFs	  more	  transparent	  is	  often	  considered	  the	  solution	  to	  most	  concerns	  regarding	  SWFs.596	  Thus,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	   is	   transparency	   that	   must	   be	   targeted	   by	   regulatory	   proposals	   has	   been	  elevated	  to	  the	  centre-­‐stage	  of	  the	  discussion.597	  As	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  1,	  when	  discussing	  the	  opacity	  of	  SWFs,	  USA	  and	  EU	  regulations	  provide	  for	  a	  considerable	  and	  comprehensive	  mandatory	  disclosure	  regime,	   that	   operates,	   for	   example,	  when	   a	  major	   stake	   in	   a	   listed	   company	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  594	  Mezzacapo	  (n	  422)	  39-­‐40.	  595	  ibid.	  596	  Although,	  as	  seen	  below,	  this	  has	  also	  been	  disputed.	  597	  As	  said	  by	  Schweitzer,	  ‘it	  seems	  that	  any	  regulatory	  regime	  meant	  to	  capture	  SWFs	  that	  would	  reach	  beyond	  transparency	  requirements	  would	  need	  to	  start	  from	  a	  definition	  of	  specific	  risk	  scenarios.	  To	  this	  day,	  these	  risk	  scenarios	  have	  not	  been	  well	  defined’,	  Heike	  Schweitzer,	  ‘[SWFs]	  –	  Market	  Investors,	  or	  Imperialist	  Capitalists?	  The	  European	  Response	  to	  Direct	  Investments	  by	  Non-­‐EU	  State-­‐Controlled	  Entities’	  in	  Bernitz	  and	  Ringe	  (n	  429)	  273.	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acquired.598	  However,	   as	   demonstrated599	  in	   various	   parts	   of	   this	   thesis,	   such	  requirements	  have	  so	  far	  not	  produced	  an	  effective	  disclosure	  regime,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	   many	   investment	   vehicles,	   such	   as	   SWFs	   and	   hedge	   funds	   remain	  extremely	  secretive.	  Opinions	  diverge	  as	  to	  what	  the	  role	  of	  transparency	  is	  in	  the	  debate	  about	  regulating	   SWFs.	   On	   one	   side	   of	   the	   discussion	   stand	   authors	   who	   view	  transparency	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  other	  results,600	  while	  others	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  transparency	  as	  an	  objective	  in	  itself.601	  Mezzacapo,	   for	   example,	   says	   that	   transparency	   is	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	  ‘intermediate	   target’,	   one	   used	   to	   attain	   other	   policy	   objectives,	   and	   is	   not	   an	  objective	   itself.	   Thus,	   for	  Mezzacapo,	   there	   is	   no	   objection	   to	   allowing	   opaque	  investors	  to	  operate	  in	  foreign	  market	  because	  ‘any	  shareholder/investor	  is	  not	  
per	   se	   transparent	   (for	   example,	   hedge	   funds	   and	   private	   equity	   funds)	   unless	  required	   or	   imposed	   to	   [be]	   so’.602	  Therefore,	   for	   Mezzacapo	   the	   real	   concern	  about	   SWFs	   is	   not	   their	   lack	   of	   transparency	   per	   se,	   but	   the	   fear	   of	   hidden	  political	  motives	  that	  might	  impact	  on	  international	  and	  domestic	  markets.	  Along	   similar	   lines,	   it	   has	  been	  argued	  by	  Lowery	  that	   in	   looking	  at	  both	  a	  large	  SWF	  (Norway’s	  GPFG)	  and	  a	  large	  USA	  state	  pension	  fund	  (California	  Public	  Employee	  Retirement	  System	  –	  CalPERS)	  which	  exercise	  their	  voting	  rights,	  two	  things	  stand	  out:	  one	  is	  ‘the	  utility	  of	  laying	  out	  in	  advance	  the	  broad	  policies	  that	  guide	   how	   the	   fund	   votes,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   undue,	   unwelcome	   surprises.’603	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  598	  In	  the	  USA,	  the	  Securities	  Exchange	  Act	  requires	  disclosure	  of	  important	  information	  by	  anyone	  seeking	  to	  acquire	  more	  than	  5%	  of	  a	  company’s	  securities	  by	  direct	  purchase	  or	  tender	  offer,	  Securities	  Exchange	  Act	  of	  1934,	  PubL	  73-­‐291,	  48	  Stat.	  881,	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  78a	  et	  seq;	  When	  a	  major	  holding	  in	  a	  listed	  company	  is	  acquired	  or	  disposed,	  see	  Articles	  85-­‐97	  of	  Council	  Directive	  2001/34/EC	  of	  28	  May	  2001	  on	  the	  admission	  of	  securities	  to	  official	  stock	  exchange	  listing	  and	  on	  information	  to	  be	  published	  on	  those	  securities;	  In	  case	  of	  acquisition	  and	  disposal	  of	  ‘qualifying	  holding’	  in	  banks,	  insurance,	  financial	  intermediaries,	  mutual	  funds	  and	  other	  regulated	  subjects,	  see	  Articles	  12,	  19-­‐21	  of	  Council	  Directive	  2006/48/EC	  of	  14	  June	  2006	  relating	  to	  the	  taking-­‐up	  and	  pursuit	  of	  the	  business	  of	  credit	  institutions	  OJ	  L177/1.	  599	  n	  150	  onwards.	  600	  Such	  as	  Mezzacapo	  (n	  422)	  28;	  and	  Lowery	  (n	  603).	  601	  Such	  as	  Truman	  (n	  65)	  and	  Halvorsen	  (n	  167).	  602	  Mezzacapo	  (n	  422)	  28.	  603	  Clay	  Lowery,	  Remarks	  at	  Barclays	  Capital’s	  12th	  Annual	  Global	  Inflation-­‐Linked	  Conference,	  hp-­‐836,	  February	  25,	  2008.	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Another	   is	   ‘the	  utility	  of	  disclosing	   the	  actual	  votes	   themselves,	   so	   that	  outside	  observers	  can	  assess	  whether	  the	  fund	  is	  following	  its	  stated	  broad	  policies.’604	  A	  somewhat	  more	  principled	  approach	  towards	  transparency	  is	  adopted	  by	  Truman,	   who	   states	   that	   ‘transparency	   [in	   SWFs]	   promotes	   horizontal	  accountability	   among	   the	   interested	   parties	   and	   stakeholders	   (domestic	   and	  international)	   as	   well	   as	   vertical	   accountability	   within	   the	   policy	   process’.605	  ‘Accountability’,	   as	   he	   adds,	   ‘involves	   the	   citizens	   of	   the	   home	   country,	   the	  citizens	   of	   the	   host	   country	   (who	   may	   distrust	   the	   motives	   of	   the	   foreign	  government),	   and	   the	   international	   financial	   community	   in	   general,	   including	  other	   participants	   in	   global	   financial	   markets’.606	  Although	   Truman	   does	   not	  make	   his	   position	   as	   to	   the	   place	   and	   role	   of	   transparency	   in	   the	   discussion	  entirely	   clear,	   his	   stance	   comes	   close	   to	   arguing	   that	   there	   is	   a	   case	   for	  transparency	  per	  se.	  Similarly,	  Halvorsen’s	  (former	  finance	  Minister	  of	  Norway)	  statement	   that	   ‘transparency	   is	   key,	   transparency	   builds	   trust’607	  implies	   that	  transparency	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   tool,	   but	   rather	   a	   principle	   according	   to	   which	  international	  financial	  markets	  should	  operate.	  As	   noted	   by	   the	   European	   Commission,	   SWFs	   transparency	   ‘is	   also	  important	   to	   ensure	   SWFs	   are	   included	   in	   global	   surveillance	   of	   financial	  markets’.608	  It	   appears,	   therefore,	   that	   according	   to	   the	   EU	   regulator,	   public	  monitoring	  and	  supervision	  of	  SWFs	  may	  be	  mainly	  or	  primarily	  focused	  on	  the	  phase	   of	   ‘integration’	   of	   SWFs	   financial	   resources	   in	   recipient	   countries’	  economies,	   and	   aims	   at	   increasing	   the	   overall	   level	   of	   transparency	   as	  well	   as	  strengthening	   the	   supervision	   of	   entities	   and	   intermediaries	   used	   by	   SWFs	   to	  manage	  their	  assets.609	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  offer	  a	  different	  perspective.	  They	  argue	  that	  increasing	  transparency	   is	   not	   even	   necessary,	   that	   the	   fundamental	   problem	   lies	   in	   the	  state-­‐owned	   nature	   of	   SWFs	   and	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   sovereigns	   have	   ‘different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  604	  ibid.	  605	  Truman	  (n	  65)	  7.	  606	  ibid	  8.	  607	  Statement	  made	  in	  an	  OECD	  forum	  about	  SWFs	  in	  2008,	  see	  chapter	  1	  (n	  167).	  608	  Commission	  (n	  1)	  5.	  609	  Mezzacapo	  (n	  422)	  45.	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interests	   from	   private	   investors’.610	  Therefore,	   ‘lack	   of	   transparency	   is	   not	   in	  itself	  the	  problem,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  transparency	  cannot	  be	  itself	  the	  solution’.611	  The	   position	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   while	   transparency	   and	  accountability	  of	  financial	  firms	  are	  sound	  governance	  principles,	  financial	  actors	  should	  be	  allowed	   to	  derogate	   from	  applying	   them	   fully	   if	   this	   is	  necessary	   for	  their	  operation.	  Transparency	  and	  accountability	  could	  become	  powerful	  tools	  in	  the	   hands	   of	   regulators	   tasked	   with	   maintaining	   financial	   stability	   and	  eradicating	   market	   imperfections.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   SWFs,	   such	   funds	   should	   be	  actively	   encouraged	   to	   increase	   their	   transparency	   levels,	   as	   this	   can	   alleviate	  potential	   concerns	  of	   recipient	   countries	   and	   create	   a	  more	  open	  environment	  for	   SWFs.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	   things	   currently	   stand,	   SWFs	   should	   not	   be	  obliged	   to	   implement	   higher	   transparency	   standards	   than	   those	   required	   for	  their	   competitors	   (which	   is	   usually	   taken	   as	   the	   standard	   required	   for	   the	  maintenance	  of	  financial	  stability).	  This	  point	  raises	  many	  issues	  seen	  under	  the	  principle	   of	   competitive	   neutrality,	   namely,	   that	   ‘no	   business	   entity	   is	  advantaged	   (or	   disadvantaged)	   solely	   because	   of	   its	   ownership’.612	  In	   fact,	   a	  certain	   degree	   of	   opacity	   is	   necessary	   for	   SWFs	   in	   order	   for	   them	   to	  maintain	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  competitiveness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  investment	  vehicles,	  such	  as	  hedge	   funds.	   If	  hedge	   funds	  and	   investment	  banks	  are	  allowed	  to	  operate	   in	  complete	   obscurity,	   then	   it	   would	   seem	   unacceptable	   to	   impose	   stricter	  standards	  upon	   SWFs	   simply	  based	  on	   theoretical	   and	  unclear	   concerns	   about	  national	   security	   and	   political	   interference.	   If,	   however,	   regulators	   deem	   that	  more	  transparency	   from	  hedge	   funds	  and	  other	   investors	   is	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  610	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  3.	  611	  According	  to	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt,	  international	  investments	  are	  always	  political	  and	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  sovereign	  investors	  (quoting	  Truman)	  ‘calls	  into	  question	  our	  most	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  the	  […]	  functioning	  of	  our	  economies	  and	  the	  international	  financial	  system,’	  ibid	  3.	  The	  response	  offered	  by	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  is	  analysed	  below	  at	  n	  654	  onwards.	  612	  Antonio	  Capobianco	  and	  Hans	  Christiansen,	  ‘Competitive	  Neutrality	  and	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises:	  Challenges	  and	  Policy	  Options’	  (2011)	  OECD	  Corporate	  Governance	  Working	  Papers,	  No.	  1,	  OECD	  Publishing	  3.	  Competitive	  neutrality	  is	  usually	  concerned	  with	  possible	  sources	  of	  competitive	  distortions	  which	  can	  arise	  because	  of	  advantages	  some	  public	  sector	  businesses	  have	  due	  to	  their	  government	  ownership.	  Governments	  may	  create	  an	  uneven	  playing	  field	  in	  markets	  where	  a	  state	  firm	  competes	  with	  private	  firms,	  as	  they	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  state-­‐owned	  firms	  succeed.	  In	  the	  current	  case,	  competitive	  neutrality	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  reverse,	  namely	  that	  state-­‐owned	  firms	  are	  not	  subjected	  to	  additional	  constraints	  simply	  because	  of	  their	  state	  ownership.	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another	   financial	   crisis,	   then	   the	   same	   standard	   should	   apply	   to	   SWFs	   as	  well.	  This	  way	   SWFs	  would	  not	   be	   permitted	   to	   resist	   calls	   for	   transparency	   on	   the	  basis	   that	   they	   are	   being	   unfairly	   discriminated	   against. 613 	  In	   short,	   while	  transparency	   may	   be	   a	   good	   principle	   in	   itself,	   derogating	   from	   it	   can	   be	  necessary	  to	  protect	  competitiveness.614	  Based	  on	  the	  rationale	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  regulation	  discussed	  above,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  develops	  various	  theoretical	  regulatory	  models	  that	  have	  been	  suggested	  in	  the	  past	  and	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  regulate	  the	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs.	  	  
iv. Can	  foreign	  investments	  be	  blocked?	  	   A	  final	  question	  relevant	  to	  establishing	  a	  rationale	  for	  regulation	  relates	  to	  whether	   the	   actions	   of	   foreign	   governments	   can	   indeed	   be	   regulated	   by	   other	  governments.	   In	  other	  words,	   can	  a	   sovereign	  government	  be	  asked	   to	   comply	  with	  specific	  standards	  in	  the	  way	  it	  manages	  its	  public	  wealth	  or	  can	  it	  benefit	  from	  a	  form	  of	  sovereign	  immunity?	  Discussing	  the	  possibilities	  of	  regulating	  SWFs	  is	  not	  equated	  to	  intervening	  in	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  other	  governments.	   Instead,	   the	  focus	   is	  on	  regulating	  the	  commercial	  activities	  of	  those	  governments	  in	  foreign	  jurisdictions.	  It	  would	  be	  very	  difficult,	   if	  not	   impossible,	   to	   link	   the	   investment	  behaviour	  of	   SWFs	  with	  any	  issues	  of	  sovereignty,	  let	  alone,	  sovereign	  immunity.	  To	  establish	  a	  connection	  between	  SWFs	  and	  sovereign	  immunity,	  one	  must	  first	   consider	   whether	   an	   act	   of	   a	   SWF	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	   government.615	  SWFs	  can	  have	  varying	  degrees	  of	  independence	  from	  government	  influence.616	  In	  certain	  cases	  it	  would,	  indeed,	  be	  futile	  to	  attempt	  to	  link	  a	  SWF	  action	  to	  its	  respective	  government.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  613	  See	  for	  instance,	  n	  160,	  1061.	  614	  This	  point	  is	  touched	  on	  again	  in	  chapter	  6,	  at	  286–287.	  615	  In	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  attributable	  to	  a	  state	  or	  a	  ‘separate	  entity,	  distinct	  from	  the	  executive	  organs	  of	  the	  government	  of	  the	  state	  and	  capable	  of	  suing	  or	  being	  sued’,	  Fabio	  Bassan,	  The	  Law	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds,	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing,	  2011,	  100;	  This	  definition	  appears	  both	  in	  United	  Kingdom	  State	  Immunity	  Act	  1978,	  s	  14(1)	  and	  the	  1972	  Convention	  on	  State	  Immunity	  (Art	  27,	  and	  para	  107-­‐9	  of	  the	  Explanatory	  Note).	  616	  This	  decision	  depends	  on	  its	  incorporation,	  its	  powers	  and	  activities,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.	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Secondly,	  even	  if	  the	  first	  hurdle	  is	  overcome,	  most	  governments	  nowadays	  adopt	   a	   more	   restrictive	   approach	   towards	   sovereign	   immunity,	   which	  immunises	  foreign	  states	  from	  suits	  in	  connection	  with	  sovereign	  acts,	  but	  does	  not	  equally	  cover	  commercial	  acts.617	  This	  exception	  from	  immunity	  applies	  both	  with	   regard	   to	   immunity	   from	   jurisdiction	   as	   well	   as	   immunity	   from	  execution.618	  States	  adopting	  this	  approach	  include	  the	  USA619	  and	  the	  UK,620	  the	  primary	   recipients	   of	   SWF	   investments.	   The	   jurisdictional	   immunities	   of	   the	  state	   were	   addressed	   again	   in	   February	   2012	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Germany	   v.	   Italy	  
(Greece	  intervening)621	  before	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  The	  Court	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  not	  called	  upon	  in	  these	  proceedings	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  how	  international	  law	  treats	  the	  issue	  of	  state	  immunity	  for	  non-­‐sovereign	  activities,	  especially	  private	  and	  commercial	  activities	  (acta	  jure	  gestionis)	  to	  which,	  under	  many	   laws,	   immunity	   does	   not	   apply.	   As	   Truman,	   rightly,	   notes,	   ‘governments	  are	   understandably	   concerned	   about	   not	   compromising	   their	   room	   to	  manoeuvre	   in	   managing	   their	   international	   investments	   […]	   however,	   once	   a	  government	   seeks	   to	   operate	   outside	   its	   national	   borders,	   then	   it	   no	   longer	   is	  ‘sovereign’	   in	   most	   respects.’ 622 	  Indeed,	   in	   most	   jurisdictions,	   sovereign	  immunity	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  foreign	  governments’	  commercial	  activities.623	  The	  above	  point	  becomes	  relevant	  when	  considering	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  ‘act	  of	  state	  doctrine’	   to	   the	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs.	  The	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine	  holds	  that	  ‘every	  sovereign	  state	  is	  bound	  to	  respect	  the	  independence	  of	  every	  other	  sovereign	   state,	   and	   the	   courts	  of	  one	  country	  will	  not	   sit	   in	   judgement	  on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  617	  James	  Berger	  and	  Charlene	  Sun,	  ‘Sovereign	  Immunity:	  A	  Venerable	  Concept	  in	  Transition?’	  (2011)	  Vol	  27(2)	  International	  Litigation	  Quarterly	  5.	  618	  David	  Gaukrodger,	  ‘Foreign	  State	  Immunity	  and	  Foreign	  Government	  Controlled	  Investors’	  (2010)	  2010/2	  OECD	  Working	  Papers	  on	  International	  Investment	  <www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/45036449.pdf>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012,	  5.	  619	  Letter	  from	  Tate,	  Acting	  Legal	  Adviser,	  USA	  Department	  of	  State,	  to	  Acting	  USA	  Attorney	  Perlman,	  19	  May	  1952,	  reprinted	  in	  26	  Dept.	  State	  Bulletin	  984–85;	  Under	  the	  restrictive	  theory,	  foreign	  states	  were	  accorded	  immunity	  for	  their	  governmental	  acts,	  but	  not	  for	  their	  private	  or	  commercial	  acts. 620	  Section	  14(2),	  (3)	  State	  Immunity	  Act	  1978.	  621	  Jurisdictional	  Immunities	  of	  the	  State	  (Germany	  v.	  Italy:	  Greece	  intervening)	  -­‐	  Judgment	  of	  3	  February	  2012.	  622	  Truman	  (n	  65).	  623	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘sovereignty’	  and	  how	  it	  applies	  in	  the	  context	  of	  SWFs	  see,	  Gordon	  and	  Tash	  (n	  414)	  16,	  ‘a	  trend	  away	  from	  conferring	  absolute	  sovereign	  immunity’.	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acts	  of	  the	  government	  of	  another	  done	  within	  its	  own	  territory’.624	  This	  doctrine	  is	   used	   to	   protect	   a	   national	   government	   from	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   acts	   performed	  within	  its	  own	  borders	  by	  foreign	  courts.625	  For	  acts	  performed	  by	  a	  government	  outside	   its	   national	   borders,	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine	   cannot	   be	   evoked.	   Thus	  there	   should	   be	   no	   obstacle	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ‘sovereignty’	   in	   the	   regulation	   of	  SWFs.	  An	   additional	   question	   before	   regulatory	   frameworks	   are	   discussed	   is	  whether	   national	   regulatory	   measures	   comply	   with	   international	   foreign	  investment	  law,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  SWFs	  rely	  on	  international	  multilateral	   treaties?	   At	   a	   multilateral	   level,	   the	   existing	   treaties	   give	   limited	  guarantees	   to	   SWF	   investments.	   Given	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	   treaty	   on	  investments,	   the	   protection	   afforded	   to	   SWFs	   by	   international	   treaties	   is	  ‘indirect,	  conditional,	  fragmented,	  if	  not	  occasional’.626	  Firstly,	  such	  national	  measures	  can	  be	  viewed	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  World	  Trade	  Organisation	   (WTO)	   rules,	   in	   particular,	   Agreements	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	  Investment	   Measures	   (TRIM)	   and	   General	   Agreements	   on	   Tariffs	   and	   Trade	  (GATT).	  TRIM	  Agreements	  are	  agreements	  reached	  by	  WTO	  members.627	  These,	  however,	   do	   not	   relate	   to	   FDI.	   They	   only	   deal	   with	   trade	   issues	   and	   aim	   to	  guarantee	   that	   foreign	   investments	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   trade	   restricting	  measures.628	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  624	  Underhill	  v.	  Hernandez,	  168	  U.S.	  250	  (1897).	  In	  this	  case,	  Underhill	  instituted	  an	  action	  in	  a	  New	  York	  Court	  to	  recover	  damages	  for	  his	  detention	  in	  Venezuela	  by	  Hernadez’s	  new	  revolutionary	  government.	  Finding	  for	  the	  defendant,	  the	  court	  determined	  that	  Hernandez	  had	  acted	  in	  his	  official	  capacity	  as	  a	  military	  commander	  so	  his	  actions	  were	  those	  of	  the	  Venezuelan	  government.	  Therefore,	  based	  on	  the	  act	  of	  state	  doctrine,	  the	  Court	  refused	  to	  hear	  Underhill’s	  claim	  against	  the	  government.	  625	  For	  more	  see,	  Michael	  Zander,	  ‘The	  Act	  of	  State	  Doctrine’	  (1959)	  53	  AJIL	  826. 626	  Bassan	  (n	  615)	  76.	  627	  WTO	  Analytical	  Index,	  ‘Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Investment	  Measures’,	  (WTO,	  2012)	  <www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trims_01_e.htm>	  accessed	  26	  September	  2012.	  628	  Any	  attempts	  to	  broaden	  the	  notion	  of	  investments	  in	  TRIM	  agreements,	  or	  extend	  their	  scope	  so	  they	  can	  apply	  not	  only	  between	  states,	  but	  also	  between	  states	  and	  individuals	  have	  not	  been	  concluded;	  Bassan	  (n	  615)	  55.	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GATT	  rules,629	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  may,	  at	   least	   in	  theory,	  apply	  to	  SWFs.	   In	  particular	   the	   relative	   provisions	   are	   the	   principle	   of	   mandatory	   national	  treatment	   on	   internal	   taxation	   and	   regulation	   (Article	   III), 630 	  and	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	  (external,	  Article	  I,631	  and	  internal,	  Article	  XIII).632	  The	  principles	  of	   reciprocity	   (Preamble	   and	  Article	   XXVIII),633	  and	   transparency	   (Article	   X)634	  are	  also	  of	  relevance.	  These	  principles	  however,	  can	  hardly	  apply	  in	  practice	  to	  SWF	  investments.	  As	  stated	  by	  Bassan,	  these	  are	  general	  principles	  that	  cannot	  apply	   to	   specific	   investment	   cases	   and	  GATT	   rules	   apply	   to	   the	   trade	  of	   goods	  and,	  as	  such,	  its	  principles	  would	  apply	  only	  indirectly	  to	  investments.635	  Regulations	   promulgated	   by	   the	   OECD636	  may	   also	   provide	   a	   theoretical	  framework	  to	  apply	  to	  SWF	  investments,	  although	  it	  may	  be	  of	  limited	  relevance	  in	  practice.	  In	  particular,	  the	  OECD	  has	  issued	  the	  1961	  Code	  of	  Liberalisation	  of	  Capital	   Movements637	  and	   the	   1976	   Declaration	   on	   International	   Investments	  and	  Multinational	  Enterprises	  (containing	  the	  principle	  of	  national	  treatment),638	  both	   of	   which	   are	   of	   relevance	   to	   SWF	   investments.	   These	   instruments	   also	  provide	   for	   non-­‐discrimination	   of	   foreign	   investments	   and	   transparency	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  629	  WTO,	  ‘GATT	  and	  the	  Goods	  Council’	  (WTO,	  2012)	  <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/gatt_e.htm>	  accessed	  25	  September	  2012.	  630	  The	  requirement	  that	  taxes	  and	  other	  internal	  charges	  are	  not	  applied	  to	  imported	  products	  so	  as	  to	  afford	  protection	  to	  domestic	  products.	  631	  Requiring	  that	  any	  advantage	  accorded	  to	  any	  product	  originating	  by	  another	  country,	  shall	  immediately	  and	  unconditionally	  be	  accorded	  to	  any	  like	  products	  originating	  by	  all	  other	  contracting	  parties.	  632	  The	  rule	  of	  non-­‐discriminatory	  administration	  of	  quantitative	  restriction.	  633	  Requiring	  reciprocity	  of	  obligations	  and	  guaranteeing	  equal	  trade	  opportunities.	  634	  Guaranteeing	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  measures	  that	  a	  state	  may	  take	  to	  restrict	  foreign	  SWF	  activities.	  635	  Bassan	  (n	  615)	  57.	  636	  OECD	  rules	  specific	  to	  SWFs	  are	  dealt	  with	  in	  chapter	  6	  n	  1067.	  At	  this	  stage,	  only	  the	  general	  rules	  on	  foreign	  investments	  are	  examined.	  637	  This	  document,	  which	  applies	  to	  all	  long-­‐	  and	  short-­‐term	  capital	  movements	  between	  residents	  of	  OECD	  countries	  (including	  FDI),	  is	  the	  only	  binding	  multilateral	  instrument	  promoting	  liberalisation	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  and	  establishment	  in	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  OECD	  ‘Code	  of	  Liberalisation	  of	  Capital	  Movements’,	  (OECD,	  2012)	  <www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/39664826.pdf>,	  accessed	  25	  August	  2012.	  638	  This	  document	  was	  last	  amended	  in	  2011.	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  Code	  of	  Liberalization,	  this	  one	  is	  merely	  a	  recommendation	  and	  it	  is	  addressed	  to	  the	  enterprises,	  and	  not	  to	  national	  governments.	  OECD,	  ‘Text	  of	  the	  OECD	  Declaration	  on	  International	  Investment	  and	  Multinational	  Enterprises’	  (OECD,	  Investment	  Policy,	  2011)	  <www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/oecddeclarationoninternationalinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm>,	  accessed	  7	  October	  2012.	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obligations	  of	  restrictions	  adopted,	  along	  similar	   lines	  to	  the	  WTO	  instruments.	  However,	  both	  documents	  seem	  rather	  toothless	  when	  considering	  the	  range	  of	  exceptions	   provided	   in	   their	   text.	   The	   Code	   of	   Liberalisation,	   in	   particular,	  provides	   an	   exception	   for	   public	   order	   and	   security	   in	   Article	   3,	   but	   abstains	  from	   defining	   those	   concepts	   and	   entrusts	   this	   task	   to	   member	   states. 639	  Moreover,	   the	   obligation	   to	   treat	   non-­‐residents	   on	   an	   equal	   footing	   with	  residents	   applies	   only	   between	   residents	   of	   OECD	   countries.640	  Finally,	   OECD	  instruments	   do	   not	   contain	   legally	   binding	   dispute	   settlement	   provisions,	  although	  Article	  17	  offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  bringing	  to	  the	  Organisation	  any	  case	  of	  alleged	  violation	  of	  its	  obligations	  by	  a	  Member.641	  	  So	   far	   this	  chapter	  has	  analysed	   the	   theoretical	   framework	  of	   the	  rationale	  for	  regulating	  SWFs	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	  implications	  involved.	  The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  examine	  regulatory	  structures	  that	  have	  been	  proposed	  in	  the	  past	  in	  the	  context	  of	  SWFs.	  	  	  
2.	  Potential	  regulatory	  frameworks	  	   In	  recent	  years,	  and	  since	  SWFs	  have	  attracted	  a	   level	  of	  attention,	  various	  regulatory	  models	   for	   SWFs	   have	   emerged.	   These	   proposals	   have	   appeared	   in	  both	  academic	  papers	  and	  media	  articles	  and,	  naturally,	  some	  are	  set	  out	  in	  more	  detail	  than	  others.	  A	  categorisation	  of	  the	  models	  most	  commonly	  offered	  in	  the	  relevant	  literature	  follows.	  In	   the	   first	   category	   are	  models	   that	   favour	   limitation	   of	   the	   operation	   of	  SWFs.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  ceiling	  should	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  amount	  of	   shares	  SWFs	  can	  acquire	   in	  domestic	   companies,	  or	   that	   it	  be	  made	  conditional	   (on	   state	   approval)	   for	   share	   ownership	   to	   exceed	   a	   certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  639	  Although	  its	  application	  is	  restricted	  within	  the	  OECD	  compliance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  proportionality,	  transparency	  of	  intervention,	  regulation	  predictability,	  accountability	  of	  regulatory	  authorities,	  Bassan	  (n	  615)	  63.	  640	  Sub-­‐paragraph	  d.	  of	  Article	  1	  only	  contains	  a	  best-­‐endeavour	  commitment	  regarding	  residents	  from	  countries	  which	  are	  members	  of	  the	  IMF.	  641	  In	  particular,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  stand-­‐still	  clauses.	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percentage.	  Other	  models	  falling	  within	  this	  category	  suggest	  removing	  various	  sensitive	  sectors	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  SWFs	  altogether.	  Combinations	  of	  the	  above	  models	  have	  also	  been	  put	  forward.	  	  A	   second	   type	   of	   model	   favours	   ‘incentive-­‐type’	   regulations.	   Supporters	  propose	  imposing	  charges	  on	  SWFs	  (such	  as	  additional	  taxes	  or	  restricting	  their	  voting	  rights)	  until	  they	  rectify	  the	  costs	  they	  impose	  on	  target	  countries,	  or	  until	  they	  transfer	  their	  assets	  to	  private	  actors.	  	  The	   third	   kind	   of	   regulatory	   proposals	   suggests	   imposing	   reporting	  requirements	  on	  SWFs.	  Finally,	   another	   regulatory	   model,	   discussed	   below,	   advocates	   allowing	  	  SWFs	  to	  regulate	  their	  behaviour	  by	  themselves	  (‘self-­‐regulation’).	  	  
i. Limiting	  SWFs’	  acquisitions	  and	  protecting	  strategic	  industries	  	   The	   first	  model	   suggests	   imposing	   ceilings	   on	   the	   amount	   of	   shares	   SWFs	  can	   acquire	   and/or	   protecting	   certain	   industries	   from	   their	   investment	   ambit.	  	  This	  regulatory	  model	  finds	  its	  root	  in	  a	  measure	  which	  first	  appeared	  in	  the	  UK	  during	  the	  1980s,	  known	  as	  the	   ‘golden	  share’.	   It	  originally	  concerned	  formerly	  state-­‐owned	   enterprises,	   such	   as	   energy	   companies,	   in	   which	   former	   Prime	  Minister	   Thatcher	   purported	   to	   continue	   to	   exercise	   control	   over	   future	  ownership	  and	  activities,	  through	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  ‘golden	  share’.642	  Through	  a	  golden	  share,	  for	  example,	  the	  state	  could	  control	  the	  percentage	  of	  shares	  held	  in	  a	  company	  by	   foreign	   investors,	  or	  ensure	   its	  approval	  was	  required	   for	   the	  execution	  of	  business	  activities,	  such	  as	  mergers	  and	  asset	  sales.	  In	   2007,	   Garten	   was	   among	   the	   first	   to	   propose	   a	   similar	   scheme,	   in	   an	  article	  in	  the	  Financial	  Times.643	  Many	  governments,	  he	  stated,	  were	  at	  the	  time	  contemplating	   adopting	   measures	   to	   protect	   their	   industries	   from	   SWFs.	  However,	   ‘so	   far	   no	   western	   government	   has	   had	   the	   courage	   to	   admit	   that	  dealing	   with	   SWFs	   may	   require	   departures	   from	   the	   conventional	   liberal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  642	  Andrei	  Baev,	  ‘Is	  There	  a	  Niche	  for	  the	  State	  in	  Corporate	  Governance?	  Securitization	  of	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises	  and	  New	  Forms	  of	  State	  Ownership’	  (1985)	  18	  HousJInt'lL	  20;	  Golden	  shares	  are	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  5,	  n	  745	  onwards.	  643	  Jeffrey	  Garten,	  ‘We	  Need	  Rules	  for	  SWFs’,	  Financial	  Times,	  7	  Aug.	  2007	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1a968284-­‐44fd-­‐11dc-­‐82f5-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>,	  (accessed	  10	  December	  2009).	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orthodoxy	   concerning	   global	   trade	   and	   investment	   flows’.644	  Yet,	   according	   to	  Garten,	  this	   is	  what	  was	  needed.	  He	  suggested	  that	  SWFs	  should	  not	  own	  more	  than	   20%	  of	   any	   company	   in	   the	  USA	   or	   the	   EU	  without	   the	   host	   government	  making	   a	   decision	   to	   permit	   it.	   Garten	   suggested	   a	   requirement	   of	   reciprocity,	  where	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   country	   to	   buy	   foreign	   assets	   was	   conditional	   on	   that	  country	   granting	   similar	   access	   to	   foreign	   (western)	   funds.	   In	   his	   view	   the	  underlying	  premise	   is	   that	  SWFs	  are	  essentially	  political	  entities	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  such.645	  In	   the	   same	   year,	   Davis,	   a	  Wall	   Street	   Journal	  columnist,	   also	   argued	   for	   a	  two-­‐step	  response	   to	  SWFs.646	  First,	   the	  USA,	  Europe	  and	  Canada	  would	  seek	  a	  common	  position	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  whether	  government	  funds	  should	  be	  limited	  to	   minority	   stakes,	   whether	   certain	   companies,	   such	   as	   defence	   and	   media	  companies,	   should	   be	   protected	   from	   foreign	   investments,	   and	   whether	  countries	  whose	  funds	  invest	  in	  certain	  sectors,	  such	  as	  financial	  services,	  should	  be	   required	   to	   open	   those	   same	   sectors	   in	   their	   domestic	   markets	   to	   foreign	  investment.	   Davis	   argued	   that	   a	   failure	   to	   coordinate	   could	   result	   in	   funds	  playing	  ‘one	  country	  against	  another	  to	  attract	  investment,	  like	  automakers	  play	  one	  state	   in	   the	  [USA]	  against	  another	   to	  get	  a	  richer	  package	  of	   tax	  cuts’.647	  In	  the	  second	  stage,	  the	  SWF	  holding	  countries	  would	  participate	  in	  these	  talks,	  to	  ensure	   they	   would	   be	   ‘maintaining	   the	   freest	   possible	   access	   to	   invest	   in	   the	  world’s	  richest	  markets’.648	  If	  the	  talks	  ended	  in	  failure,	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  EU	  could	  unilaterally	  impose	  rules.	  Setting	   investment	   caps	   soon	   became	   a	   popular	   idea	   among	   various	  countries	   in	   Europe	   and	   elsewhere.	   Das	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   commonly	   seen	  ‘knee-­‐jerk	  reaction’	  of	  analysts	  and	  policy	  makers	  in	  the	  recipient	  economies	  ‘is	  to	   limit	   the	  stakes	   that	  SWFs	  can	  have	   in	   [a]	  certain	  category	  of	   industries	  and	  keep	   it	   below	   a	   prescribed	   proportion’.649	  Under	   such	   a	  model,	   the	   regulatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  644	  ibid.	  645	  ibid.	  646	  Bob	  Davis,	  ‘How	  Trade	  Talks	  Could	  Tame	  [SWFs]’,	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (New	  York,	  29	  October	  2007)	  <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119360521899874131.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  647	  ibid.	  648	  ibid.	  649	  Dilip	  Das,	  ‘SWFs:	  the	  Institutional	  Dimension’	  (2009)	  Vol	  56(1)	  IntRev	  Econ	  99.	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authorities	  of	  the	  host	  country	  can	  determine	  both	  the	  industries	  accessible	  and	  the	   stake	   limit.	   Such	   a	  model	   is	   currently	   applied	   in	   India,	   where	   the	   Foreign	  Exchange	   Management	   Act	   of	   1999	   enables	   ‘Press	   Notes’	   to	   be	   issued	   by	   the	  Department	   of	   Industrial	   Policy	   and	   Promotion	   and	   establish	   the	   foreign	  investment	   policy	   applicable	   to	   each	   sector.	   The	   Press	  Notes	   determine	  which	  sectors	   require	   the	  prior	  approval	  of	   the	  Foreign	   Investment	  Promotion	  Board	  before	   foreigners	   may	   directly	   invest	   in	   them	   and	   which	   do	   not	   require	   such	  approval.	  Additionally,	   the	  Press	  Notes	  establish	   the	  maximum	  percentage	  of	  a	  company	  that	  can	  be	  owned	  by	  a	  foreign	  investor	  based	  on	  the	  sector	  in	  which	  that	  company	  operates.650	  Pursuant	  to	  Press	  Note	  7,	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  is	  prohibited	   in	   the	   following	   industries:	   retail	   trading,	   atomic	   energy,	   lottery,	  gambling	  and	  betting,	  Nidhi	  companies	  (non-­‐bank	  financial	  services),	  trading	  in	  transferable	  development	  rights	  and	  activities/sectors	  not	  open	  to	  private	  sector	  investment.651	  Some	  EU	  Member	  States,	  such	  as	  France,	  Greece	  and	  Germany	  also	  adopted	  similar	   measures.	   These	   were	   shaped	   by	   the	   circumstances	   that	   prevailed	   in	  each	   country	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   their	   adoption	   and	   were	   designed	   to	   address	  concerns	  specific	  to	  each	  of	  them.	  Thus,	  using	  the	  examples	  of	  France,	  Greece	  and	  Germany,	  each	  set	  of	  measures	  presents	  different	  degrees	  of	  protectionism.	  The	  legislative	   framework	  of	   these	  countries	   (as	  well	  as	  of	   the	  USA)	  as	   it	   relates	   to	  SWFs	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  detailed	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  5.	  	  
ii. Incentive-­‐type	  regulation:	  restricting	  voting	  shares	  or	  imposing	  taxes	  	   Incentive-­‐type	  regulation	  is	  softer	  than	  the	  regulation	  type	  discussed	  above.	  It	   is	  designed	   to	  offer	   incentives	   to	  SWFs	  operating	   in	  various	  countries	  which	  encourage	  them	  either	  to	  rectify	  the	  various	  costs	  they	  impose	  on	  the	  system	  or	  to	   transfer	   the	   exercise	   of	   voting	   rights	   attached	   to	   company	   shares	   to	   third	  parties.	   Superficially	   appealing,	   a	   detailed	   look	   reveals	   that	   the	   underlying	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  650	  While	  some	  sectors	  are	  100%	  open	  to	  foreign	  ownership,	  they	  may	  not	  be	  invested	  in	  by	  foreigners	  without	  required	  FIPB	  approval.	  Maya	  Steinitz	  and	  Michael	  Ingrassia,	  ‘The	  Impact	  of	  SWFs	  on	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  in	  Strategic	  Industries:	  A	  comparative	  Review’	  (2009)	  Vol	  10(1)	  BLI	  14.	  651	  Press	  Note	  7,	  Issued	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  India,	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Industry,	  Department	  of	  Industrial	  Policy	  and	  Promotion,	  SIA	  (FC	  Section),	  16	  June	  2008.	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purpose	   of	   such	   proposals	   is	   to	   incentivise	   SWFs	   to	   suspend	   investment	  activities	  altogether.	  The	  first	  incentive-­‐type	  regulation	  is	  the	  one	  restricting	  the	  voting	  rights	  of	  shares	   held	   by	   SWFs.	   This	   idea,	   as	   a	   protectionist	   measure	   against	   foreign	  corporate	  control,	  appeared	   towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	  18th	  century.	   In	   the	  USA	   in	  1791,	   legislative	   provisions	   were	   made	   in	   the	   charter	   for	   the	   country’s	   first	  quasi-­‐central	  bank,	  the	  first	  Bank	  of	  the	  USA,	  to	  avoid	  foreign	  domination.	  Under	  the	   charter,	   only	   resident	   shareholders	   could	   vote	   and	   only	   American	   citizens	  could	   become	   directors.	   This	   provision	   prevented	   foreign	   control	   of	   the	   Bank,	  even	   though	   62%	   of	   its	   shares	   by	   1803	   and	   70%	   by	   1811	   were	   owned	   by	  foreigners.652	  Buiter	  was	  among	  the	  first	  in	  2007	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  proposal	  of	  this	  type	  to	  tackle	   SWF	   concerns.	   A	  main	   concern	  was	   the	   risk	   of	   political	   extortion	   if,	   for	  example,	   the	   Russian	   Stabilisation	   Fund	   acquired	   a	   controlling	   stake	   in	   a	   UK	  energy	  distributor.653	  According	  to	  him,	  SWFs	  should	  only	  be	  allowed	  to	  invest	  in	  equity	   that	   does	   not	   have	   control	   rights	   attached	   to	   it,	   that	   is,	   in	   non-­‐voting	  stocks	  and	  shares.654	  In	  2009	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  developed	  the	  idea	  in	  more	  detail.	  The	  authors’	  ‘minimalist	  approach’	   (as	   they	  described	   it)	  was	   to	  remove	   the	  voting	  rights	  of	  equities	  of	  USA	   firms	  acquired	  by	   foreign	  government	   controlled	  entities,	   until	  the	   equity	   is	   transferred	   to	   private	   hands. 655 	  Their	   rationale	   behind	   their	  proposal	   is	   that,	   in	   principle,	   the	   interests	   of	   sovereign	   and	   private	   investors	  clash	  and	  they	  accept	  Keynes’s	  maxim	  that	   ‘international	  cash	  flows	  are	  always	  political’.656	  The	   authors	   call	   this	   state	   directed	   capitalist	   ‘mercantilism’.	   By	  removing	   voting	   rights,	   sovereigns	   will	   refrain	   from	   exercising	   influence	   over	  management	   and	   those	   who	   have	   purely	   financial	   motives	   will	   continue	   to	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  Despite	  this,	  when	  its	  charter	  was	  up	  for	  renewal	  in	  1811,	  the	  Congress	  did	  not	  re-­‐charter	  the	  Bank	  ‘in	  large	  part	  owing	  to	  fears	  of	  foreign	  influence’,	  Chang	  (n	  527)	  3.	  653	  Willem	  Buiter,	  ‘Taming	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  in	  Two	  Easy	  Steps’,	  (Maverecon,	  24	  July	  2007)	  <http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/07/taming-­‐sovereightml/>	  accessed	  12	  June	  2010.	  654	  ibid.	  655	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  10.	  656	  ibid	  1.	  
Regulation	  of	  SWFs:	  The	  Avoidance	  of	  Investment	  Protectionism	  
	   167	  
invest.657	  This	  mechanism	  is	  mirroring	  the	   ‘break	  through’	  rule	  provided	  by	  the	  EU	  Takeover	  Directive.658	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  accept	  that	  their	  model	  may	  lead	  to	  unsuccessful	  results	  if	   applied	   in	   an	   under-­‐inclusive	   or	   an	   over-­‐inclusive	   manner.	   In	   the	   first	   case	  (under-­‐inclusion),	   the	  model	  will	   lack	   effectiveness	   if	   it	   is	   not	   applied	   to	   other	  manipulative	  transactions,	  such	  as	  requiring	  strategic	  concessions	  before	  a	  SWF	  injects	  more	  capital	  into	  a	  portfolio	  company	  (problem	  of	  reciprocity);	  or	  if	  does	  not	  cover	  state	  investment	  entities	  other	  than	  SWFs	  which	  may	  also	  be	  used	  to	  advance	   political	   goals,	   such	   as	   government	   controlled	   companies. 659 	  The	  authors	   believe	   that	   these	   problems	   can	   be	   dealt	   under	   the	   disclosure	   rules	  already	  present	   in	  developed	  countries	  or	  via	  other	  measures	  dealing	  with	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  state	  capitalism	  in	  general.660	  In	  the	  second	  case	  (over-­‐inclusion),	  the	  measure	  may	  apply	  to	  foreign	  public	  entities	   other	   than	   SWFs,	   such	   as	   state	   pension	   funds,	   and	   could	   risk	   being	  imposed	   by	   foreign	   governments	   on	   USA	   state	   pension	   funds,	   such	   as	   the	  CalPERS.	   Gilson	   and	   Milhaupt	   argue	   that	   suspending	   the	   voting	   rights	   of	   USA	  state	   pension	   fund	   foreign	   equity	   investments	   should	   not	   hurt	   the	   funds’	  performance	   for	   the	   same	   reason	   that	   vote	   suspension	   should	   not	   deter	   USA	  equity	   investments	  by	   foreign	  SWFs	  who	  do	  not	  have	   a	   strategic	  motive.661	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  what	   is	   lost	   is	   the	  positive	   impact	   that	  shareholder	  activism	  by	  USA	   state	   pension	   funds,	   most	   vocally	   by	   CalPERS,	   has	   had	   on	   corporate	  governance	   standards	   in	   other	   countries.	   The	   authors	   accept	   this	   cost,	   but	  believe	  it	  is	  not	  a	  large	  one,	  mainly	  because	  the	  role	  played	  by	  USΑ	  state	  pension	  funds	   in	   the	   effort	   to	   improve	   corporate	   governance	   standards	   has	   not	   been	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  ibid.	  658	  The	  ‘break	  through’	  rule	  provides	  that	  shareholder	  voting	  restrictions	  provided	  by	  corporate	  charter,	  contracts	  or	  different	  shareholders’	  agreements	  do	  not	  apply	  where	  the	  offeror	  has	  gained	  75%	  of	  the	  shares	  of	  the	  target	  company,	  Thomas	  Papadopoulos,	  ‘The	  Mandatory	  Provisions	  of	  the	  EU	  Takeover	  Bid	  Directive	  and	  Their	  Deficiencies’	  (2007)	  Vol	  1(6)	  LFMR	  525.	  659	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  26-­‐28.	  660	  ibid	  28.	  As	  they	  say,	  ‘the	  difficulties	  caused	  by	  the	  plate	  tectonics	  between	  capitalist	  systems	  in	  which	  the	  government	  plays	  radically	  different	  roles	  are	  far	  more	  important	  and	  far	  more	  complicated	  than	  those	  associated	  with	  SWFs.	  Suspended	  voting	  addresses	  only	  the	  latter’.	  661	  ibid	  30.	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central.662	  Another	  proposal	   falling	   in	   the	  category	  of	   ‘incentive	   regulation’	   is	   the	  one	  offered	   by	   Fleischer	   in	   2009.663	  Fleischer	   based	   his	   discussion	   on	   the	   USA	   tax	  regime	  which	  currently	  treats	  SWFs	  as	  sovereigns	  for	  tax	  purposes.664	  Sovereign	  status	   in	   this	   context	   can	  be	  a	   significant	  benefit.	  As	   long	  as	   the	  SWF	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  commercial	  activity	  other	  than	  ‘portfolio	  investments’	  (defined	  as	  the	  acquisition	   of	   non-­‐controlling	   stakes),	   the	   funds	   can	   avoid	   both	   USA	   income	  taxes	   and	   withholding	   taxes	   on	   their	   USA	   investments. 665 	  Private	   foreign	  investors,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   generally	   taxed	   lightly	   on	   their	   portfolio	  investments	   in	   the	  USA,	  but	  do	   face	   significant	   taxes	  on	  some	   types	  of	   income,	  such	  as	  dividends	  from	  USA	  corporations	  and	  certain	  real	  estate	  investments.666	  Fleisher,	   citing	   Qantas	   Airways	   v.	   US, 667 	  argues	   that	   such	   generosity	   is	   not	  required	   under	   international	   law,	   as	   ‘the	   international	   doctrine	   of	   sovereign	  immunity	  as	  such	  imposes	  no	  restrictions’	  on	  the	  USA’s	  right	  to	  tax	  SWFs.668	  Fleischer	  develops	  a	  theory	  of	  taxing	  sovereign	  wealth	  as	  a	  complementary	  instrument	   to	   other	   regulations.	   He	   performs	   a	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   of	   the	  operation	   of	   SWFs	   and	   concludes	   that	   the	   negative	   externalities	   outweigh	   the	  positive	  ones.669	  In	  his	  view,	  because	   the	  potential	   for	  negative	  harm	   is	   severe,	  the	   potential	   for	   positive	   benefit	  modest,	   and	   the	   capital	   supplied	   by	   SWFs	   so	  easily	  replaced	  by	  private	  investors,670	  there	  is	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  for	  a	  Pigouvian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  662	  ibid.	  663	  Victor	  Fleischer,	  ‘A	  Theory	  of	  Taxing	  Sovereign	  Wealth’	  (2009)	  UIlL&Econ	  Research	  Paper	  No	  LE08-­‐030.	  664	  U.S.	  Tax	  Code,	  s	  892.	  665	  See	  also,	  Michael	  Knoll,	  ‘Taxation	  and	  the	  Competitiveness	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Do	  Taxes	  Encourage	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  to	  Invest	  in	  the	  United	  States?’	  (2009)	  82	  Southern	  California	  Law	  Review	  712.	  666	  Fleischer	  (n	  663)	  24-­‐25.	  667	  Qantas	  Airways,	  Ltd.	  v.	  United	  States,	  62	  F.3d	  385,	  388–90	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1995).	  668	  Fleischer	  (n	  663)	  19.	  669	  He	  says	  that	  SWFs	  threaten	  American	  foreign	  policy	  interests,	  support	  the	  inefficient	  allocation	  of	  resources,	  increase	  managerial	  slack	  (for	  example	  when	  China	  acquired	  a	  non-­‐voting	  stake	  in	  Blackstone),	  their	  lack	  of	  transparency	  may	  have	  a	  contagion	  effect,	  they	  encroach	  on	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  American	  enterprise	  (in	  exchange	  for	  foreign	  investments)	  and	  support	  autocratic	  regimes,	  ibid	  46-­‐54.	  670	  Although	  he	  states	  that	  ‘neither	  the	  brightest	  promises	  nor	  the	  greatest	  perils	  of	  [SWFs]	  have	  yet	  been	  realized’,	  ibid	  49.	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tax. 671 	  Fleischer	   argues	   that	   setting	   the	   right	   tax	   rate	   depends	   on	   what	  policymakers	  believe	  the	  hurdle	  rate	  of	  sovereign	  wealth	  fund	  investors	  is,	  which	  means	   in	   practice,	   whether	   they	   should	   be	   taxed	   more	   or	   less	   than	   private	  investors.672	  The	  main	  object	  of	  the	  above	  proposals	  is	  to	  incentivise	  SWFs	  either	  to	  sell	  their	   stakes	   to	   privately	   held	   companies	   (Buiter/Gilson	   and	   Milhaupt)	   or	   to	  reduce	  the	  costs	  they	  impose	  upon	  the	  system	  (Fleisher).	  However,	  as	  discussed	  below,	  both	  systems	  contain	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  all	  incentivising	  schemes	  but	  fail	   to	   provide	   clear	   guideline	   by	   which	   SWFs	   could	   continue	   to	   operate	   in	  financial	  markets	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  retain	  their	  voting	  rights	  or	  avoid	  the	  tax	  charges.	  	  
iii. Command	  and	  control	  regulation:	  increase	  transparency	  through	  reporting	  
requirements	  	  This	   type	   of	   regulation	   advocates	   forcing	   SWFs,	   through	   legislation,	   to	  produce	   reports	   with	   specific	   information,	   thus	   aligning	   themselves	   with	   the	  regulated	   part	   of	   the	   industry,	   such	   as	   mutual	   funds,	   banks	   and	   insurance	  companies.673	  Such	  proposals	  appeared	  in	  Truman’s	  analysis	  of	  SWFs,	  where	  he	  supported	  the	   adoption	   of	   strict	   guidelines	   and	   the	   issuance	   of	   annual	   reports	   (and	  preferably	   quarterly	   reports)	   by	   SWFs.674	  Similarly,	   Garten	   argued	   in	   favour	   of	  such	   action,	   as	   he	   suggested	   that	   investment	   restrictions	   be	   coupled	   with	  reporting	   requirements	   to	   tackle	   concerns	   about	   SWFs.675 	  Neither	   of	   these	  articles	   specify	   whether	   such	   reporting	   requirements	   should	   be	   for	   national	  authority	  purposes	  only	  or	  whether	  such	  information	  should	  be	  made	  public	  so	  that	  investors	  and	  media	  are	  equally	  able	  to	  scrutinise	  them.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  671	  A	  Pigouvian,	  or	  corrective,	  tax,	  is	  designed	  to	  make	  the	  person	  who	  engages	  in	  an	  activity	  with	  negative	  externalities	  or	  public	  harms	  internalise	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  that	  activity,	  Arthur	  Pigou,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Welfare	  (Macmillan	  and	  Co.,	  4th	  ed.,	  1932)	  192–93.	  672	  Fleischer	  (n	  663)	  29,	  33.	  673	  See	  n	  1062	  with	  examples	  of	  regulation.	  674	  Truman	  (n	  65).	  675	  Garten	  (n	  643).	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Additionally,	  an	  ‘indirect’	  supervisory	  and	  regulatory	  framework	  adapted	  to	  address	   the	   specific	   concerns	   about	   SWF	   investments	   may	   be	   based,	   as	  suggested	   by	   Keller,	   ‘on	   the	   mandatory	   requirement	   for	   a	   SWF	   to	   conduct	  investments	  over	  a	  certain	   threshold	  (or	   investments	  of	  certain	  kinds)	   through	  third-­‐party	   professional	   asset	   managers’	   or	   alternatively	   ‘to	   disclose	   its	  shareholder	   voting	   records	   when	   the	   ownership	   percentage	   in	   a	   company	  exceeds	  a	  given	  threshold’.676	  A	  more	  detailed	  model	  is	  proposed	  by	  Mezzacapo,	  who	  suggests	  following	  a	  two-­‐layer	   approach	   of	   ‘self-­‐regulation	  within	   a	   statutory	   framework’,677	  as	   the	  one	  widely	  adopted	  in	  Europe	  for	  stock	  exchanges	  regulation.	  In	  this	  respect,	  she	  recalls	   the	   provisions	   introduced	   in	   2005	   in	   the	   Italian	   Financial	   Consolidated	  Act 678 	  in	   order	   to	   increase	   transparency,	   and	   thus	   market	   discipline,	   in	  relationships	   between	   Italian	   listed	   companies	   and	   foreign	   companies	   having	  their	   registered	   office	   in	   a	   country	   whose	   legal	   system	   does	   not	   ensure	  transparency.679 	  The	   same	   provisions	   also	   apply	   to	   Italian	   companies	   with	  financial	  instruments	  widely	  distributed	  among	  the	  public	  and	  affiliated	  with	  or	  controlled	  by	  such	  foreign	  companies.	  Pursuant	  to	  Articles	  165ter–165septies	  of	  the	  Italian	  Financial	  Consolidated	  Act,	  Italian	  listed	  companies	  linked,	  controlled	  or	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  ‘foreign	  non	   transparent	   companies’,	   for	   example	   SWFs,	   should	   attach	   to	   their	   Annual	  Report	  a	  Relation,	  signed	  by	  CEO	  and	  CFO,	   illustrating	  the	  relationship	  existing	  with	  the	  ‘foreign	  non	  transparent	  companies’.	  The	  Italian	  Securities	  Commission	  is	   entrusted	   with	   significant	   supervision	   and	   on-­‐site	   inspection	   powers,	   while	  relevant	  countries	  are	  identified	  in	  joint	  decrees	  issued	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	   the	  Economy	  and	  Finance	  (using	  criteria	   listed	   in	   the	  same	  Italian	  Financial	  Consolidated	  Act).	  In	   order	   to	   prevent	   jurisdiction	   shopping	   by	   SWFs,	   where	   state	   investors	  would	   select	   as	   targets	   the	   jurisdictions	   that	   are	   more	   favourable	   to	   them,	  reporting	   requirements	   could	   be	   implemented	   on	   a	   global	   basis.	   A	   number	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  676	  Amy	  Keller,	  ‘SWFs:	  Trustworthy	  Investors	  or	  Vehicles	  of	  Strategic	  Ambition?’	  (2008)	  Vol	  7(1)	  GJLPP	  51.	  677	  Mezzacapo	  (n	  422)	  45.	  678	  Legislative	  Decree	  n.	  58	  of	  24	  February	  1998.	  679	  Meaning	  transparency	  as	  to	  their	  establishment,	  assets	  and	  liabilities,	  and	  operations.	  
Regulation	  of	  SWFs:	  The	  Avoidance	  of	  Investment	  Protectionism	  
	   171	  
international	   organisations	   could	   be	   considered	   to	   host	   such	   an	   enterprise,	  although	   it	   is	   argued	   by	  Mattoo	   and	   Subramanian	   that	   the	  WTO	  would	   be	   the	  ‘natural’	   place	   to	   strike	   a	   bargain	   between	   countries	   with	   SWFs	   which	   want	  secure	   and	   liberal	   access	   for	   their	   capital,	   and	   capital-­‐importing	   countries	   that	  have	   concerns	   about	   the	   objectives	   and	   operations	   of	   SWFs.	   According	   to	   the	  authors,	  such	  a	  bargain	  would	  necessarily	  involve	  greater	  transparency	  by	  SWFs	  and	  channelling	   investment	   through	   independent	  asset	  managers,	   in	  return	   for	  access	   for	   SWF	   investors	   to	  western	  markets.	   The	  model	   for	   the	   transparency	  requirement	   could	   be	   the	   disclosure	   requirements	   of	   the	   OECD’s	   principles	   of	  corporate	  governance.680	  	  
iv. Self-­‐regulation	  	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  SWFs,	  the	  idea	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  has	  not	  received	  wide	  support	  in	  the	  literature.	  It	  seems	  that	  most	  commentators	  did	  not	  trust	   that,	   left	   to	   themselves,	   SWFs	   would	   produce	   a	   reliable	   regulatory	  framework	  to	  address	  the	  perceived	  costs	  raised	  by	  the	  activity	  of	  SWFs.681	  The	  model	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  was,	  nevertheless,	  the	  one	  opted	  for	  by	  the	  IMF	  during	  the	   IWG	  which	   culminated	   in	   the	   ‘Generally	  Accepted	  Principles	   and	  Practices’	  (GAPP)	  and	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  6.	  To	  this	  day,	  GAPP,	  or	  the	  ‘Santiago	  Principles’	  as	  they	  are	  often	  called,	  offer	  possibly	  the	  most	  effective	  route	   towards	   reducing	   the	   costs	   due	   to	   SWFs	   and	   silencing	   their	   critics,	   and	  together,	  reducing	  protectionist	  pressures.	  	  The	  categorisation	  above	  of	  the	  most	  commonly	  proposed	  regulatory	  models	  has	  offered	  a	  platform	  of	  analysis	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	   real	   issues	   that	   surround	  SWFs,	   namely	   their	   benefits	   and	   concerns	   about	   them.	   The	   analysis	   below	  focuses	   on	   the	   theoretical	   aspects	   of	   the	   above	   models,	   but	   also	   aspects	  pertaining	  to	  the	  implementation	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  each	  system.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  680	  Aaditya	  Mattoo	  and	  Arvind	  Subramanian,	  ‘Currency	  Undervaluation	  and	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  A	  New	  Role	  for	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization’	  (2008)	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  
Economics,	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  08-­‐02,	  16;	  For	  the	  OECD’s	  principles,	  see	  n	  1066.	  681	  See	  table	  6.1	  above.	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3.	  Analysis	  	  The	  basic	  problem	   identified	   in	   the	  abovementioned	  proposals	   is	   that	   they	  appear	  to	  be	  overshooting	  the	  mark.	  Nearly	  all	  of	  these	  proposals	  are	  based	  on	  the	  misguided	  premise	  that	  regulation	  is	  necessary	  to	  preserve	  national	  security	  and	   other	   interests,	   while	   the	   conclusions	   from	   chapter	   3	   show	   that	   such	  intervention	  is	  not	  necessary.682	  In	  addition,	  each	  of	  those	  proposals	   is	   likely	  to	  impose	   extra	  burdens	  upon	  SWFs	  which	  might	   incite	   them	   to	   seek	   investment	  opportunities	   elsewhere,	  where	   they	  will	   not	   face	   protectionism.683	  Thus,	   such	  models	  can	  result	  in	  being	  more	  economically	  injurious	  than	  beneficial.	  Moreover,	  imposing	  additional	  burdens	  against	  foreign	  funds	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  state	  ownership	  appears	  discriminatory	  and	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  state-­‐owned	  actors	  can	  behave	  like	  model	  investors	  in	  global	  markets.	  Finally,	  some	  of	  the	   measures	   contemplated	   are	   too	   severe	   on	   those	   SWFs	   that	   have	   already	  implemented	   high	   transparency	   standards,	   such	   as	   the	   Norwegian	   and	   USA	  funds,684	  and	  may	  even	  discourage	  others	   from	  making	  similar	  progress.	  These	  difficulties	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  below.	  	  
i. Theory	  	   The	  first	  ground	  for	  criticising	  the	  above	  models	  is	  that,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   the	   self-­‐regulatory	   model,	   they	   cannot	   avoid	   being	   labelled	   as	   overtly	  protectionist.	   In	   the	  words	  of	  Matoo	   and	  Subramanian,	   ‘unilateral	   action	   could	  easily	   acquire	   a	   protectionist	   slant,	   especially	   if	   protectionists	   articulate	   their	  concerns	   in	   the	   language	   of	   national	   security	   as	   happened	   in	   the	   aborted	  acquisition	  effort	  by	  DPW	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Chinese	  SOE,	  CNOOC.685	  This	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  682	  Although	  it	  may	  still	  serve	  a	  useful	  purpose	  in	  satisfying	  critics	  and	  general	  consumer	  demand	  for	  a	  risk	  free	  economic	  environment.	  683	  See	  above	  the	  case	  of	  Chinese	  funds,	  n	  363.	  684	  See	  table	  1.3	  at	  chapter	  1.	  685	  Mattoo	  and	  Subramanian	  (n	  680)	  16.	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objection	  could	  form	  a	  preliminary	  basis	  for	  rejecting	  most	  of	  the	  above	  models.	  In	  practice,	  any	  measure	  that	  aims	  at	  screening	  FDI	  on	  national	  security	  or	  any	  other	   grounds	   (even	   those	   justified)	   involves	   some	   degree	   of	   protectionism.	  However,	  the	  above	  models	  appear	  to	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	  specific	   national	   interests.	   As	   shown	   in	   chapter	   3,	  most	   of	   the	   concerns	   about	  SWFs,	   which	   prompted	   the	   above	   regulatory	   models,	   are	   either	   theoretical,	  exaggerated	   or	   completely	   unfounded	   and	   thus	   do	   not	   need	   addressing	   with	  hard-­‐line	  legislative	  measures.	  	  Garten’s	   model	   (setting	   investment	   caps)	   has	   been	   met	   with	   fierce	  opposition	   in	  The	  Economist.	   In	   its	   criticism,	  The	  Economist	   described	  Garten’s	  view	  as	  ‘outrageous’	  and	  said	  that	  he	  fails	  to	  explain	  ‘how	  any	  of	  this	  would	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  which	  SWFs	  might	  want	  to	  put	  their	  money’.686	  It	  was,	   moreover,	   argued	   that	   there	   are	   better	   ways	   of	   managing	   risk.	   If	   for	  example,	   the	  government	  of	  North	  Korea	  were	   in	  a	  position	  to	   lay	   its	  hands	  on	  vital	   defence-­‐related	   technology	   by	   buying	   British	   Aerospace,	   say,	   that	   would,	  indeed,	   be	   a	   worrisome	   development.	   But	   the	   danger	   could	   be	   prevented	   ‘by	  making	  any	   such	   takeover	   subject	   to	  a	  national-­‐security	  veto’,	   as	  would	  be	   the	  case	   in	   the	  USA.687	  Following	   this	  article,	  and	  during	   the	   financial	  crisis,	  Garten	  himself	  retreated	  from	  his	  position,	  stating	  that	  he	  had	  ‘misjudged	  the	  context	  of	  global	  capital	  flows	  in	  the	  last	  half	  of	  this	  decade’	  and	  that	  ‘we	  should	  be	  careful	  not	   to	   discriminate	   against	   SWFs,	   especially	   as	   compared	  with	   other	   investors	  such	  as	  private	  equity,	  hedge	  funds	  and	  corporations’.688	  Although	  Buiter’s	  model	  (allowing	  SWFs	  to	  invest	  only	  in	  non-­‐voting	  equity)	  falls	   in	   a	   different	   category	   from	   Garten’s,	   he	  makes	   a	   similar	   mistake.	   It	   is	   a	  common	  practice,	  when	  discussing	  SWFs,	   to	  concentrate	  on	  extreme	  scenarios,	  such	   as	   that	   of	   a	   Chinese	   or	   Russian	   SWF	   taking	   over	   a	   controlling	   stake	   in	   a	  sensitive	  western	  company.	  This	  practice	  excludes	  from	  consideration	  the	  usual	  investment	  practices	  of	  SWFs	  dating	  back	  many	  years,	  and	   lacks	  an	  analysis	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  686	  Economist	  staff,	  ‘Fear	  of	  Foreigners’,	  Economist	  (London,	  14	  August	  2007)	  <www.economist.com/node/9641906>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  687	  ibid.	  688	  Jeffrey	  Garten,	  ‘Keep	  Your	  Rich	  Rivals	  Close’	  Newsweek	  (New	  York,	  9	  August	  2008)	  <www.newsweek.com/2008/08/08/keep-­‐your-­‐rich-­‐rivals-­‐close.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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the	  likelihood	  of	  such	  a	  scenario	  materialising.689	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  essential	  analysis,	  such	  scenarios	  cannot	  be	  granted	  much	  credibility.	  The	  essence	  of	  Buiter’s	  suggestion,	  i.e.	  stripping	  SWFs	  of	  voting	  power,	  also	  appears	   in	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt’s	  model	  on	  how	   to	  deal	  with	  SWFs.	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt,	   however,	   offer	   a	  more	   complete	   proposal	   than	  Buiter	   in	   this	   regard,	  and	   therefore	   merit	   a	   greater	   level	   of	   scrutiny.	   Gilson	   and	   Milhaupt	   do	   not	  consider	   their	   proposal	   ‘protectionist’.	   In	   their	   view,	   a	   protectionist	   measure	  would	   be	   one	   designed	   to	   protect	   domestic	   companies’	   commercial	   interests,	  whereas	  their	  proposal	  ‘would	  not	  lower	  investment	  values	  for	  foreign	  investors	  on	   account	   of	   their	   nationality	   or	   sovereign	   affiliation	   per	   se.’690	  Gilson	   and	  Milhaupt	   believe	   that	   the	   absolute	   value	   of	   the	   investments	   (and	   thus	   their	  attractiveness)	  will	   remain	  unaffected	  by	   their	  proposal.	  However,	   it	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  that	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  a	  non-­‐voting	  share	  will	  remain	  the	  same	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   sovereign	   investors,691	  or	   that	   the	   overall	   value	   of	   a	   share	   will	   not	  decrease	   (even	   very	  modestly)	   if	   demand	  by	   SWFs	  drops.	   In	   any	   event,	   Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt’s	  argument	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  stretch	  the	  analysis	  of	  their	  model	  to	  bypass	  the	   ‘protectionism’	   label.	   It	   is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  removing	  an	  important	   privilege	   from	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   foreign	   investor	   can	   escape	   the	  characterisation	   of	   ‘protectionism’.	   In	   addition,	   Gilson	   and	  Milhaupt’s	   proposal	  appears	  to	  discriminate	  against	  sovereign	  investors	  by	  removing	  a	  fundamental	  proprietary	   right	   (of	   the	   voting	   right	   attached	   to	   each	   share)	   for	   a	   weak	  justification,	   which	   is	   to	   protect	   ‘market	   based	   capitalism	   against	   mercantilist	  regimes’.692	  Their	   justification,	   therefore,	   appears	   to	   be	   based	   primarily	   on	   the	  ideological	  premise	  that	  state	  capitalism	  is	  inherently	  problematic.	  A	   similar	   inclination	   to	   that	   of	   Gilson	   and	   Milhaupt’s	   is	   also	   evident	   in	  Fleischer’s	  proposal	  (a	  fact	  which	  reinforces	  the	  reasons	  for	  including	  these	  two	  models	   in	   the	   same	   category).	   Fleisher	   argues	   that	   ‘a	   tax	   on	   sovereign	  wealth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  689	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  2	  and	  3,	  SWFs	  never	  follow	  such	  investment	  practices	  when	  they	  invest	  in	  western	  companies;	  neither	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  690	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  11.	  691	  Principle	  No	  21	  of	  GAPP	  states	  that	  ‘SWFs	  view	  shareholder	  ownership	  rights	  as	  a	  fundamental	  element	  of	  their	  equity	  investments’	  value’,	  IWG,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  -­‐	  Generally	  Accepted	  Principles	  and	  Practices’	  (2008)	  
International	  Working	  Group	  on	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds,	  IMF	  <www.iwg-­‐swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  January	  2013.	  692	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  10.	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could	   help	   encourage	   a	   broader	   policy	   of	   supporting	   private	   investment	   over	  state-­‐controlled	   investment’.693	  This	   stance	   is	  a	   clear	  example	  of	   the	  challenges	  to	  western	  notions	  of	  capitalism	  posed	  by	  SWFs	  to	  which	  reference	  was	  made	  in	  chapter	  3.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  should	  be	  said	  that	  while	  taxing	  and	  removing	  voting	  rights	   from	  SWFs	  appears	   to	   ‘incentivise’	   them	  to	  operate	  differently,	   in	  reality	  what	   both	   theories	   suggest	   is	   to	  maintain	   the	   restrictions	   for	   as	   long	   as	   SWFs	  hold	  domestic	  securities	  or	  to	  tax	  them	  simply	  for	  their	  presence	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	   There	   is	   not	  much	   SWFs	   can	  do	   to	   remove	   those	   restrictions	   or	   avoid	  being	  taxed,	  other	  than	  abandon	  the	  market	  alltogether.694	  Finally,	   the	   issue	   of	   discrimination	   equally	   arises	   with	   relation	   to	   the	  command	  and	  control	  regulatory	  proposals,	  specifically	  those	  by	  Truman,	  Garten	  and	   Mezzacapo,	   advocating	   mandatory	   reporting	   requirements	   (which	   also	  involve	  placing	  sovereign	  investors	  at	  a	  serious	  competitive	  disadvantage).	  The	   chapter	   now	   turns	   to	   analyse	   problems	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  implementations	  of	  the	  regulatory	  proposals.	  	  
ii. Implementation	  	   The	   second	   of	   this	   three-­‐part	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   implementation	   of	   the	  above	   proposals.	   It	   is	   shown	   that	   many	   of	   them	   involve	   important,	   if	   not	  insurmountable,	  difficulties,	  and	  as	  such	  do	  not	  represent	  a	  reliable	  solution	  to	  the	  concerns	  about	  SWFs.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  first	  category	  of	  proposals,	  namely	  restricting	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs,	  is	  thwarted	  by	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  identify	  an	  investor	  or	  a	  fund	  that	  should	  be	  subjected	  to	  such	  restrictions.	  This	  is	  a	  controversial	  and	  multifaceted	  issue	  (see	  discussion	  at	  176-­‐177).	  Furthermore,	  some	  host	  country	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  693	  Fleischer	  (n	  663)	  55.	  	  694	  If	  a	  restriction	  or	  tax	  was	  implemented	  as	  a	  penalty	  for	  their	  opacity,	  all	  SWFs	  would	  have	  to	  do	  to	  regain	  their	  voting	  rights	  or	  avoid	  a	  tax	  would	  be	  to	  become	  more	  transparent.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  required	  of	  them,	  rather	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  and	  Fleischer	  believe	  this	  restriction	  should	  be	  implemented	  for	  as	  long	  as	  they	  exist.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  ‘special	  tax’	  would	  incentivise	  the	  countries	  managing	  them	  to	  ‘stop	  threatening	  USA	  national	  economic	  interests’,	  or	  ‘cease	  to	  be	  autocratic’.	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corporations	   and	   pension	   funds	   may	   be	   as	   averse	   to	   such	   limitations	   on	   the	  SWFs	  as	  the	  SWFs	  themselves.695	  First,	   restricting	   SWFs	   (either	   by	   imposing	   investment	   caps	   or	   excluding	  various	  sectors	  from	  their	  ambit)	  would	  run	  into	  difficulties	  if	  applied	  in	  the	  EU.	  Under	   the	   Treaty	   on	   the	   Functioning	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (TFEU),	   capital	  movements	   from	   third	   (non-­‐EU)	   countries	   into	   the	   EU	   may	   not	   be	   hindered,	  otherwise	  they	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  contravening	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaty.696	  So	  far	  no	  judgment	  has	  been	  delivered	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (CJEU,	  formerly	  ‘European	  Court	  of	  Justice’)	  involving	  investments	  by	  SWFs,	  but	  the	   existing	   case-­‐law	   is	   sufficient	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   roadmap	   for	   most	   types	   of	  investments,	  including	  those	  of	  SWFs.	  According	  to	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court,	  FDI	  may	  be	  screened,	  or	  hindered,	  only	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  a	  fundamental	   national	   interest,	   such	   as	   national	   security	   or	   the	   provision	   of	   a	  universal	   service	   (water,	   electricity	   etc.). 697 	  These	   provisions	   must	   also	   be	  specific	   and	   proportional	   to	   the	   threat	   encountered	   and	  must	   not	   intrude	   into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  autonomy	  of	  the	  undertakings	  concerned.698	  In	  light	  of	  this	  provision,	  most	  of	   the	  proposed	  regulatory	   frameworks,	  such	  as	  Garten’s	  share	  limitation	  model,	  Buiter’s,	  and	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt’s	  restriction	  of	  voting	  rights	  and	   Fleischer’s	   tax	   model	   (and	   in	   some	   cases	   even	   Truman’s	   reporting	  requirements	   model)	   would	   risk	   contravening	   EU	   law	   as	   they	   would	   fail	   to	  demonstrate	   how	   SWFs	   can	   present	   an	   imminent	   and	   specific	   threat	   to	   the	  national	  security	  of	  the	  recipient	  countries.	  As	  such,	  they	  would	  be	  struck	  down	  by	  the	  EU	  Courts.699	  Since	  some	  of	  those	  models	  support	  restriction	  of	  FDI	  in	  particular	  sectors,	  a	  serious	   obstacle	   in	   their	   implementation	   would	   be	   identifying	   those	   ‘strategic	  sectors’	  that	  warrant	  special	  protection.	  It	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  adopt	  in	  the	  EU	  context	  a	  uniform	  framework	  establishing	  which	  industries	  are	  ‘strategic’	  and	  which	  are	  not.	  In	  carrying	  out	  such	  an	  enterprise,	  each	  Member	  State	  would	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  695	  Das	  (n	  649)	  99.	  696	  See	  the	  discussion	  at	  chapter	  5,	  n	  739	  onwards.	  697	  n	  752.	  698	  ibid.	  699	  The	  reach	  of	  the	  prohibition	  as	  well	  as	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  case	  law	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs	  is	  discussed	  at	  199	  onwards.	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bound	   by	   its	   own	   interests	   and	   beliefs	   and	   by	   its	   own	   special	   circumstances,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  identify	  those	  sectors	  or	  sub-­‐sectors	  of	  a	  strategic	  value	  to	  every	  member	  state.	  The	  fact	  that,	  in	  2005,	  France	  included	  ‘casinos’	  in	  its	  list	  of	  strategic	   industries	  as	  being	   ‘directly	  or	   indirectly	   linked	  to	  matters	  of	  national	  security’,700	  is	   only	   demonstrative	   of	   the	   difficulties	   awaiting	   the	   EU	   regulator	  faced	  with	  the	  task	  of	  formulating	  an	  EU-­‐wide	  list.	  Such	  an	  enterprise	  might	  also	  invite	  considerable	  public	  interest	  and	  render	  policymakers	  sensitive	  to	  populist	  arguments	   or	   subject	   them	   to	   special	   interests	   when	   determining	   strategic	  industries.701	  In	   its	  capital	  movement	  case	   law,702	  the	  CJEU	  has	  given	  directions	  as	   to	   what	   activity	   constitutes	   a	   strategic	   interest	   (which	   would	   in	   any	   event	  exclude	  sectors	  as	  obviously	  not	  strategic	  as	  ‘casinos’)	  but	  they	  still	  remain	  very	  broad	   and,	  more	   importantly,	   they	   do	   not	   give	   sufficient	   directions	   as	   to	  what	  specific	  parts	  of	  a	  sector	  are	  strategic	  and	  what	  not.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  Court	  may	  consider	   Telecoms	   as	   a	   ‘strategic’	   industry,703	  although	   the	   Commission	  might	  not	   classify	   an	   entire	   national	   telecoms	   industry	   as	   strategic,	   but	   rather	   only	  specific	  parts	  of	  it.	  A	  similar,	  if	  not	  more	  difficult,	  task	  would	  consist	  in	  identifying	  those	  funds	  that	   should	   be	   subject	   to	   reporting	   requirements.704	  First,	   a	   number	   of	   high	  profile	   SWFs	   would	   refuse	   to	   be	   characterised	   as	   one	   of	   these.705	  Thus	   each	  country	  would	   be	   faced	  with	   the	   task	   of	   unilaterally	   picking	   the	   specific	   funds	  that	  must	   disclose	  more	   information	  without	   driving	   those	   funds’	   investments	  away	  to	  other	  countries.	  To	  ensure	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  among	  all	  countries	  concerned,	  a	  global	  list	  of	  SWFs	  could	  be	  agreed	  multilaterally,	  possibly	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  WTO,	  as	  suggested	   by	   Mattoo	   and	   Subramanian.706	  Indeed,	   a	   level	   playing	   field	   would	  prevent	   two	   types	   of	   harms:	   firstly,	   it	   would	   prevent	   the	   reduction	   of	   FDI	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  700	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘France	  Under	  Fire	  for	  Protectionist	  Initiative’	  Euractiv	  (Brussels,	  2	  September	  2005)	  <www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/france-­‐fire-­‐protectionist-­‐initiative/article-­‐143656>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  701	  Certain	  industries	  might,	  for	  example,	  make	  use	  of	  lobbying	  in	  order	  to	  be	  included	  in	  such	  a	  category.	  702	  See	  n	  739	  onwards.	  703	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  71,	  n	  749.	  704	  No	  universally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  SWF	  exists	  to	  this	  day.	  705	  Such	  examples	  include	  China’s	  SAFE,	  and	  Singapore’s	  Temasek,	  see	  chapter	  1,	  n	  44,	  45.	  706	  Mattoo	  and	  Subramanian	  (n	  680).	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countries	  that	  implement	  stricter	  reporting	  requirements	  and,	  secondly,	  it	  would	  prevent	  the	  exploitation	  by	  SWFs	  of	  poorer	  underdeveloped	  countries	  in	  urgent	  need	  of	  foreign	  capital	  that	  are	  unable	  to	  screen	  FDI,	  let	  alone	  impose	  reporting	  requirements	   upon	   them.707 	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   an	   international	  institution	   could	   force	   a	  member	   to	   subject	   its	   state-­‐owned	   funds	   to	   reporting	  requirements,	  or	  even	   force	   it	   to	  recognise	   that	   it	  possesses	  such	  a	   fund	   in	   the	  first	   place. 708 	  The	   failed	   outcome	   of	   the	   negotiations	   for	   a	   Multilateral	  Investment	  Agreement	   (MIA)	   in	  1998709	  under	   the	  auspices	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	   the	   OECD,	   and	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  WTO	   to	   include	   investment	   issues	   in	   its	  mandate	   in	   1994	   are	   sufficiently	   paradigmatic	   of	   the	   difficulties	   of	   such	   an	  endeavour.710	  Nevertheless,	  even	  assuming	  that	  a	  list	  of	  the	  world’s	  SWFs	  was	  universally	  accepted,	  the	  road	  would	  still	  be	  open	  for	  governments	  to	  modify	  the	  structure	  and	  arrangement	  of	  state	  entities	  in	  order	  to	  circumvent	  the	  regulatory	  regime.	  In	  some	  cases,	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  or	  even	  the	  ruler’s	  private	  wealth	  could	  be	  used	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  same	  activities	  as	  SWFs	  do	  today.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  models	  suggested	  by	  Truman,	  Garten	  and	  Mezzacapo	  appear	  extremely	  time	  consuming	  and	  ultimately	  unworkable.	  Fleischer’s	  taxing	  model	  appears	  less	  difficult	  to	  implement,	  but	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	   tax	   policy	   can	   identify	   the	   appropriate	   tax	   to	   compensate	   for	   risks	   to	  national	   security.	   Tax	   authorities	   are	   hardly	   the	   appropriate	   bodies	   to	   protect	  national	   security	   and	   set	   foreign	   policy	   –	   how	   is	   a	   tax	   official	   supposed	   to	  calculate	  and	  impose	  a	  tax	  to	  compensate	   for	  the	  cost	  of	   ‘threatening	  American	  national	  interests’	  or	  ‘supporting	  autocratic	  regimes’?711	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  707	  In	  such	  a	  case	  the	  WTO’s	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanism	  would	  ensure	  that	  countries	  with	  SWFs	  respect	  the	  established	  rules,	  Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  WTO,	  15	  Apr	  1994,	  33	  I.L.M.	  1144,	  <www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-­‐wto.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  October	  2012,	  establishing	  the	  WTO’s	  structure	  and	  relations	  among	  its	  members.	  708	  For	  example	  Saudi	  Arabia	  does	  not	  accept	  that	  it	  manages	  such	  a	  fund,	  see	  chapter	  1,	  n	  43.	  709	  MIA	  purported	  to	  develop	  multilateral	  rules	  that	  would	  ensure	  intra-­‐state	  investment	  was	  governed	  in	  a	  more	  systematic	  and	  uniform	  way.	  Despite	  the	  considerable	  areas	  of	  consent,	  this	  enterprise	  came	  to	  a	  halt	  because	  of	  insurmountable	  disagreements,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘exception	  
culturelle’	  maintained	  by	  France	  and	  Canada	  in	  support	  of	  French	  culture,	  Jean-­‐Rodolphe	  Fiechter,	  ‘The	  French	  Strategic	  Investment	  Fund:	  A	  Creative	  Approach	  to	  Complement	  SWF	  Regulation	  or	  Mere	  Protectionism?’	  (2010)	  Vol	  3	  JApplEcon	  67.	  	  710	  ibid.	  711	  See	  above,	  footnote	  669.	  
Regulation	  of	  SWFs:	  The	  Avoidance	  of	  Investment	  Protectionism	  
	   179	  
Finally,	   as	   regards	   the	   application	   of	   investment	   screening	   mechanisms,	  there	  remains	  a	  risk	  of	  politicisation,	  where	  political	  representatives	  attempt	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  its	  work,	  or	  where	  the	  officials	  tasked	  with	  its	  execution	  are	  responsive	  to	  political	  considerations	  beyond	  those	  inherent	  in	  the	  object	  of	  their	   work.	   Additionally,	   politicisation	   of	   the	   process	   might	   also	   result	   from	  private	  activities	  (where	  the	  target	  company	  favours	  one	  investor	  over	  another).	  Such	   a	   risk	   is	   especially	   present	   in	   Fleischer’s	   model,	   which	   involves	   value	  judgments	   by	   a	   governmental	   authority,	   but	   also	   arises	   in	   Garten	   and	   Davis’s	  model	  which	  restricts	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs	  or	  excludes	  certain	  sectors	  from	  the	  ambit	  of	  their	  investments.712	  Finally,	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   proposals	   as	   to	   reporting	  requirements	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  information	  disclosed	  will	  be	  available	  only	  to	  regulators	  or	  disseminated	  to	  the	  public	  in	  the	  form	  of	  corporate	  reports.	  Although	   it	   is	  not	   always	   specified	   in	   the	  proposals,	   it	   is	  necessary	   for	   it	   to	  be	  made	   clear,	   as	   each	   option	   would	   entail	   different	   consequences.	   If	   the	  information	  as	  to	  size,	  holdings,	  structure	  and	  investment	  strategies	  is	  available	  to	   the	   public	   at	   large,	   then	   SWFs	   may	   become	   popular	   targets	   and	   their	  investment	  strategies	  may	  be	  exploited	  by	  their	  competitors.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  such	  information	  is	  disclosed	  confidentially	  only	  to	  regulators,	  then	  safeguards	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  avoid	  the	  leaking	  of	  information	  to	  competitors.713	  	  
iii. Costs	  	   The	   final	   part	   of	   the	   analysis	   discusses	   the	   potential	   costs	   of	   each	   system.	  These	  may	  differ	  greatly,	  but	   they	  also	  depend	  on	   the	   special	   circumstances	  of	  each	  country.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  Dubai	  Ports	  case,	  the	  argument	  was	  used	  that	  such	  a	  deal	  might	  facilitate	  the	  smuggling	  of	  terrorists	  into	  the	  USA	  from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  712	  This	  risk	  becomes	  more	  serious	  if	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  the	  CJEU	  has	  required	  that	  the	  screening	  of	  foreign	  investments	  is	  done	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  clear	  and	  objective	  criteria,	  reviewable	  by	  national	  courts,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  its	  abusive	  application	  by	  national	  governments,	  
Commission	  v	  France,	  n	  747.	  713	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  of	  a	  hedge	  fund	  named	  Amaranth.	  In	  this	  case,	  position	  transparency	  enabled	  prime	  brokers	  (or	  their	  proprietary	  trading	  desks)	  to	  use	  this	  information	  to	  their	  advantage,	  Michael	  King	  and	  Philipp	  Maier,	  ‘Hedge	  funds	  and	  Financial	  Stability:	  Regulating	  Prime	  Brokers	  Will	  Mitigate	  Systemic	  Risks’	  (2009)	  Vol	  5(3)	  JFStabil	  293. 
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Middle	   East.714	  Concerns	   about	   terrorism,	   however,	   are	   not	   identical	   for	   all	  countries	   that	   receive	   SWF	   investments.	   This	   fact	   must	   be	   considered	   when	  assessing	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  a	  model,	  when	  applied	  in	  different	  countries.	  If	   the	   USA	   is	   a	   far	   more	   popular	   destination	   for	   foreign	   capital	   than	   other	  recipient	  countries,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  a	  small	  part	  of	  this	  in	  order	  to	   maintain	   national	   security	   safeguards.	   In	   contrast,	   FDI	   in	   Greece,	   Portugal,	  Spain	   and	   Ireland	  might	   have	   a	   higher	   value	   during	   the	   debt	   crises	   currently	  facing	  these	  countries,715	  and	  thus	  the	  cost	  of	  hindering	  foreign	  capital	  might	  be	  higher	  for	  them	  than	  for	  Switzerland	  or	  Estonia.716	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  costs	  (or	  benefits)	  of	  each	  regulatory	  model	  are	  determined	  by	  circumstances	  which	  are	  better	  assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐study	  basis.717	  Any	   national	   authority	   contemplating	   establishing	   a	   regulatory	   framework	  for	  SWF	  should	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  (CBA).	  According	  to	  Alfon	  and	  Andrews,	  a	  regulator	  that	  does	  not	  use	  CBA	  to	  formulate	  new	  policy	  or	  to	  check	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  specific	  measures	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  delivering	  an	  output	  that	   may	   reflect	   the	   given	   objectives	   but	  may	   lead	   to	   unintended	   inefficiency,	  since	  not	  all	   relevant	   factors	  will	  be	   taken	   into	  account.718	  Thus,	   for	  example,	  a	  regulator	   who	   curtails	   the	   freedom	   of	   banks	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   greater	  systemic	   safety,	   without	   considering	   the	   wider	   implications	   of	   the	   measure	  taken,	   runs	   a	   greater	   risk	   of	   imposing	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   a	   lack	   of	  innovation	  and	  investment.719	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  CBA	  is	  the	  description	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  world	  as	  it	  would	  be	  if	  a	  proposed	  option	   were	   adopted	   and	   the	   situation	   if	   it	   were	   not	   adopted.	   CBA	   therefore	  focuses	   on	   the	   incremental	   impact	   of	   the	   proposed	   options	   (including	   the	   ‘do	  nothing	  option’).720	  According	  to	  Alfon	  and	  Andrews,	  the	  cost	  of	  no	  action	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  714	  Levin	  (n	  449).	  715	  n	  375,	  552.	  716	  Estonia	  has	  a	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  of	  9.6%,	  the	  lowest	  in	  the	  Eurozone,	  Juhan	  Tere,	  ‘EU’s	  Least-­‐Indebted	  State	  Estonia	  Is	  Model	  for	  Euro	  After	  Greek	  Crisis’,	  The	  Baltic	  
Course	  (Tallinn,	  11	  May	  2010)	  <www.baltic-­‐course.com/eng/analytics/?doc=26735&ins_print>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  717	  The	  special	  circumstances	  of	  specific	  case	  studies	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  718	  Isaac	  Alfon	  and	  Peter	  Andrews,	  ‘Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  in	  Financial	  Regulation	  –	  How	  to	  do	  it	  and	  how	  it	  adds	  value’	  (1999)	  Occasional	  Paper	  Series	  3	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  9.	  719	  ibid.	  720	  ibid.	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wider	  financial	  sector	  could	  be	  big:	  a	  complete	  market	  failure,	  while	  the	  indirect	  costs	   (negative	   market	   impact)	   are	   those	   that	   are	   least	   obvious	   from	   a	   cash	  perspective.721	  On	  the	  subject	  of	  regulation	  of	  SWFs,	  the	  option	  of	  no	  action	  will	  hardly	   result	   in	  a	  complete	  market	  breakdown	  or	  a	   threat	   to	  national	   security.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  indirect	  costs	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  strict	  regulation	  of	  FDI	  warrant	  more	  attention	  and	  analysis.722	  At	  the	  present	  time	  there	  are	  sufficient	  indications	  of	  the	  types	  of	  costs	  that	  may	  ensue	   if	   governments	  give	  way	   to	  protectionist	   calls	   and	  adopt	   legislation	  restricting	   SWFs.	   Bloomberg	   and	   Schumer	   have	   cited	   the	   example	   of	   the	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  Act	  2002	  in	  the	  USA	  –	  shortly	  after	  its	  passing,	  there	  were	  signs	  of	  investment	  shifts	  towards	  Europe	  and	  Asia.723	  While	  discussing	  protectionism	  (see	  above),	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  Chinese	  funds	  have	  proved	  that	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	   seek	   investment	   opportunities	   elsewhere	   if	   faced	   with	   a	   protectionist	  backlash,	  even	  before	  the	  adoption	  of	  concrete	  legislation.724	  Such	  behaviour	  was	  in	   line	   with	   previous	   statements	   by	   Chinese	   officials	   that	   they	   will	   avoid	  investing	   in	   countries	   that	   use	   national	   security	   as	   an	   excuse	   for	  protectionism.725	  Moreover,	   as	   already	   explained,	   the	   protectionist	   outlook	   of	  many	   western	   countries	   in	   the	   energy	   sector	   may	   be	   hindering	   India	   from	  creating	  a	  SWF	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  thus	  further	  reducing	  global	  liquidity.726	  Such	  a	  fund	   would	   aim	   to	   direct	   its	   investments	   in	   the	   western	   energy	   sector	   to	  complement	   India’s	   lack	  of	  natural	   resources,	  but	  such	  a	  move	  would	  certainly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  721	  ibid	  18.	  722	  Some	  prefer	  to	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘type	  I	  and	  type	  II	  errors’	  or	  ‘false	  positives	  and	  false	  negatives’.	  The	  first	  case	  consists	  in	  prohibiting	  conduct	  that	  should	  be	  allowed,	  while	  the	  second	  consists	  in	  allowing	  conduct	  that	  should	  be	  prohibited.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  SWFs	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  speak	  of	  CBA	  rather	  than	  type	  I	  and	  type	  II	  errors	  since	  the	  CBA	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  concrete	  identification	  of	  actual	  costs.	  723	  ‘Over	  the	  first	  ten	  months	  of	  2006,	  [USA]	  exchanges	  attracted	  barely	  one	  third	  of	  the	  share	  of	  IPOs	  measured	  by	  market	  value	  that	  they	  captured	  back	  in	  2001,	  while	  European	  exchanges	  increased	  market	  share	  by	  30	  percent	  and	  Asian	  exchanges	  doubled	  their	  share’,	  Michael	  Bloomberg	  and	  Charles	  Schumer,	  ‘Sustaining	  New	  York’s	  and	  the	  US’	  Global	  Financial	  Services	  Leadership’	  (2007)	  New	  York	  City	  12,	  <www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  724	  n	  363.	  725	  Leonora	  Walet,	  ‘CIC	  Warns	  Western	  Governments	  Against	  Protectionism–Report’	  Forbes	  (New	  York,	  10	  December	  2007)	  <www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/	  2007/12/10/afx4424545.html>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  726	  n	  565.	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raise	   suspicions	   and	   eventually	   face	   the	   resistance	   of	  western	   governments.727	  Even	  when	  investments	  are	  not	  met	  with	  resistance	  by	  national	  administrations,	  the	  highly	  heterogeneous	  standards	  of	  foreign	  investment	  regulations	  set	  up	  by	  different	  governments	  can	  still	  inflict	  considerable	  costs	  of	  compliance	  on	  SWFs	  and	  hence	  affect	  the	  efficient	  flow	  of	  capital.728	  It	  thus	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  each	  of	  the	  above	  regulatory	  models	  (perhaps	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   self-­‐regulation)	   imposes	   significant	   costs	   on	   the	   system,	  the	   extent	   of	   which	   depends	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   each	   model	   and	   its	   degree	   of	  protectionism.	  These	  costs	  can	  ultimately	  defeat	  the	  very	  rationale	  for	  adopting	  each	  of	   the	  above	  models,	  which	   is	   to	  rectify	  other	  costs	  associated	  with	  SWFs,	  such	  as	  political	  extortion,	  systemic	  instability	  and/or	  investor	  uncertainty.	  This	  finding	  should	  inform	  the	  next	  part	  of	  the	  analysis.	  In	   the	   first	   category	   of	   regulatory	   models	   (such	   as	   Davis’s	   or	   Garten’s),	  imposing	  ceilings	  upon	  the	  share	  ownership	  of	  SWFs	  may	  surely	  be	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  discarding	  most	  possible	  concerns,	  such	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  financial	  stability	  and	  using	  corporations	  to	  achieve	  political	  means.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  creates	   an	   excessively	   hostile	   economic	   environment	   for	   SWFs	   and	   is	   almost	  certainly	   the	   most	   effective	   way	   of	   driving	   their	   investments	   overseas.	   Under	  such	  a	   framework,	  SWFs	  would	  be	  automatically	  classed	  as	   ‘bad	   investors’	  and	  their	   investment	  activity	  would	  meet	  various	  reputational	  obstacles	  apart	   from	  the	   legal	   ones.	   Therefore,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   costs,	   excluding	   various	  sectors	  altogether	  is	  preferable	  to	  the	  ‘investment	  caps’	  solution	  because	  it	  offers	  SWF	  managers	  the	  assurance	  that	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  investment	  they	   wish	   to	   undertake.	   Such	   a	   system,	   however,	   it	   is	   still	   far	   from	   optimal	  because	   of	   the	   uncertainty	   it	   creates	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   sectors	   open	   to	  investment.	   Such	   a	   model	   has	   serious	   drawbacks	   when	   considering	   its	  implementation,	   which	  may	   lead	   to	   additional	   costs	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   loss	   of	  investment	  activity.	  Gilson	   and	   Milhaupt,	   who	   suggest	   removing	   the	   voting	   rights	   of	   state	  investors,	   themselves	   admit	   the	   risk	   of	   over-­‐inclusion,	   namely	   the	   expectation	  that	   governments	   whose	   SWFs	   and	   pension	   funds	   have	   their	   voting	   rights	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  ibid.	  728	  Mattoo	  and	  Subramanian	  (n	  680)	  16.	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suspended	  will	  impose	  similar	  suspensions	  on	  the	  equity	  holdings	  of	  comparable	  USA	   government	   entities.729	  As	   they	   admit,	   this	   side-­‐effect	   might	   cause	   the	  positive	   impact	   that	   shareholder	   activism	   by	   USA	   state	   pension	   funds,	   for	  example,	   CalPERS,	   has	   had	   on	   corporate	   governance	   standards	   in	   other	  countries,	   to	   be	   lost.730	  However,	   Gilson	   and	  Milhaupt	   appear	   prepared,	   albeit	  tacitly,	  to	  accept	  a	  larger	  loss	  than	  they	  openly	  admit,	  since	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  activist	  SWFs	  investing	  in	  domestic	  equity	  will	  also	  be	  lost.	  As	  seen	  in	  chapter	  2,	  activist	  sovereign	  shareholders	  have	  on	  many	  occasions	  benefited	  companies	  by	  raising	   takeover	   premiums,	   opposing	   hostile	   takeovers	   and	   making	   valuable	  contributions	  to	  shareholder	  meetings.731	  SWFs	  have	  so	  far	  shown	  weak	  signs	  of	  activism,	   but,	   if,	   following	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   sovereign	   shareholder	   activism	  develops	   further	   in	   the	   future,732	  then	   those	  benefits	  will	   also	   increase.	  Finally,	  an	  additional	  type	  of	  cost	  incurred	  by	  this	  model	  is	  the	  reduction	  in	  value	  of	  the	  shares	   in	   question.	   As	   SWFs	   would	   abstain	   from	   purchasing	   such	   stock,	   and	  would	   arguably	   favour	   stocks	   from	   other	   countries	   or	   investments	   in	  government	   bonds	   or	   real	   estate,	   the	   subsequent	   drop	   in	   demand	   for	   shares	  would	   also	   be	   reflected	   in	   their	   price.	   Although	   this	   reduction	   could	   be	   small	  (even	  minuscule)	  no	  company	  management	  would	  choose	   to	   incur	   it	   simply	   to	  prevent	  sovereign	  shareholders	  from	  voting	  in	  company	  meetings.	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  adopt	  such	  a	  stance	  based	  on	  their	  inherent	  suspicions	  of	  state	  capitalism	  regardless	  of	  the	  individual	  characteristics	  of	  state	  investment	  companies.	  Their	   ideological	  position,	  however,	  necessitates	   imposing	   costs	  on	  the	  entire	  international	  financial	  system	  and	  as	  such	  it	  cannot	  be	  supported.	  Fleischer’s	  model	   is	  more	  nuanced	  than	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt’s,	  and	  offers	  a	  theoretically	  more	  interesting	  system	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  concerns	  about	  SWFs,	  at	   least	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  costs.	  Fleischer	  suggests	  that	  the	  transactions	  carried	   out	   by	   SWFs	   impose	   certain	   costs	   on	   the	   recipient	   countries,	   which,	  however,	   are	   not	   reflected	   in	   the	   actual	   price	   of	   the	   transaction.	   Fleischer’s	  proposal	   suggests	   that	   opaque	   SWFs	   pay	   a	   ‘Pigouvian’	   tax733	  to	   the	   recipient	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  729	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  29.	  730	  ibid	  30.	  731	  See	  above	  chapter	  2,	  n	  441.	  732	  As	  was	  argued	  above	  in	  chapter	  2,	  n	  261.	  733	  n	  671.	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countries,	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	  costs	   they	   impose	  on	   them	  (however	   large	  or	  small)	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   be	   incentivised	   to	   become	  more	   transparent.734	  It	  can	  be	  argued	   that	   the	   tax	   incentive	  proposal	   is	  a	  good	  way	   to	   incorporate	   the	  cost,	   if	   any,	   in	   the	   decision	  making	   of	   SWFs	   and	   thus	   appears	   to	   be	   the	  most	  effective	   way	   to	   regulate	   ‘market	   imperfections’. 735 	  Although	   Fleischer’s	  proposition,	   surely,	   also	   creates	   the	   risk	   of	   turning	   investors	   away	   and	   hardly	  escapes	   criticism	   as	   to	   the	   obstacles	   to	   its	   implementation,	   from	   the	   point	   of	  view	  of	  costs	  it	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  the	  best	  of	  the	  models	  discussed	  so	  far.	  	  
Table	  4.2:	  Summary	  of	  Regulatory	  Proposals	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Finally,	  another	  important	  element	  is	  that	  most	  models	  are	  likely	  to	  impose	  extra	  administrative	  costs	  as,	  apart	  from	  the	  additional	  administrative	  agencies	  they	   create,	   they	   also	   impose	   both	   substantial	   transaction	   costs	   on	   SWFs	   and	  	  	  	  costly	   delays	   to	   their	   investments,	   especially	   if	   their	   transactions	   are	   to	   be	  reviewed.	  	  The	   above	   analysis	   indicates	   that	   most	   types	   of	   hard	   regulatory	  interventions	  to	  regulate	  SWFs	  have	  serious	  setbacks	  as	  much	  from	  a	  theoretical	  point	   of	   view,	   as	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   implementation	   and	   costs.	   The	   next	  chapter	  scrutinises	  specific	  case	  studies	  of	  models	   introduced	  to	  regulate	  SWFs	  where	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  so	  far	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  practice.	  	  
	  
	  CONCLUSION	  	   Investment	  protectionism	  has	  long	  existed.	  Where	  SWFs	  are	  involved,	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  how	  they	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  from	  a	  regulatory	  perspective.	  A	  close	  examination	  of	  SWFs’	   investment	  behaviour	  and	  a	  sober	  analysis	  of	  the	  real	   benefits	   and	   potential	   costs	   they	   bring	   to	   international	   financial	   markets	  leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	  nightmare	   scenarios	   about	   financial	   instability	  and	  national	  security	  predicted	  by	  many	  are	  not	  realistic.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  actual	  costs	  of	  SWFs	  are	  not	  significant	  enough	  to	  justify	  hard	  regulatory	   intervention.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   limited	   form	   of	   regulation	   may	   be	  warranted	   simply	   to	  ease	  protectionist	  pressures	  and	  maintain	   consumer	   (and	  corporate)	   confidence	   in	   the	   market	   for	   SWF	   investments.	   While,	   other	   risks,	  such	  as	   the	  undue	  political	   leverage	  of	  countries	  managing	  huge	  SWFs,	  may	  be	  real,	   they	   cannot	   be	   tackled	   by	   a	   simple	   regulatory	   instrument.	   Increasing	  transparency	   might	   have	   a	   positive	   impact,	   but	   SWFs	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	  remain	  opaque	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  their	  immediate	  competitors	  are	  allowed	  to.	  Taking	   all	   of	   the	   above	   into	   account,	   neither	   the	   ‘restriction’	   of	   SWFs,	   the	  ‘incentives’	   or	   the	   ‘command	   and	   control’	   regulatory	   models	   can	   offer	   a	  satisfactory	   regulatory	   response	   to	   the	   rising	   phenomenon	   of	   SWFs.	   These	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models	   are	   either	   excessively	   protectionist	   and	   discriminatory	   (and	   are	   not	  justified	  by	  the	  real	  facts	  regarding	  SWFs)	  or	  they	  are	  too	  costly	  and	  unworkable.	  The	  following	  chapters	  demonstrate	  this	  even	  further	  by	  examining	  case	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  a	  proposed	  model	  of	  self-­‐regulation.	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CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
-­‐	  
National	  Regulatory	  Models	  	  	  	  INTRODUCTION	  	   Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  have	  examined	   the	  benefits	   from,	  and	  potential	   concerns	  caused	   by,	   SWFs’	   investments	   as	   well	   as	   the	   main	   legislative	   proposals	   to	  regulate	   the	  operation	  of	  SWFs.	   It	  has	  been	  established	   that	  SWFs	  do	  not	  pose	  serious	   risks	   to	   financial	   stability	   or	   national	   security	   that	   would	   justify	   the	  adoption	   of	   hard	   regulatory	   instruments.736	  Nevertheless,	   many	   of	   the	   regulatory	   proposals	   examined	   in	   chapter	   4	  are	   designed	   to	   address	   those	   perceived	   risks	   by	   imposing	   transparency	  requirements	  or	   limiting	  SWF	  investments	   in	   individual	  companies.	   It	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   these	   proposals	   are	   disproportionate	   in	   their	  response	  to	  the	  rising	  phenomenon	  of	  SWFs	  and	  are	  thus	  overly	  protectionist.	  This	   chapter	   examines	   hard	   law	   instruments	   adopted	   by	   national	  governments	   to	   regulate	   SWF	   investments	   and	   analyse	   them	   using	   the	  conclusions	  from	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  The	  analysis	  of	  each	  case	  study	  includes	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  and	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  such	  funds	  in	   each	   country.	   As	   far	   as	   EU	   Member	   States	   are	   concerned,	   it	   is	   relevant	   to	  consider	  the	  compatibility	  of	  these	  laws	  with	  the	  EU	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.737	  The	  present	  chapter	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  sections.	  Section	  A	  examines	  laws	  directed	  at	  SWFs	  implemented	  by	  EU	  Member	  States.	  For	  this,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  provisions	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  freedom	   of	   establishment.	   Section	   A	   then	   examines	   the	   legislation	   of	   two	   EU	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  736	  While	  some	  existing	  risks,	  such	  as	  the	  potential	   influence	  on	  a	  recipient	  country’s	  economy,	  cannot	  be	  addressed	  by	  regulation	  itself,	  See	  chapter	  3,	  discussion	  at	  ‘The	  motivations	  behind	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs	  and	  national	  security	  
concerns’	  onwards.	  737	  As	  incompatibility	  of	  the	  measure	  with	  those	  rules	  may	  result	  in	  striking	  down	  the	  measure,	  n	  739	  onwards.	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Member	  States,	  France	  and	  Germany,	  as	  well	  as	   that	  of	  Greece	  as	  an	  additional	  jurisdiction.	  These	  jurisdictions	  were	  chosen	  because	  they	  offer	  a	  standpoint	  for	  analysis	   of	   two	   large	  markets	   that	   attract	   a	   large	   share	   of	   SWFs’	   investments	  (France	  and	  Germany),	  and	  a	  smaller	  market	  with	  specific	  circumstances	  that	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  legislation	  relating	  specifically	  to	  SWFs	  (Greece).	  Section	  II	  will,	  for	  comparative	  purposes,	  examine	  the	  legislation	  of	  a	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdiction	  –	   the	  USA.	  The	  choice	  of	  a	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdiction	   is	   to	  offer	  a	  broader	  perspective	   on	   the	   national	   laws	   regarding	   SWFs.	   Finally,	   in	   Section	   C,	   a	  comparative	   analysis	   of	   all	   of	   the	   above	   systems	   is	   provided.	   This	   analysis	  includes	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  these	  instruments,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  overview	  of	  their	  potential	  clash	  with	  EU	  law.738	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  unilateral	  measures	  at	  the	  national	   level	   intended	   to	   apply	   to	   SWFs	   are	   liable	   to	   be	   too	  protectionist	   and	  create	   negative	   spill-­‐overs	   for	   recipient	   countries	   and	   the	   global	   financial	  system.	   This	   finding	   is	   used	   later	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	   establish	   that	   between	   the	  adoption	  of	  national	  measures	  and	  a	  supranational	  response	  to	  address	  concerns	  about	  SWFs,	  the	  latter	  is	  preferable.	  	  	  	  A.	  EU	  LAW	  AND	  EU	  NATIONAL	  MODELS	  	  	  
1. EU	  Law	  	  
i.	  Free	  movement	  of	  capital	  	   As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter 739 ,	   regulations	   screening	   the	  investments	   of	   SWFs,	   and	   thus	   limiting	   their	   ability	   to	   invest	   freely	   in	   the	   EU,	  may	  fall	  foul	  of	  the	  established	  laws	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  and	  in	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  738	  In	  particular,	  the	  EU	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  see	  the	  discussion	  below	  from	  n	  739	  onwards.	  739	  n	  696.	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cases	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  establishment.	  More	  specifically,	  Article	  63(1)	  TFEU	  (previously	  56(1)	  EC)	  is	  worded	  as	  follows:	  	  ‘Within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   provisions	   set	   out	   in	   this	   chapter,	   all	  restrictions	   on	   the	  movement	   of	   capital	   between	  Member	   States	   and	   between	  Member	  States	  and	  third	  countries	  shall	  be	  prohibited’.	  	  Furthermore,	  Article	  65(1)(b)	  TFEU	  (previously	  58(1)(b)	  EC)	  states	  that:	  	  ‘the	   provisions	   of	   Article	   63	   shall	   be	   without	   prejudice	   to	   the	   right	   of	  Member	   States:	   (b)	  To	   take	   all	   requisite	  measures	   to	  prevent	   infringements	   of	  national	   law	   and	   regulations,	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   field	   of	   taxation	   and	   the	  prudential	  supervision	  of	  financial	  institutions,	  or	  to	  lay	  down	  procedures	  for	  the	  declaration	   of	   capital	   movements	   for	   purposes	   of	   administrative	   or	   statistical	  information,	  or	  to	  take	  measures	  which	  are	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy	  or	  public	  security’.	  	  Annex	   I	   to	   Council	   Directive	   88/361/EEC	   of	   24	   June	   1988	   for	   the	  implementation	  of	  Article	  67	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty740	  contains	  a	  nomenclature	  of	  the	  capital	  movements	   referred	   to	   in	  Article	   1	   of	   the	   same	  Council	  Directive.	   Inter	  
alia,	  a	  number	  of	  movements	  are	  listed:	  First,	   direct	   investments,	   which	   are	   defined	   as	   the	   ‘establishment	   and	  extension	   of	   branches	   or	   new	   undertakings	   belonging	   solely	   to	   the	   person	  providing	  the	  capital,	  and	  the	  acquisition	  in	  full	  of	  existing	  undertakings’,741	  and,	  ‘participation	   in	   new	   or	   existing	   undertakings	   with	   a	   view	   to	   establishing	   or	  maintaining	  lasting	  economic	  links’.742	  The	  explanatory	  notes	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Annex	  I	  to	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  Council	  Directive	  state	  that	  direct	  investments	  are:	  	  	  ‘investments	   of	   all	   kinds,	   by	   natural	   persons	   or	   commercial,	   industrial	   or	  financial	   undertakings,	   and	  which	   serve	   to	   establish	   or	   to	  maintain	   lasting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  740	  OJ	  1988	  L	  178	  5.	  741	  Nomenclature	  I-­‐1	  of	  the	  Directive.	  742	  Nomenclature	  I-­‐2	  of	  the	  Directive.	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and	   direct	   links	   between	   the	   person	   providing	   the	   capital	   and	   the	  entrepreneur	   to	   whom,	   or	   the	   undertaking	   to	   which,	   the	   capital	   is	   made	  available	   in	   order	   to	   carry	   on	   an	   economic	   activity.	   This	   concept	   must	  therefore	  be	  understood	  in	  its	  widest	  sense’.743	  	  As	   regards	   those	   undertakings	   referred	   to	   under	   I-­‐2	   of	   the	   nomenclature,	  which	  have	   the	   status	  of	   companies	   limited	  by	   shares,	   there	   is	  participation	   in	  the	   nature	   of	   direct	   investment	   where	   the	   block	   of	   shares	   held	   by	   a	   natural	  person	   or	   another	   undertaking	   or	   any	   other	   holder	   enables	   the	   shareholder,	  either	  pursuant	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  national	  laws	  relating	  to	  companies	  limited	  by	   shares	   or	   otherwise,	   to	   participate	   effectively	   in	   the	   management	   of	   the	  company	  or	  in	  its	  control.	  Second,	   the	   nomenclature	   of	   Annex	   I	   to	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   Council	  Directive	  also	  refers	  to	  operations	  in	  securities	  normally	  dealt	  with	  on	  the	  capital	  market	   such	  as	   the	  acquisition	  by	  non-­‐residents	  of	  domestic	   securities	  dealt	   in	  on	  a	  stock	  exchange	  and	  the	  acquisition	  by	  non-­‐residents	  of	  domestic	  securities	  not	  dealt	  in	  on	  a	  stock	  exchange.	  Moreover,	  Article	  345	  TFEU	  (previously	  295	  EC)	  provides	   that	   ‘this	  Treaty	  shall	   in	   no	  way	   prejudice	   the	   rules	   in	  Member	   States	   governing	   the	   system	   of	  property	   ownership’.	   Thus,	   EU	   law	   has	   taken	   a	   neutral	   approach	   to	   the	   state	  ownership	   of	   firms	   and	   has	   refrained	   from	   subjecting	   the	  Member	   States	   to	   a	  duty	  to	  privatise.744	  The	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  2009,	  has	  granted	  the	  EU	  the	  exclusive	   competence	   to	   the	   abolition	   of	   restrictions	   on	   foreign	   direct	  investments.	   Article	   206	   of	   the	   TFEU	   provides	   that	   by	   establishing	   a	   custom	  union	   in	   accordance	   with	   Articles	   28–32,	   the	   Union	   shall	   contribute	   to	   the	  progressive	   abolition	   of	   restrictions	   on	   international	   trade	   and	   foreign	   direct	  investments.	  Article	  207	  includes	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  as	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  covered	  by	  the	  common	  commercial	  policy	  of	  the	  Union.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  743	  Explanatory	  notes,	  ‘Direct	  Investments’.	  744	  This	  provision	  has	  important	  implications,	  not	  only	  regarding	  the	  ownership	  status	  of	  firms	  based	  in	  EU	  Member	  States,	  but	  also	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  foreign	  state-­‐owned	  entities,	  such	  as	  SOEs	  and	  SWFs,	  n	  751.	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The	   above	  hard	   law	   sets	   out	   the	  basis	   upon	  which	   investment	   restrictions	  are	  scrutinised	  by	  the	  EU	  courts.	  As	  such,	  it	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  national	  measures	  adopted	  to	  regulate	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	  	  It	   is	   necessary	   to	   analyse	   the	   case	   law	  deriving	   from	   the	   above	  provisions	  and	  their	  interpretation	  by	  the	  EU	  courts.	  The	  case	  law	  on	  free	  movement,	  often	  also	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   ‘golden	   shares’	   case	   law,	   is	   said	   to	   be	   an	   example	   of	  intense	  scrutiny	  and	  strict	  application	  by	  the	  courts.745	  It	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   case	   law,	   an	   infringement	  of	  Article	  63	  TFEU	   is	  no	  longer	   limited	   to	   discriminatory	   national	   provisions,	   but	   covers	   all	   norms	   that	  might	   hinder	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital,	   even	   if	   their	   effect	   is	   not	  discriminatory.746	  In	   essence,	   when	   discussing	   the	   EU	   approach	   to	   restrictions	   on	   foreign	  investments	   (and	   thus	   to	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   and	   freedom	   of	  establishment)	   a	   distinction	   must	   be	   made	   between	   ex	   ante	   and	   ex	   post	  measures.	  Ex	  ante	  measures	  consist	  of	  prior	  administrative	  approvals,	  whereas	  
ex	  post	  measures	  require	  a	  review	  of	  the	  suspected	  investment	  once	  it	  has	  been	  made.	  Both	  types	  have	  been	  used	  at	  the	  national	  level	  to	  screen	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	  Therefore,	  the	  next	  sections	  deal	  with	  this	  binary	  distinction.	  The	  ability	  of	  Member	  States	   to	   implement	  ex	  ante	  and	  ex	  post	  measures	  differs	  as	   the	  EU	  legal	   framework	   clearly	   prohibits	   the	   former,	   while	   it	   allows	   the	   second	   type	  under	   certain	   circumstances.	   Issues	   concerning	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   are	  also	  examined.	  
 a.	  Ex	  ante	  restrictions	  
	   A	  measure	  constituting	  an	  ex	  ante	   restriction	  of	  all	  or	   certain	  categories	  of	  investment	  will,	  as	  far	  as	  EU	  law	  is	  concerned,	  qualify	  as	  a	  restriction	  on	  foreign	  investments.	   Article	   63	   TFEU	   lays	   down	   a	   general	   prohibition	   with	   regard	   to	  restrictions	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   between	   EU	   Member	   States	   and	  between	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  third	  countries.	  The	  prohibition	  goes	  beyond	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  745	  Andrea	  Biondi,	  ‘When	  the	  State	  is	  Owner	  –	  Some	  Further	  Comments	  on	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  “Golden	  Shares”	  Strategy’,	  in	  Bernitz	  and	  Ringe	  (n	  429)	  97.	  746	  C-­‐367/98	  Commission	  v	  Portugal	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐4731	  paras	  44-­‐45;	  Case	  C-­‐98/01	  Commission	  v	  
United	  Kingdom	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4641	  para	  43. 
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mere	  elimination	  of	  unequal	  treatment	  on	  grounds	  of	  nationality.	  Such	  treatment	  amounts	  to	  discrimination,	  even	  if	  it	  applies	  alike,	  without	  distinction,	  to	  national	  shareholders	  and	  to	  shareholders	  who	  are	  nationals	  of	  other	  Member	  States.	  The	  problem,	  as	  stated	  by	  the	  CJEU,	   is	   that	  such	  a	  measure	  risks	  rendering	  the	   free	  movement	  of	  capital	  illusory.747	  The	  CJEU	  has	  stated	  that	  national	  measures	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  restrictions	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  63(1)	  TFEU	  if	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  prevent	  or	  limit	  the	  acquisition	  of	  shares	  in	  the	  undertakings	  concerned	  or	  to	  deter	  investors	  of	  other	  Member	   States	   from	   investing	   their	   capital. 748 	  Moreover,	   the	   Court	   has	  repeatedly	   ruled	   that	   measures	   which	   limit	   the	   acquisition	   of	   shareholdings,	  such	   as	  making	   the	   acquisition	   of	   voting	   rights	   above	   a	   certain	   cap	   subject	   to	  prior	  administrative	  approval,	   constitute	  a	  restriction	  on	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  capital.749	  Hence,	   the	  next	  question	  is	  whether	  such	  ex	  ante	  restrictions	  fall	  under	  the	  justifications	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  public	  security	  provided	  in	  the	  Treaty	  and,	   in	  particular,	   Article	   65	   TFEU.	   Indeed,	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   may	   be	  restricted	  by	  national	  measures	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  65	  TFEU	  or	  by	  overriding	  reasons	   in	   the	   general	   interest.750	  It	   follows	   from	   the	   case	   law	   that	   this	  Article	  does	  not	  have	   the	   effect	   of	   exempting	   the	  Member	   States’	   systems	  of	   property	  ownership	  from	  the	  fundamental	  rules	  of	  the	  Treaty.	  Member	  States	  cannot	  refer	  to	   this	   Article	   to	   justify	   obstacles	   resulting	   from	   privileges	   attached	   to	   their	  position	  as	  shareholder	  in	  a	  privatised	  undertaking.751	  However,	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances,	  certain	  concerns	  may	  justify	  the	  retention	   by	   Member	   States	   of	   an	   exceptional	   degree	   of	   influence	   within	  undertakings	   that	  were	   initially	  public	  and	  subsequently	  privatised.	  This	   is	   the	  case	   where	   those	   undertakings	   are	   active	   in	   fields	   involving	   the	   provision	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  747	  Case	  C-­‐483/99	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐4781	  paras	  40-­‐41;	  Joined	  Cases	  163,	  165	  250/94 Sanz	  de	  Lera	  and	  Others	  [1995]	  E.C.R.	  1-­‐4821	  para	  25. 748	  Commission	  v	  France	  paras	  36-­‐37;	  Commission	  v	  UK	  paras	  39-­‐40.	  749	  C-­‐463/00	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4581;	  Commission	  v	  Portugal;	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Commission	  v	  France,	  where	  the	  acquisition	  of	  20%	  of	  voting	  rights	  was	  subject	  to	  prior	  administrative	  approval	  by	  the	  French	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Affairs.	  750	  Case	  C-­‐319/02	  Manninen	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐7477	  para	  29.	  751	  Commission	  v	  France	  para	  44.	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services	   in	   the	   public	   interest,	   or	   strategic	   services.752	  This	   exception	   also	   is	  supported	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   1997	   Communication	   on	   certain	   legal	   aspects	  concerning	   intra-­‐EU	   investment753	  (the	   ‘1997	   Communication’).	   On	   a	   similar	  note,	   the	   former	   EU	   Trade	   Commissioner,	   Mandelson,	   made	   some	   qualified	  comments	  about	  the	  possible	  usefulness	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  European	  golden	  share,	  to	  vet	   foreign	   takeovers	  of	  key	   industries.754	  In	  any	  event,	   it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  under	  the	  current	  regime,	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  may	  be	  restricted	  by	  national	   measures	   justified	   on	   the	   grounds	   set	   out	   in	   Article	   65	   TFEU,	   or	   by	  overriding	  reasons	  in	  the	  general	  interest,755	  but	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  are	  no	  relevant	  EU	  harmonising	  measures	  already	  in	  place	  ensuring	  the	  protection	  of	  those	  interests.	  In	   this	   context	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   relevant	   Directives,	   as,	   for	  example,	   in	   the	   electronic	   communications	   or	   energy	   sectors,	   do	  not	   lay	  down	  the	   standards	   that	   should	   apply	   in	   the	   context	   of	   privatisations. 756 	  The	  liberalisation	  of	  certain	  sectors	  does	  not	  affect	  or	  reduce	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  services	  provided	  in	  a	  Member	  State.	  It	  is,	  in	  principle,	  for	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  decide	   on	   the	   degree	   of	   protection	   that	   they	  wish	   to	   afford	   to	   such	   legitimate	  interests	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  that	  protection	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.	  They	  may	  do	  so	  only	  within	   the	   limits	  provided	  by	   the	  TFEU	  and	   should,	   in	  particular,	   observe	  certain	   general	   EU	   law	   principles,	   such	   as	   the	   principles	   of	   necessity	   and	  proportionality.	   These	   general	   legal	   principles	   require	   that	   the	   measures	  adopted	  must	  be	  appropriate	  to	  secure	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  set	  objectives	  and	  must	  not	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  those	  objectives.757	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  752	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  66;	  See	  also,	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  43;	  Commission	  v	  Portugal	  para	  47.	  753	  OJ	  1997	  C220/06.	  754	  See	  for	  more	  information	  below,	  n	  1117.	  755	  Manninen	  para	  29;	  See	  also	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  45.	  756	  See	  for	  example,	  Directive	  2009/72/EC	  of	  13	  July	  2009	  concerning	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  electricity,	  OJ	  L	  211;	  
Directive	  2009/140/EC	  of	  25	  November	  2009	  on	  a	  common	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  
electronic	  communications	  networks	  and	  services,	  2002/19/EC	  on	  access	  to,	  and	  
interconnection	  of,	  electronic	  communications	  networks	  and	  associated	  facilities,	  
2002/20/EC	  on	  the	  authorisation	  of	  electronic	  communications	  networks	  and	  services	  OJ	  L	  337.	  757	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  45;	  Commission	  v	  Portugal	  para	  49.	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The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  EU	  (CJEU)	  has	  accepted	  in	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  that	   public	   security	   considerations	   may	   justify	   an	   obstacle	   to	   free	   movement	  rules.758	  Moreover,	  in	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  it	  stated	  that	  the	  guarantee	  of	  a	  service	   of	   general	   interest	   is	   capable	   of	   justifying	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   capital. 759 	  Therefore,	   as	   stated	   by	   the	   CJEU,	   as	   regards	  undertakings	   active	   in	   the	   petroleum,	   telecommunications	   and	   electricity	  sectors,	   it	   is	   undeniable	   that	   the	   objective	   of	   safeguarding	   supplies	   of	   such	  products,	  or	  the	  provision	  of	  such	  services	  within	  the	  Member	  State	  concerned,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  crisis,	  may	  constitute	  a	  public-­‐security	  reason.760	  Nevertheless,	  the	  CJEU	  also	  held	  that	  the	  requirements	  of	  public	  security,	  as	  derogation	  from	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  must	  be	  interpreted	   strictly,	   so	   that	   their	   scope	   cannot	   be	   determined	   unilaterally	   by	  each	   Member	   State	   without	   any	   control	   by	   the	   EU	   Institutions.	   Thus,	   public	  security	  may	   be	   relied	   on	   as	   justification	   only	   if	   there	   is	   a	   sufficiently	   serious	  threat	   to	   a	   fundamental	   interest	   of	   society.761	  The	   Court	   does	   not	   define	  what	  constitutes	   such	   a	   fundamental	   interest	   of	   society.	   However,	   in	   Portugal	   v	  
Commission	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  retention	  of	  a	  degree	  of	  influence	  in	  a	  recently	  privatised	   undertaking	   is	   justified	   where	   that	   undertaking	   is	   ‘active	   in	   fields	  involving	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  or	  strategic	  services’.762	  Furthermore,	   it	   was	   specified	   in	   Commission	   v	   Belgium	   that	   ‘the	   objective	  pursued	  by	  the	  legislation	  at	  issue,	  namely	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  energy	  supplies	  in	  the	   event	   of	   a	   crisis,	   falls	   undeniably	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   a	   legitimate	   public	  interest’.763	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	  Commission	  v	  Spain,	  undertakings	   involved	   in	  the	   banking	   and	   tobacco	   manufacturing	   sectors	   (but	   also	   the	  telecommunications	   sector,	   where	   they	   were	   formed	   to	   provide	   telephony	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  758	  para	  46	  –	  although	  the	  relevant	  para	  refers	  to	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  the	  Court	  states	  that	  it	  applies	  equally	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.	  759	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐282/04	  and	  C-­‐283/04	  Commission	  v	  The	  Netherlands	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐9141	  para	  38.	  760	  Commission	  v	  France	  para	  47;	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  46;	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  71;	  This	  conclusion	  is	  reinforced	  when	  the	  adopted	  national	  measure	  targets	  companies	  that	  control	  or	  make	  use	  of	  a	  national	  network.	  761	  As	  required	  by	  C-­‐54/99	  Eglise	  de	  Scientologie	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐1335	  para	  17;	  Commission	  v	  
Belgium	  para	  47;	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  72.	  762	  para	  47.	  763	  para	  46;	  See	  also,	  Case	  72/83	  Campus	  Oil	  and	  Others	  [1984]	  ECR	  2727	  paras	  34–35.	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overseas)	   could	   not	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   justification	   based	   on	   overriding	  requirements	   of	   the	   general	   interest. 764 	  Overall,	   restrictions	   appear	   to	   be	  justified	   only	   where	   they	   protect	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   public	   service,	   such	   as	  petroleum,	   telecommunications	   and	   electricity,765	  without	  which	   society	  would	  undeniably	  break	  down.	  Any	   prior	   administrative	   approval	   scheme	   must	   be	   proportionate	   to	   the	  objective	   pursued	   in	   so	   far	   as	   the	   same	   objective	   cannot	   be	   attained	   by	   less	  restrictive	  measures,	   in	   particular	   a	   system	   of	   declaration	   ex	  post	   facto.766	  The	  objectives	   must	   be	   clear	   enough	   to	   justify	   the	   measure	   as	   being	   the	   least	  restrictive	  means	  of	  achieving	  the	  set	  objectives.	  According	  to	  the	  case	   law,	  the	  prior	  authorisation	  scheme	  must	  also	  relate	  to	  specific	  companies	  and	  must	  state	  the	  reasons	  which	  render	  any	  restrictive	  measures	  indispensable.767	  In	  addition,	  all	  persons	  must	  have	  a	  legal	  remedy	  available.768	  For	   example,	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   golden	   share	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Belgium	  depended	  on	  the	  specified,	  and	  yet	  widely	  defined	  objective	  of	  ‘national	  interest’.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Minister	  in	  charge	  had	  to	  ascertain	  that	  there	  was	  an	  ‘adversary	  affectation	   to	   the	   national	   interest	   in	   the	   energy	   sector’.	   This	   provision	   was	  regarded	   as	   the	   least	   vague	   of	   all	   national	   provisions	   scrutinised	   by	   the	  European	  Courts.	  Although	  the	  wording	  seemed	  to	  be	  giving	  a	  broad	  discretion,	  important	   restrictions	   were	   subsequently	   introduced	   by	   a	   Decree:	   the	  infringement	  proceedings,	  while	   they	  were	   still	  pending,	  prompted	   the	  Belgian	  government	   to	   introduce	   stricter	   rules	   at	   a	   second	   level.	   The	   Belgian	   state-­‐controlled	   rights	   henceforth	   could	   be	   exercised	   only	   for	   ‘objective,	   non-­‐discriminatory	   and	   transparent	   considerations’	   and	   numerous	   clauses	   of	  purposes	  or	  objectives	  were	  specified	  in	  Decrees.769	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  state	  decision	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  764	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  35.	  765	  ibid	  para	  71.	  766	  Commission	  v	  France	  para	  46.	  767	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  69:	  ‘such	  a	  system	  must	  be	  based	  on	  objective,	  non-­‐discriminatory	  criteria	  which	  are	  known	  in	  advance	  to	  the	  undertakings	  concerned,	  and	  all	  persons	  affected	  by	  a	  restrictive	  measure	  of	  that	  type	  must	  have	  a	  legal	  remedy	  available	  to	  them’;	  Also	  see	  Commission	  v	  Portugal	  para	  50;	  Case	  C-­‐205/99,	  Analir	  and	  Others	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐1271	  para	  38.	  768	  Analir	  para	  38;	  Commission	  v	  Portugal	  para	  50.	  769	  This	  was	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Belgian	  Article	  29	  para	  2,	  Loi	  relative	  a	  l’organisation	  du	  marché	  
du	  gaz	  et	  au	  statut	  fiscal	  des	  procedures	  d’electricité,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  Articles	  1	  and	  3	  of	  
Arreté	  royal	  fixant	  les	  criteres	  pour	  l’exercise	  des	  droits	  speciaux	  attachés	  aux	  actions	  specifiques	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could	   be	   imposed	   upon	   the	   privatised	   company	   only	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   the	  operation	  of	   the	  wires	  and	  conduits	   infrastructure	  as	  well	   as	   the	   technical	  and	  financial	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   companies.770	  On	   this	   basis,	   it	   was	   apparently	  considered	   by	   the	   Court	   that	   interested	   parties	   had	   an	   effective	   legal	   remedy	  before	   Belgian	   courts:	   the	   concrete	   conditions	   specified	   in	   the	   legislation	  rendered	  the	  judicial	  review	  of	  the	  authority’s	  decision	  possible.771	  A	  necessary	   final	  point	   is	   that	   the	  principle	  of	   free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  as	  foreseen	  in	  Article	  63	  TFEU,	  applies	  equally	  to	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  third	  countries.	  However,	   certain	  Articles,	   such	   as	  Articles	   64	   (previously	  Article	   57	  EC),	   66	   (previously	   Article	   59	   EC)	   and	   75	   TFEU	   (previously	   Article	   60	   EC)	  foresee	  the	  possibility	  of	  specific	  restrictions,	  safeguard	  measures	  or	  sanctions	  in	  respect	   of	   third	   countries.	   Under	   Article	   64	   TFEU,	   restrictions	   on	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  capital	  involving	  direct	  investments	  can	  be	  maintained	  as	  regards	  third	  countries.772	  Article	  66	  TFEU	  foresees	  in	  a	  safeguard	  clause	  the	  possibility	  of	   adopting	   restrictive	  measures	   for	   a	  period	  not	   exceeding	   six	  months	   should	  extremely	   disturbing	   capital	   movements	   with	   third	   countries	   endanger	   the	  operation	  of	  economic	  and	  monetary	  union.	  Hence,	  there	  might	  be	  room	  to	  argue	  that	   certain	   measures	   might	   be	   justified	   in	   view	   of	   the	   potential	   danger	   that	  investments	  from	  third	  countries	  might	  entail	  and	  that	  certain	  objective	  criteria	  may	  be	  necessary	   in	   those	   sectors	   of	   strategic	   importance	   as	   a	   safeguard.	   It	   is	  emphasised	  that	  the	  EU	  case	  law	  referred	  to	  above	  dealt	  with	  restrictions	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  capital	  coming	  from	  within	  the	  EU	  and	  not	  from	  third	  countries.	  	  b.	  Ex	  post	  restrictions	  	   An	   ex	   post	   measure	   does	   not	   establish	   a	   system	   of	   prior	   administrative	  authorisation	  for	  an	  investment,	  but,	  rather,	  a	  system	  of	  opposition	  ex	  post	  facto.	  Though	  it	   is	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  less	  restrictive	  than	  the	  system	  of	  prior	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instituées	  au	  profit	  de	  l’Etat	  aupres	  de	  la	  Societé	  nationale	  de	  Transport	  par	  Canalisations	  et	  
Distrigaz	  of	  5/12/2000,	  Moniteur	  belge	  of	  20/12/2000,	  p	  42347	  specify	  the	  objectives.	  770	  See	  Articles	  2	  and	  4	  of	  the	  abovementioned	  law.	  771	  Seen	  para	  29	  on	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  Minister	  to	  provide	  a	  statement	  of	  reasons.	  772	  Member	  States	  may	  continue	  to	  apply	  restrictions	  which	  existed	  with	  regard	  to	  third	  countries	  in	  respect	  of	  direct	  investment	  on	  31st	  December	  1993	  (or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bulgaria,	  Estonia	  and	  Hungary,	  31st	  December	  1999).	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authorisation,773	  it	   still	   qualifies	   as	   a	   restrictive	  measure	   that	  must	   be	   justified	  under	  EU	  law.	  Similarly	   to	   the	   system	   of	   prior	   authorisation	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   previous	  section,	   it	   may	   be	   justified	   under	   Article	   65	   TFEU	   (previously	   Article	   58	   EC).	  Again,	  the	  adopted	  legislation	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  securing	  the	  pursued	  objective	  and	  must	  not	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  proportionality	   is	   key.774	  Accordingly,	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   the	   public	   interest	  objective,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  continuous	  supply	  of	  services	  in	  strategically	  important	  sectors775	  may	   be	   considered	   as	   falling	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   legitimate	   public	  interest	   which,	   in	   turn,	   may	   justify	   a	   restriction	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	  capital.776	  In	  this	  context,	  any	  legislation	  must	  be	  predicated	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  decision-­‐making	  autonomy	  of	  the	  undertaking	  concerned,	  in	  as	  much	  as,	  in	   each	   individual	   case,	   the	   exercise	   of	   control	   by	   the	   Minister	   responsible	  requires	  an	  initiative	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government	  authorities.777	  In	  addition,	  as	  regards	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  restriction,	  the	  same	  level	  of	  specificity,	  as	  prescribed	  for	  the	  ex	  ante	  measure,	  is	  also	  required	  for	  the	  ex	  post	  measure.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  relevant	  restrictions	  must	  relate	  to	  a	  genuine	  and	  sufficiently	  serious	  threat	  to	  a	   fundamental	   interest	  of	  society778	  and	  be	   limited	  both	  in	  time	  and	  to	  strategic	  assets	  of	  the	  company.	  Moreover,	  the	  objective	  must	  guarantee	   the	   continuous	   provision	   of	   the	   strategic	   services	   and,	   limit	   the	  ministerial	   power	   to	   those	   companies’	   activities	   as	   providers	   of	   public	  services.779	  Finally,	  it	  must	  offer	  all	  persons	  an	  effective	  legal	  remedy	  because	  the	  national	  courts	  may	  review	  the	  ministerial	  decision.	  It	   follows	  from	  the	  Belgian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  773	  Commission	  v	  France	  para	  52.	  774	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  45.	  775	  Such	  as	  companies	  active	  in	  telecommunications,	  petroleum,	  gas,	  electricity	  and	  defence.	  Companies	  managing	  a	  public	  network	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  strategic	  (n	  759).	  But	  banks	  and	  other	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  however	  lucrative,	  usually	  do	  not	  fall	  in	  this	  category,	  
Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  70.	  776	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  46.	  777	  ibid,	  para	  49.	  778	  Eglise	  de	  Scientologie	  para	  17;	  Commission	  v	  France	  para	  49	  ;	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  para	  47.	  779	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  the	  Advocate-­‐General	  in	  his	  opinion	  in	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  para	  38	  and	  39	  and	  later	  upheld	  by	  the	  Court	  para	  40.	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case	   that	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   set	   out	   in	   detail	   the	   reasons	   something	   is	   a	  sufficiently	  serious	  threat,	  but	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  indicate	  what	  this	  threat	  is.	  	  
ii.	  Freedom	  of	  establishment	  	   A	   law	  may	   not	   only	   hinder	   direct	   and	   portfolio	   investment,	   but	   may	   also	  hinder	   the	   taking	   of	   controlling	   holdings	   in	   companies,	   namely	   investments	  which	   confer	   a	   definite	   influence	   over	   the	   management	   and	   control	   of	   these	  companies.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  government	  in	  question	  may	  be	  held	  to	  breach	   its	  obligations	  under	  Article	  49	  TFEU	  (previously	  43	  EC)	  on	   freedom	  of	  establishment. 780 	  This	   Article	   provides	   that	   restrictions	   to	   freedom	   of	  establishment,	   including	  the	  setting-­‐up	  of	  agencies,	  branches	  or	  subsidiaries,	  as	  well	  as	  activities	  pursued	  by	  self-­‐employed	  persons,	  shall	  be	  prohibited.	  Article	  54	  TFEU	  (previously	  48	  EC)	  holds	  that:	  ‘companies	  or	   firms	   formed	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	   law	  of	   a	  Member	  State	  and	  having	   their	  registered	  office,	   central	  administration	  or	  principal	  place	  of	  business	  within	  the	  Union	  shall,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  be	  treated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  natural	  persons	  who	  are	  nationals	  of	  Member	  States’.	  In	   so	   far	   as	   a	   particular	   measure	   may	   entail	   restrictions	   on	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment,	  such	  restrictions	  are	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  obstacles	  to	  the	  free	  movement	   of	   capital,	   to	  which	   the	   additional	   restrictions	   are	   inextricably	  linked.781	  Consequently,	  if	  a	  justification	  of	  the	  restriction	  of	  Article	  63(1)	  TFEU	  is	   established,	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	   a	   separate	   examination	   and	   the	   same	  justifications	   apply	   to	   the	   restriction	   of	  Article	   49	  TFEU	   (previously	  Article	   43	  EC).	  However,	   in	   this	   context	   it	   should	  be	  noted	   that	  Article	  49	  TFEU	  does	  not	  make	  reference	  to	  restrictions	  in	  respect	  of	  third	  countries	  outside	  the	  EU.	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  significant	  difference	  from	  Article	  63	  TFEU,	  since	  Article	  49	  TFEU	  does	   not	   catch	   restrictions	   to	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   with	   regard	   to	  investments	   coming	   from	   outside	   the	   European	   Union.	   As	   stated	   in	   Fidium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  780	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  para	  42;	  Case	  C-­‐208/00	  Uberseering	  para	  77.	  781	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  para	  86;	  Commission	  v	  Netherlands	  para	  43.	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Finanz,	   this	   Article	   cannot	   be	   relied	   on	   by	   a	   company	   established	   in	   a	   non-­‐EU	  Member	  country.782	  Regarding	   the	   Court’s	   choice	   of	   application	   between	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment	   or	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital,	   there	   is	   no	   order	   of	   priority	  between	   the	   two.	   Instead,	   each	   freedom	   is	  held	   to	   regulate	  different	   situations	  with	  the	  Court	  applying	  what	  Schweitzer	  calls	  the	  ‘centre	  of	  gravity’	  approach,	  i.e.	  the	  most	   relevant	   of	   the	   two.783	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	  simultaneous	  application	  of	  both	  articles	   if	   the	  restriction	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  is	  ‘merely	  an	  unavoidable	  consequence	  of	  the	  restriction	  on	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services’.784	  Having	  examined	  the	  distinction	  of	  ex	  ante	  and	  ex	  post	  rules	  with	  regard	  to	  both	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  the	  next	  section	  examines	  how	  a	  golden	  share	  strategy	  may	  be	  applied	  in	  practice.	  	  
iii.	  The	  ‘Golden	  shares’	  debate	  and	  other	  ex	  post	  rules	  	   ‘Golden	   shares’	   may	   be	   broadly	   defined	   as	   company	   shares	   that	   give	   the	  state	   special	   rights	   over	   management	   decisions	   despite	   privatisation	   of	   state	  assets.785	  These	   enable	   the	   state	   to	   retain	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   influence	   in	  previously	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises.	   Golden	   shares	   are	   particularly	   relevant	   in	  the	   study	   of	   SWFs	   as,	   in	   the	   past,	   they	   have	   been	   used	   extensively	   by	  governments	  in	  Europe	  to	  maintain	  control	  over	  newly	  privatised	  companies786	  and	  have	  been	  considered	  again	  more	  recently	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  SWFs.	  Privatisation	  emerged	  as	  a	  global	  trend	  in	  the	  last	  20–30	  years.	  Nowhere	  in	  Europe,	   however,	   did	   privatisation	   really	   put	   an	   end	   to	   state	   interference	   in	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  782	  On	  the	  difference	  between	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  see	  C-­‐452/04	  Fidium	  Finanz	  paras	  25-­‐35.	  783	  Schweitzer	  (n	  597)	  273.	  784	  Fidium	  Finanz	  para	  48.	  785	  Stefan	  Grundmann	  and	  Florian	  Möslein,	  ‘Golden	  Shares	  –	  State	  Control	  in	  Privatised	  Companies:	  Comparative	  Law,	  European	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Aspects’	  (2001-­‐2002)	  EB&	  FLJ	  3.	  786	  The	  prime	  example	  is	  the	  UK,	  and	  Margaret	  Thatcher	  who	  is	  largely	  regarded	  as	  the	  inventor	  of	  golden	  shares.	  Examples	  involve	  the	  privatisations	  of	  Jaguar	  in	  1984	  and	  British	  Oil	  in	  1982,	  see	  also	  Andrei	  Baev,	  ‘Is	  There	  a	  Niche	  for	  the	  State	  in	  Corporate	  Governance?	  Securitization	  of	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises	  and	  New	  Forms	  of	  State	  Ownership’	  (1995)	  Vol	  18(1)	  HousJInt'l	  L	  1;	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variety	  of	  specific	  decisions	  and	  information	  rights.787	  Golden	  shares	  usually	  vest	  the	   state	   with	   influence	   over	   strategic	   decisions	   of	   the	   company	   concerned,	  sometimes	  even	  extending	  to	  an	  outright	  veto.	  Recognising	  that	  the	  special	  rights	  of	  the	  state	  are	  concerned,	  the	  discussion	  in	   Europe	   seems	   to	   have	   largely	   been	   regarded	   as	   a	   public	   law	   issue.788	  Nonetheless,	   Grundmann	   and	   Möslein	   suggest	   that	   the	   issue	   is	   rather	   one	   of	  company	  law.	  They	  argue	  that	  this	  is,	  firstly,	  because	  it	  involves	  rights	  attached	  to	  one	  share,	  accordingly	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  equal	  right	  conferred	  by	  shares	  (‘one	   share	   one	   vote’)	   and	   golden	   shares	   alter	   the	   decision	   power	   in	   a	  company. 789 	  Secondly,	   the	   discussion	   goes	   beyond	   privatisation	   and	   the	  retention	  of	  special	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  by	  the	  state.	  Golden	  shares	  reduce	  the	   decision	   making	   power	   of	   the	   undertaking	   and	   may	   potentially	   make	  investment	   in	   its	   shares	   less	   attractive.790	  These	   special	   rights	   do	   not	   only	  depend	   on	   holding	   such	   a	   share,	   but	   also	   upon	   a	   share	   being	   held	   by	   a	   state	  body.791	  The	  state,	  however,	  could	  retain	   influence	  even	  without	  a	  requirement	  to	  hold	  a	  single	  share.	   It	  could	  deal	  with	   this	  matter	  under	   traditional	   forms	  of	  public	   law,	   such	  as	  by	  passing	  a	   law	  conferring	   it	   those	  powers	  of	   influence.	   It	  has	  been	  much	  more	  common,	  however,	  for	  states	  to	  use	  the	  channel	  of	  company	  law	  to	  control	  companies	  by	  establishing	  a	  golden	  share.792	  In	  either	  event,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  matter	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  one	  legal	  branch	  alone.	  Although	   most	   legal	   considerations	   that	   arise	   under	   golden	   shares	   are	   of	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  787	  ibid	  8.	  788	  In	  Germany,	  specific	  duties	  of	  state	  bodies	  as	  shareholders	  have	  been	  formulated	  and	  discussed	  as	  a	  public	  law	  requirement,	  Grundmann	  and	  Möslein	  (n	  785)	  625.	  789	  ibid.	  790	  ibid.	  791	  As	  it	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Commission	  v	  Belgium:	  ‘the	  special	  rights	  defined	  in	  Articles	  2	  to	  5	  shall	  attach	  to	  that	  share,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  information	  rights	  attaching	  to	  ordinary	  shares	  in	  SNTC,	  only	  for	  as	  long	  as	  that	  share	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  state,	  which	  may	  assign	  it	  or	  transfer	  it	  only	  pursuant	  to	  prior	  legislative	  authorisation’	  para	  9	  of	  the	  judgement.	  792	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  Advocate-­‐General	  Maduro	  in	  his	  opinion	  in	  joined	  cases	  C-­‐463/04	  and	  C-­‐464/04	  Federconsumatori	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐10419	  293	  has	  inquired	  whether	  public	  ownership	  of	  shares	  itself	  can	  constitute	  a	  restriction	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  by	  dissuading	  investments	  from	  other	  Member	  States.	  He	  finds	  that	  ‘the	  mere	  fact	  that	  a	  public	  body	  owns	  shares	  in	  a	  company	  does	  not	  reduce	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  cross-­‐border	  investments	  in	  that	  company,	  as	  long	  as	  investors	  in	  other	  Member	  States	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  the	  public	  body	  concerned	  will	  […]	  respect	  the	  normal	  rules	  of	  operation	  of	  the	  market’	  para	  25.	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company	   law	   nature,793	  they	   may	   also	   raise	   issues	   of	   public	   law,	   such	   as	   the	  provision	  of	  public	  services,	  agency	  work,	  national	  security	  etc.794	  Golden	  shares	  or	  other	  ex	  post	  rights	  concern	  fundamental	  decisions,	  such	  as	  the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   company	   and	   other	   structural	   changes,	   but	   also	  management	   decisions	   of	   strategic	   importance,	   such	   as	   the	   sale	   of	   substantial	  assets	  or	  a	  shareholding,	   for	  which	  shareholder	  approval	  may	  be	  required.	  The	  line	   between	   fundamental	   decisions	   (typically	   within	   the	   competence	   of	   the	  general	  meeting)	  and	  management	  decisions	  (which	  normally	  the	  board	  decides	  upon)	  may	  not	  be	  the	  same	  in	  all	  Member	  States.	  	  As	  discussed	   above,	   the	  Belgian	  Decree	   that	   specified	   the	  objectives	   of	   the	  Belgian	  golden	  share,795	  and	  which	  was	  the	  object	  of	  discussion	  in	  Commission	  v	  
Belgium,	  is	  the	  best-­‐tested	  precedent	  in	  restrictions	  attached	  to	  ex	  post	  approval	  (or	  veto)	  rights.	  The	  relevant	  articles	  of	  the	  Belgian	  Decree	  provided	  that	  on	  the	  day	  on	  which	  the	  shares	  held	  by	  the	  state	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  Société	  nationale	  
d’investissement	   are	   transferred	   to	  one	  or	  more	  natural	   or	   legal	  persons	   in	   the	  private	  sector,	  the	  company	  will	  assign	  one	  share	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  company	  known	   as	   Société	   nationale	   de	   transport	   par	   canalisations	   (SNTC)	   to	   the	   state	  (Article	  1).	  According	   to	   the	  same	  article,	   the	  special	   rights	   remain	  attached	   to	  that	  share	  only	  for	  as	  long	  as	  that	  share	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  and	  they	  would	  be	  exercised	  by	  the	  minister	  responsible	  for	  energy.	  The	  said	  (golden)	  share	  would	  confer	  on	  the	  minister	  the	  right	  to	  oppose	  any	  transfer,	  use	  as	  security	  or	  change	  in	  the	  intended	  destination	  of	  SNTC’s	  system	  of	   lines	   and	   conduits	   which	   are	   used	   or	   are	   capable	   of	   being	   used	   as	   major	  infrastructures	   for	   the	  domestic	  conveyance	  of	  energy	  products,	   if	   the	  minister	  considers	  that	  the	  operation	  in	  question	  adversely	  affects	  the	  national	  interest	  in	  the	   energy	   sector	   (Article	   3).	   Prior	   notice	   of	   the	   operations	   referred	   to	   in	   the	  above	  paragraph	  had	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  minister	  who	  could	  exercise	  his	  right	  of	  opposition	  within	  21	  days	  after	  receiving	  notice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  793	  Such	  as	  share	  ownership,	  control	  over	  a	  company’s	  business	  decisions,	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  establishment,	  see	  from	  n	  796	  onwards.	  794	  Some	  of	  those	  issues	  that	  are	  discussed	  below	  where	  relevant,	  for	  instance,	  from	  n	  801	  onwards.	  795	  Articles	  1	  and	  3	  of	  Arreté	  royal	  fixant	  les	  criteres	  pour	  l’exercise	  des	  droits	  speciaux	  attachés	  
aux	  actions	  specifiques	  instituées	  au	  profit	  de	  l’Etat	  aupres	  de	  la	  Societé	  nationale	  de	  Transport	  par	  
Canalisations	  et	  Distrigaz	  of	  5/12/2000,	  Moniteur	  belge	  of	  20/12/2000	  42347.	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The	  golden	  share,	  moreover,	  conferred	  on	  the	  minister	  the	  right	  to	  appoint	  two	  representatives	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  of	  SNTC	  who	   would	   sit	   on	   the	   board	   in	   a	   non-­‐voting	   advisory	   capacity	   (Article	   4).	  According	  to	  the	  Decree,	  these	  government	  representatives	  were	  empowered	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  Minister	  for	  Energy,	  within	  four	  working	  days,	  for	  annulment	  of	  any	  decision	  of	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  of	  SNTC	  which	  they	  regarded	  as	  contrary	  to	  the	  guidelines	   for	   the	   country’s	   energy	   policy,	   including	   the	   government’s	   energy	  supply	  objectives.	  The	  application	  to	  the	  minister	  would	  have	  suspensory	  effect	  for	  eight	  working	  days,	  past	  which,	  the	  board’s	  decision	  would	  become	  final.	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  Decree,	  Articles	  1,	  3	  and	  4	  of	  the	  Royal	  Decree	  of	  16	  June	  1994	  laid	  down	  essentially	  identical	  rules	  concerning	  another	  Belgian	  company,	  the	  Société	  de	  distribution	  du	  Gaz	  SA.	  The	   debate	   on	   golden	   shares	   has	   revived	   after	   several	   EU	   Commissioners	  accepted	   that	   they	   constitute	   the	   appropriate	   (although	   qualified)	   response	   to	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  SWFs	  (see	  below	  chapter	  6	  n	  1118).	  Certain	  forms	  of	  golden	  share	   may,	   therefore,	   be	   used	   to	   safeguard	   valuable	   industries	   from	   foreign	  state-­‐controlled	  funds	  whose	  long-­‐term	  objectives	  cannot	  be	  known	  to	  Member	  States.	  However,	  the	  use	  of	  golden	  shares	  for	  this	  purpose	  is	  not	  exempt	  from	  the	  strict	   conditions	   laid	   down	   by	   the	   Court	   rulings	   on	   free	   movement	   of	   capital.	  Member	  States	  have	   to	  satisfy	  all	   the	  essential	   requirements	   in	  order	   to	   justify	  any	  restrictions	  to	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.	  The	  example	  of	  the	  EADS	  can	  offer	  a	  helpful	  illustration	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  golden	  share	  in	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  law,	  even	  in	  strategically	  important	  companies.	  In	  2007,	  Germany	  expressed	  its	  intention	  to	  consider	  creating	  a	  golden	  share	  in	  EADS,	  a	  global	  pan-­‐European	  aerospace	  and	  defence	  corporation	  and	  a	  leading	  defence	   and	  military	   contractor.	   This	   golden	   share	  would	   ensure	   the	   strategic	  influence	  of	   the	  French	  and	  German	  governments	  on	   the	  company.	   It	  has	  been	  reported	   in	  Der	  Spiegel	   that	   the	  motivation	  behind	   the	  possible	   creation	  of	   the	  share	  was	  the	  growing	  concern	   in	  Germany	  both	  about	   the	   increasing	   financial	  clout	   of	   countries	   such	   as	   China	   and	   Russia,	   ‘who	   are	   suspected	   of	   political	  motivations	   behind	   their	   investments’,	   and	   ‘über-­‐capitalist	   private	   equity	   and	  hedge	   funds,	   which	   are	   popularly	   known	   as	   “locusts”	   in	   Germany	   because	   of	  their	   perceived	   tendency	   to	   strip	   firms	   clean,	   abandon	   less	   lucrative	   divisions	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and	   sell	   the	   most	   profitable’.796	  In	   the	   case	   of	   EADS,	   Germany’s	   reaction	   was	  initially	  triggered	  by	  the	  5%	  stake	  in	  the	  aerospace	  group	  EADS	  taken	  by	  VTB,	  a	  Russian	  state	  bank.797 The	  share	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  a	  veto	  over	  major	  decisions	  by	  Europe’s	  biggest	   aerospace	   and	   defence	   company.798	  Accordingly,	   a	   working	   group	   was	  set	  up	  to	  discuss	  the	  proposal	  ‘within	  the	  following	  months’.799	  The	  golden	  share	  proposal	  was	  a	  new	  and	  a	  surprising	  German	  contribution	  to	  a	  debate	  launched	  by	   the	   French	   Government	   about	   a	   reform	   of	   the	   pact	   that	   binds	   EADS’	  shareholders	  and	  governs	   their	  voting	   rights.800	  Had	   it	  been	  realised,	   the	  move	  would	  have	  given	  Berlin,	  which	  does	  not	  have	  a	   stake	   in	  EADS,	  a	  bigger	   say	   in	  decisions	  that	  might	  affect	  national	  security.	  It	  would	  also	  have	  allowed	  Paris,	  if	  it	  so	  chose,	  to	  sell	  its	  holding	  without	  losing	  its	  influence	  over	  the	  company.	  According	  to	  Grube’s	  statements	  (EADS’	   former	  Chairman)	   in	  August	  2007,	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  golden	  share	  would	  be	  made	  at	  the	  company’s	  general	  meeting	  in	  May	  2008.	  The	  golden	  share	  would	  help	  fend	  off	  any	  hostile	  takeover,	  which	  as	  he	  described	  it,	  is	  a	  ‘legitimate	  concern’	  given	  EADS’	  role	  in	  national	  security.801	  The	  European	  Commission	  rejected	   the	   idea	  as	  early	  as	  March	  2008802	  and	   the	  plan	  was	  not	  implemented.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  idea	  was	  raised	  again	  by	  the	  EADS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  796	  Spiegel	  staff,	  ‘German	  Government	  Wants	  to	  Buy	  “Golden	  Share”	  in	  EADS’	  Der	  Spiegel	  (Hamburg,	  6	  August	  2007)	  <www.spiegel.de/international/business/defending-­‐national-­‐interests-­‐german-­‐government-­‐wants-­‐to-­‐buy-­‐golden-­‐share-­‐in-­‐eads-­‐a-­‐498327.html>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  797	  David	  Gow,	  ‘German	  Government	  Seeks	  Power	  to	  Veto	  Takeovers	  by	  SWFs’	  The	  Guardian	  (London,	  21	  August	  2008)	  <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/21/germany.mergersandacquisitions>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  798	  Spiegel	  staff,	  ‘Berlin	  Seeks	  Veto	  for	  EADS	  Decisions’	  Der	  Spiegel	  (Hamburg,	  18	  July	  2007)	  <www.spiegel.de/international/business/power-­‐poker-­‐berlin-­‐seeks-­‐veto-­‐for-­‐eads-­‐decisions-­‐a-­‐495220.html>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  799	  Gerrit	  Wiesman,	  ‘France	  and	  Germany	  Consider	  EADS	  Veto’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  16	  July	  2007	  <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee77f788-­‐3385-­‐11dc-­‐9887-­‐0000779fd2ac.html#axzz28cZl9F7t>	  accessed	  8	  October	  2012.	  800	  The	  current	  pact	  does	  not	  allow	  France	  to	  directly	  exercise	  the	  voting	  rights	  its	  15%	  stake	  carries,	  or	  allow	  new	  shareholders	  in,	  ibid.	  801	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘EADS	  to	  Put	  Golden	  Shares	  Proposal	  to	  AGM	  in	  2008’	  Reuters	  (London,	  27	  August	  2007)	  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/08/27/uk-­‐eads-­‐grube-­‐idUKL2772531820070827>	  accessed	  4	  November	  2012.	  802	  According	  to	  Commission	  spokesman	  Drewes,	  ‘the	  European	  Commission	  doesn’t	  think	  golden	  shares	  have	  their	  place	  in	  the	  single	  market’,	  BBC	  News	  staff,	  ‘EU	  Rejects	  EADS	  Golden	  Share	  Idea’	  BBC	  News	  (London,	  7	  March	  2008)	  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7283483.stm>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	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management	  in	  February	  2011	  as	  a	  possible	  solution	  to	  the	  question	  of	  balance	  of	   control	   between	   entities	   of	   German	   and	   French	   interests	   over	   the	   airspace	  manufacturer.803	  The	   idea,	  which	  was	   seen	   as	   only	   one	   possible	   option	   among	  others,	  was	  not	  followed	  at	  the	  time;	  however,	  the	  issue	  of	  an	  EADS	  golden	  share	  may	  emerge	  again	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  experience	  of	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  makes	   it	   clear	   that,	   although	  seen	  with	   great	   suspicion,	   EU	   law	   and	   the	   Commission’s	   practice	   recognise	   states’	  right	  to	  make	  use	  of	  golden	  shares,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  proportional	  and	  limited	  to	  the	  circumstances	   that	   would	   genuinely	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   social	  good.	  More	   specifically,	   should	  a	   golden	   share	  ever	   actually	  be	  used	  by	  France	  and	  Germany	   to	  protect	  EADS	   from	   foreign	  ownership,	   it	  would	  have	   to	   target	  (and	  be	  limited	  to)	  the	  facilities	  linked	  with	  national	  security,	  such	  as	  EADS’	  role	  in	   national	   defence.	   Accordingly,	   it	   should	   avoid	   affecting	   the	   ownership	   or	  business	  decisions	  of	  EADS’	  civil	  operations.	   It	   is	  now	  well	  established	  that	   the	  protection	   of	   a	   purely	   economic	   interest	   in	   a	   domestic	   firm804	  is	   not	   in	   the	  justifications	  permitted	  under	   the	  exceptions	   to	   the	  Treaty’s	   free	  movement	  of	  capital	   rules.	   It	   is	   difficult,	   therefore,	   to	   envisage	   circumstances	   in	   which	   the	  protection	   of	   civil	   operations	   in	   EADS	   would	   justify	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   golden	  share.	  A	  possible	  argument	  that	  a	  golden	  share	  could	  be	  limited	  to	  specific	  business	  decisions,	   for	   example,	   the	   protection	   of	   sensitive	   information	   or	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   from	   exiting	   the	   EU,805	  is	   unsatisfactory.	   First	   of	   all,	   such	   a	  scenario	   would	   have	   to	   assume	   that	   such	   assets	   or	   information	   cannot	   be	  protected	  through	  an	  ex	  post	  control,	  or	  through	  the	  firm’s	  own	  internal	  rules	  (in	  other	  words,	   assume	   that	   a	   golden	   share	  would	   indeed	   be	   a	   proportional	   and	  necessary	   response).	   Furthermore,	   in	   the	   event	   where	   a	   foreign	   shareholder	  acquires	  a	   firm’s	  total	   issued	  shares	  and	  thus	  owns	  all	  of	   the	  company’s	  assets,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  803	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘EADS	  Plans	  to	  Create	  Golden	  Share’	  Reuters	  (London,	  19	  February	  2011)	  <www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/daimler-­‐idUSLDE71I0BF20110219>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  804	  Which	  do	  not	  pertain	  to	  national	  security,	  such	  as	  the	  protection	  of	  IP	  rights.	  805	  In	  the	  event	  where	  a	  controlling	  shareholder	  influences	  the	  company	  rules	  to	  allow	  the	  disclosure	  of	  sensitive	  company	  information	  to	  a	  foreign	  government	  or	  foreign	  competing	  company,	  or	  influences	  business	  decisions	  in	  favour	  of	  moving	  the	  company	  factory	  plants	  abroad.	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including	  sensitive	  information	  and	  intellectual	  property,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  a	  national	  government	  could	  limit	  the	  use	  of	  those	  assets	  by	  their	  rightful	  owner.	  In	  short,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  EADS,	  creating	  a	  golden	  share	  would	  be	  a	  dubious	  strategy	  with	  considerable	  difficulties	  in	  its	  application.	  All	   in	   all,	   in	   their	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Treaty	   rules	   on	   capital	  movements	  and	   freedom	  of	  establishment	  EU	  courts	  have	  shown	  consistency	   in	   their	  strict	  application	   of	   the	   concepts	   of	   proportionality	   and	   necessity.	   In	   addition,	   their	  application	  of	   proportionality	   has	  not	   been	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   balancing	   interests,	  but	  by	  using	  objective	  benchmarks	  such	  as	  transparency	  and	  legal	  certainty.	  The	  courts	   have	   now	   recognised	   the	   justification	   of	   public	   security,	   but	   refused	   to	  accept	  any	  purely	  economic	  ones.806	  The	   following	   two	   sections	  demonstrate	  how	   the	   above	   case	   law	  has	  been	  applied	   in	   the	   circumstances	   created	   by	   the	   advent	   of	   SWFs,	   and	   examine	   in	  more	   detail	   the	   specific	   circumstances	   leading	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   restrictive	  measures	   by	   Member	   States.	   The	   examples	   used	   are	   those	   of	   France,	   and	  Germany.	  In	  addition,	  Greece,	  is	  discussed	  more	  briefly.	  	  	  	  
2.	  National	  Measures	  	  	   Germany	   and	  France,	   as	  well	   as	  Greece,	   have	  been	   chosen	   as	   case	   studies.	  These	   are	   not	   the	   only	   countries	   that	  merit	   analysis	   in	   this	   area.	   SWFs	   invest	  globally	  and	  many	  countries	  around	   the	  world	  adopt,	  or	  consider	   the	  adoption	  of,	   laws	   on	   foreign	   investment.	   The	   UK	   and	   the	   Netherlands,	   for	   example,	   are	  both	  attractive	  destinations	  for	  SWFs.807	  Both	  maintain	  very	  open	  economies808	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  806	  Biondi	  (n	  745)	  97.	  807	  Between	  January	  1995	  and	  July,	  the	  2008	  UK	  received	  $26	  bn	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  $1.3	  bn	  in	  SWF	  investments.	  The	  UK	  received	  the	  highest	  share	  of	  SWF’	  investments	  in	  the	  EU	  while	  the	  Netherlands	  ranked	  5th,	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  8.	  808	  According	  to	  a	  2008	  report	  by	  GAO	  for	  the	  USA	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Banking,	  Housing,	  and	  Urban	  Affairs,	  they	  were	  the	  most	  open	  economies	  among	  the	  ones	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Committee	  (Canada,	  China,	  France,	  Germany,	  India,	  Japan,	  Netherlands,	  Russia,	  UAE,	  UK),	  United	  States	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  ‘Foreign	  Investment	  -­‐	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and,	  although	  they	  have	  some	  form	  of	  market	  regulation	  in	  place,809	  protectionist	  forces	   do	  not	   play	   a	   substantial	   role	   in	   those	   countries.810	  In	   the	  UK,	   despite	   a	  rumoured	   takeover	   of	   Centrica,	   a	   major	   British	   energy	   company,	   by	   Russian	  state-­‐owned	  Gazprom	  in	  2006,	  the	  British	  government	  opted	  against	  making	  any	  changes	  to	  its	  investment	  review	  laws.811	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  there	  is	  no	  formal	  security	   review	   of	   foreign	   investments	   on	   grounds	   of	   national	   security.	  Moreover,	  SWF	  investments	  have	  never	  been	  a	  subject	  of	   intense	  public	  debate	  in	  either	  country.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons	  neither	  the	  UK	  nor	  the	  Netherlands	  would	  make	  appropriate	  case	  studies.	  	  Numerous	  reasons	  make	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Greece	  useful	  as	  case	  studies:	  firstly,	  both	  France	  and	  Germany	  are	  sizeable	  and	  largely	  competitive	  economies	  that	  receive	  a	  substantial	  share	  of	  the	  EU-­‐wide	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   each	   of	   these	   countries	   has	   had	   different	   experiences	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  place	  and	  role	  of	  SWFs	   in	   their	  economies.812	  Greece	  can	  be	  usefully	  studied	  as	  offering	   an	   example	   of	   a	   smaller	   economy.	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   Greece,	   as	  opposed	   to	   France	   and	   Germany,	   has	   suffered	   from	   chronic	   difficulty	   in	  attracting	   FDI	   and	   a	   general	   lack	   of	   competitiveness.813 	  Secondly,	   all	   three	  countries	   have	   introduced	   legislation	   to	   address	   national	   security	   and	   other	  issues	  deriving	   from	   investments	  by	  SWFs	  and	  other	   third	   country	   investment	  vehicles.	   The	   primary	   motivation	   behind	   the	   adoption	   of	   those	   laws	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Laws	  and	  Policies	  Regulating	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  10	  Countries’	  (2008)	  GAO-­‐08-­‐320	  <www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf>	  accessed	  29	  May	  2013,	  14,	  80,	  99.	  809	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  provides	  for	  a	  public	  interest	  review	  of	  foreign	  investments	  and	  the	  control	  of	  classified	  and	  sensitive	  technology.	  The	  Act	  tasks	  the	  Department	  of	  Business,	  Enterprise,	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  with	  recommending	  intervention	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  public	  interest	  when	  necessary.	  The	  DBERR	  was	  disbanded	  in	  June	  2009	  upon	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Department	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  (DBIS)	  which	  now	  has	  responsibility	  for	  the	  said	  review.	  In	  the	  Netherlands	  the	  Financial	  Supervision	  Act	  (Wet	  op	  het	  Financieel	  Toezicht)	  of	  2006	  provides	  for	  competition	  rules	  and	  financial	  markets	  oversight	  on	  grounds	  of	  financial	  stability.	  810	  A	  list	  of	  transactions	  in	  the	  UK	  with	  a	  national	  security	  element	  for	  which	  the	  DBIS	  (see	  ibid)	  has	  issued	  intervention	  notices	  can	  be	  found	  here	  (none	  of	  which	  however	  involve	  SWFs):	  BIS,	  ‘Mergers	  with	  a	  National	  Security	  Element’	  (Department	  for	  Business	  Innovation	  and	  Skills)	  <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20091002210316/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/competition/mergers/public-­‐interest/national-­‐security/index.html>	  accessed	  6	  ;	  The	  Netherlands	  has,	  so	  far,	  typically	  also	  not	  been	  opposed	  to	  investment	  from	  government-­‐controlled	  investors	  see	  GAO	  (n	  808)	  21.	  811	  GAO	  (n	  808)	  103.	  812	  And	  have	  also	  exhibited	  different	  forms	  of	  protectionism.	  813	  As	  discussed	  at	  n	  913,	  Greece	  has	  been	  in	  the	  epicentre	  of	  a	  debt	  crisis	  that	  struck	  various	  Eurozone	  countries.	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protectionism	  present	  in	  each	  country	  in	  varying	  degrees,	  arising	  from	  particular	  circumstances.	  Thirdly,	  all	  of	  them,	  being	  EU	  Member	  States,	  must	  comply	  with	  the	   relevant	   EU	   legislation	   on	   free	   movement	   of	   capital,	   an	   obligation	   which	  Germany	  appears	  to	  have	  fulfilled	  better	  than	  France	  or	  Greece.	  The	   analysis	   demonstrates	   that	   unilateral	   measures	   taken	   by	   individual	  countries	   are	   typically	   out	   of	   proportion	   to	   the	   reality	   of	   SWF	   threats.	   Such	  measures	   will	   almost	   certainly	   cause	   unnecessary	   harm	   through	   the	   loss	   of	  investment	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   economic	   distortions.	   Additionally,	   these	  measures	  risk	  bringing	  the	  respective	  governments	  before	  the	  EU	  courts	  and	  the	  imposition	  of	  costly	  fines.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  implementation	  by	  the	  case	  study	  countries	  of	  SWF	   related	   legislation	   was	   caused	   in	   part	   by	   the	   absence	   of	   comprehensive	  legislation	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  SWFs.	  National	  lawmakers	  may	  have	  been	  convinced	  they	  were	  doing	  nothing	  more	  than	  filling	  a	  legislative	  gap.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  6,	  the	  European	  Commission	  opted	  for	  a	  non-­‐interventionist	   approach	  even	  after	   the	  passing	  of	   the	   relevant	   laws	   in	  France,	  Germany	   and	   Greece.	   The	   Commission	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   convinced	   that	  SWFs	  do	  not	  pose	  risks	  serious	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	  adoption	  of	  hard	  regulatory	  instruments	  and,	  thus,	  the	  Commission	  chose	  the	  soft	  law	  approach	  of	  suggesting	  their	  own	  code	  of	  conduct.	  That	  the	  chosen	  national	  governments	  failed	  to	  follow	  such	  a	   facts-­‐based	  approach	  suggests	  that	  they	  were	  guided	  in	  part	  by	  political	  considerations	  or	  protectionist	  doctrines.	  The	   analysis	   of	   each	   country	   also	   touches	   briefly	   upon	   their	   Bilateral	  Investment	   Treaties	   (BITs)	   concluded	   with	   developing	   countries.	   BITs	   are	  implemented	   to	   offer	   foreign	   investors	   protection	   from	   discrimination	   and/or	  unlawful	   appropriation	   of	   their	   investment.	   They	   also	   aim	   to	   establish	   a	  settlement	  mechanism	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   dispute	   between	   the	   investor	   and	   the	  host	   nation.	   The	   conclusion	   of	   such	   treaties	   initially	   suggested	   that	   many	  investors	   from	   developed	   countries	   were	   not	   confident	   about	   the	   legal	   and	  political	   environment	   in	   low	   and	   middle-­‐income	   countries.814	  In	   this	   context,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  814	  Jennifer	  Tobin	  and	  Susan	  Rose-­‐Ackerman,	  ‘Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  and	  the	  Business	  Environment	  in	  [FDI]	  and	  the	  Business	  Environment	  in	  Developing	  Countries:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties’	  (2005)	  Yale	  Law	  School,	  Center	  for	  Law,	  Economics	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  Research	  Paper	  No	  293,	  3.	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investment	  treaties played	  the	  role	  of	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  quality	  of	   institutions	  or	   the	   political	   risk	   in	   a	   developing	   country.815	  Today,	   developed	   nations	   seek	  foreign	   capital	   from	   developing	   ones.	   BITs	   may	   serve	   to	   reassure	   sovereign	  investors	   that	   they	   will	   not	   be	   discriminated	   against	   in	   developed	   western	  markets	  and	  will	  be	  offered	  parity	  with	  other	  investors.	  However,	  most	  treaties	  tend	   to	   provide	   for	   national	   security	   exceptions,	   or	   sometimes	   exclude	   entire	  sectors	   (such	   as	   telecommunications	   or	   energy)	   from	   SWFs’	   ambit.816	  In	   this	  sense,	  although	  BITs	  are	  a	  relevant	  consideration	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  SWFs,	  they	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  determinant	  factor	  in	  the	  SWF	  debate.	  The	  conclusions	  of	  this	  chapter	  serve	  in	  the	  next	  one	  to	  support	  the	  case	  that	  if	  any	  further	  action	  against	  SWFs	  is	  taken,	  it	  would	  be	  preferable	  to	  do	  so	  at	  the	  EU,	  rather	  than	  the	  national	  level.	  	  
i.	  France	  
	  a.	  French	  openness	  to	  foreign	  investments	  	  France	  is	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  the	  countries	  most	  open	  to	  foreign	  investment	  in	  the	  world.817	  According	  to	  article	  L151-­‐1	  of	  the	  French	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Code,	   financial	  dealings	  between	  France	  and	   foreign	  countries	  are,	   in	  principle,	  unrestricted.	  Overall,	   the	   country	   ranked	   fifth	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   average	   value	   of	  FDI	   defined	   inflows	  worldwide	   between	   2000	   and	   2006,	   while	   FDI	   stock	   as	   a	  proportion	   of	   GDP	   in	   France	   was	   35%	   in	   2006.818	  Moreover,	   according	   to	  Deutsche	  Bank	  research,	  between	  January	  1995	  and	  July	  2008	  France	  attracted	  $3.8	  bn	  from	  SWF	  investments,	  thus	  ranking	  third	  in	  the	  EU.819	  France	   has,	   moreover,	   concluded	   BITs	   with	   a	   number	   of	   third	   countries,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  815	  Kim	  Sokchea,	  ‘Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaties,	  Political	  Risk	  and	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment’	  (2007)	  Vol	  11(1)	  Asia	  Pacific	  JEconBus	  7.	  816	  For	  instance	  Singapore’s	  treaties	  with	  France,	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  limit	  the	  protection	  offered	  to	  investors	  to	  specifically	  approved	  investment	  projects,	  Tobin	  and	  Ackerman,	  (n	  814)	  11;	  Other	  examples	  from	  the	  countries	  analysed	  in	  this	  chapter	  can	  be	  seen	  below	  n	  820,	  868,	  943.	  817	  AmCham,	  ‘The	  French	  Investment	  Climate’	  (American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce’,	  2010)	  <www.amchamfrance.org/theme1.php?idcontenu=107&idpage>	  accessed	  29	  January	  2012.	  818	  GAO	  (n	  808)	  53.	  819	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  8	  chart	  13.	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including	  many	  who	  manage	  SWFs,	  such	  as	  Qatar820	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia.821	  Those	  agreements	  offer	  a	  heightened	  degree	  of	  investment	  protection	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  provide	   for	   ‘national	   treatment’822	  but	   they	   also	  provide	   for	   exceptions	   to	  the	  rules	  against	  appropriation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  public	  utility.823	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  France	  has	  not	  overcome	  a	  traditional	  preference	  for	  state	   intervention	  and	  a	  sometimes	   ‘reflexive	  opposition’	   to	   foreign	   investment	  noting	   in	   particular	   the	   opacity	   under	  which	   certain	   privatisations	   have	   taken	  place	  in	  the	  past,	  thus	  creating	  the	  impression	  that	  not	  all	   foreign	  investors	  are	  treated	  equally.824	  One	   of	   the	   most	   notable	   legal	   cases	   concerning	   privatisation	   in	   France	  concerned	  the	  golden	  share	  case	  (see	  above)	  retained	  by	  the	  French	  government	  in	  Société	  Nationale	  Elf-­‐Aquitaine	  by	  Decree	  No	  93-­‐1298	  of	  13	  December	  1993	  to	  ‘protect	   national	   interests’. 825 	  The	   golden	   share	   gave	   the	   government	   the	  following	  legal	  rights:	  1.	   To	   require	   prior	   authorisation	   from	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Economy	   for	   any	  investor	  to	  own	  more	  than	  the	  ceiling	  of	  one	  tenth,	  one	  fifth	  or	  one	  third	  of	  the	  capital	  of,	  or	  voting	  rights	  in,	  the	  company;	  and	  2.	  To	  oppose	  any	  decision	  to	  transfer	  or	  use	  as	  security	   the	  assets	   listed	   in	  the	  annex	  to	  the	  Decree.826	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  820	  Décret	  no	  2000-­‐775	  du	  1er	  août	  2000	  portant	  publication	  de	  l’accord	  entre	  le	  
Gouvernement	  de	  la	  République	  française	  et	  le	  Gouvernement	  de	  l’Etat	  du	  Qatar	  sur	  
l’encouragement	  et	  la	  protection	  réciproques	  des	  investissements,	  (signed	  1996),	  <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000584162&dateTexte>	  accessed	  14	  March	  2012.	  821	  ‘Décret	  n°	  2004-­‐207	  du	  8	  mars	  2004	  portant	  publication	  de	  l’accord	  entre	  le	  
Gouvernement	  de	  la	  République	  française	  et	  le	  Gouvernement	  du	  Royaume	  d’Arabie	  
saoudite	  sur	  l’encouragement	  et	  la	  protection	  réciproques	  des	  investissements’,	  (signed	  2002)	  <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000611383&dateTexte>	  accessed	  14	  March	  2012.	  822	  As	  opposed	  to	  simple	  mention	  to	  ‘fair	  and	  equitable’	  treatment,	  national	  treatment	  offers	  foreign	  investors	  the	  same	  treatment	  as	  national	  ones,	  for	  example,	  see	  Article	  4	  paragraph	  1	  in	  the	  agreement	  concluded	  with	  Qatar.	  823	  Article	  5.2	  in	  the	  agreement	  with	  Qatar.	  824	  ibid.	  The	  American	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  mentions,	  in	  particular,	  that	  sales	  of	  shares	  in	  public	  companies,	  such	  as	  Air	  France-­‐KLM,	  Gaz	  de	  France,	  Électricité	  de	  France,	  Thales,	  Areva	  etc.,	  are	  more	  often	  made	  through	  an	  ‘off-­‐market’	  bidding	  process.	  825	  Commission	  v	  France	  (n	  747).	  826	  The	  assets	  in	  question	  being	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  capital	  of	  four	  subsidiaries	  of	  the	  parent	  company,	  namely	  Elf-­‐Aquitaine	  Production,	  Elf-­‐Antar	  France,	  Elf-­‐Gabon	  SA	  and	  Elf-­‐Congo	  SA,	  Article	  2(3)	  of	  the	  Decree.	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In	  its	  2002	  decision,	  the	  CJEU	  reaffirmed	  the	  principle	  of	   free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  struck	  down	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  from	  the	  French	  law	  for	  failing	  to	   lay	   down	   sufficiently	   precise	   and	   objective	   criteria	   for	   approval	   of,	   or	  opposition	  to,	  these	  operations.827	  	  b.	  French	  ‘economic	  patriotism’	  	  More	  recently,	  under	  former	  President	  Sarkozy,	  a	  number	  of	  actions	  by	  the	  French	   government	   were	   a	   continuation	   of	   Sarkozy’s	   predecessor’s	   policy	   of	  ‘economic	   patriotism’.828	  Such	   a	   stance	  was	   also	   evident	   with	   regard	   to	   SWFs,	  which	  Sarkozy	  described	  as	   ‘aggressive	   funds’	   from	  which	  French	  businessmen	  ought	   to	  be	  protected,829	  while	  he	  has	  also	  expressed	  concerns	  over	   the	   lack	  of	  reciprocity	  within	  the	  home	  markets	  of	  many	  of	  the	  largest	  SWF	  holders.830	  Such	  statements	   have	   contradicted	   other	   simultaneous	   messages	   by	   French	  government	  ministers	  inviting	  SWFs	  to	  invest	  in	  France.831	  As	   regards	   EU	   politics,	   in	   October	   2008	   in	   a	   speech	   before	   the	   European	  Parliament	  (EP),	  Sarkozy	  proposed	  that	  European	  countries	  should	  create	  their	  own	   SWFs	   to	   protect	   national	   companies	   from	   foreign	   ‘predators’	   and	   act	   as	  political	  investors	  to	  thwart	  foreign	  purchases	  of	  European	  companies.832	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  827	  Commission	  v.	  France	  (n	  747).	  828	  ‘Economic	  patriotism’	  was	  a	  phrase	  coined	  by	  former	  French	  Prime	  Minister	  de	  Villepin	  following	  PepsiCo’s	  rumoured	  attempt	  in	  July	  2005	  to	  take	  over	  Danone,	  Ben	  Clift,	  ‘French	  Economic	  Patriotism:	  Legislative,	  Regulatory,	  &	  Discursive	  Dimensions’,	  Paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  PSA	  Annual	  Conference,	  Manchester,	  April	  7-­‐9th	  2009,	  <http://www.psa.ac.uk/2009/pps/Clift.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  May	  2013,	  2. 829	  Economist	  staff,	  ‘The	  Invasion	  of	  the	  SWFs’	  (n	  834).	  830	  In	  his	  own	  words,	  ‘I	  don’t	  accept	  that	  certain	  [SWFs]	  can	  buy	  anything	  here	  and	  our	  own	  capitalists	  can’t	  buy	  anything	  in	  their	  countries.	  I	  demand	  reciprocity	  before	  we	  open	  Europe’s	  barriers’,	  Martin	  Weiss,	  ‘[SWFs]:	  Background	  and	  Policy	  Issues	  for	  Congress’	  (2012)	  Order	  Code	  RL34336	  CRS	  Report	  for	  Congress	  <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110750.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  May	  2013,	  18.	  831	  Demarolle’s	  report	  in	  May	  2008	  described	  the	  funds	  as	  ‘fundamentally	  positive’,	  Alain	  Demarolle	  and	  Henri	  Johanet,	  ‘Rapport	  sur	  les	  Fonds	  Souverains’	  (2008)	  Report	  to	  the	  French	  Minister	  of	  Finances	  <www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-­‐publics/084000299/0000.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  May	  2013,	  4.	  832	  Kavaljit	  Singh,	  ‘Nicolas	  Sarkozy	  and	  SWFs’	  Spectrezine	  (3	  November	  2008)	  <www.spectrezine.org/europe/Singh.htm>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012;	  For	  the	  text	  of	  the	  speech	  see,	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy,	  ‘Speech	  Before	  the	  European	  Parliament’	  Strasbourg,	  21	  October	  2008,	  <www.ambafrance-­‐uk.org/President-­‐Sarkozy-­‐s-­‐speech-­‐before.html>	  accessed	  6	  February	  2012.	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In	  line	  with	  the	  ideas	  expressed	  in	  that	  speech,	  also	  in	  October	  2008,	  while	  addressing	  French	  business	  leaders	  in	  Annecy	  (France),	  Sarkozy	  announced	  that	  France	   would	   establish	   a	   SWF	   to	   support	   companies	   of	   national	   strategic	  importance	   as	   he	   would	   ‘not	   be	   the	   French	   President	   who	   wakes	   up	   in	   six	  months	   time	   to	   see	   that	   French	   industrial	   groups	   have	   passed	   into	   other	  hands’.833	  The	   state-­‐owned	   bank	   Caisse	   des	   Depots	   et	   Consignations	   (CDC)	   was	  chosen	   to	   form	   part	   of	   the	   defence	   of	   French	   companies	   against	   attacks	   by	  foreign	   state-­‐owned	   investment	   funds.	   The	   CDC	   would,	   thus,	   be	   elevated	   to	   a	  ‘tool	  in	  this	  policy	  of	  defence	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  economic	  interests	  essential	  to	  the	  nation’.834	  The	   French	   SWF	  was	   created	   in	  November	   2008,835	  under	   the	   name	   ‘Fond	  
d’Investissement	  Strategique’	  (FSI).	  It	  was	  set	  up	  to	  be	  partly	  owned	  by	  the	  bank	  CDC	   (51%)	   and	   partly	   owned	   by	   the	   French	   government	   (49%)	   and	   was	  endowed	  with	  EUR	  20	  billion,	  which	   consisted	  of	  14	  billion	  worth	  of	   stakes	   in	  French	  companies	  and	  6	  billion	  in	  cash.836	  Its	  stated	  strategy	  was	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  with	  a	  strong	  potential	  for	  innovation	  and	  sector	  leadership,	  and	  to	  stabilise	  the	  capital	  companies	  deemed	  strategic	  to	  the	  French	  economy.837	  It	  offers	  a	  high	  level	  of	  disclosure838	  and	  also	  provides	   for	  Parliamentary	  supervision	   through	   the	  Commission	  de	  Surveillance	  of	   the	   CDC,	   composed	   of	   thirteen	   members	   of	   which	   five	   are	   members	   of	  Parliament	  (three	  deputies	  and	  two	  senators).839	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  833	  ibid.	  834	  Helen	  Beresford,	  ‘Sarkozy	  to	  Use	  CDC	  to	  Defend	  French	  Companies	  Against	  “Aggressive”	  Speculators’	  AFX	  News	  (London,	  1	  August	  2008)	  <www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-­‐2008-­‐01/9821362-­‐sarkozy-­‐to-­‐use-­‐cdc-­‐to-­‐defend-­‐french-­‐cos-­‐against-­‐aggressive-­‐speculators-­‐020.htm>	  accessed	  26	  December	  2012.	  835	  The	  speech	  of	  20	  November	  2008	  at	  Montrichard	  served	  as	  the	  opportunity	  to	  announce	  its	  strategy	  and	  organisation.	  836	  Fiechter	  (n	  709)	  72.	  837	  ibid.	  838	  Fond	  Strategique	  d’Investissement,	  <http://www.fonds-­‐fsi.fr>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012;	  This	  site	  provides	  access	  to	  the	  fund’s	  activity	  report	  for	  2010,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  governance	  team	  and	  structure,	  external	  partners	  and	  press	  releases;	  for	  example,	  see,	  FSI,	  ‘Rapport	  d’Activité	  Annuel	  2011’	  (FSI,	  2012)	  <www.fonds-­‐fsi.fr/le-­‐fsi/le-­‐rapport-­‐d-­‐activite-­‐annuel-­‐2010.html>,	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  839	  The	  Commission	  de	  Surveillance	  according	  to	  article	  L	  518-­‐4	  of	  the	  French	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Code,	  guarantees	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  CDC	  and	  exercises	  control	  over	  the	  fund;	  it	  supervises	  the	  state	  of	  the	  coffers	  and	  the	  management	  of	  the	  fund.	  It	  also	  makes	  recommendations	  to	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  the	  fund,	  the	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Government,	  see	  (French	  speaking	  site):	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The	   creation	   of	   the	   French	   SWF	   itself,	   differs	   in	   many	   respects	   from	   the	  usual	  method	   of	   creation	   and	   operation	   of	   SWFs,	   firstly,	   in	   that	   France	   suffers	  from	  chronic	   fiscal	  deficits	  and	  a	  growing	  national	  debt,840	  instead	  of	  surpluses	  which	  are	  typical	  in	  SWF	  managing	  nations.	  Moreover,	  the	  FSI	  is	  aimed	  primarily	  to	   invest	   domestically	   to	   protect	   the	   national	   economy,	   instead	   of	   investing	  abroad	   to	   diversify	   its	   economy	   or	   insulate	   it	   from	   volatile	   international	  commodity	   prices.	   The	   creation	   of	   such	   a	   fund,	   driven	   principally	   by	   political	  motives	   has	   been	   described	   as	   ‘hypocritical’	   since	   a	   number	   of	   European	  countries,	   including	   France,	   condemn	   potential	   political,	   non-­‐commercial	  motivations	  behind	  these	  funds,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  creating	  SWFs	  with	  that	  same	   motivation.841	  However	   during	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   as	   seen	   in	   chapter	   2,	  many	   countries	   made	   use	   of	   their	   funds,	   essentially,	   to	   assist	   their	   domestic	  economies.842	  The	  action	  taken	  by	  Sarkozy	  did	  no	  more	  than	  to	  formalise	  such	  a	  specific	  use	  of	  a	  SWF.843	  As	   largely	  seen	   in	   the	   first	   three	  chapters,	  managing	  a	  SWF	  is	  mainly	  about	  government	  policy	  choices.	  	  c.	  The	  French	  legal	  response	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Caisse	  des	  Dépôts,	  ‘La	  Commission	  de	  Surevillance’	  <www.caissedesdepots.fr/le-­‐groupe/gouvernance/la-­‐commission-­‐de-­‐surveillance.html>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  840	  In	  2010,	  France’s	  budget	  deficit	  amounted	  to	  7.1%	  of	  its	  national	  GDP	  and	  its	  public	  debt	  was	  estimated	  at	  95.2%	  of	  its	  GDP.	  These	  figures	  are	  close	  to	  the	  OECD	  average	  for	  that	  period,	  namely,	  7.7%	  deficit	  and	  98.7%	  debt,	  For	  the	  deficit	  see,	  OECD,	  ‘Government	  deficit	  –	  Net	  Lending/Net	  Borrowing	  as	  a	  Percentage	  of	  GDP,	  Surplus	  (+),	  Deficit	  (-­‐)’	  (OECD,	  2012)	  <www.oecd-­‐ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/190200211e1t001.pdf?expires=1352212219&id=id&accname=freeContent&checksum=21BC16C57C18C3891C4DC6071BE11955>,	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012;	  For	  the	  debt	  see,	  OECD,	  ‘Government	  Debt	  –	  General	  Government	  Gross	  Financial	  Liabilities	  as	  a	  Percentage	  of	  GDP’	  (OECD,	  2012)	  <www.oecd-­‐ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/190200221e1t004.pdf?expires=1352212436&id=id&accname=freeContent&checksum=540A50F9762580969E77AC50B5FDC3E2>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  841	  Singh	  (n	  832).	  842	  See	  chapter	  2,	  ‘Shifting	  focus	  on	  domestic	  issues’.	  843	  Such	  an	  action	  could	  well	  expand	  the	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  (discussed	  in	  chapter	  1)	  to	  include	  this	  category	  of	  fund	  as	  well.	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Contrary	  to	  most	  other	  cases	  of	  national	  laws,844	  France’s	  legal	  response	  was	  not	   triggered	   by	   a	   specific	   incident,	   rather,	   it	   was	   a	   calculated	   response	   to	   a	  wider	  phenomenon	  of	  increasing	  FDI	  and	  growing	  state	  capitalism.	  This	  section	  will	  deal	  with	  two	  relevant	  decrees,	  one	  issued	  in	  2005	  and	  a	  later	  one	  of	  2012	  making	  a	  number	  of	  amendments.	  Firstly,	   France	  had	   always	   implemented	   a	   general	   screening	  procedure	   for	  FDI.	   Under	   article	   L151-­‐3	   of	   the	   Monetary	   and	   Financial	   Code,	   financial	   links	  with	   foreign	   countries	   (such	   as	   foreign	   investments)	   are	   subject	   to	   ex	   ante	  review	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Economics	  for	  reasons	  of	  public	  order,	  health,	  security,	  research,	   production	   or	   trade	   in	   any	   substances	   destined	   for	   military	   use	   or	  wartime	  equipment.	  The	  review	  may	  result	  in	  approval,	  rejection	  or	  conditional	  approval	   and	  may	  be	  appealed	  by	   the	  applicant	   foreign	   investor.	  The	  available	  evidence	   shows	   that	   under	   the	   powers	   conferred	   by	   this	   provision,	   nine	  applications	   were	   rejected	   between	   1992	   and	   1994	   for	   reasons	   of	   public	  order.845	  Compared	  to	  the	  equivalent	  investment	  screening	  measures	  adopted	  in	  the	  USA,	  Japan	  and	  the	  UK,846	  French	  measures	  achieved	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  transactions	  blocked	  (thus	  confirming	  that	  although	  France	  is	  an	  open	  economy	  it	  still	  maintains	  protectionist	  practices).	  Legal	  developments	  in	  France	  more	  relevant	  to	  SWFs	  came	  later	  in	  2005.	  In	  reaction	   to	   the	  Court’s	   judgement	   in	  Eglise	  de	  Scientologie,847	  France	   issued	   the	  Decree	   No	   2005-­‐1739	   of	   30	   December	   2005	   (codified	   at	   Articles	   R.153-­‐1	   to	  R.153-­‐5).	   The	   2005	   Decree	   established	   a	   list	   of	   eleven	   protected	   sectors	  requiring	   ministerial	   authorisation	   for	   any	   attempt	   to	   purchase	   a	   controlling	  interest848	  in	  a	  firm	  or	  acquire	  a	  branch	  of	  a	  firm	  whose	  corporate	  headquarters	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  844	  And	  especially	  the	  other	  jurisdictions	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  USA,	  Germany	  and	  Greece.	  845	  Kern	  (n	  43)	  10.	  846	  Until	  2008,	  only	  one	  case	  was	  blocked	  in	  the	  USA,	  while	  in	  Japan	  none	  was	  blocked	  since	  the	  2002	  revision	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Exchange	  and	  Foreign	  Trade	  Control	  Law	  of	  1997.	  In	  the	  UK	  the	  powers	  under	  the	  relevant	  law	  have	  never	  been	  evoked	  to	  block	  a	  transaction.	  ibid.	  847	  Condemning	  France	  for	  maintaining	  a	  number	  of	  provisions	  in	  the	  French	  legislation	  laying	  down,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  a	  system	  of	  prior	  authorisation	  for	  direct	  foreign	  investments,	  n	  761.	  848	  Article	  L	  233-­‐3	  of	  the	  French	  Commercial	  Code,	  provides	  a	  definition	  of	  ‘control’	  of	  a	  company	  by	  another	  one,	  based	  on	  1.	  Controlling	  the	  majority	  of	  voting	  rights,	  2.	  Effectively	  determining	  the	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  company	  through	  the	  use	  of	  that	  voting	  power,	  and	  3.	  Being	  able	  to	  appoint	  or	  dismiss	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  of	  that	  company’s	  administrative,	  management,	  or	  supervisory	  structures.	  Control	  is	  also	  assumed	  when	  a	  company	  holds	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  voting	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are	   located	   in	   France,	   or	   acquire	  more	   than	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	   capital	   or	   voting	  rights	  of	  a	  firm	  whose	  corporate	  headquarters	  are	  located	  in	  France.	  Under	  the	  2005	  Decree,	   the	  Minister	  of	  Economy	  had	  two	  months	  to	  assess	  the	   investor’s	  request	   for	   authorisation,	   after	  which	   he	   issued	   an	   approval	   or	   denial.849	  If	   no	  decision	  was	  taken	  within	  this	  limit,	  the	  authorisation	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  granted.	  When	   deciding	   the	   national	   security	   implication	   of	   an	   investment,	   regard	  was	  also	  given,	  informally,	  to	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  investing	  body	  that	  is	  owned	  by	  a	  foreign	   government.850	  Failure	   to	   apply	   for	   a	   national	   security	   review	   when	  required	  could	  result	  in	  criminal	  and	  civil	  penalties.851	  The	  eleven	  sectors	   requiring	  approval	  were	   the	   following:	  1.	  gambling	  and	  casinos;	  2.	  private	  security;	  3.	  research,	  development,	  or	  production	  of	  means	  to	  stem	   the	   unlawful	   use,	   in	   terrorist	   activities,	   of	   pathogens	   or	   toxins;	   4.	  equipment	  designed	  to	  intercept	  correspondence	  and	  monitor	  conversations;	  5.	  testing	  and	  certification	  of	   the	  security	  of	   information	  technology	  products	  and	  systems;	  6.	  production	  of	   goods	  or	   supply	  of	   services	   to	  ensure	   the	   security	  of	  information	   systems;	   7.	   dual-­‐use	   items	   and	   technologies; 852 	  8.	   cryptology	  equipment	  and	  services;	  9.	  activities	  carried	  out	  by	  firms	  entrusted	  with	  national	  defence	  secrets,	  in	  particular	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  national	  defence	  contracts	  or	  of	  security	   clauses;	   10.	   research,	   production,	   or	   trade	   in	   weapons,	   ammunitions,	  powders,	   and	   explosives	   intended	   for	  military	   purposes	   or	   war	  materials;	   11.	  activities	   carried	   out	   by	   firms	   holding	   a	   contract	   for	   the	   design	   or	   supply	   of	  equipment	   for	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Defence,	   either	   directly	   or	   as	   subcontractors,	   to	  produce	  an	  item	  or	  supply	  a	  service	  for	  one	  of	  the	  sectors	  referred	  to	  in	  points	  7	  to	  10	  above.853	  Companies	   based	   in	   EU	   Member	   States	   were	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   review	  process	  for	  sectors	  8	  to	  11.	  As	  far	  as	  sectors	  1	  to	  7	  are	  concerned,	  more	  details	  were	  required	  from	  the	  potential	  (EU)	  investor,	  including	  the	  location	  where	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  rights	  above	  40%	  and	  no	  other	  partner	  or	  shareholder	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  holds	  a	  fraction	  larger	  than	  its	  own.	  849	  Article	  R153-­‐8.	  850	  GAO	  (n	  808)	  59.	  851	  Art	  R165-­‐2;	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Economy	  may	  also	  deliver	  opinions	  to	  investors	  if	  they	  are	  unsure	  whether	  the	  proposed	  investment	  is	  subject	  to	  review,	  Art	  R	  153-­‐7.	  	  852	  As	  listed	  in	  Annex	  IV	  of	  European	  Council	  Regulation	  No.	  1334/2000	  of	  June	  22,	  2000.	  853	  Article	  R153-­‐2.	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investor	   is	  a	   legal	  entity	  and	  details	  on	   the	   individuals	  and	  public	   legal	  entities	  that	   have	   ultimate	   control	   over	   the	   investing	   organisation.854 	  The	   place	   of	  residence	  (siège	  sociale)	  of	  a	  corporate	  investor	  under	  French	  law	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  location	  of	  its	  owners,	  without	  regard	  to	  its	  place	  of	  incorporation.855	  The	  fact	   that	   an	   investor	  was	   a	   foreign	   state-­‐owned	   enterprise	   or	   a	   SWF	   could	   be	  considered	   during	   the	   review	  process,	   although	   no	   specific	   rules	   or	   guidelines	  existed	  about	  this.856	  The	   Ministry	   of	   Economy	   had	   responsibility	   for	   determining	   whether	  security	   risks	   are	   present	   and	   whether	   these	   may	   be	   mitigated	   by	   imposing	  conditions	   for	   approving	   the	   transaction.	   For	   example,	   sensitive	   technologies	  may	  be	  kept	  in	  France,	  or	  where	  classified	  information	  was	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  business,	  this	  may	  be	  available	  only	  to	  French	  citizens.857	  The	  requirement	  to	  notify	   and	   the	   prior-­‐authorisation	   arose	   not	   only	   when	   the	   initial	   investment	  was	  made,	  but	  also	  during	  any	  re-­‐capitalisation,	  change	  in	  shareholding,	  or	  upon	  a	   resale	   of	   the	   investment.	   This	   aspect	   of	   the	   review	   distinguished	   the	   French	  from	  the	  German	  and	  American858	  review	  system.	  Half	   the	   cases	   reviewed	   in	   2006	   required	   mitigation	   agreements.859	  The	  decision	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Economy	   was	   subject	   to	   an	   appeal,	   although,	  considering	   that	  up	   to	  2010,	  only	   two	  cases	  had	  been	  rejected	   (of	  a	   few	  dozen	  examined	  every	  year)	  the	  opportunity	  to	  appeal	  is	  rarely	  used.	  Soon	  after	  France	  adopted	  this	   law,	  the	  EU	  Commission	  embarked	  upon	  its	  formal	   review	   process	   to	   investigate	   potential	   violations	   of	   the	   rule	   on	   free	  movement	   of	   capital.	   As	   stated,	   although	   objectives	   of	   public	   policy,	   public	  security	   and	   national	   defence	   ‘may	   require	   measures	   that	   restrict	   the	  fundamental	  freedoms	  established	  by	  the	  EC	  Treaty’,	  the	  Commission	  expressed	  its	   concern	   that	   the	   authorisation	   procedure	   provided	   by	   the	   French	   Decree	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  854	  Article	  R	  153-­‐4.	  855	  EDA,	  ‘ANNEX	  1:	  the	  French	  Regulation	  Related	  to	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  Sensitive	  Industry’	  (2011)	  European	  Defence	  Agency	  <http://eda.europa.eu/SOSWeb/Libraries/Library/The_French_regulation_related_to_foreign_investment_in_sensitive_industry_main_features.sflb.ashx>	  accessed	  28	  May	  2013,	  1.	  856	  Schweitzer	  (n	  597)	  268.	  857	  GAO	  (n	  808)	  58.	  858	  See	  below	  at	  227.	  859	  GAO	  (n	  808)	  58.	  
National	  Regulatory	  Models	  
	   216	  
‘lacked	   the	   required	  proportionality	  with	   regard	   to	   these	   objectives’.860	  Special	  reference	   was	  made	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	   casinos	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   Decree	   as	  ‘unsatisfactory’.861	  On	  May	  7,	  2012,	   the	  French	  government	   issued	  a	  second	  decree	   (the	  2012	  Decree)	  to	  address	  the	  Commission’s	  concerns.	  The	  2012	  Decree	  revised	  the	  list	  of	   protected	   sectors	   by	   applying	   a	   stricter	   standard	   for	   non-­‐EU	   investors	   and	  foreign-­‐controlled	  French	   investors.	  For	   instance,	   it	  removed	   ‘casinos’	   from	  the	  list,	   but	   only	   as	   far	   as	   EU	   investors	   are	   concerned.	  Moreover,	   it	   specified	   that	  only	  non-­‐EU	  investors	  were	  to	  seek	  authorisation	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economy.	  	  
ii.	  Germany	  	  a.	  German	  industry	  and	  foreign	  investments	  	   Germany	   currently	   enjoys	   the	   position	   of	   being	   one	   of	   the	   most	   open	  investment	  location	  among	  the	  world’s	  large	  industrialised	  countries.862	  In	  2008	  Germany	  is	  said	  to	  have	  received	  $5.1	  billion	  of	  investment	  from	  SWFs,	  making	  it	  the	   second	   most	   popular	   destination	   in	   Europe,	   after	   the	   UK	   (which,	   as	   seen	  above,	  enjoyed	  a	  strong	  lead	  of	  $26	  billion).863	  The	   German	   government	   and	   industry	   is	   known	   to	   actively	   encourage	  foreign	   investment	   in	   Germany,	   and	   German	   law	   treats	   foreign	   and	   national	  investors	  alike.864	  Foreigners	  are	  also	  treated	  equally	  in	  privatisations865	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  860	  Commission,	  ‘Free	  Movement	  of	  Capital:	  Commission	  Scrutinises	  French	  Law	  Establishing	  Authorisation	  Procedure	  for	  Foreign	  Investments	  in	  Certain	  Sectors’,	  Press	  Release,	  IP/06/438,	  4	  April	  2006	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐06-­‐438_en.htm?locale=en>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012.	  861	  ibid.	  862	  In	  2010	  Germany	  ranked	  seventh	  in	  the	  world	  on	  the	  OECD’s	  FDI	  restrictiveness	  index	  (the	  index	  is	  based	  on	  equity	  restrictions,	  screening	  and	  approval	  requirements,	  restrictions	  on	  foreign	  key	  personnel,	  and	  other	  operational	  restrictions,	  such	  as	  limits	  on	  purchase	  of	  land	  or	  on	  repatriation	  of	  profits	  and	  capital),	  Blanka	  Kalinova,	  Angel	  Palerm	  and	  Stephen	  Thomsen,	  ‘OECD’s	  FDI	  Restrictiveness	  Index:	  2010	  Update’	  (2010)	  No.	  2010/3	  OECD	  Working	  Papers	  on	  International	  Investment	  19. 863	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  8.	  864	  Foreign-­‐owned	  companies	  registered	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  as	  a	  GmbH	  (limited	  liability	  company)	  or	  an	  AG	  (joint	  stock	  company)	  receive	  the	  same	  treatment	  under	  German	  law	  as	  German-­‐owned	  companies,	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investment-­‐related	  problems	   foreign	  companies	   face	  are	  generally	   the	   same	  as	  for	   domestic	   firms.866	  Similarly,	   foreign	   investors	   are	   generally	   subject	   to	   the	  same	  eligibility	  conditions	  as	  German	  investors	  for	  incentive	  programs.867	  Germany	  has	  BITs	  in	  force	  with	  131	  countries	  and	  territories868	  including	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  which	  manage	  SWFs,	   such	  as	  Kuwait,869	  China,870	  Qatar,871	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia.872	  The	  more	  recent	  agreements	  provide	   for	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rules	  on	   ‘fair	  and	  equitable	  treatment’	   for	  measures	  taken	  for	  reasons	  of	  public	  security	   and	   order,	   public	   health	   or	   morality.873	  Interestingly,	   the	   agreement	  with	   Kuwait	   includes	   the	   Kuwaiti	   SWF,	   the	   KIA,	   in	   the	   list	   of	   investors	   to	   be	  accorded	   the	   protections	   provided	   in	   the	   body	   of	   the	   agreement.874	  Moreover,	  the	  agreement	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  one	  investment	  dispute	  before	  the	   International	   Centre	   for	   Settlement	   of	   Investment	   Disputes	   (ICSID) 875	  between	   a	   German	   corporation	   and	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia.876	  The	   case,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Germany,	  ‘Investment	  Climate’	  (2011)	  Export.gov	  <http://export.gov/germany/MarketResearchonGermany/CountryCommercialGuide/InvestmentClimate/index.asp#P14_474>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012.	  865	  ibid,	  There	  are	  no	  special	  nationality	  requirements	  on	  directors	  or	  shareholders.	  In	  addition,	  investors	  need	  to	  register	  investment	  intent	  with	  any	  government	  entity	  only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  acquiring	  a	  significant	  stake	  in	  a	  firm	  in	  the	  defence	  or	  encryption	  industries.	  866	  ibid,	  Such	  as	  high	  marginal	  income	  tax	  rates	  and	  labour	  laws	  that	  impede	  hiring	  and	  dismissals.	  867	  ibid,	  Such	  as	  investment	  grants,	  credit	  programs	  and	  state	  guarantees.	  868	  ibid,	  Of	  these,	  eight	  are	  with	  ‘predecessor’	  states,	  such	  as	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Yugoslavia.	  869	  Agreement	  between	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Kuwait	  for	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments	  (signed	  1994)	  <www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_kuwait.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  March	  2012.	  
870 ‘Agreement	  between	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  on	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments’	  (signed	  2003)	  <www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_germany.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  March	  2012.	  871	  ‘Agreement	  Between	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Qatar	  Concerning	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investments’,	  <www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_qatar.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  March	  2012.	  872	  ‘Abkommen	  zwischen	  der	  Bundesrepublik	  Deutchland	  und	  dem	  Königreich	  Saudi-­‐Arabien	  über	  
die	  Förderung	  und	  den	  gegentseitigen	  Schutz	  von	  Kapitalanlagen’,	  (signed	  1996)	  <www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_saudiarabia_gr_arb.pdf>	  873	  Such	  as	  the	  agreement	  with	  China	  (Protocol	  to	  the	  agreement,	  Article	  1).	  874	  Article	  1(3)b)iii.	  875	  An	  autonomous	  international	  institution	  sitting	  in	  Washington	  DC,	  established	  under	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  between	  States	  and	  Nationals	  of	  Other	  States	  with	  over	  one	  hundred	  and	  forty	  member	  states,	  ICSID,	  <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp>	  accessed	  23	  January	  2013.	  876	  Züblin	  AG	  v.	  Kingdom	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (ICSID	  Case	  No.	  ARB/03/1).	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however,	  was	  discontinued	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  claimant	  (the	  German	  company)	  before	  it	  was	  concluded.	  Possibly	  no	  case	  other	  than	  that	  of	  Volkswagen	  (VW)	  is	  a	  better	  illustration	  of	  the	  CJEU’s	  scrutiny	  of	  capital	  restrictions	  and	  the	  Member	  States’	  insistence	  on	  protecting	  major	  companies.	  The	  case	  of	  Commission	  v	  Germany877	  involved	   the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  control	  of	  Germany’s	  largest	  car-­‐maker.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  the	  VW	  case	  touches	  upon	  ‘the	  limits	  which	  EU	  law	  places	  on	  Member	  States	  when	  they	  attempt	  to	  organise	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  their	  companies’	  and	  that	  through	  it,	  the	  Court	  is,	  in	  fact,	  creating	  a	  set	  of	  EU-­‐based	  values	  on	  regulating	  companies,	  rather	  than	  purely	  safeguarding	  the	  interests	  of	  market	  integration.878	  The	   VW	   law	   (Volkswagengesetz)	   is	   a	   federal	   statute,	   based	   on	   a	   1959	  agreement	   between	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   and	   the	   Land	   of	   Lower	  Saxony879	  deciding	  over	  the	  ownership	  at	  VW	  and	  protecting	  its	  employees	  from	  a	   large	   new	   shareholder.880	  According	   to	   this	   agreement	   the	   Land	  would	   hold	  20%	  of	  the	  shares	  in	  the	  company	  and	  enjoy	  a	  number	  of	  rights:	  (1)	  a	  provision	  capping	   the	  voting	  rights	  of	  every	  shareholder	  at	  20%	  (section	  2(1)	  of	   the	  VW	  law),	  (2)	  a	  provision	  implementing	  an	  80%	  majority	  requirement	  for	  important	  company	  decisions	  (section	  4(3)	  of	  the	  VW	  law)	  and	  (3)	  the	  right	  of	  the	  Federal	  State	  and	  of	  the	  Land	  of	  Lower	  Saxony	  to	  appoint	  two	  members	  to	  the	  company’s	  supervisory	  board,	  if,	  and	  as	  long	  as,	  the	  State	  and	  the	  Land	  were	  shareholders	  of	  VW	  (section	  4(1)	  of	  the	  VW	  law).	  The	  EU	  Commission	   investigated	   the	  matter	  and	   issued	  a	  decision	   in	  2004	  announcing	   that	   the	   above	   provisions	   violated	   the	   rules	   on	   free	  movement	   of	  capital	   in	   that	   it	   rendered	   investments	   in	   the	   company	   less	   attractive.881	  The	  matter	  was	  ruled	  upon	  by	  the	  Court,	  which	  in	  2007	  agreed	  with	  the	  Commission	  and	  declared	  the	  contested	  provisions	  as	   incompatible	  with	  the	  free	  movement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  877	  Case	  C-­‐112/05	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐8995,	  the	  ‘Volkswagen	  case’.	  878	  Wolf-­‐Georg	  Ringe,	  ‘Company	  Law	  and	  Free	  Movement	  of	  Capital:	  Nothing	  Escapes	  the	  European	  Court?’	  (2010)	  CLJ	  378,	  4;	  Ringe’s	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  Court’s	  judgment	  as	  to	  the	  role	  and	  place	  of	  the	  state	  versus	  private	  actors	  in	  company	  law.	  879	  Gesetz	  über	  die	  Überführung	  der	  Anteilsrechte	  an	  der	  Volkswagenwerk	  GmbH	  in	  private	  Hand	  of	  21	  July	  1960,	  [1960]	  Bundesgesetzblatt	  I,	  585. 880	  Ringe	  (n	  878)	  12.	  881	  Commission,	  ‘Free	  movement	  of	  capital:	  Commission	  asks	  Germany	  to	  amend	  the	  Volkswagen	  law’	  Press	  Release	  IP/04/400,	  30	  March	  2004.	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of	  capital.	  Interestingly,	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  Court’s	  decision,	  Porsche	  prepared	  the	  ground	  for	  an	  eventual	  takeover	  bid	  should	  the	  law	  be	  revoked.882	  The	  decision	  that	  the	  VW	  law	  violated	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  rather	   than	   free	  movement	   of	   establishment,	   is	   particularly	   important	   to	   third	  country	   investors.	   Since	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   rules	   also	   apply	   to	   third	  country	  investors	  Ringe	  argues	  that	  they	  have	  a	  greater	  ambit	  than	  the	  rules	  on	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  and	  as	  such,	  they	  also	  apply	  to	  SWFs.883	  Furthermore,	  Schweitzer	  argues	   that	  extending	   the	   freedom	  of	  capital	   to	   third	  countries	  also	  extends	  that	  provision	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.884	  She	  cites	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  European	  Court	  has	  rejected	  propositions	  to	  interpret	  Article	  56	  EC	  (Article	  63	   TFEU)	   differently	   depending	   on	   whether	   it	   is	   applied	   in	   an	   intra-­‐Union	  context	  or	  with	  regard	  to	  movements	  of	  capital	  with	  third	  countries.885	  At	   the	   end	   of	   2008,	   Germany	   amended	   the	  VW	   law,	   removing	   the	   right	   to	  nominate	  directors	  and	  the	  voting	  cap.	  However,	   it	  maintained	  the	  80%	  special	  majority	   requirement	   for	   important	   company	   decisions	   and	   the	   rule	   that	  required	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  of	  the	  supervisory	  board	  for	  a	  decision	  about	  the	  business	   location	   of	   the	   company.	   The	   new	   statute	   was	   soon	   criticised	   as	  potentially	  clashing	  with	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.886	  Events	   following	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  Court’s	  decision	  have	  been	  marked	  by	   a	   confrontation	   between	   the	   European	   Commission	   and	   Germany.	   German	  officials	   were	   quoted	   saying	   that	   the	   Commission	  would	   be	   ‘badly	   advised’	   to	  lodge	  a	  complaint	  against	  the	  law	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  stepping	  on	  to	  ‘very	  thin	  ice’	   if	   it	   chose	   to	   take	   on	   Berlin	   again.887	  Nevertheless,	   the	   Commission	   soon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  882	  A	  fact	  which,	  alone,	  demonstrates	  the	  unattractiveness	  of	  large	  investments	  in	  the	  company	  under	  the	  existing	  regime.	  Until	  that	  moment	  Porsche	  had	  acquired	  somewhat	  over	  50%	  stake	  in	  VW,	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  raising	  it	  to	  75%,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  takeover,	  Ringe	  (n	  878)	  386.	  883	  ibid	  381;	  It	  is	  equally	  argued	  by	  Ringe	  that	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  is	  a	  ‘larger’	  freedom	  than	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  because,	  unlike	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  provisions	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  investments	  that	  confer	  control,	  but	  also	  extend	  to	  direct	  and	  portfolio	  investments.	  884	  Schweitzer	  (n	  597)	  272.	  885	  Case	  C-­‐101/05	  A	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐11531	  para	  31.	  886	  Ringe	  (n	  878)	  37.	  887	  Statements	  made	  by	  Zypries,	  Germany’s	  former	  justice	  minister,	  in	  May	  2008,	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brought	  new	  legal	  action	  against	  Germany,	  claiming	  that	  the	  new	  version	  of	  the	  law	  still	  violated	  EU	  law.888	  Things	  then	  remained	  silent	  for	  some	  time.	  The	  inactivity	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  subsequent	   events	   taking	   place	   between	  VW	  and	  Porsche.	   The	   global	   financial	  crisis	   had	   overturned	   Porsche’s	   plans	   to	   take	   over	   VW.	   Instead,	   the	   new	  arrangement	  between	  the	  two	  car-­‐makers	  was	  that	  Porsche	  would	  be	  sold	  to	  VW	  in	   two	   stages:	   VW	   would	   initially	   acquire	   49.9%	   of	   Porsche,	   and	   it	   would	  purchase	  the	  remaining	  shares	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  Porsche	  Automobil	  Holding	  would	  likely	  receive	  about	  €8	  billion	  ($11.2	  billion)	  for	  the	  shares,	  which	  would	  allow	  it	  to	  pay	  off	  most	  of	  its	  debt.	  Since,	  to	  facilitate	  the	  deal,	  the	  Land	  of	  Lower	  Saxony	  had	  indicated	  it	  would	  agree	  to	  an	  Arab	  investment	  in	  the	  German	  carmaker,889	  a	  Qatari	  SWF	  acquired	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  group.890	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  inactivity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Commission	  coincided	  with	  the	  election	  of	  the	  new	  Commission	   following	   the	   European	   elections	   of	   2009	   and	   the	   renewal	   of	  Barroso’s	  position	  as	  President.	  Eventually,	   in	   November	   2011,	   Brussels	   returned	   to	   the	   matter	   by	   suing	  Germany.	  It	  is	  reported	  that	  the	  German	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  CJEU	  ruling	  found	  the	  blocking	  minority	  only	  breached	  laws	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  when	  seen	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   20%	   voting	   cap,	   which	   had	   been	   scrapped.891	  However,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	   Court	   will	   accept	   this	   interpretation,	   since	   it	  tends	  to	  look	  at	  many	  factors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  effect	  of	  the	  legislation	  when	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hugh	  Williamson,	  ‘Berlin	  Warns	  Against	  a	  Challenge	  to	  VW’s	  Takeover	  Rule’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  30	  May	  2008)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/99b12432-­‐2de3-­‐11dd-­‐b92a-­‐000077b07658.html>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012. 888	  The	  Commission	  initiated	  new	  proceedings	  against	  Germany	  on	  5	  June	  2008,	  Hendrick	  Kafsack,	  ‘EU-­‐Verfahren	  gegen	  neues	  VW-­‐Gesetz’	  FAZ,	  6	  Jun	  2008,	  13;	  Economist	  staff,	  ‘Porsche	  and	  Volkswagen	  –	  See	  You	  in	  Court’	  Economist	  (London,	  14	  June	  2008)	  86.	  889	  Christiaan	  Hetzner	  and	  Maria	  Sheahan,	  ‘Lower	  Saxony	  Open	  to	  Arab	  Investor	  in	  Volkswagen’	  
Reuters	  (London,	  4	  May	  2009)	  <www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAndRetailNews/idUSL431770920090504>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012. 890	  In	  January	  2012,	  the	  state	  of	  Qatar	  owned	  17%	  of	  Volkswagen’s	  voting	  stock	  and	  10%	  of	  the	  voting	  shares	  in	  the	  Porsche	  holding	  company,	  Christoph	  Rauwald,	  ‘VW	  Might	  Buy	  Out	  Porsche	  Brand	  in	  Lieu	  of	  Merger’	  Market	  Watch	  (New	  York,	  9	  Jan	  2012)	  <www.marketwatch.com/story/vw-­‐might-­‐buy-­‐out-­‐porsche-­‐brand-­‐in-­‐lieu-­‐of-­‐merger-­‐2012-­‐01-­‐09>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  891	  Alex	  Barker,	  ‘Brussels	  Sues	  Germany	  Over	  VW	  “Golden	  Share”’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  24	  November	  2011)	  <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7dc5550a-­‐168c-­‐11e1-­‐be1d-­‐00144feabdc0.html>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	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assessing	   potential	   obstacles	   to	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital.	   Based	   on	   its	  current	  case	  law,892	  it	   is	  more	  probable	  that	  the	  Court	  will	  rule	  that	  the	  current	  amendments	  to	  the	  VW	  law	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  general	  spirit	  of	  its	  original	  ruling.	   If	  Germany	   lost	   the	  case	   it	  would	  have	   to	   scrap	   the	   law	  and	   in	  addition	  pay	  a	  multimillion	  fine	  for	  late	  compliance.893	  	  b.	  The	  German	  legal	  response	  	   The	  WV	   case	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   generally	   open	   German	  economy.	   Foreign	   investment	   controls	   in	   Germany	   came	   in	   two	   waves,	   one	  concerning	   general	   security	   related	   matters	   and	   one	   adopted	   following	   rising	  concerns	  about	  SWFs.	  Specific	   controls	   over	   FDI	  were	   adopted	   in	   2004	   reacting	   to	   concerns	   that	  German	   export	   control	   laws	   might	   be	   insufficient	   to	   protect	   national	   security	  interests	  in	  case	  of	  a	  foreign	  acquisition	  of	  a	  German	  company	  directly	  involved	  in	  that	  security.894	  To	  this	  end	  certain	  provisions	  were	  introduced	  in	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Trade	  and	  Payments	  Act	  (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz)	  of	  1961.	  	  Para	  7,	  provided:	  	  Protection	  of	  Security	  and	  External	  Interests:	  (1)	  Legal	   transactions	   and	  acts	   in	   foreign	   trade	  payments	  may	  be	   restricted	   in	  order	  to	  1.	  guarantee	  the	  vital	  security	  interests	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany.	  2.	  prevent	  a	  disturbance	  of	  the	  peaceful	  coexistence	  between	  the	  nations,	  or	  3.	  prevent	  a	  major	  disruption	  of	  the	  foreign	  relations	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany.	  (2)	  According	  to	  paragraph	  1	  above,	  the	  following	  may	  be	  restricted	  in	  particular	  […]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  892	  See	  the	  analysis	  above	  from	  n	  739	  onwards.	  893	  Barker	  (n	  822).	  894	  Schweitzer	  (n	  597)	  268.	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4.	  Legal	  transactions	  referring	  to	  industrial	  property	  rights,	  inventions,	  manufacturing	  processes	  and	  expertise	  relating	  to	  the	  goods	  and	  other	  objects	  […].	  5.	  Legal	  transactions	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	  resident	  companies	  which	  —	   produce	  or	  develop	  war	  weapons	  and	  other	  military	  equipment,	  or	  	  —	   produce	   cryptographic	   systems	   admitted	   for	   the	   transmission	   of	  governmental	   classified	   information	   by	   the	   Federal	   Office	   for	   Information	  Security	  Technology	  with	  the	  company’s	  approval,	  or	  legal	  transactions	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  shares	  in	  such	  companies,	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	   the	  vital	  security	   interests	  of	   the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany;	  this	  applies	   in	  particular	   if	   the	  political	  and	  security	   interests	  of	   the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  or	  the	  military	  security	  precautions	  are	  jeopardized	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  purchase	  [...].	  	   The	  German	  legal	  framework	  has	  also	  provided	  for	  a	  notification	  scheme	  to	  the	  German	  government	  in	  the	  event	  of	  the	  planned	  acquisition	  of	  a	  German	  firm	  (or	  of	  an	  acquisition	  of	  25%	  stake	  or	  more)	  active	  in	  the	  production	  of	  weapons	  and	  other	  military	  equipment	  or	  cryptographic	  systems.	  Once	  the	  notification	  is	  made,	  the	  transaction	  must	  be	  either	  approved	  or	  prohibited	  within	  one	  month.	  Soon	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  above,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  rising	  phenomenon	  of	  SWFs	  and	  state-­‐owned	  companies,	  a	  public	  debate	  emerged	   in	   Germany	   on	   the	   impact	   and	   objectives	   of	   such	   entities.895	  The	  German	  Chancellor,	  Merkel,	  said	  that	  ‘one	  can	  question	  whether	  these	  funds	  are	  solely	  concerned	  with	  attaining	  a	  high	  return	  on	  capital’	  and	  ‘state-­‐owned	  funds	  can	   also	   have	   politico-­‐strategic	   aims	   in	   mind	   that	   could	   be	   problematic	   in	  sensitive	   areas’.896	  Similarly,	   Koch,	   Minister-­‐President	   of	   Hesse	   and	   one	   of	   the	  most	  influential	  Christian-­‐Democratic	  Union	  (CDU)	  politicians,	  said	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  2007,	   that	  Russian	  and	  Chinese	   investors	   ‘would	  be	   in	  a	  position	  to	  buy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  895	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘Germany	  Plans	  Law	  Against	  Foreign	  Takeovers’	  Euractiv	  (Brussels,	  31	  October	  2007)	  <www.euractiv.com/trade/germany-­‐plans-­‐law-­‐foreign-­‐takeovers/article-­‐168060>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  896	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘EU	  to	  Consider	  Protection	  from	  State-­‐Funded	  Foreign	  Takeovers’	  Euractiv	  (Brussels,	  24	  July	  2007)	  <www.euractiv.com/innovation/eu-­‐consider-­‐protection-­‐state-­‐funded-­‐foreign-­‐takeovers/article-­‐165798>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	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the	  whole	  DAX’.897	  According	  to	  Merkel,	  this	  was	  a	  new	  phenomenon	  that	  had	  to	  be	  tackled	  ‘with	  some	  urgency’	  and	  she	  called	  for	   ‘an	  EU-­‐wide	  discussion	  about	  this’.898	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   review	   powers	   established	   by	   the	   previous	   law	   were	  expanded.	   A	   first	   draft	   of	   the	   proposed	   law,	   the	   new	   Außenwirtschaftsgesetz	  (AWG)	  and	  its	  implementing	  law,	  the	  Außenwirtschaftsverordnung	  (AWV),	  were	  issued	   in	   September	   2007.	   The	   EU	   Commission	   then	   notified	   the	   German	  government	   that	   a	   distinction	  must	   be	  drawn	  between	  FDI	   coming	   from	  other	  Member	  States	  of	   the	  EU	  and	  FDI	   coming	   from	  non-­‐EU	  states.899	  Consequently,	  foreign	   state-­‐controlled	   investors	   from	   other	   EU	   Member	   States	   had	   to	   be	  excluded	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   proposed	   regulation.	   These	   amendments	   came	  into	  force	  on	  24	  April	  2009.900	  Under	   the	  new	  scheme,	   the	  Federal	  Minister	  of	  Economics	  and	  Technology	  was	  empowered	  to	  review	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  any	  acquisition	  of	  a	  stake	  of	  25%	  or	  more	  of	   any	   listed	  or	  non-­‐listed	  German	   firm	  by	   a	  non-­‐EU	   investor.901	  The	  review	  aims	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  acquisition	  endangers	  public	  order	  or	  security	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany.	  It	  will	  be	  judged	  to	  do	  so	  only	  if	  a	  real	  and	  sufficiently	  severe	  danger	  can	  be	  identified	  which	  affects	  a	  fundamental	  interest	  in	  society.902	  However,	  the	  law	  does	  not	  make	  any	  further	  specifications	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  danger	  or	  the	  fundamental	   interest	  to	  be	  protected.	  The	  German	   government	   has	   stated	   in	   the	   past	   that	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	   foreign	  investment	   fund	   (state	  or	  private)	   and	   its	   strategic	   interests	  will	  be	   taken	   into	  consideration	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  transaction.903	  Generally	   speaking,	   the	   2009	   amendment	   has	   a	  much	   broader	   application	  than	   the	   previous	   law,	   especially	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   sectors	   and	   types	   of	   firm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  897	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘Germany	  plans’	  (n	  895);	  DAX	  is	  the	  stock	  market	  index	  consisting	  of	  the	  30	  major	  German	  companies	  trading	  on	  the	  Frankfurt	  Stock	  Exchange.	  898	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘EU	  to	  consider’	  (n	  896).	  899	  Mathias	  Audit,	  ‘Is	  the	  Erecting	  of	  Barriers	  Against	  Foreign	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  Compatible	  with	  International	  Investment	  Law?’,	  Inaugural	  Conference,	  Geneva,	  July	  15-­‐17,	  2008,	  Online	  Proceedings	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  29/08,	  6.	  900	  Through	  the	  Dreizehntes	  Gesetz	  zur	  Änderung	  des	  Außenwirtschaftgesetzes	  und	  der	  Außenwirtschaftsverodnung,	  [2009]	  Bundesgesetzblatt	  I	  770.	  901	  para	  53.	  902	  para	  7(2)	  No.	  6	  AWG.	  903	  Gordon	  and	  Tash	  (n	  414)	  19. 
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involved	  that	  are	  subject	   to	  review.	  With	  regard	  to	  notification	  by	  the	   investor,	  the	  German	  review	  system	  also	  allows	   for	  some	   laxity	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   it	  does	  not	  contain	  any	  mandatory	  notification	  or	  prior-­‐authorisation	  scheme.	  In	  fact,	  it	  rests	  upon	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Economics	  and	  Technology	  itself,	  within	  three	  months	   of	   the	   transaction,	   to	   acquire	   all	   the	   relevant	   information	   and,	   if	  necessary,	  prohibit	  the	  acquisition.	  After	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  review	  process,	  the	  Ministry	   has	   another	   two	   months	   to	   make	   its	   assessment,	   and	   then	   it	   may	  impose	  conditions	  (such	  as	  the	  suspension	  of	  voting	  rights)	  in	  order	  to	  clear	  the	  transaction.	   During	   this	   delay	   the	   investments	   affected	   by	   the	   law	   are	   held	   as	  ‘pending’.	  Under	  the	  German	  legal	  ‘principle	  of	  abstraction’	  (Abstraktionsprinzip)	  a	   personal	   obligation	   to	   pay	   or	   exchange	   goods	   or	   legal	   rights	   (e.g.	   through	  contract)	   is	   independent	   from	  the	  transfer	  of	  proprietary	  title	  of	  goods	  or	   legal	  rights.	   Thus,	   in	   an	   agreement	   for	   the	   transfer	   and	   assignment	   of	   shares,	   the	  transfer	  and	  assignment	  agreement	  remains	  in	  effect	  even	  though	  the	  underlying	  obligation	   does	   not.904 In	   the	   event	   of	   prohibition	   the	   contract	   is	   deemed	   null	  and	  void.905	  In	  the	  event	  of	  clearance,	  the	  mutual	  obligations	  of	  each	  side	  of	  the	  transaction	  can	  be	  fulfilled. Unlike	   the	   system	   established	   in	   the	   USA	   for	   determining	   security	   risks,	  which	   relies	   on	   contributions	   from	   both	   public	   and	   private	   actors,906	  Germany	  assigns	   the	  main	   role	   for	   information	   finding	   to	   the	   government.	   However,	   all	  jurisdictions	   at	   some	   stage	   assign	   some	   responsibility	   for	   the	   provision	   of	  information	   to	   the	   foreign	   investor.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Germany,	   the	   initial	  notification	   requirement	  pertains	  only	   to	   the	  narrow	  security	   review	   involving	  armaments	   and	   cryptology	   technology.	   The	   more	   general	   review	   procedure	  assigns	   the	  responsibility	  of	   initial	   information	  gathering	  to	   the	  government.907	  Moreover,	   relevant	   information	   is	   collected	   from	   the	   Federal	   Cartel	   Office	   and	  the	   Federal	   Financial	   Supervisory	   Authority	   and	   these	   agencies	   receive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  904	  For	  more	  see,	  Norbert	  Horn	  and	  others,	  German	  Private	  and	  Commercial	  Law	  1982,	  Clarendon	  Press	  69-­‐70. 905	  para	  31(3),	  AWG.	  906	  The	  responsibility	  lies	  with	  both	  the	  USA	  government,	  and	  the	  foreign	  investors	  themselves.	  The	  USA	  system	  is	  analysed	  in	  more	  details	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  907	  Kathryn	  Gordon	  and	  Alexis	  Nohen,	  ‘Identification	  of	  Foreign	  Investors:	  A	  Fact	  Finding	  Survey	  of	  Investment	  Review	  Procedures’	  (2010)	  Freedom	  of	  Investment	  Process	  OECD	  3.	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information	  about	  acquisitions	  and	  takeover	  offers.908	  In	   2008	   there	   was	   a	   press	   rumour	   that	   the	   coming	   adoption	   of	   the	   new	  legislation	   could	   be	   used	   to	   block	   the	   possible	   multi-­‐billion	   euro	   takeover	   by	  Temasek	  of	  container	  shipping	  giant	  Hapag	  Lloyd,	  owned	  by	  German	  firm	  TUI.909	  The	  bid	  from	  Temasek,	  which	  had	  publicly	  expressed	  interest	  in	  the	  company	  via	  its	   Neptune	   Orient	   Lines	   unit,	   was	   one	   of	   about	   half	   a	   dozen	   that	   TUI	   had	  received.910	  The	  bid	  ultimately	  failed,	  reportedly	  because	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  agree	  on	  a	   price	   for	   Hapag	   Lloyd,	   rather	   than	   because	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   new	   law.911	  According	   to	   the	   American	   Chamber	   of	   Commerce	   in	   Germany,	   up	   until	   June	  2011,	   no	   foreign	   companies	   had	   complained	   about	   difficulties	   under	   the	  amendment.912	  	  
iii.	  Additional	  national	  measures	  	   In	  addition	  to	  France	  and	  Germany,	  other	  EU	  Member	  States	  have	  produced	  specific	   legislation	  to	   target	  SWFs.	  Greece	   is	  a	  characteristic	  example.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  2010	  Greece	  has	  suffered	  a	  severe	  form	  of	  debt	  crisis	  caused	  from	  chronic	   public	   debt	   and	   budget	   deficits.	   The	   crisis	   effectively	   removed	   the	  country	   from	   international	   debt	   markets913	  and	   has	   forced	   it	   to	   accept	   two	  rescue	  packages	  from	  a	  tripartite	  source,	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	   (ECB)	   and	   the	  European	  Commission.914	  The	  Greek	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  908	  ibid	  10.	  909	  As	  reported	  by	  the	  Financial	  Times	  Deutschland,	  Agence	  France-­‐Presse,	  ‘Germany	  Moves	  to	  Block	  SWFs’	  Industryweek	  (Cleveland,	  21	  August	  2008)	  <www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=17121>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  910	  ibid.	  911	  Deutsche	  Presse-­‐Agentur,	  ‘Singapore	  Shipper	  NOL	  Denies	  Fresh	  Bid	  for	  Germany’s	  Hapag-­‐Lloyd’	  M&C	  (5	  December	  2011)	  <www.monstersandcritics.com/news/business/news/article_1678943.php/Singapore-­‐shipper-­‐NOL-­‐denies-­‐fresh-­‐bid-­‐for-­‐Germany-­‐s-­‐Hapag-­‐Lloyd>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  912	  Export	  GOV,	  ‘Germany	  -­‐	  Investment	  Climate’	  (Export.gov,	  17	  July	  2012)	  <http://export.gov/germany/MarketResearchonGermany/CountryCommercialGuide/InvestmentClimate/index.asp#P14_474>	  6	  November	  2012.	  913	  Georgios	  Kouretas	  and	  Prodromos	  Vlamis,	  ‘The	  Greek	  Crisis:	  Causes	  and	  Implications’	  (2010)	  Vol	  57(4)	  Panoeconomicus	  391. 914	  Regarding	  the	  first	  package	  see,	  IMF	  staff,	  ‘Europe	  and	  IMF	  Agree	  €110	  Billion	  Financing	  Plan	  with	  Greece’	  IMF	  Survey	  Magazine	  (New	  York,	  2	  May	  2010)	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/car050210a.htm>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012;	  
National	  Regulatory	  Models	  
	   226	  
debt	  crisis	  makes	  the	  country	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  case	  study,	  since	  it	  could	  be	   argued	   that	   heavy	   handed	   government	   intervention	   combined	   with	   tough	  regulation	   (leading	   to	   a	   loss	   of	   FDI)	   helped	   cause	   Greece’s	   loss	   of	  competitiveness,	  leading	  to	  its	  financial	  crisis.915	  The	  Greek	  government	  passed	  legislation	  in	  2008	  to	  regulate	  FDI	  in	  publicly	  held	  companies.	  Although	  Greece	  is	  not	  a	  major	  recipient	  of	  SWF	  investments,916	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  2007	  the	  Greek	  government	  was	  alarmed	  by	  MIG’s	  growing	  stake917	  in	  the	  country’s	  then	  public	  telecommunications	  operator	  (OTE).	  MIG,	  a	  private	   equity	   firm	  controlled	   in	  part	  by	   a	  Dubai	   state	   investment	   fund,918	  was	  deemed	   by	   the	   Greek	   government	   to	   be	   an	   unsuitable	   investor	   to	   acquire	   a	  majority	  stake	  in	  OTE.919	  The	  Greek	  government,	  therefore,	   in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  management	  of	  OTE,	  searched	  for	  possible	  ways	  to	  obstruct	  the	  advance	  of	  MIG.	  Until	   2008,	   privatisations	   in	   Greece	   were	   governed	   by	   Law	   3049/2002	  establishing	  an	  Inter-­‐ministerial	  Privatisations	  Committee	  (IPC)	  tasked	  with	  the	  execution	  and	  supervision	  of	  the	  privatisation	  process.	  The	  new	  Law	  3631/2008	  imposed	  a	  requirement	  for	  prior	  approval	  from	  the	  IPC	  for	  any	  foreign	  investor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  For	  the	  second	  rescue	  package	  see,	  IMF	  Survey	  magazine	  staff,	  ‘IMF	  Welcomes	  Greece	  to	  Tackle	  Eurozone	  Crisis’	  IMF	  Survey	  
Magazine	  (New	  York,	  22	  July	  2011)	  <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/car072211a.htm>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  915	  The	  crisis	  began	  when	  international	  markets	  deemed	  the	  country’s	  debt	  unsustainable.	  A	  variety	  of	  chronic	  factors	  had	  contributed	  to	  Greece’s	  competitiveness	  problems.	  Apart	  from	  protectionism	  and	  tough	  regulations,	  the	  Greek	  economy	  presented	  substantial	  administrative	  costs,	  high	  margins	  across	  most	  economic	  activities	  and	  rising	  labour	  costs,	  Antonio	  Garcia	  Pascual	  and	  Piero	  Ghezzi,	  ‘The	  Greek	  Crisis:	  Causes	  and	  Consequences’	  (2011)	  
CESIFO	  Working	  Paper,	  No.	  3663,	  4.	  916	  Between	  January	  1995	  and	  Jul	  2008,	  Greece	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  received	  a	  mere	  $0.6	  bn	  of	  SWFs’	  investments,	  Kern	  (n	  101),	  table	  13. 917	  Shortly	  before	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  law,	  MIG	  had	  acquired	  19,6%	  of	  the	  total	  shares	  in	  OTE,	  Hellenic	  Stock	  Exchange,	  ‘History	  of	  Ownership	  Variations	  for	  the	  Year	  2008’	  Final	  Report	  25_2_2008,	  Telecommunications	  Organisation	  of	  Greece	  A.E.,	  MIG	  AES,	  <www.ase.gr/content/gr/ann.asp?annId=63800>	  accessed	  15	  March	  2012.	  918	  Dubai	  Group	  Ltd	  owned	  16.04%	  of	  MIG	  A.E.S.,	  while	  Dubai	  Investment	  Group	  Ltd	  also	  owned	  16.93%	  of	  Marfin	  Popular	  Bank	  CO	  Ltd,	  which	  in	  turn	  also	  owned	  6.428%	  of	  MIG,	  Hellenic	  Stock	  Exchange,	  ‘History	  of	  Ownership	  Variations	  for	  the	  year	  2008’	  Final	  Report	  31_3_2008	  and	  Final	  Report	  02_06_2008,	  MIG	  A.E.S.	  and	  Marfin	  Popular	  Bank	  CO	  Ltd	  <www.ase.gr/content/gr/ann.asp?annId=63800>	  accessed	  15	  March	  2012.	  919	  Kathimerini	  staff,	  ‘Alogoskoufis’	  Letter	  to	  Dubai’	  Kathimerini	  (Athens,	  30	  December	  2007)	  <http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_economy_2_30/12/2007_253924>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	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wanting	   to	   acquire	   voting	   rights	   of	   20%	   or	  more	   of	   the	   total	   share	   capital	   in	  companies	   of	   national	   strategic	   importance. 920 	  The	   law	   established	   certain	  criteria	  for	  the	  grant	  of	  approval	  by	  the	  IPC	  which	  aim	  to	  ensure	  a	  benefit	  for	  the	  Greek	   public.	   The	   criteria	   relate	   to	   the	   investor’s	   experience	   in	   the	   sector	   and	  reputability,	  but	  also	   to	   its	   share	  ownership,	   its	  place	  of	   residence	  and	   level	  of	  transparency.921	  In	  November	   2008,	   the	   Commission	   announced	   its	   opposition	  to	   the	   measure	   declaring	   that	   it	   infringed	   Treaty	   rules	   on	   free	   movement	   of	  capital,922	  and	   brought	   an	   action	   before	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	  Union	  against	  Greece	  on	  those	  grounds.	  The	  judgement	  of	  the	  Court	  condemning	  Greece	   was	   issued	   on	   8	   November	   2012.923	  The	   compatibility	   of	   the	   Greek	  measure,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   national	   measures,	   with	   EU	   law	   is	   discussed	   in	   the	  analysis	  below.	  	  This	   section	   presented,	   first,	   the	   EU	   legal	   framework	   on	   the	   restriction	   of	  capital	  movements	   and,	   second,	   national	  measures	   of	   some	  EU	  member	   states	  designed	   to	   limit	   the	   investment	   activity	   of	   SWFs.	   Many	   non-­‐EU	   countries,	  however,	   also	   receive	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   sovereign	   investments	   and	   have	  consequently	   implemented	   similar	   legislation.	   Of	   those	   countries,	   the	   USA	   is	  particularly	   important	  due	   to	   its	   regulatory	  openness	  and	   the	  attractiveness	  of	  its	  economy	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  It	  is	  therefore	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  	  	  
	  B.	  THIRD	  COUNTRY	  MODEL	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  920	  As	  laid	  down	  in	  Art	  11(1),	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Art	  11(2),	  of	  Law	  3613/2008.	  Such	  companies	  are	  in	  particular	  those	  involved	  in	  energy	  and	  telecommunications.	  921	  Art	  11(2)	  of	  Law	  2613/2008.	  922	  Commission,	  ‘Free	  movement	  of	  capital:	  Commission	  contests	  Greek	  law	  on	  investment	  in	  strategic	  companies’	  Press	  Release	  IP/08/1784,	  27	  November	  2008	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐08-­‐1784_en.htm?locale=en>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012.	  923	  C-­‐244/11	  Commission	  v	  Hellenic	  Republic.	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1.	  Non-­‐EU	  Countries	  
	   The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  focused	  on	  EU	  law	  relevant	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	   investments	   of	   SWFs	   as	  well	   as	   the	  measures	   adopted	  by	  EU	   jurisdictions.	  This	   part	   contains	   an	   analysis	   of	   a	   third	   jurisdiction,	   the	   USA,	   which	   has	   also	  adopted	  legislation	  that	  restricts	  SWFs.	  Various	  countries,	  such	  as	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	   have	   also	   adopted	   laws	   that	   target	   foreign	   investors	   and	   SWFs	   in	  particular.924	  But,	  as	  shown,	  the	  USA	  is	  distinguished	  from	  other	  countries	  due	  to	  the	  attractiveness	  of	   its	  economy	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	   foreign	   investor	  despite	  recent	  developments	  there	  that	  have	  reignited	  debate	  about	  SWFs.925	  Third	  countries,	  naturally,	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  external	  obligations	  such	  as	  those	   of	   EU	   law	   discussed	   in	   Section	   A.	   They	   are	   undoubtedly	   bound	   by	  international	   agreements	   and	   obligations	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   OECD	   and	   the	  WTO,	  but,	  as	  seen	  in	  chapter	  4,	  these	  frameworks	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  application	  and	   lack	   the	   legal	   teeth	   to	  challenge	   legislation	   that	   limits	   foreign	   investments.	  Thus,	   third	   countries,	   such	   as	   the	   USA,	   enjoy	   an	   important	   autonomy	   when	  regulating	   SWFs.	   This	   discussion	   therefore	   provides	   an	   additional	   analytical	  standpoint:	   it	   enables	   the	   reader	   to	   observe	  how	  SWF	   issues	   are	  dealt	  with	   in	  jurisdictions	  not	  bound	  by	  EU	  law,	  but	  where	  SWF	  investments	  have	  also	  given	  rise	  to	  national	  security	  issues.	  This	   section	   provides	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  USA	   and	  SWFs	  as	  well	  as	  the	  USA	  legal	  framework	  which	  governs	  them.	  In	  the	  final,	  third,	  section,	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   the	   three	   EU	   countries’	   and	   the	   USA’s	   legal	  frameworks	  controlling	  SWFs	  is	  provided.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  924	  Australia	  has	  enacted	  the	  Foreign	  Acquisitions	  and	  Takeovers	  Act	  1975	  and	  the	  Foreign	  Acquisitions	  and	  Takeovers	  Regulations	  1989.	  Under	  Australian	  law,	  the	  Foreign	  Investment	  Review	  Board	  reviews	  foreign	  investments	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  are	  consistent	  with	  Australia’s	  national	  interest;	  Canada	  adopted	  in	  December	  2007	  the	  ‘Guidelines	  –	  Investment	  by	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  –	  Net	  benefit	  assessment’,	  which	  aims	  to	  ‘to	  encourage	  investment	  in	  Canada	  by	  Canadians	  and	  non-­‐Canadians	  that	  contributes	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  employment	  opportunities	  and	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  review	  of	  significant	  investments	  in	  Canada	  by	  non-­‐Canadians	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  such	  benefit	  to	  Canada’	  (para	  2).	  925	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  DPW	  deal	  examined	  below,	  n	  936.	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i.	  The	  USA	  	  a.	  The	  USA	  –	  the	  holy	  grail	  of	  SWF	  investments	  	   The	  USA	  has	  been	  the	  prime	  target	  economy	  for	  SWFs	  worldwide	  before	  and	  during	   the	   crisis	   and	   for	   this	   reason	   it	   serves	   in	   this	   thesis	   as	   a	   comparative	  model.926	  Before	  any	  analysis	  begins,	   several	  points	  need	   to	  be	  made.	  First,	   the	  USA	  has	  a	  different	  legal	  regime	  from	  the	  models	  discussed	  above,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  a	  supranational	  legal	  structure	  as	  EU	  countries	  are.	  Second,	  the	  USA	  legal	  system	  is	  a	  federal	  one,	  divided	  between	  the	  state	  level	  and	  the	  federal	  level.927	  The	   laws	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   fall	   in	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   federal	   state.	  Third,	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  note	  that	  national	  security	  issues,	  already	  prominent	  in	  the	  USA	  political	  agenda,	  have	  been	  part	  of	   the	  debate	   regarding	  SWFs	  more	  often	  than	  in	  Europe.928	  As	  discussed	   in	  chapter	  2,	   the	  USA	  market	  economy	  is	   targeted	  by	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  SWFs,	  such	  as	  ADIA,929	  while	  Chinese	  funds	  invest	  largely	  in	  USA	   government	   debt. 930 	  Saudi	   funds	   also	   show	   a	   preference	   for	   dollar-­‐denominated	   assets. 931 	  According	   to	   Deutschebank	   the	   most	   common	  sectorial/regional	  preferred	  combination	  for	  SWFs	  is	   the	  financial	  sector	   in	  the	  USA.932	  Moreover,	   during	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   SWFs	   from	   around	   the	   world	  continued	   to	   invest	   in	   troubled	   American	   companies,	   thus	   increasing	   the	  presence	  of	  SWFs	  in	  the	  USA	  market.933	  The	  USA	  has	  also	  been	  the	  target	  of	  past	  buyout	  attempts	  that	  caused	  great	  controversy	   and	   stirred	   debate	   on	   the	   nature	   and	   objectives	   of	   SWFs.	   In	   July	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  926	  For	  a	  historical	  review	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  foreign	  investment	  in	  various	  sectors	  the	  USA,	  n	  527.	  927	  The	  USA	  is	  composed	  of	  50	  states.	  According	  to	  the	  10th	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Federal	  Constitution	  of	  the	  USA,	  all	  of	  them	  technically	  remain	  sovereign,	  although	  they	  have	  transferred	  considerable	  powers	  to	  the	  federal	  level	  under	  the	  Federal	  Constitution.	  928	  As	  stated	  by	  O’Brien,	  ‘concerns	  about	  national	  security	  issues	  have	  become	  particularly	  acute	  in	  the	  [USA].	  The	  imperatives	  governing	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  have	  sharpened	  the	  potential	  conflict	  between	  the	  benefits	  of	  global	  exchange	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  national	  security’,	  O’Brien	  (n	  480)	  1242.	  929	  See	  n	  203.	  930	  See	  n	  206,	  207.	  931	  Sfakianakis	  (n	  216).	  932	  Kern	  (n	  101)	  9.	  933	  See	  chapter	  2,	  ‘Investing	  against	  the	  flow’.	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2005,	   CNOOC	   made	   an	   $18.5	   billion	   bid	   to	   buy	   a	   USA	   oil	   major,	   Unocal	   Oil	  Company.	  The	  move	  gave	  rise	   to	   intense	  scepticism	  based	  on	   the	  disadvantage	  American	   energy	   firms	   would	   suffer	   in	   competing	   with	   a	   SOE,	   the	   lack	   of	  reciprocity	  in	  the	  Chinese	  market	  as	  well	  as	  the	  status	  of	  China	  as	  a	  ‘Communist’	  country.934	  In	  August	  2005,	  CNOOC	  announced	  that	  it	  had	  withdrawn	  its	  bid	  for	  Unocal,	   blaming	   ‘the	   unprecedented	   political	   opposition’	   in	   the	   USA	   and	   a	  political	   environment	   that	   ‘made	   it	   very	   difficult	   […]	   to	   accurately	   assess	   our	  chances	  of	  success’.935	  However,	   it	  was	   the	   so-­‐called	  DWP	  deal	   in	  2005	   that	   sparked	   the	   greatest	  controversy	   around	   SWFs	   and	   SOEs.	   This	   case	   was	   an	   attempt	   on	   the	   part	   of	  DPW,	   a	  Dubai	   SOE,	   to	   acquire	   the	   London	  domiciled	  P&O,	  which	  was	   then	   the	  fourth	   largest	   ports	   operator	   in	   the	   world.	   As	   part	   of	   the	   sale,	   DPW	   would	  assume	  the	  leases	  of	  P&O	  to	  manage	  major	  USA	  port	  facilities	  in	  New	  York,	  New	  Jersey,	  Philadelphia,	  Baltimore,	  New	  Orleans,	  and	  Miami,	  as	  well	  as	  operations	  in	  sixteen	  other	  ports.	  The	  case	  was	  brought	  immediately	  to	  national	  attention	  and,	  despite	   executive	   support	   for	   the	   deal,	   various	   members	   of	   Congress,	   and	  senators	   from	   both	   parties	   expressed	   deep	   misgivings.936	  Arguments	   touched	  mainly	   upon	   issues	   of	   national	   security	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   possibility	   of	  terrorists	   being	   smuggled	   from	   the	   Middle	   East	   into	   USA	   territory.937 	  The	  transaction	  was	  eventually	  blocked	  by	  the	  USA	  House	  Appropriations	  Committee	  in	  March	  2006938	  and	  the	  next	  day,	  DPW	  released	  a	  statement	  saying	  they	  would	  turn	  over	  operations	  of	  P&O	  in	  USA	  ports	  to	  a	  USA	  entity.939	  The	  eventual	  failure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  934	  Pottinger	  and	  others	  (n	  196).	  935	  ibid.	  936	  Frist,	  a	  USA	  Senator,	  said,	  ‘If	  the	  administration	  cannot	  delay	  the	  process,	  I	  plan	  on	  introducing	  legislation	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  deal	  is	  placed	  on	  hold	  until	  this	  decision	  gets	  a	  more	  thorough	  review’,	  Jim	  Lehrer,	  ‘Port	  Sale	  Sparks	  Political	  Battle’	  Public	  Broadcasting	  Service	  (Arlington,	  2	  February	  2006)	  <www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-­‐june06/ports_2-­‐22.pdf>	  accessed	  11	  January	  2010.	  937	  Levin	  (n	  449).	  938	  Mathew	  Byrne,	  ‘Protecting	  National	  Security	  and	  Promoting	  Foreign	  Investment:	  Maintaining	  the	  Exon-­‐Florio	  Balance’	  (2006)	  Vol	  67(4)	  Ohio	  StLJ	  849	  <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/67.4.byrne_.pdf>	  accessed	  9	  November	  2012.	  939	  Dubai	  Port	  World,	  ‘Press	  Statement	  by	  Edward	  H	  Bilkey	  –	  Chief	  Operating	  Officer	  DP	  World’	  Press	  Statement,	  9	  March	  2006	  <http://webapps.dpworld.com/portal/page/portal/DP_WORLD_WEBSITE/Media-­‐Centre/News-­‐
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of	  the	  transaction	  was	  a	  catalyst	  for	  debate	  on	  reforming	  the	  existing	  legislation	  in	  the	  USA.940	  Attention	   focused	   on	   SWFs	   again	   when	   in	   May	   2007	   the	   Chinese	  government-­‐controlled	  CIC	  took	  the	  largest	  external	  stake	  (9.9%)	  in	  Blackstone	  Group	   LP	   in	   the	   form	   of	   non-­‐voting	   units.941	  This	   investment	   caused	   a	   stormy	  debate, 942 	  for,	   among	   other	   reasons,	   Blackstone,	   through	   its	   holdings	   was,	  indirectly,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  employers	  in	  the	  USA.	  Compared	  with	  France	  and	  Germany,	  the	  USA	  does	  not	  have	  many	  BITs	  with	  countries	   managing	   SWFs,	   the	   only	   ones	   being	   with	   Bahrain 943 	  and	  Kazakhstan.944	  Interestingly,	  Singapore	  refused	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  BIT	  with	  the	  USA	  based	   on	   the	   latter’s	   model	   treaty	   because	   of	   its	   limits	   on	   performance	  requirements.945	  More	   importantly,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   USA	   has,	  since	   March	   2008,	   established	   an	   agreement	   on	   principles	   with	   SWFs	   from	  Singapore	  and	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  in	  particular	  the	  Government	  of	  Singapore	  Investment	  Corporation	   and	   Abu	   Dhabi	   Investment	   Authority. 946 	  This	   non-­‐binding	  agreement,	  reflecting	  the	  previous	  work	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  OECD	  in	  this	  area,947	  has	  established	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  to	  be	  followed	  both	  by	  the	  investor	  and	  host	  country.	   For	   their	   part,	   the	   investors	   from	   Abu	   Dhabi	   and	   Singapore	   need	   to	  ensure	   that	   their	   investment	   decisions	   are	   based	   on	   commercial	   and	   not	  geopolitical	   criteria,	   and	   that	   their	   SWFs	   implement	   greater	   information	  disclosure,	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   purpose,	   investment	   objectives,	   institutional	  arrangements,	   and	   financial	   information	   –	   and	   particularly	   asset	   allocation,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Releases/News-­‐Releases-­‐2006/17%20DPW%20PRESS%20STATEMENT.PDF>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012.	  940	  Thatcher	  (n	  72)	  2.	  941	  n	  198. 942	  See	  for	  example,	  Donald	  Straszhelm,	  ‘China	  Buys	  Wall	  Street’	  Forbes	  (New	  York,	  27	  December	  2007)	  <www.forbes.com/2008/12/26/straszheim-­‐china-­‐cic-­‐oped-­‐cx_dhs_1227straszheim.html>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  943	  UNCTAD,	  ‘USA	  Senate	  106th	  Congress,	  2nd	  Session,	  Investment	  Treaty	  with	  Bahrain’	  (signed	  23	  May	  2000)	  Treaty	  Doc	  106-­‐25	  <www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_bahrein.pdf>,	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  944	  UNCTAD,	  ‘Treaty	  Between	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Kazakhstan	  Concerning	  the	  Encouragement	  and	  Reciprocal	  Protection	  of	  Investment’	  (signed	  19	  May	  1992)	  <www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_Kazakh.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012. 945	  Tobin	  and	  Ackerman	  (n	  814)	  11.	  946	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘Treasury	  Reaches	  Agreement’	  (n	  443).	  947	  See	  n	  691,	  1070.	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benchmarks,	  and	  rates	  of	  return	  over	  appropriate	  historical	  periods.948	  On	  their	  side,	   the	  host	  nation	  commits	  not	   to	  erect	  protectionist	  barriers	   to	  portfolio	  or	  foreign	  direct	   investment;	   not	   to	   discriminate	   against	   investors;	   and	   to	   ensure	  predictable	  investment	  frameworks.949	  	  b.	  The	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  regulatory	  process	  	   In	   1988,	   the	   Exon-­‐Florio	   provision 950 	  of	   the	   Omnibus	   Trade	   and	  Competitiveness	  Act	  was	  passed	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  attempted	  acquisition	  of	  an	  American	   company,	   Fairchild	   Semiconductor	   Corporation,	   by	   the	   Fujitsu	  Corporation,	   a	   Japanese	   Company.951	  In	   1993,	   Congress	   expanded	   the	   Exon-­‐Florio	  provision	   through	   the	  National	  Defence	  Authorization	  Act,	  known	  as	   the	  Byrd	   Amendment,	   which	   emphasised	   consideration	   of	   the	   national	   security	  implications	  of	  foreign	  acquisitions	  before	  a	  transaction	  could	  be	  cleared.952	  In	   general	   terms,	   the	   Exon-­‐Florio	   provision	   authorised	   the	   President	   to	  investigate	   the	   impact	   on	   national	   security	   of	   mergers,	   acquisitions,	   and	  takeovers	   by	   foreign	   entities	   engaged	   in	   interstate	   commerce	   with	   the	   USA.	  Under	   this	   provision,	   the	   President	   could	   suspend	   or	   prohibit	   a	   transaction	  where	  he	  concluded	  that	  (i)	  There	  is	  credible	  evidence	  that	  the	  foreign	  interest	  exercising	  control	  might	  take	  action	  that	  threatens	  national	  security;	  and	  (ii)	  The	  provisions	  of	  law,	  other	  than	  the	  International	  Emergency	  Economic	  Powers	  Act,	  did	   not	   provide	   adequate	   and	   appropriate	   authority	   to	   protect	   national	  security.953	  The	   President	   delegated	   his	   investigative	   authority	   under	   the	   Exon-­‐Florio	  provision	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (CFIUS),	  an	   inter-­‐agency	   committee,	   chaired	   by	   the	   Secretary	   of	   Treasury.	   CFIUS	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  948	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘Treasury	  Reaches	  Agreement’	  (n	  443).	  949	  ibid.	  950	  50	  App.	  U.S.C.A.,	  app.	  para	  2170.	  951	  Deborah	  Mostaghel,	  ‘Dubai	  Ports	  World	  Under	  Exon-­‐Florio:	  A	  Threat	  to	  National	  Security	  or	  a	  Tempest	  in	  a	  Seaport?’	  (2007)	  70	  AlbLRev	  590-­‐591.	  952	  National	  Defence	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  Fiscal	  Year	  1993,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  102-­‐484,	  para837(a),	  106	  Stat.	  2315,	  2463	  (1993).	  953	  50	  U.S.C.	  app.	  2170(d)	  (2000).	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created	   by	   President	   Ford	   through	   an	   executive	   order	   in	   1975.954	  He	   gave	   the	  committee	  the	  task	  of	  ‘continuing	  responsibility	  within	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  for	  monitoring	   the	   impact	   of	   FDI	   in	   the	   [USA]	   [...]	   and	   for	   coordinating	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  United	  States	  policy	  on	  such	  investment’.955	  A	  transaction	  could	  be	  filed	  for	  CFIUS	  review	  voluntarily,	  but	  any	  member	  of	  CFIUS	  could	  bring	  a	  transaction	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  committee.	  Such	  a	  notification	  would	  initiate	  a	   30-­‐day	   consideration	   of	   possible	   national	   security	   concerns	   caused	   by	   the	  transaction,	  extended	  by	  another	  45-­‐day	  investigation	  if	  such	  concerns	  did	  arise.	  At	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  second	  period,	  a	  report	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  President,	  who	   had	   15	   days	   to	   decide	   whether	   action	   was	   required	   on	   his	   part.	   No	  possibility	  of	  appeal	  was	  provided.	  Although	   the	   CFIUS	   operated	   in	   secrecy,	   it	   has	   been	   said	   that	   historically	  there	   have	   actually	   been	   very	   few	   45-­‐day	   investigations,	   mainly	   because	   of	  government-­‐led	   stances	   in	   favour	   of	   free	   access	   to	   markets.956	  Until	   recently,	  therefore,	  CFIUS	  had	  chosen	  to	  adopt	  a	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Exon-­‐Florio	  provision	   by	   balancing	   multi-­‐layered	   policy	   considerations	   ‘seek[ing]	   to	   serve	  [USA]	  investment	  policy	  through	  thorough	  reviews	  that	  protect	  national	  security	  while	  maintaining	  the	  credibility	  of	  our	  open	   investment	  policy	  and	  preserving	  the	  confidence	  of	  foreign	  investors	  here	  and	  of	  [USA]	  investors	  abroad	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  retaliatory	  discrimination’.957	  Moreover,	  historically,	  the	  willingness	  of	  parties	  to	  engage	  CFIUS	  proactively	  on	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   transaction	   has	   generally	   offset	   the	   need	   for	   further	  investigations	  beyond	  the	  initial	  review.958	  	  c.	  The	  Foreign	  Investment	  and	  National	  Security	  Act	  of	  2007	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  954	  Exec.	  Order	  No.	  11,858,	  3	  C.F.R.	  990	  (1971-­‐1975).	  955	  ibid.	  956	  Thatcher	  (n	  72)	  2.	  And	  between	  1988	  and	  1999,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  the	  President	  investigated	  only	  17	  of	  more	  than	  1,200	  companies	  that	  volunteered	  for	  review.	  Christopher	  Fenton,	  ‘[USA]	  Policy	  Towards	  [FDI]	  Post-­‐September	  11:	  Exon-­‐Florio	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Transnational	  Security’	  41	  ColumJTransnat'l	  L	  210.	  957	  Feng	  (n	  443)	  594.	  958	  Thatcher	  (n	  72)	  2.	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The	   increase,	   however,	   in	   the	   number	   of	   review	   processes	   in	   later	   years,	  reinforced	  by	  the	  controversy	  caused	  by	  the	  DPW	  case,	  brought	  about	  calls,	  after	  2005,	  for	  the	  tightening	  of	  the	  review	  process,	  culminating	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Investment	  and	  National	  Security	  Act	  of	  2007	  (FINSA),	  which	  amended	  Section	  721	  of	  the	  Defense	  Production	  Act	  of	  1950.	  This	  development	  essentially	  codified	   many	   of	   the	   CFIUS	   practices	   such	   as	   the	   voluntary	   nature	   of	   the	  negotiation,	   the	   review	   and	   investigation	   timeline	   and	   the	   negotiation	   of	  mitigation	   agreements,	   but	   also	   introduced	   a	   more	   onerous	   and	   burdensome	  review	   process	   by	   granting	   CFIUS	   extended	   powers	   to	   examine	   and	   identify	  potential	  national	  security	  compromises.	  The	  DPW	  case	  effectively	  triggered	  this	  legislation.	  The	  main	  amendments	  brought	  by	  FINSA	  were:	  1.	  the	  designation	  of	  a	  lead	  agency,	   i.e.	   a	   CFIUS	   agency,	   best	   equipped	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   transaction	   and	   to	  take	   the	   lead	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Committee	   on	   a	   proposed	   transaction;959	  2.	   the	  expansion	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘national	   security’	   so	   as	   to	   include	   transactions	  involving	  critical	  infrastructure,960	  energy	  assets	  and	  critical	  technologies;961	  3.	  a	  presumption	  of	  a	  45-­‐day	  investigation	  for	  certain	  transactions	  when	  the	  acquirer	  is	   controlled	  by	  or	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	   foreign	  government	  or	   the	   transaction	  could	   result	   in	   the	   control	  of	   any	   ‘critical	   infrastructure’	  by	  a	   foreign	  business;	  and	  4.	  FINSA	  provides	  statutory	  authority	  for	  the	  mitigation	  procedure,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  monitored	  by	  the	  lead	  agency.962	  If	  a	  party	  breaches	  a	  mitigation	  measure,	  the	   ‘Evergreen	   procedure’	   allows	   CFIUS	   to	   reopen	   a	   previously	   reviewed	  transaction.	  The	   criteria	   for	   the	   review	   under	   FINSA	   are	   (i)	   the	   acquiring	   country’s	  adherence	   to	   non-­‐proliferation	   regimes,	   (ii)	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   acquiring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  959	  50	  U.S.C.A.	  app.	  para	  2170(k)(5).	  960	  Under	  FINSA,	  critical	  infrastructure	  is	  defined	  expansively	  as	  any	  ‘systems	  and	  assets,	  whether	  physical	  or	  virtual,	  so	  vital	  to	  the	  United	  States	  that	  the	  incapacity	  or	  destruction	  of	  such	  systems	  or	  assets	  would	  have	  a	  debilitating	  impact	  on	  national	  security’,	  50	  U.S.C.A.	  app	  para	  2170(a)(6).	  961	  50	  U.S.C.A.	  app	  para	  2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(III).	  962	  By	  which	  to	  ‘negotiate,	  enter	  into,	  or	  impose,	  and	  enforce	  any	  agreement	  or	  condition	  with	  any	  party	  to	  the	  covered	  transaction,	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  any	  threat	  to	  the	  national	  security	  of	  the	  United	  States	  that	  arises	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  covered	  transaction’	  50	  U.S.C.A.	  app	  para	  2170(k)(5);	  One	  known	  example	  in	  this	  respect	  was	  the	  decision	  of	  CIC	  to	  buy	  non-­‐voting	  shares	  in	  Blackstone	  as	  the	  result	  of	  negotiations	  between	  the	  Chinese	  fund	  and	  CFIUS,	  n	  198.	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country	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  specifically	  on	  its	  record	  on	  cooperating	  in/with	  counterterrorism	  efforts,	  and	  (iii)	   the	  potential	   for	   trans-­‐shipment	  or	  diversion	  of	   technologies	   with	   military	   applications,	   including	   an	   analysis	   of	   national	  export	  control	  laws	  and	  regulations.963	  In	   November	   2008,	   the	   USA	   Treasury	   Department	   issued	   final	   regulations	  governing	   CFIUS,	   clarifying	   certain	   aspects	   of	   the	   procedure.964	  Among	   others,	  the	   regulations	   established	   that	   ‘covered	   transactions’	   are	   ‘any	   transaction	  proposed	  or	  pending	  after	  August	  23,	  1988,	  by	  or	  with	  any	  foreign	  person,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  control	  of	  a	  [USA]	  business	  by	  a	  foreign	  person’.965	  It	  also	  defined	  ‘control’	  as	  ‘the	  power,	  direct,	  indirect,	  whether	  or	  not	  exercised	  …	  to	  determine,	  direct,	  or	  decide	  important	  matters	  affecting	  an	  entity’.966	  Finally,	  it	  clarified	  that	  CFIUS	  only	  considers	  the	  particular	  assets	  involved	  in	  a	  transaction,	  rather	  than	  designating	  the	  whole	  classes	  as	  ‘critical	  infrastructure’.967	  FINSA,	   therefore,	  offers	  a	  unilateral	   framework	   for	   the	  government	   to	  deal	  with	   concerns	   about	   SWFs.	   The	   FINSA	   reform	   has	   been	   described	   by	   Kern	   as	  ‘one	   of	   the	   most	   demanding	   foreign	   investment	   processes	   among	   the	  industrialised	  economies	  –	  not	  least	  for	  sovereign	  investors’.968	  	  	  	  C.	  ASSESSMENT	  	  	  
A.	  Lessons	  learned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  963	  50	  U.S.C.A.	  app	  para	  2170(f)(9)(A)-­‐(C).	  964	  Department	  of	  Treasury,	  ‘Regulations	  Pertaining	  to	  Mergers,	  Acquisitions,	  and	  Takeovers	  by	  Foreign	  Persons;	  Final	  Rule’	  (2008)	  Office	  of	  Investment	  Security	  31	  CFR	  Part	  800,	  Federal	  Register	  Vol	  73(226)	  70702.	  965	  ibid	  §	  800.207,	  70719.	  966	  ibid,	  §	  800.204,	  70718.	  967	  ibid,	  §	  800.208,	  70708.	  968	  Steffen	  Kern,	  ‘Control	  Mechanisms	  for	  SWFs	  in	  Selected	  Countries’	  (2008)	  CESifo	  DICE	  Report	  <www.cesifo-­‐group.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%20DICE%20Report%202008/CESifo%20DICE%20Report%204/2008%20/dicereport408-­‐rr.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012,	  44.	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This	   chapter	   has	   reviewed	   the	   French,	   German	   and	  USA	   legal	   frameworks	  that	   apply	   to	   SWFs,	   and	  has	   also	   touched	  briefly	   upon	   the	   case	   of	  Greece.	   The	  following	  analysis	  examines	  these	  measures,	   incorporating	  also	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  previous	  chapters.	  As	  it	  was	  explained	  in	  chapter	  4,	  all	  investment	  control	  mechanisms	  entail	  a	  degree	  of	  protectionism	  (see	  table	  4.2	  above).	  This	  would	  be	  warranted	  if	  it	  were	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  protect	  national	  economies	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  harmful	  foreign	   investors.	  However,	   all	   the	  measures	   discussed	   above	   are	   excessive,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  address	  any	  possible	  risk	  arising	  from	   the	   investments	   of	   SWFs.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   in	   chapters	   3	   and	   4	   that	  although	  SWFs	  are	  in	  some	  respects	  different	  from	  regular	  investors,	  especially	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   their	   size	   or	   ownership,	   they	   are	   not	   generally	   a	   source	   of	  concern	  for	  recipient	  countries.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  their	  particular	  characteristics	  make	  them	  a	  positive	  and	  stabilising	  force	  in	  global	  markets,	  which	  enable	  them	  to	  withstand	  market	  downturns	  and	  invest	  with	  long-­‐term	  perspectives.969	  The	  mere	   existence	   and	   operation	   of	   SWFs	   should	   not	   be	   dealt	   with	   as	   a	  cause	  of	  concern	  for	  western	  countries.	  Rather,	  the	  growth	  of	  SWFs	  is	  the	  result	  of	   global	   imbalances	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   developing	  markets.	   As	   stated	   in	   chapter	  4,970	  such	  phenomena	  are	  best	  addressed	  not	  by	  regulatory	  instruments	  (such	  as	  a	   review	  of	   FDI),	   but	  by	  macroeconomic	   and	   foreign	  policy	   that	   aims	   to	   tackle	  those	  global	  imbalances.	  Once	   this	   is	  accepted,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  why	   the	  majority	  of	   the	   investment	  screening	  mechanisms	   applied	   to	   SWFs	   impose	   costs	   on	   recipient	   countries	   in	  the	   form	   of	   loss	   of	   investment	   and	   entail	   an	   unnecessary	   expenditure	   of	  government	  resources	  for	  very	  little	  or	  no	  benefit.	  In	  addition,	  these	  mechanisms	  prevent	  the	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources	  and	  thereby	  increase	  costs	  for	  global	  markets.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  predict	  the	  future	  of	  these	  mechanisms.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  some	  countries	  may	  acknowledge	  the	  lack	  of	  need	  for	  such	  excessive	  mechanisms	  and	  repeal	  or	  amend	  them.	  Such	  a	  development	  occurred	  during	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  after	  2008	  when	  formerly	  sceptical	  governments	  began	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  969	  See	  chapter	  2,	  Investing	  against	  the	  flow.	  970	  n	  488.	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lure	   SWFs	   to	   their	   countries.971	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   such	   mechanisms	   may	   be	  maintained	  as	  they	  address	  a	  popular	  demand	  for	  security	  and	  protection	  from	  foreign	   financial	   predators	   and	   a	   demand	   for	   the	   supervision	   of	   financial	  markets.	   Such	   measures,	   in	   providing	   a	   buffer	   against	   calls	   for	   even	   more	  stringent	  regulation,	  may,	  in	  this	  limited	  sense,	  be	  beneficial.	  	  
i.	  Protectionism	  and	  costs	  	   Protectionism	  is	  clearly	  present	   in	  all	   the	  measures	  referred	  to	  above.	  As	  a	  result,	  these	  measures	  impose	  significant	  costs	  on	  the	  countries	  concerned	  in	  the	  form	   of	   lost	   foreign	   investment.	   The	   precise	   extent	   of	   those	   costs	   is	   not	  quantifiable,	  but	   they	  vary	  according	   to	   the	  degree	  of	  protectionism	  present	   in	  each	  law.	  Countries	   differ,	   some	  maintaining	   a	   pre-­‐approval	   system	   and	   others	   not.	  France	   and	   Greece	   require	   a	   request	   for	   authorisation	   by	   the	   prospective	  investor	   to	   the	   national	   authorities.	   This	   system	   can	   be	   time	   consuming	   and	  uncertain,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	   investors.	  Moreover,	  the	  approval	  granted	  by	  the	  French	  Minister	  or	   the	  Greek	  Inter-­‐Ministerial	  Committee	  may	  be	  a	  conditional	  one,	   meaning	   that	   the	   prospective	   investor	   may	   be	   forced	   to	   comply	   with	  additional	  requests	  before	  the	  transaction	  is	  carried	  out.	  The	  USA	  and	  Germany,	  however,	   do	   not	   have	   prior-­‐authorisation	   regimes.	   But	   the	   American	   system	  provides	   for	   mandatory	   notification,	   whereas	   the	   German	   measure	   does	   not,	  assigning	   most	   of	   the	   obligation	   for	   the	   collection	   of	   information	   to	   the	  government.	  Thus,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  notification	  and	  pre-­‐approval	  systems,	  the	  German	  measure	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  investor	  friendly.	  Some	  measures	   examined	   in	   this	   chapter	   identify	   specific	   areas/industries	  where	   investments	   trigger	   the	   aforementioned	   review.	   Naturally,	   the	   broader	  the	   spectrum	   of	   the	   areas	   covered	   by	   the	   legislation,	   the	   greater	   the	   loss	   of	  foreign	   investment	  recipient	  countries	  will	  experience.	   In	  addition,	  some	  of	   the	  legislations	   examined	   are	  highly	  uncertain	   about	   the	   exact	   areas	   covered,	   thus	  complicating	  matters	  further	  for	  investors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  971	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘Sovereign	  Funds	  Welcome	  in	  Germany’	  (n	  1002);	  Fotak	  and	  Megginson	  (n	  478).	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France	   has	   listed	   in	   detail	   a	   high	   number	   of	   specific	   industries	   liable	   to	  activate	  a	  review,	  stating	  expected	  ones,	  such	  as	  research,	  productions	  and	  trade	  in	  weapons	  and	  dual-­‐use	  items,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  obscure	  ones,	  such	  as	  gambling,	  casinos	   and	   private	   security.	   Unfortunately	   this	   strict	   list	   remains	   in	   the	   2012	  Decree	  as	  far	  as	  foreign	  investors	  are	  concerned.	  Greece	  chose	  not	  to	  list	  specific	  industries,	   but	   rather	   has	   indicated	   the	   broad	   areas	   of	   energy	   and	  telecommunications,	  where	   investments	  (in	  particular	   those	  coming	   from	  third	  countries)	  require	  approval	  by	  the	  IPC.	  The	  USA	  law	  is	  even	  broader,	  originally	  providing	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   review	   in	   any	   transaction	   raising	   ‘national	  security’	  considerations.	  The	  law	  did	  not	  explain	  the	  term	  ‘national	  security’,	  but	  the	   FINSA	   amendment	   of	   2007	   gave	   some	   guidance	   by	   including	   ‘critical	  infrastructure’,	   ‘energy	   assets’	   and	   ‘critical	   technologies’	   in	   the	   areas	   to	   be	  reviewed	   by	   the	   CFIUS.972	  Finally,	   the	   German	   amendment	   provides	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	  review	  in	  every	  sector	  of	  the	  economy.	  All	  in	  all,	  every	  example	  of	  national	   legislation	  discussed	  above,	   is	  either	   too	  broad	  or	   too	  uncertain	  about	  which	  protected	  economic	  areas	  trigger	  a	  review.	  Most	   laws	   provide	   not	   only	   for	   specific	   areas,	   but	   also	   for	   specific	  percentages	  of	  share	  capital,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  which	  activates	  review.	  Germany	  and	   Greece	   establish	   rather	   low	   percentages	   (25	   and	   20%	   respectively),	   thus	  imposing	   tough	   restrictions	   on	   foreign	   investors	   willing	   to	   make	   significant	  investments	  in	  various	  areas.	  As	  far	  as	  Germany	  is	  concerned,	  one	  consequence	  of	   the	   abstraction	   principle	   in	   German	   private	   law973	  is	   that	   should	   a	   share	  purchase	   agreement	   be	   implemented	   but	   later	   on	   prohibited,	   the	   agreement	  would	  have	  to	  be	  unwound.974	  This,	  however,	  is	  not	  possible	  where	  25%	  or	  more	  of	  the	  voting	  rights	  have	  been	  acquired	  not	  collectively	  but	  successively	  as	  many	  of	   the	   former	   shareholders	   may	   not	   even	   be	   known	   by	   name.	   Thus,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  972	  n	  963.	  973	  Whereby	  the	  agreement	  for	  the	  transfer	  and	  assignment	  of	  shares	  remains	  in	  effect	  even	  though	  the	  underlying	  obligation	  is	  not;	  Horn	  and	  others	  (n	  904)	  69-­‐70	  974	  FTS	  Global	  Markets	  staff,	  ‘Germany	  Re-­‐acts	  to	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  Issue	  30	  November/December	  2008	  <www.ftseglobalmarkets.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=92:germany-­‐re-­‐acts-­‐to-­‐sovereign-­‐wealth-­‐funds&Itemid=55>	  accessed	  11	  December	  2012.	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25%	  threshold	  does	  not	  make	  sense.975	  It	  is	  relevant	  to	  note	  that	  the	  attendance	  at	   shareholders’	   meetings	   ranges	   on	   average	   between	   50	   and	   80%	   of	  shareholders,	  and	  that	  German	  corporate	  law	  requires	  at	  least	  a	  75%	  majority	  of	  the	  share	  capital	  present	  for	  the	  passing	  of	  special	  resolutions,976	  compared	  to	  a	  simple	   majority	   of	   votes	   cast	   for	   ordinary	   resolutions. 977 	  Against	   this	  background,	   possession	   of	   as	   little	   as	   10%	  of	   the	   voting	   rights	   often	   puts	   a	  shareholder	   in	   the	   position	   to	   block	   resolutions	   in	   a	   general	   shareholders’	  meeting	  of	  listed	  corporations	  because	  decisions	  are	  taken	  on	  a	  majority	  basis.978	  France	  and	  the	  USA,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  provide	  for	  a	  review	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  ‘control’.	   The	   American	   law	   states	   that	   the	   review	   applies	   to	   any	   ‘merger,	  acquisition	  or	  takeover’	  which	  results	  in	  foreign	  control	  of	  any	  [USA]	  person’.979	  The	   definition	   of	   ‘control’	   provided	   in	   the	   CFIUS	   2008	   regulation980	  remains	  unclear.	   To	   some	   extent,	   it	   reflects	   the	   definition	   found	   elsewhere	   in	  USA	   law,	  such	  as	  the	  Securities	  Act	  Rules,	  which	  define	  control	  as	  ‘the	  possession,	  direct	  or	  indirect,	   of	   the	   power	   to	   direct	   or	   cause	   the	   direction	   of	   the	  management	   and	  policies	  of	  a	  person,	  whether	  through	  ownership	  of	  voting	  securities,	  by	  contract,	  or	  otherwise’.981	  Under	  this	  definition,	  control	  could	  also	  be	  achieved	  by	  as	  little	  as	  10%	  of	  a	  company’s	  voting	  rights.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  section	  2(a)(9)	  of	  the	  USA	  Investment	   Company	   Act	   1940	   defines	   control	   as	   ‘the	   power	   to	   exercise	   a	  controlling	  influence	  over	  the	  management	  or	  policies	  of	  a	  company	  […]’982	  and	  presumes	   such	   control	   to	   exist	   when	   one	   controls	   25%	   or	   more	   of	   the	  company.983	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  975	  ibid.	  976	  For	  example	  resolutions	  to	  amend	  the	  articles	  of	  incorporation,	  section	  179	  para.	  2	  of	  the	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act	  (Aktiengesetz),	  or	  to	  waive	  preemption	  rights,	  section	  186(3)	  
Aktiengesetz,	  will	  require	  a	  majority	  of	  75%	  of	  the	  share	  capital	  represented	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  vote.	  977	  s	  133(1)	  Aktiengesetz.	  978	  FTS	  Global	  Markets,	  ‘Germany	  Re-­‐acts’	  (n	  974).	  979	  50	  U.S.C.A.	  app	  2170(a)(3).	  980	  ‘The	  power,	  direct,	  indirect,	  whether	  or	  not	  exercised	  …	  to	  determine,	  direct,	  or	  decide	  important	  matters	  affecting	  an	  entity’,	  §	  800.204	  p	  70718	  of	  the	  2008	  Regulation.	  981	  This	  definition	  is	  found	  in	  Rule	  405	  defining	  the	  terms	  used	  in	  Securities	  Act	  Rules	  400	  through	  494	  or	  terms	  used	  in	  Securities	  Act	  registration	  form.	  982	  15	  U.S.C.	  §	  80a-­‐2(a)(9).	  983	  ibid,	  although	  it	  is	  a	  rebuttable	  presumption.	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This	   confusion	   results	   from	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   ‘bright	   line’984	  test,	   such	   as	   is	  present	   in	   the	   German	   and	   Greek	   legislation.	   Its	   absence	   may	   grant	   the	   USA	  administration	   valuable	   flexibility	   in	   reviewing	   FDI,	   but,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  increases	   the	  uncertainty	   for	   the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	   investors	  and	   their	  consulting	  law	  firms.	  It	  is	  indicative	  that	  upon	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  regulations	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  April	  2008,	  a	  number	  of	  commentators	  complained	  that	  the	  standard	  was	   too	   ‘nebulous’	   and	   advocated	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   ‘bright	   line	   control	   test’	  based	  on	  a	  particular	  amount	  of	  stock	  ownership	  and/or	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  board	   of	   directors. 985 	  The	   CFIUS	   replied	   that,	   given	   the	   national	   security	  purposes	   of	   section	  721,	   it	  would	  be	   inappropriate	   to	   adopt	   such	   a	   bright	   line	  test,	  as	  it	  would	  make	  it	  ‘too	  easy	  to	  circumvent	  the	  statute’.986	  To	  this	  argument,	  one	   may	   reply	   that	   the	   definition	   of	   control	   in	   the	   USA	   regulation	   not	   only	  applies	  an	  unjustifiably	  low	  threshold,987	  but	  also	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  future	  investors	   to	   predict	   their	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   legislation.	   In	   these	  circumstances,	   a	   bright	   line	   test,	   even	   one	   substantially	   higher	   than	   the	   ones	  found	  in	  the	  German	  and	  Greek	  legislation,	  would	  have	  been	  preferable.	  In	  France,	  under	  the	  2005	  Decree,	  approval	  by	  the	  authorities	  was	  required	  only	   in	  cases	  of	  an	  attempt	   to	  purchase	  a	   controlling	   interest,988	  thus	  generally	  targeting	   transactions	  of	  40%	  or	  majority	   stakes.	  This	   is	  more	   in	   line	  with	   the	  general	  definition	  of	  ‘control’	  found	  in	  French	  law,	  which	  usually	  requires	  voting	  rights	  above	  40%.989	  This	  approach	  had	  advantages	  in	  that	  it	  provided	  for	  a	  high	  percentage	  triggering	  the	  review	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  preserves	  some	  valuable	  flexibility	   for	   the	  authorities	   responsible	   for	   carrying	  out	   the	   review.	  However,	  the	   2012	   Decree	   established	   a	   threshold	   test	   under	   which	   the	   acquisition	   of	  more	   than	   33.33%	   of	   the	   stock	   or	   voting	   rights	   of	   a	   company	   having	   its	  registered	  office	  in	  France	  requires	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  authorities.990	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  984	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Treasury’s	  Regulations,	  	  USA	  Treasury,	  ‘Regulations	  Pertaining	  to	  Mergers’	  (n	  964)	  70704.	  985	  Feng	  (n	  443)	  186.	  986	  ibid.	  987	  Hardly	  any	  security	  risk	  can	  arise	  from	  the	  ownership	  of	  10-­‐25%	  of	  shares	  in	  a	  company.	  988	  Article	  L	  233-­‐3	  of	  the	  French	  Commercial	  Code,	  See	  n	  848	  for	  the	  definition.	  989	  And	  where	  no	  other	  shareholder	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  holds	  a	  fraction	  larger	  than	  its	  own.	  990	  Article	  R.	  151-­‐3.	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The	   point	   about	   certainty	   in	   the	   legislation	   reveals	   a	   wider	   observable	  deficiency	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  national	  laws,	  namely,	  the	  general	  vagueness	  of	  terms	   used	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   strict	   definitions.	   In	   particular,	   the	  meaning	   of	  ‘national	   security’	   in	   the	   USA,	   French	   and	   German	   legislation	   as	   a	   basis	   for	  review	  remains	  unclear.	  The	  position	  in	  the	  German	  law	  is	  somewhat	  clearer	  as	  it	  is	  specified	  that	  public	  order,	  or	  security,	  shall	  be	  considered	  in	  danger	  only	  if	  a	  real	  and	  sufficiently	  severe	  danger	  can	  be	  identified	  which	  affects	  a	  fundamental	  interest	   of	   society.991	  However,	   the	   extremely	  wide	   range	   of	   application	   of	   the	  German	   law992	  renders	   it	   impossible	   to	   predict	   what	   may	   be	   covered	   by	   this	  definition,	   let	   alone	   provide	   for	   comprehensive	   examples	   in	   the	   legislation.	  Similarly,	   the	   Greek	   law	   fails	   to	   clarify	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘public	   benefit’	   as	   the	  standard	   underlying	   the	   criteria	   for	   approval,	   despite	   the	   small	   number	   of	  potential	   industries	   and	   companies	   covered	   by	   it.	   It,	   thus,	   appears	   from	   the	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  examined,	  that	  authority	  rests	  upon	  executive	  departments	  and	  offices	   to	  determine	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  whether	  a	   transaction	  poses	  a	  threat	   to	   national	   security	   or	   the	   public	   benefit.	   The	   risk	   resulting	   from	   these	  uncertainties	   is	   that	   foreign	   investors	  will	   seek	  opportunities	   in	  other	  markets	  with	  less	  ambiguous	  regulatory	  standards.993	  In	   addition,	   all	   the	   laws	   considered	   are	  making	   specific	   reference	   to	   third	  countries	  when	  stating	  that	  the	  origin	  and	  ownership	  of	  the	  investment	  entity	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  transaction.	  Third	  country	  investors	  are	  not	  only	  targeted	  as	  potentially	  dangerous	  investors,	  but	  are	  also	  placed	  at	  a	  disadvantage	   when	   competing	   with	   domestic	   companies	   for	   mergers	   and	  acquisitions.994	  It	   has	   been	   argued,	   for	   example,	   by	   Cox,	   that	   the	   possibility	   of	  review	   is	   advantageous	   to	   the	   domestic	   USA	   companies	   when	   they	   compete	  against	  foreign	  ones	  in	  takeover	  bids:	  not	  only	  must	  foreign	  companies	  consider	  the	  possible	  time	  delay	  of	  up	  to	  90	  days,	  but	  must	  also	  factor	  in	  the	  cost	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  991	  para	  7(2)	  No	  6	  AWG.	  992	  Which	  can	  apply	  to	  any	  company	  operating	  in	  any	  industry.	  993	  Feng	  (n	  443)	  504.	  994	  Such	  as	  Section	  7(2)	  No	  6	  AWG.	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transaction	  might	  be	  disallowed.995 As	  a	  result,	  the	  control	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  FDI,996	  and	  might	  lead	  to	  informal	  boycotting	  of	  specific	  countries	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  similar	  backlash	  in	  those	  countries	  against	  the	  USA.997	  In	   addition,	   it	   is	   highly	   likely	   that	   legislators	  will	   fail	   in	   their	   objectives	   to	  protect	  domestic	  economies	  from	  security	  and	  other	  risks.	  Taking	  USA	  law	  again	  as	   an	   example,	   it	   is	   argued	   by	   Pistor	   that	  with	   China	   holding	   20%	   of	   the	   USA	  budget	   deficit,	   ‘the	   notion	   that	   CFIUS	   could	   control	   foreign	   influence	   on	   [USA]	  soil	   by	   scrutinising	   individual	   investment	   projects	   is	   somewhat	   curious’.998	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  stated	  correctly	  that	  many	  of	  the	  anticipated	  investments	  may	  well	  be	  below	  the	  control	  threshold	  stipulated	  by	  the	  CFIUS	  regulations	  anyway;	  even	   those	   that	   are	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   ‘control’	   may	   avoid	   oversight	   as	   the	  immediate	   investors	   will	   be	   USA-­‐based	   financial	   intermediaries	   rather	   than	  foreign	  SWFs.999	  A	  similar	  criticism	  would	  certainly	  apply	  equally	  to	  the	  German	  and	  Greek	  measures.1000	  The	  above	  analysis,	  makes	  clear	   that	   the	  regulatory	   instruments	  are	  overly	  protectionist	   and	   suffer	   from	   major	   deficiencies.	   Nevertheless,	   some	   present	  fewer	  problems	  than	  others.	  The	  German	  response,	  in	  particular,	  is	  lighter	  than	  the	   French	   and	   Greek,	   as	   it	   does	   not	   contain	   a	   pre-­‐approval	   system.	   German	  officials	  themselves	  have	  compared	  the	  new	  legislation	  to	  a	  minimalist	  version	  of	  the	  CFIUS,1001	  although	  they	  have	  made	  clear	  that	  their	  proposal	  is	  still	  much	  less	  strict	  than	  other	  SWF	  regulatory	  systems.1002	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  995	  Jason	  Cox,	  ‘Regulation	  of	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  After	  the	  Dubai	  Ports	  Controversy:	  Has	  the	  [USA]	  Government	  Finally	  Figured	  Out	  How	  to	  Balance	  Foreign	  Threats	  to	  National	  Security	  Without	  Alienating	  Foreign	  Companies?’	  (2008)	  JCorpL	  996	  ibid,	  also	  argued	  by	  Feng	  (n	  443)	  Pt	  VI.B.	  997	  Cox	  (n	  995).	  998	  Pistor	  (n	  429)	  291.	  999	  ibid	  299.	  1000	  France	  provides	  specific	  criteria	  for	  identifying	  foreign-­‐controlled	  French	  investors	  and	  generally	  places	  them	  in	  the	  same	  category	  as	  foreign	  investors,	  see	  Article	  L.	  233-­‐3	  of	  the	  French	  Commercial	  Code.	  1001	  Bertrand	  Benoit	  and	  others,	  ‘Germany	  Plans	  for	  Own	  CFIUS	  Deal	  Watchdog’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  27	  September	  2007)	  <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48128c56-­‐6c82-­‐11dc-­‐a0cf-­‐0000779fd2ac.html>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012. 1002	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘Sovereign	  Funds	  Welcome	  in	  Germany,	  FinMin	  Says’	  Reuters	  (London,	  9	  May	  2008)	  <www.reuters.com/article/2008/05/09/germany-­‐sovereignfunds-­‐idUSZWE96121220080509>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012.	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Nevertheless,	   some	  commentators	  within	  Germany	  quickly	  expressed	   their	  disapproval.	   The	   General	   Secretary	   of	   Germany’s	   International	   Chamber	   of	  Commerce	   (ICC),	  Pohlenz	  said	   that	   the	  plan	   to	   regulate	   foreign	   investors	  could	  lead	  to	  lower	  FDI	  in	  Germany	  and	  trigger	  limits	  on	  German	  investment	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  chief	  of	  the	  Federation	  of	  German	  Industry,	  Schnappauf	  said	   that	   Berlin’s	   new	   laws	   sent	   ‘the	  wrong	   signal’	   for	   Germany	   as	   a	   place	   for	  investment.	  In	  his	  view,	  Germany,	  as	  the	  world’s	  leading	  export	  nation	  and	  a	  key	  provider	   of	   foreign	   investment,	   ‘is	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   open	   markets’,	   and	  foreign	  investment	  underpinned	  more	  than	  two	  million	  jobs	  in	  Europe’s	  largest	  economy.1003 	  However,	   it	   has	   been	   said	   that	   the	   law	   is	   unlikely	   to	   affect	  Germany’s	   top	   position	   in	   the	  world1004	  on	  market	   openness:	   German	   officials	  have	  reassured	  that	  the	  law	  will	  only	  be	  used	  in	  ‘extremely	  rare’	  circumstances	  and	  that	  ‘the	  majority	  of	  foreign	  investments	  will	  not	  be	  affected’.1005	  The	  impact	  of	  FDI	  laws	  is	  determined	  by	  how	  they	  are	  applied,	  rather	  than	  their	  strict	  letter.	  	  
ii.	  Compatibility	  with	  EU	  law	  	   	  Naturally,	  as	  EU	  Member	  States,	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Greece,	  must	  comply	  with	  EU	  law	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  CJEU.1006	  France	   and	   Greece	   have	   failed	   to	   pass	   the	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   Commission.1007	  The	   French	   government	   did	   not	   challenge	   the	   Commission’s	   decision	   and	  decided	   to	  embark	  upon	  an	  amendment	  of	   the	   law.	   It	   can	  be	  assumed	   that	   the	  second	  Decree	  was	  made	  largely	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Commission,	  although	  a	  final	  response	  is	  still	  pending.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1003	  DW-­‐World	  staff,	  ‘Germany	  Moves	  to	  Protect	  Companies	  From	  Foreign	  Takeovers’	  Deutsche	  
Welle	  (Berlin,	  20	  August	  2008)	  <www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,3580978,00.html>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012.	  1004	  n	  862;	  and	  Kalinova,	  Palerm	  and	  Thomsen,	  (n	  862)	  table	  1.	  1005	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘Germany	  Unveils	  Law’	  Euractiv	  (Brussels,	  21	  August	  2008)	  <www.euractiv.com/financial-­‐services/germany-­‐unveils-­‐law-­‐block-­‐foreign-­‐takeovers/article-­‐174818>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012;	  However,	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘majority	  of	  foreign	  investments’	  can	  only	  be	  ascertained	  by	  the	  application	  of	  the	  measure	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  1006	  See	  the	  discussion	  above	  n	  739	  onwards.	  1007	  See	  above	  for	  France,	  n	  861	  and	  Greece,	  n	  922.	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Since	  Greece	   took	  no	  action	   to	  comply	  with	   the	  Commission’s	  decision,	   the	  matter	  was	  referred	  to	  the	  CJEU.	  The	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  restriction	  in	  the	  Greek	  law	   was	   intended	   to	   apply	   only	   those	   shareholders	   who	   are	   able	   to	   exert	   a	  definite	  influence	  over	  the	  management	  and	  control	  of	  such	  a	  company	  and,	  thus,	  restricted	   only	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   and	   not	   the	   free	   movement	   of	  capital.1008	  Moreover,	   the	   Court	   ruled	   the	   scope	   of	   its	   application	   to	   be	   too	  discretionary	   (which	   is	   difficult	   for	   the	   courts	   to	   control)1009	  and	   it	   does	   not	  address	   specific	   threats	   to	   the	   country’s	   national	   strategic	   interests.1010	  This	  need	  not	  concern	  the	  Greek	  government	  unduly	  as	  it	  was	  recognised	  by	  Greece’s	  former	   Finance	   Minister,	   Alogoskoufis,	   that	   the	   law	   was	   an	   ad	   hoc	   measure	  designed	   to	   apply	   exclusively	   to	   the	   case	   of	   OTE.1011 	  The	   Greek	   measure	  therefore	  differs	  considerably	  from	  the	  French	  and	  German	  ones	  which	  were	  of	  general	  application.	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that,	   following	   the	   adoption	   of	   this	   measure,	   MIG	  withdrew	  its	  participation	  in	  OTE	  and	  sold	  its	  19.5%	  stake	  to	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  (DT)	   which	   became	   the	   largest	   shareholder	   of	   the	   formerly	   public	  telecommunications	   operator. 1012 	  MIG’s	   withdrawal	   is	   invoked	   by	   the	  Commission	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   law	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   driving	   away	   FDI.1013	  However,	   it	   should	   also	   have	   been	   recognised	   by	   the	   Commission	   that	   the	  measure	  was	  never	  formally	  applied	  to	  review	  MIG’s	   investment,	  as	  the	  latter’s	  interest	   in	  OTE	  never	  exceeded	  the	  20%	  benchmark.	  Also,	   the	   law	  was	  applied	  successfully	  on	  the	  investment	  of	  DT.	  As	  such,	  there	  is	  no	  concrete	  proof	  that	  the	  law	  unduly	  restricts	   foreign	   investors.	  This	  alone	  may	  not	  suffice	   to	  render	  the	  Greek	   law	  compatible	  with	  the	  Treaty	  rules	  on	   free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  but	   it	  should	  have	  carried	  weight	  in	  the	  Court’s	  review	  of	  the	  law’s	  compatibility	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1008	  Commission	  v	  Hellenic	  Republic	  (n	  923)	  para	  23.	  1009	  ibid,	  para	  75.	  1010	  ibid,	  para	  78.	  1011	  Statement	  by	  George	  Alogoskoufis,	  former	  Finance	  Minister	  of	  Greece	  (personal	  communication	  24	  January	  2009);	  As	  seen	  above	  (n	  919),	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Greek	  government	  was	  to	  protect	  OTE	  from	  MIG,	  a	  private	  equity	  firm	  controlled	  by	  a	  Dubai	  state-­‐owned	  fund.	  1012	  And	  eventually	  took	  over	  the	  management	  of	  OTE,	  Hellenic	  Stock	  Exchange,	  ‘History	  of	  Ownership	  Variations	  for	  the	  year	  2008’	  Final	  Report	  30_6_2008,	  Telecommunications	  Organisation	  of	  Greece	  A.E.,	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  A.G.,	  <www.ase.gr/content/gr/ann.asp?annId=63800>	  accessed	  15	  March	  2012.	  1013	  n	  922.	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EU	  law.	  Germany	   passed	   the	   Commission’s	   scrutiny	   without	   any	   requirement	   for	  amendments.	  This	  fact	  distinguishes	  the	  German	  case	  from	  those	  of	  France	  and	  Greece.	   It	   proved	   crucial	   that	   the	   German	   government	   had	   constructed	   its	  legislation	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Commission	  and	  thus	  ensured	  its	  compliance	  with	  EU	  law	  from	  an	  early	  stage.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   Federation	   of	   German	   Industry	   has	   insisted	   that	   the	  German	   law	   would	   be	   in	   breach	   of	   EU	   legislation	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	  capital,	   unless	   there	   is	   further	   explanation.1014	  Schweitzer	   has	   argued	   that	   the	  approach	   chosen	   by	   the	   German	   legislator	   does	   not	   comply	   with	   the	   EU	   law	  requirements	   of	   predictability	   and	   legal	   certainty,	   since	   it	   does	  not	   specify	   the	  ‘kind	  of	   threat	   that	   could	   lead	   to	   a	  prohibition’	   and,	   as	   such,	   confers	   too	  much	  discretion	  to	  the	  Minster	  for	  the	  Economy.1015	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   above	  difficulties,	   it	   needs	   to	  be	   explained	  why	  France’s	  inclusion	   of	   ‘casinos’	   in	   its	   2005	  Decree	   is	   described	   as	   ‘unsatisfactory’	   by	   the	  Commission,	  while	  the	  German	  review	  procedure	  can	  freely	  apply	   in	  the	  entire	  spectrum	   of	   the	   economy.	   It	   also	   remains	   debatable	   to	   what	   extent	   countries	  should	   be	   able	   to	   target	   third	   countries	   or	   cite	   the	   public	   ownership	   of	   the	  investment	  entity	  as	  grounds	  for	  review.	  As	  stated	  above,1016	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  rules	  apply	   to	   third	  countries	  as	  much	  as	   to	   investments	   from	  other	  EU	  Member	  States.	  It	  is,	  however,	  possible	  that	  a	  measure	  targeting	  third	  country	  investors	  can	  make	  reference	  to	  their	  ownership	  status	  (‘state-­‐owned’)	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  review	  without	   falling	   foul	   of	   the	   Treaty	   provisions	   on	   ownership.	   Article	   345	   TFEU	  (previously	   295	   EC)	   establishes	   the	   principle	   of	   neutrality	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   private	   or	  public	  ownership.	  Although	  a	  national	  foreign	  investment	  law	  that	  discriminates	  against	  public	  investors	  from	  other	  EU	  countries	  would	  violate	  the	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital,	  this	  principle	  cannot	  be	  transferred	  to	  non-­‐EU	  investors	  as	  well,	   since	   the	   ownership	   of	   a	   foreign	   investor	  might	   be	   relevant	   in	   assessing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1014	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘Germany	  unveils	  law’	  (n	  1005).	  1015	  Schweitzer	  (n	  597)	  279.	  1016	  n	  41.	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their	  objectives.1017	  Overall,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  national	  measures	  examined	  above	  present	  too	  many	  difficulties,	  and	  too	  often	  the	  governments	  adopting	  such	  measures	  are	  influenced	  by	  perverse	  incentives,	  such	  as	  popular	  pressure	  to	  fend	  off	  so-­‐called	  foreign	   economic	   predators.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   measures	   adopted	   may	   hinder	  economic	   efficiency	   and	   the	   efficient	   allocation	   of	   capital.	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	  investment	  screening	  mechanisms	  may	  act	  as	  a	  buffer	  against	  calls	  for	  even	  more	  stringent	  laws,	  when	  these	  are	  out	  of	  proportion	  and	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  real	   nature	   of	   SWFs,	   they	   are	   bound	   to	   do	  more	   harm	   than	   good.	   Against	   this	  background,	  it	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  that,	  although	  not	  without	  difficulties	  itself,	  a	  supranational	  response	  is	  more	  desirable.	  	  	  
Table	  5.1	  
	  	  This	   table	   represents	   a	   simplified	   classification	   of	   the	   investment	   review	   mechanisms	  implemented	  in	  various	  countries.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1017	  Schweitzer	  (n	  597)	  286.	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Note	   that	   the	  pre-­‐administrative	  approval	  system	   in	  France	  and	  Greece	  can	  be	  equated	   to	  the	   system	   of	   investment	   caps	   applied	   in	   India.	   It	   is	   also	   noteworthy	   that	   the	   incentive-­‐type	  scheme,	  examined	  in	  chapter	  4,	  has	  not	  been	  followed	  by	  any	  of	  the	  countries	  examined.	  	  	  	  	  	  CONCLUSION	  	   	  This	  chapter	  analysed	  four	  national	  regulatory	  instruments,	  those	  of	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece	  and	  the	  USA,	  that	  deal	  with	  the	  national	  security	  implications	  of	  SWF	   investments.	  The	   first	   three	   jurisdictions	   are	   also	  EU	  Member	   States.	  The	  EU	  rules	  on	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  examining	  the	  legality	  of	  those	   instruments	   from	   an	   EU	   point	   of	   view.	   As	   seen	   above,	   the	   CJEU	   has	  interpreted	   the	   exceptions	   to	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   capital	   for	   public	   security	  reasons	  in	  a	  very	  narrow	  way,	  thus	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  Member	  States	  to	  apply	  investment	  screening	  laws	  on	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	  Of	  the	  measures	  examined	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  were	  adopted	  by	  EU	  Member	  States,	   two,	   France	   and	   Greece,	   have	   provided	   for	   pre-­‐approval	   of	   certain	  investments	  and	  one,	  Germany,	  applies	  an	  ex	  post	  security	  review.	  It	  is	  indicative	  that	  the	  Greek	  measure	  was	  adopted	  following	  the	  rapid	  purchase	  of	  shares	  by	  a	  private	   equity	   firm	   of	   the	   country’s	   public	   telecommunications	   organisation,	  while	  in	  France	  and	  Germany	  the	  measure	  was	  adopted	  in	  response	  to	  the	  wider	  phenomenon	   of	   SWFs	   and	  was	   construed	   to	   be	   of	   general	   application.	   France,	  despite	   legislating	   to	   restrict	   SWFs,	   has	   responded	   by	   also	   creating	   a	   national	  SWF	  itself.	  The	  European	  Commission	  has	   expressed	   its	   opposition	   to	   the	  French	   and	  Greek	   measures	   and	   although	   Greece	   has	   defended	   its	   measure	   before	   the	  European	  Court,	  France	  has	  agreed	  to	  amend	  its	  law.	  No	  disagreement	  has	  arisen	  between	   the	   Commission	   and	   Germany	   over	   the	   legality	   of	   the	   German	   law,	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although	  there	  has	  been	  strong	  opposition	  from	  Germany	  against	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  German	  law	  defending	  VW	  from	  foreign	  ownership.	  Looking	   outside	   the	   EU,	   the	   USA	   is	   not	   bound	   by	   any	   supranational	  regulations	  with	  regard	  to	  FDI,	  other	  than	  international	  laws	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  WTO	   and	   the	   OECD.	   Although	   a	   security	   review	   system	   existed	   before,	   its	  provisions	  were	   tightened	   following	   the	   attempted	   takeover	  of	  USA	  ports	  by	   a	  large	  Dubai	   firm.	  The	  USA	   system	  does	  not	   contain	   a	  pre-­‐approval	  mechanism	  but	  provides,	  instead,	  for	  an	  ex	  post	  review	  by	  a	  specialised	  body,	  the	  CFIUS.	  Analysing	   those	  measures	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   lessons	   learned	   from	   the	  previous	  chapters,	   they	  all	  appear	  excessively	  protectionist.	   In	  particular,	   those	  measures	   impose	   particularly	   tough	   regulatory	   standards	   on	   global	   investors	  and	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  reality	  of	  SWF	  investment	  behaviour.	  As	  such,	  they	  deter	  investment	  and	  threaten	  to	  reduce	  the	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  the	  global	  allocation	  of	   capital.	   It	   can	  be	  assumed,	   therefore,	   that	   countries	   implementing	  security	  reviews	  are	  often	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  misinformed	  public	  perceptions	  about	   so-­‐called	   foreign	  predators.	   It	  may	   therefore	  be	   valuable	   to	   examine	   the	  possibility	   of	   establishing	   a	   supranational	   regulatory	   framework	   to	   deal	   with	  SWFs.	  This	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  SIX	  -­‐	  
Supranational	  Regulatory	  Models	  	  	  
	  INTRODUCTION	  	  	  	   The	  previous	  chapter	  dealt	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  adopting	  unilateral	  measures	  to	  address	   the	  concerns	  caused	  by	   the	  operation	  of	  SWFs.	   It	  was	   seen	   that	   the	  impact	  of	  those	  measures	  can	  deter	  FDI	  coming	  from	  SWFs,	  and	  thus	  affect	  the	  efficient	   allocation	   of	   capital	   and	   harm	   host	   economies.	   In	   this	   chapter,	  supranational	   regulatory	   frameworks	   are	   examined.	   These	   are	   typically	  produced	  by	   international	  or	   transnational	   institutions	   in	   the	   form	  of	  Codes	  of	  Conduct	   (CoCs),	   and	   in	   some	   cases	  with	   the	   cooperation	  of	   SWFs	  as	  well.	   This	  chapter	   argues,	   that,	   although	   not	   without	   problems	   themselves,	   such	   efforts	  present	   fewer	  downsides	   than	   their	  national	   regulatory	  alternatives,	   especially	  when	  they	  are	  of	  voluntary	  nature.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  outline	  of	   the	  distinction	  between	  national	  and	  supranational	   responses	   to	  SWFs.	   It	   then	  continues	   into	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  CoC	  model.	   Specific	   supranational	   instruments	   are	   then	   examined	   and	   assessed,	  namely	   those	   produced	   by	   the	   OECD,	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   EU.	   An	   analysis	   is	   also	  offered	   of	   various	   reactions	   to	   those	   CoCs	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   benefits	   and	  drawbacks	   of	   those	   instruments,	   accompanied	   by	   a	   number	   of	   proposals	   to	  improve	  their	  effect.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  recent	  experience	  of	  the	   implementation	   and	   the	   relative	   success	   of	   the	   UK	   Corporate	   Governance	  Code.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  regulation	  of	  SWFs	  and	  the	  current	  regulatory	  structure	  for	  hedge	  funds	  in	  the	  EU.	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1.	  National	  vs	  Supranational	  	   The	  analysis	  of	  national	  legislation	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  response	  taken	  at	  the	  supranational	  level	  would	  be	  preferable.	  Such	  an	   initiative	   is	   usually	   led	   by	   a	   supranational	   institution1018 	  and	   it	   may	   involve	   various	   interested	   governments	   and	   SWFs.	  Supranational	   responses	   present	   important	   differences	   when	   compared	   to	  national	  ones.	  Firstly,	  supranational	  bodies	  are	  perhaps	  more	  immune	  to	  short-­‐term	  political	   considerations	   such	   as	   a	   possible	  momentary	   suspicion	   towards	  foreign	   investments.1019	  As	   a	   result,	   measures	   adopted	   by	   such	   an	   entity	   can	  offer	   greater	   objectivity,	   focus	   on	   longer-­‐term	   benefits	   and	   resist	   frequent	  changes	   in	   the	   law.	   A	   supranational	   response	   can	   thus	   produce	   a	  more	   stable	  regulatory	  regime,	  offer	  foreign	  investors	  greater	  assurances	  and	  create	  a	  more	  welcoming	  investment	  climate.	  Secondly,	   the	   objectivity	   of	   a	   supranational	   effort,	   removed	   from	   national	  political	  considerations,	  could	  also	  appeal	  more	  easily	  to	  SWFs	  and	  include	  them	  in	   the	   rule	   making	   process,	   thus	   equating	   this	   process	   to	   that	   of	   self-­‐regulation.1020	  The	   participation	   of	   SWFs	   does	   not	   only	   provide	   the	   regulator	  with	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  expertise	  but,	  more	  importantly,	  increases	  the	  chances	  that	  the	  rules	  will	  be	  more	  easily	  accepted	  by	  those	  targeted	  by	  the	  regulation.	  Thirdly,	   supranational	   responses	   are	   harmonised.	   The	   heterogeneity	   of	  various	   national	   investment	   review	   standards1021	  could	   impose	   undue	   costs	   of	  compliance	  on	  SWFs	  and	  hence	  affect	  the	  efficient	  flow	  of	  capital.1022	  Moreover,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1018	  Whether	  it	  is	  the	  European	  Commission,	  the	  OECD	  or	  a	  body	  established	  under	  the	  United	  Nations.	  1019	  Such	  calls	  are	  sometimes	  reflected	  in	  the	  unjustified	  negative	  press	  that	  foreign	  investors	  receive	  or	  in	  the	  negative	  speech	  held	  many	  political	  actors	  (see	  n	  421	  for	  more).	  It	  is	  often	  the	  1019	  Such	  calls	  are	  sometimes	  reflected	  in	  the	  unjustified	  negative	  press	  that	  foreign	  investors	  receive	  or	  in	  the	  negative	  speech	  held	  many	  political	  actors	  (see	  n	  421	  for	  more).	  It	  is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  such	  general	  attitudes	  inform	  the	  policy	  decisions	  of	  national	  governments,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  USA.	  1020	  Self-­‐regulation	  describes	  an	  array	  of	  regulatory	  instruments	  that	  rely	  upon	  consensus	  and	  co-­‐operation	  as	  a	  means	  through	  which	  behavior	  is	  regulated,	  Bronwen	  Morgan	  and	  Karen	  Yeung,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Law	  and	  Regulation	  –	  Text	  and	  Materials,	  Cambridge	  Univesity	  Press,	  Cambridge	  2009,	  92.	  1021	  As	  the	  ones	  examined	  throughout	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  1022	  Mattoo	  and	  Subramanian	  (n	  680)	  16.	  
Supranational	  Regulatory	  Models	  
	   250	  
monitoring	  the	  compliance	  of	  supervised	  entities	  at	  the	  supranational	   level	  can	  also	  benefit	  from	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  can	  be	  cost-­‐effective.	  Fourthly,	  national	  responses	  can	  offer	  greater	  flexibility	  than	  supranational	  ones.	  A	  government	  may	  wish,	   for	  example,	   to	  adopt	  a	  more	  restrictive	  regime	  towards	   specific	   countries	   as	   retribution	   against	   the	   limited	   access	   to	   their	  markets.	   Indeed,	   although	   developed	   countries	   in	   Europe	   and	   North	   America	  maintain	  a	  high	  level	  of	  market	  openness	  to	  all	  foreign	  investors,	  the	  same	  does	  not	   hold	   always	   true	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction.1023	  This	   lack	   of	   reciprocity	  may	  lead	   western	   governments	   to	   opt	   for	   national	   measures	   to	   limit	   the	   level	   of	  market	   openness	   to	   those	   countries;	   France’s	   former	   President	   expressed	   this	  concerns	  related	  to	  SWFs.1024	  Lack	   of	   reciprocity,	   however,	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   sound	   basis	   for	   the	  adoption	  of	  national	  measures.	  Protectionist	   laws	   can	  have	  adverse	  effect	  on	  a	  country’s	   national	   economy, 1025 	  whilst	   simultaneously	   running	   the	   risk	   of	  causing	   further	   protectionist	   backlashes	   abroad.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   EU	  Commission	   has	   also	   expressed	   at	   times	   the	   willingness	   to	   counteract	  protectionism	  against	  EU	  firms	  in	  foreign	  markets,	  thus	  demonstrating	  that	  is	  it	  not	   entirely	   impervious	   to	   the	   problem.	   In	   2012	   it	   proposed	   a	   regulation	  levelling	  the	  playing	  field	  for	  European	  businesses	  in	  international	  procurement	  markets,1026	  using	  an	  instrument	  to	  target	  countries	  that	  discriminate	  against	  EU	  businesses	   in	   the	   market	   for	   public	   procurements.	   Under	   the	   proposal,	   the	  Commission	  may	  use	  mechanisms	  that	  restrict	  foreign	  access	  to	  the	  EU	  market,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  repeated	  and	  serious	  discrimination	  against	  European	  suppliers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1023	  Kalinova,	  Palerm	  and	  Thomsen	  (n	  862)	  19;	  Regarding	  China	  see	  also,	  USA	  Department	  of	  State,	  ‘2011	  Investment	  Climate	  Statement	  –	  China’	  (2011)	  Bureau	  of	  Economic,	  Energy	  and	  Business	  Affairs	  <www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157258.htm>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012. 1024	  Stating	  ‘I	  don’t	  accept	  that	  certain	  SWFs	  can	  buy	  anything	  here	  and	  our	  own	  capitalists	  can’t	  buy	  anything	  in	  their	  countries.	  I	  demand	  reciprocity	  before	  we	  open	  Europe’s	  barriers’,	  Nick	  Antonovics,	  ‘Sarkozy	  Attacks	  Wealth	  Funds	  on	  Eve	  of	  MidEast	  Trip’	  Reuters	  (London,	  12	  January	  2008)	  <www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/12/france-­‐mideast-­‐funds-­‐idUSL1220023020080112>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  1025	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  protectionism	  see	  chapter	  4	  ‘The	  
avoidance	  of	  investment	  protectionism’,	  and	  about	  protectionism	  towards	  SWFs	  in	  particular	  see	  n	  363.	  1026	  Commission,	  ‘European	  Commission	  Levels	  the	  Playing	  Field	  for	  European	  Business	  in	  International	  Procurement	  Markets’	  (Press	  Release)	  IP/12/268,	  21	  March	  2012.	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in	  non-­‐EU	  countries.	  Such	  action	  would	  be	  taken	  only	  if	  the	  non-­‐EU	  country	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  negotiations	  to	  address	  market	  access	  imbalances.	  The	  wording	  of	  the	   proposal	   ensures	   that	   these	   powers	  would	   be	   used	   only	   in	   extreme	   cases,	  thus	  avoiding	   serious	  negative	  effects	   to	   the	  economic	   interests	  of	  EU	  Member	  States.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  case	  of	  SWFs	  is	  concerned,	  similar	  action	  can	  also	  be	  taken	  with	   regard	   to	   transnational	   direct	   investments	   under	   Article	   64(3)	   TFEU.1027	  This	  way,	  if	  needed,	  the	  Commission	  can	  address	  the	  concerns	  of	  many	  Member	  States	   about	   lack	   of	   investment	   reciprocity.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   this	   possibility	  constitutes	  a	  defence	  against	  pleas	  to	  counteract	  lack	  of	  reciprocity	  with	  national	  measures	  and	  proves	  that	  supranational	  responses	  can	  also	  be	  flexible.	  It	  was	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  41028	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  binding	  supranational	  rules	  for	  SWFs	  would	  necessarily	  involve	  the	  WTO.	  This	  way,	  the	  WTO’s	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  could	  be	  used	  to	  issue	  binding	  rulings	  on	  members	  that	  violate	  the	  agreed	  rules.1029	  Nevertheless,	   it	  was	  argued	  that	  regulatory	  action	  through	  the	  WTO	  (or	  the	  EU	  for	  that	  matter)	  would	  face	  considerable	  difficulties.	  It	  was	  explained,	   in	   particular,	   that	   any	   attempt	   to	   establish	   a	   security	   review	   of	  investments	  in	  various	  industries	  at	  the	  international	   level	  would	  be	  hampered	  by	   the	   difficulty	   of	   establishing	   a	   common	   definition	   for	   SWFs	   and	   a	   list	   for	  sectors	  under	  review	  but	  also	  by	   the	   inability	  of	  a	  supervisory	  body	  to	  enforce	  the	   agreed	   rules.1030	  Given	   these	  difficulties,	   the	  position	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	  that	   hard	   regulation,	   such	   as	   investment	   screening	   and	   security	   review	  mechanisms,	  should	  not	  be	  adopted	  at	  the	  supranational	  level.	  Different	  options,	  such	   as	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   CoC	   can	   prevent	   most	   of	   the	   abovementioned	  implementation	  problems	  and	  the	  ensuing	  economic	  inefficiencies	  that	  they	  can	  cause.	  This	  option	  is	  analysed	  in	  greater	  detail	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1027	  ‘The	  Council,	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  special	  legislative	  procedure,	  may	  unanimously,	  and	  after	  consulting	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  adopt	  measures	  which	  constitute	  a	  step	  backwards	  in	  Union	  law	  as	  regards	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  capital	  to	  or	  from	  third	  countries’.	  1028	  n	  680.	  1029	  For	  the	  WTO’s	  dispute	  Settlement	  Understanding	  (Annex	  2	  of	  the	  WTO	  Agreement)	  see:	  WTO,	  ‘Understanding	  on	  Rules	  and	  Procedures	  Governing	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Disputes’,	  World	  Trade	  Organisation,	  Dispute	  Settlement	  –	  Legal	  Text,	  <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm>	  accessed	  8	  July	  2012.	  1030	  Enforcement	  would	  be	  difficult	  because	  SWFs	  would	  attempt	  to	  escape	  their	  governance	  structure	  to	  evade	  the	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  and	  thus	  escape	  the	  rules	  altogether.	  For	  more	  see,	  chapter	  4,	  at	  178.	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2.	  Codes	  of	  Conduct	  as	  a	  Regulatory	  Option	  	   A	  CoC	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  International	  Federation	  of	  Accountants	  as	  a	  set	  of:	  	  ‘principles,	  values,	   standards,	  or	   rules	  of	  behavior	   that	  guide	   the	  decisions,	  procedures	  and	  systems	  of	  an	  organization	  in	  a	  way	  that	  (a)	  contributes	  to	  the	   welfare	   of	   its	   key	   stakeholders,	   and	   (b)	   respects	   the	   rights	   of	   all	  constituents	  affected	  by	  its	  operations’.1031	  	  Compliance	  with	   the	  principles	  of	   the	  CoC	   is	  usually	  voluntary	  and,	   thus,	   it	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ‘soft	  law’	  instrument.	  Intervention	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  CoC	  may	  not	  always	  be	  necessary.	  According	  to	  the	   ‘Coase	   Theorem’,	   when	   trade	   of	   externalities	   is	   possible,	   there	   are	   no	  transaction	   costs	   and	  all	  parties	   are	   free	   to	  bargain,	   then	   the	  market	   is	   always	  able	  to	  efficiently	  accommodate	  possible	  imperfections	  in	  the	  most	  efficient	  way,	  leading	   to	   an	   efficient	   outcome	   and	  market	   allocation,	   regardless	   of	   the	   initial	  allocation	  of	  property	  rights	  and	  without	  any	  regulatory	  intervention.1032	  In	  this	  context,	   the	   legal	   system’s	   role	   should	   be	   limited	   to	   assigning	   and	   protecting	  property	  rights	  and	  letting	  the	  market	  work	  toward	  efficient	  solutions.1033	  Under	  this	  theory,	  the	  concerns	  surrounding	  SWFs,1034	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	   protectionist	   backlash	   in	   recipient	   countries	   on	   the	   other,	   may	   be	   freely	  arranged	   through	   the	  negotiations	  of	   the	  parties	   in	  question.	  While	  SWFs	  may,	  for	   instance,	   commit	   to	   more	   transparency	   and	   to	   commercially	   driven	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1031	  Professional	  Accountants	  in	  Business	  Committee,	  ‘Defining	  and	  Developing	  an	  Effective	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Organizations’	  (2007)	  International	  Federation	  of	  Accountants	  <www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Defining-­‐and-­‐Developing-­‐an-­‐Effective-­‐Code-­‐of-­‐Conduct-­‐for-­‐Orgs_0.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  September	  2012,	  5.	  1032	  Ronald	  Coase,	  ‘The	  Problem	  of	  Social	  Cost’	  (1969)	  Vol	  3	  JL&	  Econ	  1.	  1033	  ibid,	  see	  in	  particular	  19–28,	  ‘The	  legal	  Delimitation	  of	  Rights	  and	  the	  Economic	  Problem’;	  In	  the	  current	  case,	  saying	  that	  the	  law	  should	  ‘protect	  property	  rights’	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  protecting	  property	  rights	  of	  public	  companies	  against	  foreign	  purchasers.	  Instead,	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  all	  interested	  parties:	  the	  state,	  national	  private	  individuals	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  foreign	  investors	  who	  buy	  shares	  in	  western	  companies.	  1034	  Namely,	   the	   concerns	   and	   suspicions	  with	   regard	   to	   their	   investment	  motives	   and	   to	   the	  stability	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	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investments,	   recipient	   countries	  may	   commit	   to	   equal	   treatment	   to	   all	   foreign	  investors	   and	   open	   markets.	   Similar	   commitments	   could	   also	   be	   made	   by	  countries	  managing	  SWFs.1035	  However,	  market	  forces	  alone	  may	  not	  suffice	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  platform	  of	  decision-­‐making	  between	  SWFs	  and	  host	  governments	  or,	   in	   the	  parlance	  of	  the	  Coase	  Theorem:	  the	  real	  world	  does	  involve	  significant	  transaction	  costs.1036	  This	  is	  why	  market	  forces	  need	  to	  be	  complemented	  by	  government	  action	  in	  the	  form	  of	  bringing	  together	  SWFs	  and	  host	  countries	  and	  of	  establishing	  an	  agenda	  for	  discussion.	  Although	  action	  may	  be	  initiated	  by	  an	  individual	  government,	  the	  role	  played	   in	   this	   context	  by	   the	  OECD,	   the	   IMF	  and	  EU	  has	  been	   critical	   (see	  below,	  n	  1066	  onwards).	  The	   input	  of	   these	   institutional	  or	   intergovernmental	  authorities,	  however,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  alter	  the	  character	  of	  the	  rule-­‐making	  process,	  which	  can,	  in	  essence,	  be	  a	  negotiation	  among	  interested	  actors.	  Notably	  in	   the	   case	  of	   the	   IMF	  CoC,	   this	   rule-­‐making	  process	   is	   equated	   to	   that	   of	   self-­‐regulation.	  CoCs,	  as	  policy	  tools,	  are	  usually	  entered	  into	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis,	  meaning	  that	   the	   negotiating	   members	   were	   not	   compelled	   to	   participate	   by	   a	   central	  decision	   maker.	   Rather,	   a	   central	   body	   provided	   its	   members	   with	   an	  opportunity	   to	   negotiate	   and	   agree	   on	   a	   set	   of	   rules.	   This	   method	   of	   setting	  international	   standards	   is	   common	   given	   that	   the	   drafting	   of	   command-­‐based	  tools	  is,	  in	  most	  cases,	  unrealistic	  beyond	  the	  national	  level.1037	  Such	  command-­‐based	   tools	  were	   the	   topic	   of	   discussion	   in	   chapters	   4	   and	  5	  where	   they	  were	  rejected	  as	  either	  unworkable	  (some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  proposals	  in	  chapter	  4)	  or	  inefficient	  (the	  regulatory	  responses	  in	  chapter	  5).	  A	  mixed	  policy	  choice	  would	  be	   to	  maintain	   the	   voluntary	   character	   of	   the	   CoC,	   but	   render	   it	   binding	   only	  towards	  those	  SWFs	  that	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  any	  willingness	  to	  gradually	  adopt	  them	   voluntarily.	   This	   is	   the	   model	   that	   Bassan	   suggests	   should	   apply	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1035	  Mezzacapo	  (n	  422)	  41.	  1036	  Such	  as	  the	  interest	  of	  SWFs	  in	  remaining	  secretive	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  weight	  of	  a	  single	  country	  to	  initiate	  a	  discussion	  on	  transparency.	  1037	  Morgan	  and	  Yeung	  argue	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  democratic	  rule-­‐making	  institutions	  that	  can	  legitimately	  establish	  and	  enforce	  legally	  binding	  commands	  across	  and	  within	  nation	  states	  constitutes	  the	  main	  hurdle	  in	  utilising	  command-­‐based	  techniques	  at	  the	  supranational	  level.	  The	  difficulties	  of	  promulgating	  binding	  legal	  standards	  are	  a	  characteristic	  example,	  Morgan	  and	  Yeung	  (n	  1020)	  313.	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IMF’s	   CoC,	   GAPP. 1038 	  GAPP,	   which	   is	   analysed	   further	   below, 1039 	  is	   a	   CoC	  produced	  by	  the	  IMF	  in	  collaboration	  with	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  SWFs.	  This	  document	  is,	  to	  date,	  arguably	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  instrument	  to	  deal	  with	  SWFs.	  The	  approach	  suggested	  by	  Bassan,	  however,	  would	  risk	  jeopardising	  the	  entire	   effect	   of	   GAPP.	   As	   explained	   above	   with	   the	   case	   of	   the	   WTO,1040	  entrusting	  an	  institution	  to	  establish	  and	  enforce	  binding	  rules	  for	  SWFs	  would	  be	   ineffective	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  number	  of	  sovereign	  entities	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  label	  of	  a	  SWF.1041	  Those	  SWFs	  would,	  incidentally,	  also	  be	  the	  ones	  targeted	  by	  Bassan’s	  proposal.	  Furthermore,	   countries	   that	  manage	  SWFs	  would	  always	  retain	  the	  freedom	  to	  modify	  the	  structure	  and	  arrangement	  of	  state	  entities	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time	  in	  order	  to	  escape	  the	  definition	  of	  SWFs	  and	  consequently	  the	  regulatory	   regime	   altogether.	   In	   some	   cases,	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises,	   or	   even	  the	   ruler’s	  private	  wealth,	   could	  be	  used	   to	   carry	  out	   the	   same	  activities	  SWFs	  perform	  today.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  above,	  Bassan’s	  proposal	  would	  also	  encourage	  discrimination	  against	  specific	  SWFs	  based	  on	  one-­‐sided	  subjective	  grounds.	  It	  is	  equally	  important	  to	  emphasise	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  such	  an	  endeavour	  for	   global	   investment,1042	  especially	   in	   a	   post-­‐crisis	   recovery	   context.	   In	   short,	  endeavours	   such	   as	   GAPP	   can	   only	   have	   broad	   acceptance	   if	   they	   remain	  voluntary.	  Enforceable	   instruments	  can	  only	  come	   from	  unilateral	  actions	  such	  as	   the	   national	   laws	   examined	   in	   chapter	   5.	   Although,	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  GFC,	   the	   trend	   has	   been	   to	   move	   away	   from	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   towards	  command	  and	  control-­‐type	  regulation,1043	  the	  particular	  nature	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  SWFs	  (as	  explained	  in	  the	  present	  and	  previous	  chapter),	  make	  self-­‐regulation	  a	  necessary	  option.	  The	   voluntary	   character	   of	   a	   CoC,	   however,	   does	   not	   suffice	   to	   prevent	   all	  potential	  obstacles	  to	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  the	  code,	  especially	  when	  made	  at	  the	   supranational	   context.	   Disagreements	   of	   a	   political	   nature	   can	   still	   erupt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1038	  In	  particular	  for	  those	  with	  no	  legal	  personality	  nor	  governance	  rules	  and	  not	  accountable	  to	  any	  controlling	  body,	  that	  aim	  to	  control	  participated	  companies,	  Bassan	  (n	  615)	  52-­‐53.	  1039	  n	  1078.	  1040	  n	  706.	  1041	  n	  44,	  45.	  1042	  Cross	  reference,	  chapter	  2,	  n	  363.	  1043	  See,	  for	  instance,	  at	  chapter	  6	  ‘SWFs	  and	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Hedge	  Funds’.	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between	   members.	   It	   is	   argued	   by	   Morgan	   and	   Yeung	   that	   the	   avoidance	   of	  conflict	   among	  participants	   at	   the	   level	   of	   standard-­‐setting	   can	  be	   achieved	  by	  narrowing	  down	  the	  focus	  of	  activity	  to	  a	  highly	  specific	  level.1044	  This	  technique	  is	  often	  applied	  in	  many	  CoCs	  and	  it	  was	  also	  followed	  in	  the	  instruments	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  the	  IMF	  addressed	  specifically	  to	  SWFs	  (see	  below).	  It	   is	  also	  argued	  that	   standard-­‐setting	   can	   be	   better	   achieved	   where	   the	   activity	   in	   question	   is	  performed	  by	  a	   ‘community	  of	  shared	  fate’.1045	  Such	   is	  one	  where	  the	   failure	  of	  one	   participant	   may	   have	   catastrophic	   effects	   on	   the	   entire	   community	   and	  thereby	  threaten	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  each	  individual	  participant.	  In	  those	  cases	  it	  is	  normal	   to	   observe	   the	   emergence	   of	   consensual	   mechanisms	   of	   regulating	  against	   the	  potential	  harms	   from	   the	   targeted	  activity.1046	  As	   stated	  by	  Morgan	  and	  Yeung,	   this	  degree	  of	   interdependence	  between	  supranational	  participants	  characterises	   international	   financial	   markets. 1047 	  Despite	   the	   apparent	  polymorphy	   of	   SWFs,	   it	   is	   not	   difficult	   to	   envisage	   them	   as	   a	   ‘community	   of	  shared	  fate’.	  Their	  portrayal	  in	  the	  press	  as	  well	  as	  the	  national	  debates	  shaping	  the	   relevant	   regulation	   is	   such	   that	   lack	   of	   transparency	   in	   only	   a	   fraction	   of	  them	   can	   cause	   reputational	   damage	   to	   all	   of	   them. 1048 	  In	   the	   event	   of	  wrongdoing	  by	  a	  SWF1049	  this	   interdependence	   is	  even	  more	  obvious,	  since	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  single	  SWF,	  depending	  on	  the	  seriousness	  of	  those	  actions,	  can	  incur	  significant	  backlash	  against	  all	  SWFs	  investing	  in	  foreign	  markets.1050	  The	  content	  of	  the	  CoC	  is	  an	  equally	  important	  issue.	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  CoC	  for	  SWFs	  cannot	  be	   isolated	   from	  the	  wider	  debate	  about	   the	  regulation	  of	   the	  financial	   sector	   that	   dominated	   public	   discourse	   over	   the	   last	   few	   years.	   Even	  before	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  IMF	  principles	  and	  the	  EU	  Commission’s	  guidelines	  for	  SWFs,	   another	   CoC	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   transparency	   was	   published	   in	   2007	   on	  request	  by	  the	  British	  Venture	  Capital	  Association.	  The	  Guidelines	  for	  Disclosure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1044	  Morgan	  and	  Yeung	  (n	  1020)	  316.	  1045	  ibid.	  1046	  ibid.	  1047	  ibid.	  1048	  See	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  3,	  n	  474.	  1049	  As	  were	  the	  scenarios	  described	  in	  chapter	  3,	  e.g.,	  stealing	  critical	  national	  information,	  damaging	  employment	  or	  affecting	  financial	  stability	  in	  host	  economies.	  1050	  One	  example	  relates	  to	  the	  debates	  caused	  by	  the	  commercial	  strategies	  of	  DPW	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  advances	  of	  Gazprom	  in	  Europe,	  described	  in	  chapter	  2,	  n	  201.	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and	   Transparency	   in	   Private	   Equity,	   advocated	   enhanced	   reporting	  requirements	   for	   UK	   portfolio	   companies	   and	   private	   equity	   firms.1051 	  The	  Guidelines	  include	  SWFs	  in	  the	  ambit	  of	  their	  recommendations	  of	  transparency,	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   they	  are	  sufficiently	   ‘private	  equity-­‐like’.1052	  Subsequently	   five	  common	  principles	  for	  financial	  reform	  were	  agreed	  by	  the	  G20	  countries1053	  as	  part	   of	   their	   global	   response	   to	   the	   GFC:1054	  These	   were:	   (i)	   strengthening	  transparency	  and	  accountability,	  (ii)	  enhancing	  sound	  regulation,	  (iii)	  promoting	  integrity	  in	  financial	  markets,	  (iv)	  reinforcing	  international	  cooperation,	  and	  (v)	  reforming	  international	  financial	  institutions.1055	  It	   was	   in	   this	   wider	   context	   that	   the	   G7	   finance	   ministers1056 	  in	   2008	  suggested	  that	   the	   IMF,	   the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  the	  OECD	  draft	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  that	  sovereign	   investors	  could	  use	   in	  managing	   their	  SWFs.	  Specifically,	  a	  draft	  memorandum	  of	   the	  G7	  ministers	   tasked	   the	   IMF,	  World	  Bank	  and	  OECD	  with	  the	   creation	   of	   best	   practices	   ‘in	   such	   areas	   as	   institutional	   structure,	   risk	  management,	   transparency	   and	   accountability’.1057	  Although	   the	   CoC	   on	   SWFs	  preceded	   the	   conclusions	   of	   the	   G20	   summit,	   both	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   part	   of	   the	  wider	  international	  efforts	  to	  establish	  sound	  principles	  in	  the	  financial	  sphere.	  The	  principles	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  govern	  the	  wider	  financial	  sector	  post-­‐crisis,	   namely:	   risk	  management,	   transparency	  and	  accountability,	   became	  also	  the	   subject	   of	   the	   CoCs	   that	   applied	   to	   SWFs.	   This	   realisation	   becomes	   more	  interesting	  considering	  that	  SWFs	  were	  not	  perceived	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  the	  GFC.1058	  This	   concurrence,	   therefore,	   must	   be	   due	   to	   different	   reasons:	   firstly,	  transparency,	   accountability	   and	   risk	   management	   were	   deemed	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1051	  David	  Walker,	  ‘Guidelines	  for	  Disclosure	  and	  Transparency	  in	  Private	  Equity’	  (2007)	  Walker	  Working	  Group	  <http://walker-­‐gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/wwg_report_final.pdf>	  accessed	  8	  July	  2012,	  16-­‐19.	  1052	  ibid	  7,	  31.	  1053	  See	  n	  532.	  1054	  For	  more	  see,	  n	  410.	  1055	  White	  House,	  ‘Declaration	  of	  the	  Summit	  on	  Financial	  Markets	  and	  the	  World	  Economy’,	  Office	  of	  the	  Press	  Secretary,	  15	  November	  2008	  <http://georgewbush-­‐whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081115-­‐1.html>	  accessed	  25	  May	  2012.	  1056	  G7	  countries	  are	  Canada,	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  the	  USA,	  Japan	  and	  the	  UK.	  1057	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  ‘Statement	  of	  G-­‐7	  Finance	  Ministers	  and	  Central	  Bank	  Governors’,	  Canada’s	  G8	  Website,	  9	  February	  2008	  <www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/ministerials-­‐ministerielles/2008/tokyo_090208.aspx?view=d>	  accessed	  25	  May	  2012.	  1058	  After	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  crisis,	  SWFs	  were	  not	  even	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  wider	  financial	  sector	  any	  more,	  but	  rather,	  as	  a	  stabilising	  force,	  see	  chapter	  2,	  n	  407.	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universally	  accepted	  principles.	   Secondly,	   it	  was	  possibly	  believed	   that	   if	   SWFs	  remained	  opaque,	  in	  the	  future	  they	  could	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  system.1059	  A	  final	  consideration	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  why	  limit	  the	  CoC	  to	  SWFs	  and	  not	  extend	   it	   to	   other	   entities,	   such	   as	   hedge	   funds	   or	   institutional	   investors.1060	  It	  has	   been	   claimed	   that	   any	   regulation	   applying	   to	   SWFs	   could	   benefit	   their	  immediate	   competitors,	   namely	   hedge	   funds.1061	  A	   reply	   to	   this	   observation	  might	   be	   that	   although	   SWFs	   are	   not	   a	   uniform	   block	   themselves1062	  the	  main	  concerns	  that	  arise	  from	  SWFs	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  other	  investment	  vehicles.	  These	  concerns	   mainly	   arise	   from	   their	   status	   as	   public	   entities	   and	   their	   unusually	  large	   size,	  which	   understandably	  may	   necessitate	   a	  more	   focused	   approach	   to	  SWFs.	  Nevertheless,	   some	   form	   of	   regulation	   already	   exists	   for	   most	   investment	  entities	   other	   than	   SWFs.	   Institutional	   investors	   in	   particular,	   such	   as	   pension	  funds	  and	  insurance	  companies,	  are	  subjected	  to	  a	  strictly	  regulated	  regime1063	  and	   thus	   raise	   fewer	   issues	   of	   transparency.	   Hedge	   funds,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  until	  recently	  remained	  largely	  unregulated	  and	  obscure	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   regulators.	   This	   omission	   is	   largely	   remedied	   today:	   a	   more	   stringent	  regulatory	   regime	   is	   also	   applied	   to	   hedge	   funds	   and	   other	   alternative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1059	  As	  it	  was	  seen	  by	  the	  discussion	  at	  chapter	  3,	  on	  the	  potential	  negative	  effects	  of	  SWFs.	  1060	  See	  chapter	  2	  ‘SWFs	  vs.	  Hedge	  Funds’,	  the	  comparison	  between	  SWFs	  and	  hedge	  funds	  and	  institutional	  investors.	  1061	  Steven	  Weisman,	  ‘Overseas	  Funds	  Resist	  Calls	  for	  a	  Code	  of	  Conduct’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  9	  February	  2008)	  <www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/business/09sovereign.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print>,	  (accessed	  27	  December	  2012);	  The	  KIA	  argued	  that	  ‘such	  regulation	  would	  also	  be	  unfair	  unless	  also	  applied	  to	  hedge	  funds,	  private	  equity,	  pension	  funds	  and	  other	  pools	  of	  capital’,	  AFX	  News	  ,	  ‘Kuwait	  Investment	  Authority	  Says	  Regulation	  Will	  “Handcuff”	  SWFs’	  
FinanzNachrichten	  (Zurich,	  4	  April	  2008)	  <www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-­‐2008-­‐04/10537126-­‐kuwait-­‐investment-­‐authority-­‐says-­‐regulation-­‐will-­‐handcuff-­‐swfs-­‐020.htm>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  1062	  See	  chapter	  1	  ‘Broad	  and	  narrow	  definitions’	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  various	  SWFs.	  1063	  See	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  USA	  context,	  the	  Employee	  Retirement	  Income	  Security	  Act	  of	  1974	  (Pub.	  L.	  No.	  93-­‐406,	  codified	  in	  part	  at	  29	  USCS	  §	  1002	  et	  seq.)	  applying	  to	  pension	  funds;	  the	  Investment	  Advisers	  Act	  of	  1940	  (15	  U.S.C.	  §	  80b-­‐6)	  for	  institutional	  advisors;	  See	  also,	  Sandra	  Blome	  and	  others,	  ‘Pension	  Fund	  Regulation	  and	  Risk	  Management:	  Results	  from	  an	  ALM	  Optimisation	  Exercise’	  (2007)	  OECD,	  Working	  Papers	  on	  Insurance	  and	  Private	  Pensions	  No	  8.	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investment	  funds	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA.1064	  Given	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  SWFs	   and	   hedge	   funds,1065	  it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   more	   transparent	   hedge	  funds	  become,	   the	   less	   able	   SWFs	   are	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   opacity	   of	   hedge	   funds	   in	  order	   to	   avoid	   regulation	   themselves.	   In	  other	  words,	   SWFs	  will	   increase	   their	  reporting	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  their	  competitors,	  notably	  hedge	  funds,	  do	  so	  as	  well.1066	  The	  policies	  of	  the	  IMF/OECD	  and	  of	  the	  Commission	  applying	  to	  SWFs	  are	  next	  examined	  in	  turn.	  	  
i. OECD/IMF	  	   The	  effort	  to	  establish	  an	  international	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  SWFs	  was	  primarily	  led	  by	  the	  OECD,	  which	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  the	  IMF	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  issue	  even	  further.	  Before	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  IMF	  CoC,	  the	  OECD	  had	  issued	  its	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  Corporate	  Governance	  of	  state-­‐owned	  Enterprises	  in	  2005.1067	  These	   Guidelines	   intended	   to	   offer	   advice	   to	   governments	   on	   how	   to	   manage	  effectively	  companies	  that	  were	  under	  their	  ownership.	  They	  included	  advice	  on	  transparency	  and	  disclosure,1068	  and	  on	  the	  state’s	  appropriate	  ownership	  policy	  (with	  regard	  to	  efficiency,	  accountability	  and	  professionalism).1069	  What	   followed	   was	   a	   number	   of	   policy	   initiatives	   from	   OECD,	   this	   time	  specifically	   focused	  on	  SWFs.	  The	   first	  came	   in	  October	  2007	   in	   the	   form	  of	  an	  investment	   newsletter	   contemplating	   the	   possibility	   of	   international	   rules	  applying	  to	  SWFs.1070	  The	  OECD	  Investment	  Committee	  followed	  by	  publishing	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1064	  See	  below,	  n	  1235,	  1244.	  1065	  See	  n	  160,	  1061;	  It	  was	  also	  stated	  in	  an	  interview	  by	  Echarri,	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  European	  Private	  Equity	  and	  Venture	  Capital	  Association,	  that	  disclosure	  regulation	  for	  private	  equity	  will	  benefit	  their	  direct	  competitors	  who	  are	  often	  backed	  by	  SWFs,	  Euractiv	  staff,	  ‘Private	  Equity:	  EU	  Proposals	  Set	  to	  Favour	  Sovereign	  Funds’	  Euractiv	  (Brussels,	  6	  July	  2009)	  <www.euractiv.com/financial-­‐services/private-­‐equity-­‐eu-­‐proposals-­‐set-­‐favour-­‐sovereign-­‐funds/article-­‐183742>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  1066	  See	  argument	  at	  291-­‐292.	  1067	  OECD,	  ‘OECD	  Guidelines	  on	  Corporate	  Governance	  for	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises’	  (2005)	  OECD	  Publishing	  <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf>	  accessed	  22	  June	  2012.	  1068	  ibid	  16	  and	  41–46.	  1069	  ibid	  13	  and	  23–31.	  1070	  OECD,	  ‘Are	  New	  Rules	  Needed?’	  (n	  55).	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report	   to	   the	   G7	   countries	   on	   SWFs	   and	   recipient	   country	   policies.1071	  This	  document	  highlighted	  the	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  SWFs	  on	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  recognised	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   national	   security	   concerns	   although	   it	   stated	   that	  these	   cannot	  be	   a	   cover	   for	  protectionist	  policies.1072	  The	  OECD	   suggested	   that	  security-­‐related	   investment	   safeguards	   should	  be	  made	  as	  open	  as	  possible1073	  and	   that	   investors	   and	   home	   countries	   can	   ease	   concerns	   through	   greater	  transparency.1074	  The	   OECD	   policy	   initiatives	   continued	   with	   a	   declaration	   on	   SWFs	   and	  Recipient	   Country	   Policies	   in	   2008,1075	  and	   with	   a	   publication	   the	   same	   year,	  collecting	   the	  main	  OECD	  policy	   instruments	   that	   apply	   to	   SWFs	   and	   recipient	  countries.1076	  These	   two	  policy	  documents	   largely	  reinstated	   the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  April	  Report	  to	  the	  G7	  countries.1077	  Arguably,	   the	   most	   important	   step	   in	   the	   process	   of	   the	   supranational	  regulation	  of	  SWFs	  came	  in	  October	  2008,	  when	  the	  IWG	  of	  SWFs	  published	  the	  GAPP,	   also	   known	   as	   the	   Santiago	   Principles.1078	  This	   was	   the	   result	   of	   a	   long	  process	   of	   reflection	   led	   by	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   G7	   over	   the	   impact	   of	   SWFs	   on	  financial	  stability	  and	  the	  potentially	  political	  character	  of	  their	  investments.1079	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1071	  OECD,	  ‘[SWFs]	  and	  Recipient	  Country	  Policies	  -­‐	  Working	  together	  to	  maintain	  and	  expand	  freedom	  of	  investment’	  (2008)	  Investment	  Committee	  Report	  <www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-­‐policy/41456730.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  May	  2013.	  1072	  ibid	  2-­‐4.	  1073	  ibid	  4,	  without	  however	  explaining	  this	  point	  in	  great	  detail.	  1074	  ibid	  6.	  1075	  OECD,	  ‘OECD	  Declaration	  on	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Recipient	  Country	  Policies’	  (2008)	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Council	  at	  Ministerial	  Level	  <www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf?cote=C/MIN(2008)8/FINAL&doclanguage=en>	  accessed	  22	  June	  2012.	  1076	  These	  were	  the	  OECD	  Declaration	  on	  SWFs	  and	  Recipient	  Country	  Policies;	  the	  OECD	  General	  Investment	  Policy	  Principles;	  the	  OECD	  Guidelines	  for	  Recipient	  Country	  Investment	  Policies	  Relating	  to	  National	  Security;	  and	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Investment	  Process,	  OECD,	  ‘Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds	  and	  Recipient	  Countries	  -­‐	  Working	  Together	  to	  Maintain	  and	  Expand	  Freedom	  of	  Investment’	  (2008)	  OECD	  Investment	  Committee	  <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/23/41456730.pdf>	  accessed	  22	  June	  2012. 1077	  Although	  the	  October	  publication	  included	  older	  OECD	  instruments	  on	  international	  investments	  that	  were	  also	  of	  relevance	  to	  SWFs.	  1078	  IWG,	  ‘GAPP’	  (n	  691).	  1079	  As	  Norton	  says,	  issues	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  ‘Work	  Agenda’	  included	  the	  relation	  of	  SWFs	  (i)	  to	  financial	  stability	  and	  currency	  exchange	  rate	  impact,	  (ii)	  to	  possible	  geo-­‐political	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  likelihood	  of	  government	  policy	  direction	  of	  these	  funds	  and	  a	  rise	  of	  protectionism	  among	  home	  or	  target	  countries	  and	  (iii)	  to	  risk	  management	  issues,	  including	  matters	  of	  transparency,	  accountability	  and	  governance,	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The	   purpose	   of	   GAPP	  was	   to	   promote	   those	   accepted	   principles	   and	   practices	  that	   establish	   appropriate	   governance	   and	   accountability	   standards	   regarding	  the	  investment	  practices	  of	  SWF.	  A	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  GAPP,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  policy	  tools	  of	  the	  OECD	  and	  the	  EU	  Commission	  (see	  below),	   is	  that	  they	  were	  drafted	   with	   the	   participation	   of	   some	   of	   the	   world’s	   largest	   SWFs,	   thus	  amounting	  to	  a	  self-­‐regulating	  initiative.	  GAPP	   consist	   of	   24	   practices	   and	   principles	   in	   three	   key	   areas	   to	   be	  implemented	   by	   SWFs:	   (i)	   legal	   framework,	   objectives,	   and	   coordination	   with	  macroeconomic	  policies;	  (ii)	  institutional	  framework	  and	  governance	  structure;	  (iii)	   investment	   and	   risk	   management	   framework	   where	   SWF	  managers	   were	  encouraged	  to	  disclose	  more	  information.	  GAPP	  left	  it	  to	  each	  individual	  SWF	  to	  assess	  their	  implementation,	  and	  disclose	  their	  assessment	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  object	  of	  SWFs	  should	  not	  be	  to	  project	  state	  power.	  Instead,	  according	  to	   Principle	   19	   it	   is	   to	   ‘maximize	   risk-­‐adjusted	   financial	   returns	   in	   a	   manner	  consistent	   with	   its	   investment	   policy,	   and	   based	   on	   economic	   and	   financial	  grounds’.	   If	   investment	  decisions	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  this	  goal,	   then	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  fund’s	  investment	  policy	  ought	  to	  be	  disclosed.	  It	  is	  suggested	  by	  Backer	  that	  such	   deviation	   from	   the	   suggested	   model	   might	   open	   that	   fund	   to	   special	  regulation.1080	  SWF	   management	   ‘should	   be	   consistent	   with	   what	   is	   generally	  accepted	  as	  sound	  asset	  management	  principles’	  (Principle	  19(2)).	  GAPP	  reaffirmed	  the	  distinction	  between	  private	  and	  public	  funds.	  While	  the	  objective	   of	   the	   private	   funds	   lie	   in	   the	  maximisation	   of	   their	   owners	   wealth,	  public	  ones	  may	  have	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  objectives,	  namely,	  macroeconomic	  ones.	  This	   view	   of	   GAPP	   suggests,	   however,	   that	   the	   attainment	   of	   macroeconomic	  objectives	  is	  limited	  to	  economic	  ones	  and	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  political	  goals.1081	  Moreover,	  a	  number	  of	  principles	  encouraged	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  entity	  and	   the	   sovereign.	   This	   is	   supported	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	   clear	  objectives	  for	  the	  fund,	  the	  division	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities,	  and	  provisions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Joseph	  Norton,	  ‘The	  “Santiago	  principles”	  for	  SWFs:	  a	  Case	  Study	  on	  International	  Financial	  Standard-­‐setting	  Processes’	  (2010)	  Vol	  13(3)	  JInt'l	  EconL	  645.	  1080	  Larry	  Catá	  Backer,	  ‘[SWFs]	  as	  Regulatory	  Chameleons:	  The	  Norwegian	  [SWFs]	  and	  Public	  Global	  Governance	  Through	  Private	  Global	  Investment’	  (2009)	  Vol	  41(2)	  GJIL	  108. 1081	  By	  ‘political	  goals’	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  aim	  to	  increase	  one	  country’s	  strength	  in	  the	  political	  sphere,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  other	  countries.	  This	  is	  distinguished	  from	  purely	  macroeconomic	  objectives	  that	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  economic	  sphere,	  such	  as	  boosting	  a	  country’s	  employment,	  supporting	  pension	  obligations	  etc.	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on	   independence	   and	   the	   maximisation	   of	   risk-­‐adjusted	   financial	   returns.1082	  This	  may	  be	  accomplished	  at	  a	   functional	   level,1083	  for	  example,	   through	  a	   legal	  specification	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  GAPP	   is,	   therefore,	   to	  make	  the	  sovereign	  entity	  act	   like	  a	  private	   one.	   The	   fund,	   for	   example,	   should	   not	   use	   special	   information	   it	   has	  because	  of	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  government	  when	  competing	  with	  other	  private	  firms.1084	  Furthermore,	  it	  should	  exercise	  its	  ownership	  rights	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  objectives	  and	  investment	  policy	  of	  the	  fund	  and	  protects	  the	  financial	  value	  of	  its	  investment.1085	  This	  policy	  goal	  is	  understandable.	  As	  it	  was	  seen	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   the	   novelty	   of	   the	   SWF	   phenomenon	   consists	   in	   the	  exercise	  by	   the	  sovereign	  of	  a	  public	  activity1086	  in	  a	  manner	   traditionally	  used	  by	   private	   actors. 1087 	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   SWFs	   behave	   like	   private	   actors	  themselves	  they	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  benign	  instrument	  and	  participate	  in	  global	  financial	   markets.	  This	   insistence	   on	   the	   ‘private	   actor’	   is	   not	   unknown	   as	   it	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  EU	  law	  of	  state	  aids,	  where	  an	  action	  by	  the	  state	  is	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  a	  private	  actor	  under	  the	  similar	  circumstances	  to	  determine	  whether	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  common	  market.1088	  However,	  while	   directing	   SWFs	   to	   adopt	   the	   conduct	   of	   a	   private	   investor,	  GAPP	   does	   not	   require	   the	   funds	   to	   hire	   outside	   managers.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   the	  fund’s	   investment	   policy	   that	   ‘should	   address	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   internal	  and/or	  external	  investment	  managers	  are	  used,	  the	  range	  of	  their	  activities	  and	  authority,	   and	   the	   process	   by	   which	   they	   are	   selected	   and	   their	   performance	  monitored’.1089 	  Similarly,	   GAPP	   do	   not	   require	   SWFs	   to	   adopt	   a	   particular	  structure,	   as	   long	   as	   they	  maintain	   a	   clear	   division	   of	   responsibilities	   for	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1082	  See	  in	  particular	  Principles	  1,	  6,	  8,	  15,	  19,	  20	  and	  21.	  1083	  Backer,	  ‘Sovereign	  Investing	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis’	  (n	  73)	  127.	  1084	  Principle	  20.	  1085	  Principle	  21.	  1086	  Investing	  state	  proceeds	  to	  obtain	  returns	  with	  a	  view	  to	  supporting	  macroeconomic	  objectives.	  1087	  Through	  the	  participation	  in	  financial	  markets,	  profiting	  from	  dividends	  or	  the	  resale	  of	  shares	  at	  a	  profit.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Backer,	  the	  state’s	  interference	  in	  this	  sector	  until	  recently	  was	  limited	  to	  its	  regulatory	  control,	  Backer,	  ‘Sovereign	  Investing	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis’	  (n	  73)	  131.	  1088	  The	  test	  aims	  to	  discover	  whether	  an	  undertaking	  has	  received	  a	  benefit	  which	  it	  would	  not	  have	  received	  in	  ‘the	  normal	  course	  of	  events	  in	  the	  private	  market’,	  Case	  C-­‐256/97	  DMT	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3913,	  opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  at	  para	  31.	  1089	  Sub-­‐principle	  18.	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members.	  This	  approach	   indicates	  a	  result-­‐based	  concern1090	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  code	  drafters,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  formalistic	  approach,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  SWFs	  the	  flexibility	   to	   adopt	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   code	   without	   compromising	   their	  traditional	  preferences	  for	  specific	  modes	  of	  governance.	  In	  addition,	  GAPP	  requires	  that	  SWFs	  comply	  with	  regulatory	  accounting	  and	  auditing	  standards	  that	  apply	   in	  each	  country.1091	  This	  requirement	   is	  provided	  in	  return	  for	  not	  subjecting	  them	  to	  additional	  disclosure	  requirements,	  such	  as	  their	   size	   or	   their	   positions.	   This	   requirement	   creates	   a	   positive	   upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  transparency	  level	  of	  SWFs	  and	  its	   implementation	  would	  be	  a	  welcome	  development.	  For	  example,	  the	  Monetary	  Authority	  of	  Singapore	  issued	  the	   updated	   Code	   of	   Corporate	   Governance 1092 	  requiring	   publically	   listed	  companies	  to	  disclose	   in	  their	  annual	  reports	  how	  they	  are	  complying	  with	  the	  provisions	   of	   the	   code.	   The	   Singaporean	   code	   formalises	   the	   board’s	  responsibilities	  for	  risk	  governance	  and	  internal	  controls,1093	  but	  also	  establishes	  a	   higher	   standard	   of	   transparency	   in	   many	   areas	   of	   a	   fund’s	   activity,	   such	   as	  board	   selection	   and	   appointment, 1094 	  remuneration, 1095 	  delegations	   of	  authority1096	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest.1097	  	  
ii. Reactions	  to	  the	  IMF	  CoC	  	   The	   publication	   of	   GAPP	   has	   been	   the	   most	   decisive	   step	   so	   far	   in	   the	  establishment	  of	  global	  rules	  for	  SWFs.	  It	  would,	  therefore,	  be	  useful	  to	  examine	  the	  reactions	  to	  this	  development.	  Firstly,	   although	   a	   number	   of	   funds	   took	   part	   in	   the	   preparation	   of	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1090	  Focusing	  on	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  fund.	  1091	  See	  principles	  11	  and	  12.	  1092	  Monetary	  Authority	  of	  Singapore,	  ‘Code	  of	  Corporate	  Governance’	  2	  May	  2012	  <www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/fin_development/corporate_governance/cgcrevisedcodeofcorporategovernance2may2012.ashx>	  accessed	  19	  February	  2013.	  1093	  Principle	  11.	  1094	  Principle	  4.	  1095	  Principle	  9.	  1096	  Principle	  1.	  1097	  Principles	  2-­‐4.	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CoC,1098	  others	  remained	  skeptical	  of	   the	  effort	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	  operation	  of	  SWFs.	   One	   such	   example	   was	   the	   managing	   director	   of	   KIA,	   Al-­‐Saad,	   who	  questioned	   the	   code’s	   contribution	   to	   market	   efficiency	   and	   claimed	   that	  ‘complete	   transparency	   would	   raise	   more	   questions	   than	   answers’.1099	  Other	  funds	   from	  Russia,	   Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   Kuwait	   have	   described	   it	   as	   unnecessary	  since	   their	   investments	   are	   already	   strictly	   commercial	   in	   nature.1100	  Officials	  from	   a	   Chinese	   fund	   have	   even	   described	   the	   entire	   effort	   as	   ‘stupid’.1101	  Opposition	  was	  also	  observed	  from	  the	  governor	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank	  for	  the	  UAE	  who	   issued	   a	   statement	   on	  behalf	   of	   thirteen	   countries,	  which	   argued	   that	   the	  IMF	  did	   not	   have	   the	   requisite	   expertise	   to	   produce	   a	   set	   of	   best	   practices	   for	  SWFs.1102	  Despite	   the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	   the	  CoC,	   the	  reaction	  by	  SWFs	  and	  various	  state	  officials	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  subtle	  force	  of	  such	  CoCs.	  For	  instance,	  the	  KIA’s	  claim	  that	  a	  CoC	  ‘will	  handcuff	  SWFs’,1103	  (although	  unrealistic)	  demonstrates,	  to	  some	   degree,	   the	   pressure	   that	   the	   CoC	   exerts	   over	   sovereign	   investors’	  governance	   and	  general	   behaviour.	   It	   is	   highly	   likely	   that	   this	  was,	   indeed,	   the	  purpose	  behind	  the	  Kuwait	  Declaration	  of	  20091104	  establishing	  an	  international	  forum	   for	   SWFs,	   namely	   to	   create	   some	   kind	   of	   group/peer	   pressure	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1098	  The	  countries	  that	  showed	  their	  support	  for	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  code	  where	  as	  diverse	  as	  China,	  East	  Timor,	  Libya,	  Norway,	  Russia,	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  1099	  Huw	  Jones,	  ‘Kuwait	  Questions	  Wealth	  Fund	  Code’	  Arabian	  Business	  (Dubai,	  9	  April	  2008)	  <www.arabianbusiness.com/property/article/516165-­‐kuwait-­‐questions-­‐wealth-­‐fund-­‐code>	  accessed	  12	  December	  2012.	  1100	  Steven	  Weisman,	  ‘Overseas	  Funds	  Resist	  Calls	  for	  a	  Code	  of	  Conduct’	  NY	  Times	  (New	  York,	  9	  February	  2008)	  <www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/business/09sovereign.html>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  1101	  Referring	  to	  a	  Chinese	  SWF,	  Thomas	  Wilkins,	  ‘Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  SWFs	  “Stupid”	  says	  CIC’	  China	  Stakes	  (Shanghai,	  8	  April	  2008)	  <www.chinastakes.com/2008/4/A-­‐Code-­‐of-­‐Conduct-­‐for-­‐Sovereign-­‐Wealth-­‐Fund-­‐Stupid-­‐Says-­‐CIC.html>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012.	  1102	  IMF,	  ‘Statement	  to	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  by	  His	  Excellency	  Sultan	  Al-­‐Suwaidi,	  governor	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates’	  International	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Committee,	  Seventeenth	  Meeting,	  12	  April	  2008	  <www.imf.org/External/spring/2008/imfc/statement/eng/uae.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012,	  7;	  The	  stance	  of	  a	  number	  of	  them	  on	  the	  matter	  changed,	  however,	  as	  the	  Emirati	  SWFs	  later	  supported	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  IMF.	  Note	  also	  that	  Al-­‐Saad	  on	  May	  1	  2008	  stated	  that	  the	  KIA	  would	  probably	  agree	  to	  the	  IMF	  guidelines,	  Behrendt	  (n	  257)	  endnote	  24. 1103	  AFX	  News	  staff	  (n	  1061).	  1104	  IWG,	  ‘“Kuwait	  Declaration”:	  Establishment	  of	  the	  International	  Forum	  of	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds’	  (2009)	  International	  Working	  Group	  of	  SWFs	  <www.iwg-­‐swf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm>	  accessed	  23	  June	  2012. 
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governments	  to	  adopt	  the	  requirements	  of	  GAPP.	  Norton	  describes	  this	  process	  as	  ‘club	  law’.1105	  Various	   experts	   in	   the	   field	   explored	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   code	   on	   the	  autonomy	  of	  SWFs.	  Behrendt	  stated,	  for	  example,	  that	  by	  voluntarily	  submitting	  to	   GAPP,	   ‘IWG	   members	   ceded	   their	   autonomy	   to	   establish	   governance	  arrangements	   in	   line	  with	  their	   individual	  needs	  and	  preferences’.1106	  In	  a	  way,	  according	  to	  Behrendt,	  ‘they	  made	  a	  conscious	  decision	  to	  limit	  the	  reach	  of	  their	  “sovereignty”’.1107	  Backer,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  supports	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	   GAPP.	   Backer	   looks	   at	   a	   particular	   provision	   requiring	   IWG	   members	   to	  maximize	   risk	   adjusted	   financial	   returns	   in	   a	   manner	   consistent	   with	   its	  investment	   policy,	   and	   based	   on	   economic	   and	   financial	   grounds. 1108 	  This	  provision	   could	   be	   understood	   as	   influencing	   the	   investment	   policies	   of	   the	  funds.	  In	  his	  view,	  however,	  this	  provision	  does	  not	  function	  as	  a	  restriction,	  but	  rather,	   ‘as	   a	   trigger	   for	   the	  application	  of	   transparency	   rules’.1109	  As	  he	  argues,	  GAPP	   ‘do	   not	   limit	   the	   use	   of	   SWFs	   for	   any	   purpose,	   from	   the	   application	   of	  political	   embargoes	   and	   national	   policy	   projected	   abroad’,1110	  as	   long	   as	   these	  policies	  are	  disclosed.	  The	  objective	  of	  disclosure	  of	   investment	  policies	   is	   to	  curb	   in	  practice	  any	  motivation	  for	  politically	  driven	  behavior	  from	  sovereign	  investors.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  disclosure,	  however,	   is	   contested	  by	  Rose	  who	  argues	   that	   that	  GAPP	  does	  not	   offer	  necessary	   assurances	   as	   it	   falls	   short	   of	   condemning	  non-­‐commercial	  investments.1111	  This	  view,	  however,	  does	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  CoC	  which	   shows	  a	   clear	  preference	   for	   the	  private-­‐type	  behaviour	  over	   the	  public	  one.	   It	  also	  neglects	   the	  practical	  effects	  of	  disclosing	  political	  objectives	  which	  would	   result	   in	   the	   marginalisation	   of	   a	   SWF	   from	   global	   markets.	   In	   short,	  requiring	   SWFs	   to	   disclose	   their	   policies	   as	   required	   by	   GAPP	   is	   equivalent	   to	  condemning	  non-­‐commercial	  behavior.	  The	  requirement	  of	  disclosure	   is	  where	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1105	  Norton	  (n	  1079)	  655.	  1106	  Sven	  Behrendt,	  ‘[SWFs]	  and	  the	  Santiago	  Principles	  Where	  Do	  They	  Stand?’	  (2010)	  Number	  22	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace	  2. 1107	  ibid.	  1108	  Principle	  19. 1109	  Backer,	  ‘Sovereign	  Investing	  in	  Times	  of	  Crisis’	  (n	  74)	  135.	  1110	  ibid	  132.	  1111	  Rose,	  ‘Sovereigns	  as	  Shareholders’	  (n	  474)	  162.	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the	  said	  ‘club	  law’	  or	  ‘peer	  pressure’	  comes	  most	  vigorously	  into	  play.	  Rose	   also	   discusses	   the	   issue	   of	   political	   accountability	   of	   the	  members	   of	  the	   IWG	   that	   produced	   GAPP.	   Accountability	   of	   SWFs,	   given	   the	   absence	   of	  formal	   fiduciary	   ties,1112	  is	   primarily	   political.	   Principle	   10	   requires	   that	   they	  create	   an	   accountability	   framework	   in	   the	   relevant	   legislation	   charter	   or	  management	   agreement.	   Yet,	   according	   to	   Rose,	   the	   fact	   that	   many	   SWFs	   are	  products	   of	   regimes	   that	   are	   not	   democratic	   begs	   the	   question	   of	   whether	  internal	  political	  accountability	  exists	  for	  the	  mismanagement	  of	  many	  SWFs.1113	  It	  is,	  moreover,	  noted	  that	  sovereign	  investing	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  other	  resolution	  mechanisms	  that	  exist	  for	  other	  types	  of	  economic	  disputes	  between	  sovereigns,	  such	  as	  tariff	  disputes.1114	  It	  is	  true	  that	  immediate	  compliance	  of	  all	  SWFs	  with	  the	   CoC	   should	   not	   be	   expected,	   especially	   on	   matters	   that	   concern	   internal	  accountability	   for	   SWF	   members.	   Rose,	   in	   this	   regard,	   proposes	   to	   establish	  dispute	   resolution	   mechanisms	   for	   sovereign	   investments	   too.	   However,	   any	  aggressive	  solution	  to	  address	  this	  deficiency	  such	  as	  the	  one	  proposed	  by	  Rose,	  could	   risk	   compromising	   the	   progress	  made	   so	   far:	   putting	   aside	   the	   fact	   that	  such	  an	  intervention	  would	  not	  be	  accepted	  by	  SWFs,	  it	  is	  also	  seen	  (below)	  that	  SWFs	  are	  not	  completely	  unresponsive	  to	  their	  commitments	  under	  GAPP	  albeit	  made	   voluntarily.	   If	   anything,	   it	   is	   preferable	   to	   allow	   a	   process	   of	   natural	  integration	  of	  GAPP	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  SWFs	  instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  set	  up	  a	  binding	  resolution	  mechanism.	  	  
iii. The	  European	  ‘Common	  Approach’	  to	  SWFs	  	   The	  European	  approach	   to	  SWFs1115	  (the	  Communication)	  was	  prepared	   in	  the	  same	  period	  as	  the	  IWG	  and	  it	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  principles	  that	  shaped	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1112	  See	  discussion	  at	  n	  261	  onwards.	  1113	  ‘Mismanagement’	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  probably	  meant	  not	  only	  in	  economic	  terms	  but	  must	  also	  include	  the	  exploitation	  of	  a	  SWF	  for	  political	  aims,	  Rose	  (n	  474).	  1114	  ibid,	  Also	  see,	  WTO,	  ‘Agreement	  Establishing	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization’	  (WTO,	  33	  I.L.M.	  1144,	  1994	  )	  <www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-­‐wto.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012,	  (document	  establishing	  the	  WTO’s	  structure	  and	  relations	  among	  its	  members).	  1115	  Commission,	  ‘A	  Common	  European	  Approach’	  (n	  1).	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the	  general	  debate	   about	   the	   regulation	  of	   SWFs.1116	  The	  2008	  Communication	  put	   an	   end	   to	   a	   period	   of	   confusion	   as	   to	   the	   EU	   Commission’s	   position	   with	  regard	   to	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   proliferation	   of	   SWFs.	   A	   number	   of	  contradicting	  statements	  made	  by	  various	  Commissioners	  before	  the	  publication	  of	   the	   Communication	   indicated	   a	   disagreement	   over	   the	   legality	   of	   national	  security	  measures	  aimed	  at	  SWFs.	  Initially,	  in	  July	  2007	  former	  Trade	  Commissioner	  Mandelson,	  in	  the	  context	  of	   Barclays’	   decision	   to	   seek	   funding	   from	   China	   to	   support	   its	   ABN	   Ambro	  takeover	   bid,1117 	  warned	   against	   eyeing	   foreign	   state	   investments	   in	   major	  transactions	  as	  something	  inherently	  suspect	  and	  denied	  the	  characterisation	  of	  China	  Development	  Bank’s	  move	  as	  ‘political’.1118	  Mandelson,	  nevertheless,	  made	  qualified	  comments	  about	  a	  possible	  solution	  to	  have	  a	  European	  ‘golden	  share’	  to	  vet	  foreign	  takeovers.1119	  Soon	   after,	   however,	   it	   was	   acknowledged	   by	   the	   Former	   Enterprise	   and	  Industry	  Commissioner	  Verheugen	   that	   ‘the	  question	   that	  must	  be	  discussed	   is	  how	  can	  we	  defend	  our	  strategic	  interests	  without	  violating	  our	  most	  important	  principles	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  in	  the	  internal	  market’.1120	  According	  to	   European	   Voice,	   Verheugen	   implicitly	   criticised	   Mandelson	   who	   had	   earlier	  suggested	   that	   golden	   shares	   might	   be	   a	   viable	   way	   of	   protecting	   key	  industries.1121	  He	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  EU	  was	  entitled	  to	  protect	  its	  interests	  under	   the	  WTO	   rules	   and	   that	   the	  USA	  was	   ‘using	   those	   instruments	   in	   a	   very	  broad	  way’.1122	  Mandelson	  himself,	  referred	  back	  to	  the	  issue	  in	  November	  2007	  by	  stating	  that	   foreign	   state	   investments	   into	   European	   and	   USA	   assets	   of	   strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1116	  The	  Commission’s	  Communication	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  parallel	  development	  of	  rules	  for	  SWFs	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  OECD,	  ibid	  6.	  1117	  Robert	  Peston,	  ‘China	  Could	  Buy	  Stake	  in	  Barclays’	  BBC	  News	  (London,	  23	  July	  2007)	  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6911138.stm>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012. 1118	  Duncan	  Lumsden,	  ‘Mandelson	  Defends	  Foreign	  State	  Investment	  Into	  EU’	  Mlex	  (Brussels,	  25	  July	  2007)	  (registration-­‐based).	  1119	  ibid.	  1120	  Lorraine	  Mallinder,	  ‘Verheugen	  Warns	  of	  Sovereign-­‐Fund	  Raiders’	  European	  Voice	  (Brussels,	  26	  July	  2007)	  <www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/verheugen-­‐warns-­‐off-­‐sovereign-­‐fund-­‐raiders/57996.aspx>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012.	  1121	  Noting	  that	  the	  Commissioner	  in	  charge	  for	  such	  matters	  were	  those	  for	  Competition	  and	  the	  Internal	  Market,	  ibid.	  1122	  ibid.	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importance	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  transparency	  rules.	  However,	  he	  acknowledged	  some	  difficulties	   in	   determining	   precisely	  which	   sectors	   needed	  protection.1123	  He	  explained,	  ‘what	  we	  need	  is	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  agreed	  internationally	  –	  a	  sort	  of	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  investors	  and	  recipients	  of	  investment	  –	  that	  will	  establish	  the	   ground	   rules	   for	   the	   global	   investment	   of	   sovereign	   wealth’.1124	  He	   added	  that,	   to	   this	   purpose,	   Europe	   and	   the	   USA	   had	   a	   common	   interest	   in	   working	  together.1125	  Mandelson’s	  words	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  retreat	  from	  his	  defence	  of	  the	  Chinese	  move	  to	  buy	  a	  stake	  in	  Barclays’	  takeover	  bid	  for	  ABN	  Ambro	  a	  few	  months	  earlier.1126	  The	  most	  explicit	  statements	  regarding	  this	  issue	  were	  arguably	  made	  by	  the	  Former	  Commissioner	   for	   Internal	  Market	  and	  Services,	  McCreevy.	  He	  believed	  investments	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  compromise	  national	  security	  could	  be	  blocked.	   As	   he	   stated,	   ‘it	   is	   often	   forgotten	   that	   a	   Member	   State	   is	   entitled	   to	  restrict	   Treaty	   freedoms	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   legitimate	   national	   security	  concerns’.1127	  According	  to	  McCreevy,	  this	  was	  true	  in	  respect	  of	  all	  investments,	  be	   they	   from	   SWF,	   state-­‐controlled	   companies,	   private	   companies	   or	  whoever.	  He	  added	  that	  a	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  have	  measures	   in	  place	  that	  restrict	  investments,	   for	   example	   in	   the	   defence	   sector,	   and	   that	   not	   long	   ago	   the	  Commission	   had	   proposed	   certain	   controls	   on	   investment	   in	   the	   energy	  sector.1128	  He	   concluded	   by	   suggesting	   that	   ‘we	   also	   require	   investors	   in	   our	  financial	  institutions	  to	  be	  “fit	  and	  proper”’.1129	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1123	  Juliane	  Reppert-­‐Bismarck,	  ‘Mandelson	  Urges	  Rules	  on	  Foreign	  State	  Investments	  Into	  EU,	  [USA]’	  Mlex	  (Brussels,	  8	  November	  2007)	  (registration-­‐based).	  1124	  Peter	  Mandelson,	  ‘EU-­‐US:	  Confronting	  global	  challenges’	  SPEECH/07/691	  Washington,	  8	  November	  2007.	  1125	  ibid.	  1126	  Reppert-­‐Bismarck	  (n	  1123).	  1127	  Charlie	  McCreevy,	  ‘Meeting	  of	  the	  ALDE	  (Alliance	  of	  Liberals	  and	  Democrats	  for	  Europe)	  Group	  –	  European	  Parliament’	  SPEECH/07/787,	  4	  December	  2007.	  1128	  ibid;	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  Directive	  2009/72/EC	  concerning	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  electricity	  (OJ	  L211/55),	  and	  Directive	  2009/73/EC	  concerning	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  natural	  gas	  (OJ	  L211/55)	  also	  widely	  known	  as	  the	  ‘keep	  Gazprom	  out	  Directives’.	  Under	  Articles	  11	  of	  both	  Directives,	  if	  a	  transmission	  system	  owner	  or	  operator,	  controlled	  by	  a	  person	  or	  persons	  from	  a	  third	  country,	  requests	  a	  certification	  in	  one	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  the	  national	  authorities	  shall	  conduct	  a	  special	  control	  procedure	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Commission.	  They	  may	  refuse	  the	  certification	  if,	  among	  others,	  the	  certification	  puts	  at	  risk	  the	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  of	  the	  Member	  State.	  1129	  ibid.	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Finally,	   in	   December	   2007,	   the	   former	   Economic	   and	   Monetary	   Affairs	  Commissioner,	  Almunia,	  said	  foreign	  state-­‐backed	  investment	  funds	  are	  a	  great	  opportunity	   although	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   increase	   transparency	   on	   their	  investments.1130	  He	  said	   that	  protectionism	  should	  be	  avoided,	  but	   that	  general	  suitable	  rules	  were	  needed	   for	   fund	  managers,	   for	   the	  owner	  countries	  and	   for	  countries	  where	  investment	  takes	  place.1131	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  added	  that	  host	  countries	  must	   ‘define	   clear	   rules	   on	  whether	   to	   set	   exceptions	   to	   the	   general	  criteria	  of	  freedom	  of	  movement	  of	  capital’.1132	  Therefore,	   whilst	   the	   Commissioners	   maintained	   their	   beliefs	   to	   market	  openness,	   their	   statements	   conversely	   encouraged	   the	   belief	   that	   SWFs	   posed	  specific	   risks	   to	   host	   countries.	   Similarly,	   while	   members	   of	   the	   Commission	  warned	  Member	  States	  against	  adopting	  protective	  measures,	  at	   the	  same	  time	  they	  recognised	   that	   those	  states	  could	  benefit	   from	  exceptions	   to	   the	  rules	  on	  free	   movement	   of	   capital.	   This	   inconsistency	   in	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   EU	  Commission	   may	   have	   supported	   the	   view	   that	   EU	   law	   was	   incomplete	   and	  unable	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   effects	   of	   SWF	   and,	   thus,	   encouraged	   the	   adoption	   of	  measures	  at	  national	  level.	  The	   Commission’s	   stance	   was	   made	   clearer	   in	   December	   2007	   when	   the	  President	  of	  the	  Commission,	  Jose	  Manuel	  Barroso,	  stated	  that	  there	  were	  ‘good	  reasons	   for	  an	  EU	  common	  approach	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   SWFs,	  both	   inside	   the	  EU	  and	  internationally’,	  however,	  he	  added,	  at	  this	  stage,	  ‘the	  Commission	  [did]	  not	  favour	  legislative	  action,	  but	  it	  [considered]	  that	  some	  ground	  rules	  or	  guidelines	  on	   governance	   and	   transparency	   could	   be	   useful’.1133	  This	   position,	   although	  recognising	   the	   need	   for	   fresh	   rules	   to	   oversee	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   SWF	  phenomenon,	  simultaneously	  left	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  Commission	  considered	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  Treaties	  as	  sufficient	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  investments	  of	  SWFs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1130	  	  Reuters	  staff,	  ‘EU’s	  Almunia	  Says	  Sovereign	  Funds	  an	  Opportunity’	  Reuters	  (London,	  17	  December	  2007)	  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/17/businesspro-­‐almunia-­‐sovereign-­‐dc-­‐idUKL1715804120071217>	  accessed	  28	  December	  2012.	  1131	  ibid.	  1132	  ibid.	  1133	  Lewis	  Crofts,	  ‘No	  EU	  Legislation	  for	  Now	  on	  SWFs’	  Mlex	  (Brussels,	  5	  December	  2007)	  (registration-­‐based).	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Ultimately,	   the	   Commission	   responded	   by	   introducing	   in	   February	   2008	   a	  CoC	   for	   SWFs	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   Communication.1134	  Communications	   are	   policy	  documents	  with	  no	   legal	  effect,	  but	  which	  enable	  the	  Commission	  to	  set	  out	   its	  own	  thinking	  on	  a	  topical	  issue.1135	  The	  Commission’s	  Communication	  advocated	  principles	   such	   as	   the	   clear	   allocation	   and	   separation	   of	   responsibilities	   in	   the	  internal	  governance	  structure	  of	  a	  SWF,	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  investment	  policies	  and	   objectives	   of	   SWFs	   as	   well	   as	   the	   disclosure	   of	   the	   general	   principles	  governing	   a	   SWF’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   governmental	   authority	   (section	  4.3(a)).1136	  According	   to	   the	   Communication,	   transparency	   practices	   that	   could	  be	  considered	  would	  include	  the	  annual	  disclosure	  of	   investment	  positions	  and	  asset	   allocation;	   the	   exercise	   of	   ownership	   rights;	   the	   disclosure	   of	   the	   use	   of	  leverage	   and	   of	   the	   currency	   composition;	   the	   size	   and	   source	   of	   an	   entity’s	  resources	   and	   the	   disclosure	   of	   the	   home	   country	   regulation	   and	   oversight	  governing	   the	   SWF	   (section	   4.3(b)).1137	  The	   Commission	   also	   underlined	   the	  need	   to	   observe	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality,	   a	   well-­‐established	   EU	   legal	  principle	  (section	  4.2)1138	  and	  also	  makes	  reference	  to	  article	  63	  TFEU	  (formerly	  article	  65	  EC)	  on	   the	   free	  movement	  of	   capital	  and	   the	  exceptions	   that	  may	  be	  invoked.1139	  The	   similarities	   between	   the	   Commission’s	   Communication	   and	   GAPP	   are	  easily	   noticeable,	   especially	   as	   regards	   the	   issue	   of	   transparency	   and	   the	  separation	   of	   responsibilities	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   SWFs.	   It	   becomes	   therefore	  clear	   that	   the	   principles	   that	   shaped	   the	   two	   instruments	   formed	   part	   of	   a	  broader	  public	  debate	  about	   the	   regulation	  of	   SWFs	  and	   the	   financial	  world	   in	  general.	  Given	  the	  new	  competences	  of	  the	  EU	  on	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  under	  the	  TFEU,1140	  it	   can	   be	   expected	   that	   the	   EU	  will	   intervene	  more	   decisively	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1134	  Commission,	  ‘A	  Common	  European	  Approach’	  (n	  1).	  1135	  European	  Judicial	  Network,	  ‘Glossary’	  (Commission)	  <http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/glossary/glossary_en.htm>	  accessed	  2	  February	  2013.	  1136	  Commission,	  ‘A	  Common	  European	  Approach…’	  (n	  1)	  10.	  1137	  ibid	  11.	  1138	  ibid	  9.	  1139	  But	  also	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  adopt	  by	  unanimous	  decision	  measures	  that	  restrict	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.	  ibid	  6.	  1140	  chapter	  5,	  on	  Articles	  206-­‐207	  TFEU,	  at	  190.	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laws	  of	  Member	  States	   that	   restrict	  FDI,	  without,	  however,	   changing	   its	  overall	  stance.	  Having	  analysed	  the	  three	  main	  transnational	  soft	  law	  instruments	  for	  SWFs,	  namely	   those	   of	   the	   OECD,	   the	   IMF1141	  and	   the	   European	   Commission,	   the	  chapter	   can	   move	   on	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   prospective	   advantages	   and	  shortcomings	  of	  each	  of	  those	  regulatory	  tools.	  
	  	  
3.	  Can	  GAPP	  and	  Other	  CoCs	  Offer	  an	  Appropriate	  Regulatory	  Response?	  	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  CoC	  system,	  and	  GAPP	  in	  particular,	  can	  ensure	  that	  the	  rules	  established	  for	  SWFs	  are	  observed.	  CoCs,	  as	   soft	   law	   instruments,	   are	   distinguished	   from	   binding	   legislative	   tools	   of	  dealing	  with	  SWFs	  and,	   as	   such,	   they	  present	  a	  different	   set	  of	   efficiencies	  and	  inefficiencies.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  negative	  and	  positive	  aspects	  of	  the	  CoC	  model	  must	   take	   into	   account	   a	   number	   of	   factors.	   Primarily,	   it	   depends	   on	   the	  observer’s	   stance	   towards	   transparency.1142	  Gilson	   and	   Milhaupt,	   for	   example,	  have	   cast	   doubts	   over	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   demanding	   more	   transparency	   for	  sovereign	   investors,	   arguing	   that	   ‘lack	   of	   transparency	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   the	  problem,	   and	   as	   a	   result	   transparency	   cannot	   be	   itself	   the	   solution’. 1143	  Encouraging	  transparency	  for	  SWFs,	  however,	  can	  help	  silence	  voices	  calling	  for	  protectionist	   policies.	   As	   said	   by	   Halvorsen,	   the	   former	   finance	   Minister	   of	  Norway	   stated,	   transparency	   can	   ‘build	   trust’	   in	   the	   international	   financial	  system.1144	  Furthermore,	   the	   disclosure	   of	   information	   about	   a	   SWF’s	   business	  plans	  and	  governance	  structure	  could	  dissipate	  concerns	  of	  target	  countries	  over	  the	   degree	   of	   political	   interference	   in	   the	   investment	   decisions	   of	   SWFs.	   This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1141	  As	  seen	  above	  at	  n	  1067	  onwards,	  the	  OECD	  was	  the	  first	  to	  propose	  rules	  for	  SWFs,	  a	  work	  that	  the	  IMF	  subsequently	  picked	  up	  and	  developed	  even	  further.	  1142	  See	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  place	  and	  role	  of	  transparency	  in	  chapter	  4,	  n	  596	  onwards;	  ‘Transparency’	  here	  should	  be	  understood	  widely:	  transparency	  of	  governance	  structure,	  business	  plans	  and	  investment	  goals.	  1143	  According	  to	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  is	  that	  sovereigns	  have	  different	  interests	  from	  private	  investors	  and,	  as	  such,	  (quoting	  Truman)	  they	  ‘call	  into	  questions	  our	  most	  basic	  assumptions	  about	  the	  […]	  functioning	  of	  our	  economies	  and	  the	  international	  financial	  system’,	  Gilson	  and	  Milhaupt	  (n	  156)	  3.	  1144	  Halvorsen	  (n	  167).	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development	  could	  open	  the	  path	  for	  SWFs	  to	  invest	  further	  into	  sectors	  deemed	  to	  be	  of	  national	  strategic	  importance,	  such	  as	  telecoms	  and	  energy.1145	  Nevertheless,	   even	   if	   transparency	   is	   accepted	   as	   a	   regulatory	   objective,	  GAPP,	  like	  forms	  of	  CoCs,	  still	  present	  a	  significant	  weakness	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  absence	   of	   any	   formal	   enforcement	   mechanism. 1146 	  No	   SWF	   is	   under	   any	  obligation	  to	  implement	  or	  observe	  any	  of	  those	  principles,	  not	  even	  those	  funds	  that	  took	  part	  in	  the	  preparatory	  work	  of	  the	  IWG.	  Although	  under	  national	  self-­‐regulatory	  models	   the	   law	  may	   intervene	   in	  a	   facilitative	  capacity	  by	  enforcing	  mutual	   agreements,1147	  such	   enforcement	   cannot	   be	   easily	   implemented	   at	   the	  supranational	   level	   where	   compliance	   is	   usually	   reliant	   upon	   the	   parties’	  willingness	   to	   observe	   the	   agreed	   rules. 1148 	  The	   absence	   of	   appropriate	  enforcement	  mechanism	  thus	  risks	  rendering	  those	  commitments	  ineffective.	  This	  concern,	  although	  a	  valid	  one,	   should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  Enforcement,	  just	  like	  standard-­‐setting,	  differs	  significantly	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  made	  at	  the	  national	  or	  supranational	  level.	  At	  the	  supranational	  level,	  both	  the	  drafting	  of	   command-­‐based	   tools	   and	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   agreed	   rules	   are,	   in	  most	  cases,	  unrealistic	  or	  at	  least	  unworkable.	  International	  commitments,	  even	  when	  drafted	   as	   binding	   rules,	   are	   left	   to	   Member	   States	   to	   implement	   them	   in	   the	  domestic	  setting.	  This	   ‘internalisation’	  may	  encounter	   interpretative	  difficulties	  when	   national	   officials	   attempt	   to	   translate	   global	   standards	   into	   domestic	  reality,	  or	  may	  even	  be	  blocked	  entirely	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will.1149	  The	  refusal	  by	  the	  Thatcher	  and	  Labour	  governments	  to	  honour	  their	  commitments	  under	   the	   International	   Labour	   Organisation	   (ILO)	   Conventions	   despite	   their	  ratification	   by	   previous	   UK	   governments	   is	   an	   illustrative	   example	   in	   this	  respect. 1150 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   informal	   resolution	   practices	   such	   as	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1145	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  SWFs	  that	  uses	  external	  managers	  be	  subject	  to	  political	  influence	  since	  that	  alone	  would	  jeopardise	  the	  final	  performance	  of	  the	  managers	  which	  determines	  their	  salary	  and	  bonuses.	  For	  a	  concrete	  example,	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Investment	  Authority,	  ‘An	  Introduction	  to	  ADIA’,	  ADIA,	  Governance,	  January	  2009,	  p	  6.	  1146	  Below	  there	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  various	  supplementary	  mechanisms	  to	  replace	  formal	  enforcement.	  1147	  Morgan	  and	  Yeung	  (n	  1020)	  95.	  1148	  ibid	  313.	  1149	  ibid	  326.	  1150	  A	  number	  of	  complaints	  were	  taken	  to	  the	  ILO	  Convention	  supervisory	  bodies	  in	  Geneva	  which,	  however,	  failed	  to	  alter	  UK	  policy,	  ibid.	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persuasion	  and	  negotiation	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  quite	  pervasive.	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  ‘community	   of	   shared	   fate’	   mentioned	   above	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   the	   level	   of	  standard-­‐setting	  but	  may	  also	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  enforcement.	  The	  fact	  of	   belonging	   in	   a	   ‘community	   of	   share	   fate’,	   such	   as	   the	   one	   of	   SWFs,	   can	  incentivise	  members	  to	  supervise	  potential	  non-­‐compliance	  and	  use	  persuasion	  and	   negotiation	   to	   ensure	   that	   compliance.	   An	   effective	   implementation	   of	   the	  agreed	   rules	   can	   also	   have	   symbolic	   value	   as	   it	  may	   allow	   individual	   SWFs	   to	  invoke	   it	   in	  order	   to	  advertise	   their	   ‘business	  ethos’	   to	   the	  rest	  of	   the	   financial	  world.1151	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  model	  of	  a	  voluntary	  CoC	  presents	  elements	  found	  in	  the	   competition	   approach	   to	   regulation,	  which	   relies	   on	  market	   forces	   for	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  agreed	  rules.1152	  	  
i. The	  experience	  of	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  Stewardship	  Codes	  	   An	  example	  portraying	  the	  above	  contention	  is	  the	  application	  of	  CoCs	  in	  the	  area	   of	   corporate	   governance	   in	   the	   UK.	   The	   current	   code,	   the	   UK	   Corporate	  Governance	  Code1153	  is	   the	   result	   of	   a	   long	  process	  of	   development	   that	  begun	  with	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   Cadbury	   Report	   in	   1992.1154	  The	   UK	   Corporate	  Governance	  Code,	  until	  2010	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Combined	  Code’,	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  successfully	  implemented	  voluntary	  code	  of	  practice.	  Its	  focus	  is	  on	   board	   effectiveness,	   the	   establishment	   of	   non-­‐executive	   directors	   and	   the	  division	   of	   board	  members’	   responsibilities,1155	  the	   accountability	   of	   the	   board	  through	   business	   reporting	   and	   audit,1156	  remuneration	   of	   executives1157	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1151	  ibid	  328.	  1152	  Although	  a	  major	  difference	  being	  that	  the	  competition	  approach	  relies	  on	  the	  facilitative	  role	  of	  the	  law	  to	  provide	  a	  stable	  institutional	  framework	  that	  ensures	  the	  freedom	  and	  security	  of	  economic	  transactions,	  for	  example,	  the	  system	  of	  tradable	  emission	  licenses,	  ibid	  91.	  1153	  FRC,	  ‘UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code’	  (2010)	  Financial	  Reporting	  Council	  <www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/b0832de2-­‐5c94-­‐48c0-­‐b771-­‐ebb249fe1fec/The-­‐UK-­‐Corporate-­‐Governance-­‐Code.aspx>	  accessed	  27	  August	  2012.	  1154	  For	  the	  history	  of	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  see,	  Lowry	  and	  Reisberg	  (n	  442)	  207–214.	  1155	  Sections	  A	  and	  B.	  1156	  Section	  C.	  1157	  Section	  D.	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relations	  of	  the	  board	  with	  shareholders.1158	  The	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  is	   considered	   internationally	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   premier	   benchmarks	   of	   good	  corporate	   governance	   practice,	   while	   many	   companies	   both	   in	   the	   UK	   and	  elsewhere	  seek	  voluntarily	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Code’s	  requirements	  as	  evidence	  that	   they	   observe	   good	   corporate	   governance	   practice.1159	  Its	   approach	   shares	  many	   common	   features	   with	   that	   of	   GAPP,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   promotes	   a	  division	  and	  strict	  delineation	  of	  responsibilities	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  company1160	  and	   an	   improvement	   of	   financial	   reporting	   and	   audit	   function.1161 	  The	   UK	  Corporate	   Governance	   Code	   is	   today	   incorporated	   in	   the	   listing	   rules	   of	   the	  London	   Stock	   Exchange	   (LSE),	   requiring	   listed	   companies	   to	   comply	   with	   its	  recommendations	  or	  state	  reasons	  for	  non-­‐compliance.1162	  Another	  CoC	  adopted	  in	  the	  UK	  alongside	  with	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	   is	   the	  2010	  Stewardship	  Code1163	  which	  aims	   to	  set	  out	  good	  practice	   for	  institutional	   investors	   on	   engagement	   with	   investee	   companies.	   The	  Stewardship	   Code	   recognises	   the	   responsibility	   of	   institutional	   investors	   to	  promote	   the	   long-­‐term	  sustainable	  operation	  of	   the	  company	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	  all	   stakeholders.1164 	  It	   is	   based	   on	   seven	   broad	   principles	   (and	   associated	  guidance),	   a	   number	   of	   which	   could	   also	   inform	   future	   amendments	   of	   GAPP,	  either	  as	   improvements	   to	   the	  current	   text	  of	  GAPP	  or	  as	  a	   separate	  appendix.	  Some	   of	   them	   are:	   disclosing	   how	   stewardship	   responsibilities	   are	  discharged;1165	  managing	  conflict	  of	  interests;1166	  establishing	  guidelines	  on	  how	  shareholder	  value	   is	  protected	  and	  enhanced;1167	  willingness	   to	   act	   collectively	  with	   other	   investors	   where	   appropriate 1168 	  and	   a	   disclosure	   of	   voting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1158	  Section	  E.	  1159	  Max	  Barrett,	  ‘The	  end	  of	  “comply	  or	  explain”?	  Corporate	  governance	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Ireland	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  CRD	  IV’	  (2012)	  Vol	  27(1)	  JIBLR	  4.	  1160	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code,	  Principle	  A.2.	  1161	  ibid,	  Principles	  C.1	  –	  C.3.	  1162	  LR	  9.8.6(5)	  –	  RL	  9.8.6(6);	  This	  approach	  is	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  below	  at	  n	  1192.	  1163	  FRC,	  ‘UK	  Stewardship	  Code’	  (2010)	  Financial	  Reporting	  Council	  <www.frc.org.uk/FRC-­‐Documents/FRC/The-­‐UK-­‐Stewardship-­‐Code.aspx>	  accessed	  27	  August	  2012.	  1164	  Lowry	  and	  Reisberg	  (n	  442)	  229.	  1165	  Principle	  1.	  1166	  Principle	  2.	  1167	  Principle	  4.	  1168	  Principle	  5.	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activity.1169	  These	  principles,	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  apply	  to	  large	  shareholders,	  could	   be	   adapted	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   SWFs	   when	   they	   invest	   in	   large	  corporations	   not	   only	   in	   the	   UK,	   but	   also	   at	   the	   supranational	   level.1170	  This	  possibility	  would	  also	  address	  questions	  arising	  in	  the	  UK	  as	  to	  the	  applicability	  of	   such	   a	   code	   in	   a	   country	   where	   41.2%	   of	   the	   shares	   quoted	   in	   the	   stock	  market1171	  are	  beneficially	  owned	  by	  overseas	  investors.1172	  Interestingly,	   the	   self-­‐regulatory	   enforcement	   approach	   to	   corporate	  governance	   followed	   by	   the	   UK	   government	   since	   the	   first	   publication	   of	   the	  Cadbury	  Code	  appears	   to	  have	  had	  overall	  positive	  results.	  Significant	   levels	  of	  compliance	  with	  the	  code	  had	  emerged	  as	  early	  as	  1995,	  albeit	  with	  lower	  levels	  among	   smaller	   companies.1173	  This	   positive	   trend	   had	   continued	   until	   2000,	  when	  93%	  of	  a	  sample	  of	  FTSE	  All	  Share	  Index	  companies	  had	  a	  board	  made	  up	  of	   one-­‐third	   or	   more	   of	   non-­‐executive	   directors.1174 	  By	   2006,	   the	   available	  evidence	  showed	  that	  compliance	  with	  the	  Combined	  Code	  continued	  to	  improve:	  although	  only	  28%	  of	   companies	   surveyed	  were	   completely	   compliant	  with	  all	  provisions	   of	   the	   code,	   overall	   compliance	   amounted	   to	   98%.1175	  Finally,	   the	  annual	   survey	   of	   compliance	   by	   FTSE	   350	   companies	   carried	   out	   by	   Grant	  Thornton 1176 	  in	   2010-­‐2011	   showed	   that	   50%	   of	   companies	   claimed	   full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1169	  Principles	  6	  and	  7.	  	  1170	  See	  the	  comments	  made	  at	  n	  1223,	  1227.	  1171	  As	  estimated	  at	  31	  December	  2010,	  ONS,	  ‘Ownership	  of	  UK	  Quoted	  Shares,	  2010’	  (Office	  for	  National	  Statistics,	  28	  February	  2012)	  1	  <www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_257476.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  September	  2012.	  1172	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  such	  a	  code	  to	  a	  market	  with	  a	  strong	  presence	  of	  overseas	  investors,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  rising	  SWFs,	  is	  also	  mentioned	  in	  Arad	  Reisberg,	  ‘The	  Notion	  of	  Stewardship	  from	  a	  Company	  Law	  Perspective’	  (2011)	  Vol	  18(2)	  JFC	  138-­‐139.	  1173	  See	  for	  example,	  Alice	  Belcher,	  ‘Regulation	  by	  the	  Market:	  the	  Case	  of	  the	  Cadbury	  Code	  and	  Compliance	  Statement’	  (1995)	  JBL	  321.	  1174	  UK	  Department	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills,	  ‘Modern	  Company	  Law	  for	  a	  Competitive	  Economy:	  Developing	  the	  Framework’	  (2000)	  Company	  Law	  Steering	  Group	  <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://berr.gov.uk/files/files23245.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  August	  2012,	  para	  3.129.	  1175	  There	  were	  in	  total	  only	  58	  reported	  exceptions	  (i.e.	  reported	  instances	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  a	  particular	  provision	  of	  the	  Code)	  across	  the	  companies	  surveyed.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  wide	  majority	  of	  companies	  are	  complying	  with	  almost,	  but	  not	  quite,	  all	  of	  the	  Code	  provisions.	  Sarah	  Ray,	  ‘Combined	  Code:	  Compliance	  Improves’	  (2006)	  PLC <http://plc.practicallaw.com/7-­‐204-­‐1241>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012.	  1176	  This	  report	  was	  compiled	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  2010,	  based	  on	  publicly	  available	  data	  for	  35	  companies	  with	  ordinary	  shares	  listed	  on	  the	  Main	  Securities	  Market	  (MSM)	  of	  the	  Irish	  Stock	  Exchange.	  The	  authors	  have	  omitted	  MSM-­‐listed	  companies	  whose	  primary	  listing	  is	  on	  a	  market	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compliance	  with	   the	  code.	  Of	   those	  remaining,	  80%	  comply	  with	  all	  but	  one	  or	  two	   of	   the	   code’s	   48	   provisions.1177	  It	   is	   illustrative	   that	   80%	   of	   FTSE	   350	  companies	  already	  adopting	  annual	  re-­‐election	  of	  all	  directors,	  up	  from	  only	  ten	  per	  cent	  in	  2010.1178	  Data	  also	  showed	  that	  compliance	  levels	  on	  the	  FTSE	  Small	  Cap	   were	   generally	   consistent	   with	   those	   of	   larger	   companies	   (see	   table	   6.1	  below).1179	  	  
Table	  6.1:	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  compliance	  
	  (FRC	  ‘Impact	  and	  Implementation’	  2011,	  12)	  	  As	  regards	  the	  Stewardship	  Code,	  although	  it	  is	  still	  early	  to	  evaluate	  its	  final	  impact,	  the	  sign-­‐up	  to	  the	  Code	  by	  234	  asset	  managers,	  asset	  owners	  and	  service	  providers	   in	   its	   eighteen	  months	   of	   life	   is	   said	   to	   have	   been	   beyond	   the	   FRC’s	  expectations.1180	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  outside	  the	  UK	  and	  Ireland,	  and	  which	  have	  opted	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  corporate	  governance	  regime	  applicable	  to	  their	  primary	  listing,	  GrantThornton,	  ‘Corporate	  Governance	  Review’	  (2011)	  <www.grantthornton.ie/db/Attachments/Grant-­‐Thornton-­‐Corporate-­‐Governance-­‐Review-­‐2011.pdf>	  accessed	  30	  January	  2013.	  1177	  Financial	  Reporting	  Council	  ‘The	  Impact	  and	  Implementation	  of	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  Stewardship	  Code’	  (2011)	  FRC	  11	  <www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5f4fada9-­‐2a88-­‐43a4-­‐bbec-­‐be15b6519e79/Developments-­‐in-­‐Corporate-­‐Governance-­‐2011-­‐The-­‐impact-­‐and-­‐implementation-­‐of-­‐the-­‐UK-­‐Corporate-­‐Governance-­‐and-­‐Stewardship-­‐Codes.aspx>	  accessed	  27	  January	  2013,	  11.	  1178	  As	  suggested	  by	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code,	  para	  B7.1,	  ibid	  14.	  1179	  ibid	  11.	  1180	  ibid	  4.	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Areas	   where	   the	   FRC	   considers	   there	   is	   room	   for	   improvement	   in	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  include	  reporting	  on	  how	  conflicts	   of	   interest	   are	  managed	   and	   the	  use	   of	   proxy	   voting	   agencies,1181	  and	  reporting	   by	   audit	   committees	   is	   said	   to	   be	   often	   unenlightening.1182	  A	   similar	  criticism	  was	  made	   by	   the	   EU	   Commission	   in	   a	   2009	   study	   on	  Member	   State	  reception	  of	  corporate	  governance	  codes	  (the	  2009	  study),	  where	  it	  stated	  that	  in	   over	   60%	   of	   cases	   where	   companies	   chose	   not	   to	   apply	   recommendations,	  they	   did	   not	   provide	   sufficient	   explanation. 1183 	  A	   possible	   solution	   to	   this	  shortcoming	   is	  offered	  by	  the	  Commission	   in	  a	  2011	  Green	  Paper	  on	  corporate	  governance. 1184 	  The	   Green	   Paper	   mentions	   the	   example	   of	   the	   Swedish	  Corporate	   Governance	   Code	   which	   requires	   companies	   to	   state	   not	   only	   the	  reasons	   for	   departure	   of	   the	   rule	   but	   also	   describe	   the	   solutions	   applied	  instead.1185	  The	   Green	   Paper,	   moreover,	   recommends	   greater	   monitoring	   to	  addressing	   this	   particular	   deficiency.1186 	  Another	   problem	   identified	   by	   the	  Commission’s	  Green	  Paper	  is	  the	  difficulty	  of	  protecting	  minority	  shareholders	  in	  companies	  with	  one	  large	  dominant	  shareholder	  and	  that	  the	  ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  rule	   is	   not	   effective	   in	   those	   cases.1187	  This	   deficiency,	   it	   is	   suggested,	   may	   be	  remedied	   through	   an	   enhanced	   disclosure	   of	   ‘related	   party	   transactions’.1188	  Finally,	  concerns	  have	  been	  expressed	  in	  the	  past	  that	  the	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code’s	  increased	  prescriptiveness	  and	  rigidity	  observed	  in	  its	  2008	  version	  came	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1181	  ibid	  5.	  1182	  ibid	  4.	  1183	  RiskMetrics	  Group	  and	  others,	  ‘Study	  on	  Monitoring	  and	  Enforcement	  Practices	  in	  Corporate	  Governance	  in	  the	  Member	  States’	  (2009)	  European	  Commission,	  DG	  Internal	  Market	  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-­‐or-­‐explain-­‐090923_en.pdf>	  accessed	  31	  January	  2013,	  84.	  1184	  Commission	  ‘Green	  Paper	  -­‐	  The	  EU	  corporate	  governance	  framework’	  COM(2011)	  164	  final	  19.	  1185	  Swedish	  Corporate	  Governance	  Board,	  ‘The	  Swedish	  Corporate	  Governance	  Board’	  2010	  point	  10.1	  <www.corporategovernanceboard.se/the-­‐code/current-­‐code>	  accessed	  31	  January	  2013.	  1186	  Commission,	  ‘Green	  Paper’	  (n	  1184)	  3;	  As	  the	  2009	  study	  on	  national	  codes	  mentions,	  only	  in	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  (France,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Portugal,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  United	  Kingdom)	  are	  shareholders	  encouraged	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  active	  monitoring	  role	  via	  the	  publication	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  voting	  at	  general	  meetings,	  RiskMetrics	  Group	  and	  others	  (n	  1183)	  12.	  1187	  Commission,	  ‘Green	  Paper’	  (n	  1184)	  16.	  1188	  ibid	  17;	  In	  any	  event,	  this	  issue	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  SWFs	  (which	  are	  state-­‐owned).	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at	  the	  expense	  of	  its	  reputed	  flexibility.1189	  This	  criticism	  could	  be	  evoked	  again	  on	  the	  code’s	   latest	  2010	  and	  2012	  versions	  given	   its	  even	  greater	  attention	  to	  detail	   and	   augmented	   prescriptiveness.1190 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	   equally	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  code’s	  2012	  version	  appears	  to	  place	  greater	  weight	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  success	  of	  the	  company	  than	  seen	  under	  the	  previous	  codes.1191	  Despite	  various	  shortcomings,	  it	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  2009	  study	   on	   national	   codes	   that	   the	   ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	   approach	   remains	  widely	  supported	  by	  regulators,	  companies	  and	  investors.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  totality	  of	  EU	  Member	  States1192	  have	   implemented	  some	   form	  of	  corporate	  governance	  code	  supported	  by	  a	  ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  obligation	  in	  their	  national	  system	  since	  the	  UK’s	  Cadbury	  Code	  first	  introduced	  it,	  is	  illustrative	  enough	  in	  this	  respect.1193	  The	  overall	  success	  of	  the	  code	  is	  also	  exhibited	  by	  its	  reception	  by	  the	  EU’s	  corporate	   governance	   policy.	   In	   2006,	   the	   European	   Commission	   issued	  Directive	   2006/46/EC,1194	  introducing	   the	   comply-­‐or-­‐explain	   principle	   for	   the	  first	   time	   in	   European	   law.	   The	   Directive	   introduced	   the	   requirement	   for	  companies	  with	  securities	   traded	  on	  a	  regulated	  market	   to	  publish	  a	  corporate	  governance	   statement.	   The	   statement	   shall	   contain	   at	   least	   a	   reference	   to	   the	  code	   that	   the	   company	   is	   subject	   to,	   and/or	   all	   relevant	   information	  about	   the	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  applied	  beyond	  the	  requirements	  under	  national	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1189	  Marc	  Moore,	  ‘The	  end	  of	  "comply	  or	  explain"	  in	  UK	  corporate	  governance?’	  (2009)	  60	  NIrLegalQ	  90;	  The	  author	  notes	  that	  by	  insisting	  on	  the	  division	  of	  leadership	  responsibilities,	  and	  by	  not	  recognising	  sufficiently	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  strategic	  non-­‐compliance,	  the	  code	  ignores	  the	  board	  members'	  over-­‐riding	  positive	  legal	  duty	  of	  ensuring	  the	  promoting	  the	  long-­‐term	  success	  of	  the	  company	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  its	  shareholders,	  see	  96,	  100.	  1190	  FRC	  ‘FRC	  publishes	  updates	  to	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  and	  Stewardship	  Code’	  28	  September	  2012	  <www.frc.org.uk/News-­‐and-­‐Events/FRC-­‐Press/Press/2012/September/FRC-­‐publishes-­‐updates-­‐to-­‐UK-­‐Corporate-­‐Governance-­‐C.aspx>	  accessed	  30	  May	  2013.	  1191	  See	  ‘Governance	  and	  Code’	  points	  1	  and	  4;	  ‘Preface’	  point	  4;	  A1;	  A4;	  D1;	  Schedule	  A;	  This	  is	  in	  line,	  arguably,	  with	  section	  172	  CA	  2006,	  establishing	  a	  duty	  to	  promote	  the	  success	  of	  the	  company.	  1192	  The	  study	  mentions	  the	  exception	  of	  Ireland	  (which	  applies	  the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code)	  and	  Greece.	  Since	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  study,	  Greece	  implemented	  its	  first	  corporate	  governance	  code	  applying	  the	  ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  requirement,	  see	  SEV,	  ‘Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  For	  Listed	  Companies’	  (2011)	  Hellenic	  Federation	  of	  Enterprises	  <www.sev.org.gr/Uploads/pdf/SEV_CGC_ENG_2011_FINAL%20_MARCH_2011.pdf>	  accessed	  31	  January	  2013.	  1193	  See	  RiskMetrics	  Group	  and	  others	  (n	  1183)	  24,	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  requirement	  implemented	  in	  different	  EU	  Member	  States.	  1194	  Directive	  2006/46/EC	  of	  14	  June	  2006	  on	  the	  annual	  accounts	  and	  consolidated	  accounts	  of	  insurance	  undertakings	  [2006]	  OJ	  L224/1.	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law.1195	  Additionally,	   companies	   shall	   provide	   information	   internal	   control	   and	  risk	   management	   systems,	   antitakeover	   bid	   measures	   and	   key	   powers	   of	  shareholder	  meetings.1196	  The	  European	  Corporate	  Governance	  Forum	  had	  also	  expressed	  strong	  and	  unanimous	  support	  for	  the	  comply-­‐or-­‐explain	  approach	  in	  2006,	  as	  it	  judged	  it	  ‘best	  suited	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  variety	  of	  situations	  of	  individual	   companies’.1197	  More	   recently,	   the	  EU	   included	   a	   ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  obligation	   in	   the	   founding	   regulation	   of	   the	   European	   Securities	   Market	  Authority	  (ESMA).1198	  Under	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  regulation,	  ESMA	  is	  empowered	  to	  issue	   recommendations	   and	   guidelines	   to	   companies,	   which	   those	   companies	  must	   either	   comply	  with,	   or	   state	   the	   reasons	   for	  non-­‐compliance.1199	  It	   seems	  that,	  despite	  the	  various	  deficiencies	   identified,	   ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  has	  become	  an	   established	   EU	   practice.	   Overall,	   as	   the	   2009	   study	   published	   by	   the	   EU	  Commission	   concludes,	   ‘the	   “comply-­‐or-­‐explain”	   regime	   should	   not	   be	  abandoned.	  It	  should	  be	  strengthened’.1200	  
	  
ii. Compliance	  with	  GAPP	  	   The	   evidence	   of	   implementation	   of	   the	   Combined	   Code/UK	   Corporate	  Governance	   Code	   is	   quite	   encouraging	   as	   far	   as	   general	   self-­‐regulatory	  approaches	   are	   concerned.	   It	   would	   certainly	   be	   unlikely	   to	   expect	   similar	  results	   with	   GAPP	   taking	   effect	   so	   quickly,	   as	   GAPP	   and	   the	   UK	   Corporate	  Governance	   Code	   differ	   considerably	   in	   the	   conditions	   of	   their	   application.1201	  However,	   it	  would	   not	   be	  wholly	   unrealistic	   to	   observe	   a	   similar	   effect	   in	   due	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1195	  Article	  1.7.1(a)(i).	  1196	  Article	  1.6(7a),	  1.7.1(d)	  and	  1.7.1(e).	  1197	  Commission	  ‘Statement	  of	  the	  European	  Corporate	  Governance	  Forum	  on	  the	  Comply-­‐or-­‐explain	  Principle’	  (2006)	  Internal	  Market,	  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-­‐comply-­‐explain_en.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  February	  2013,	  1.	  1198	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  1095/2010	  of	  24	  November	  2010	  establishing	  a	  European	  Supervisory	  Authority	  (European	  Securities	  and	  Markets	  Authority)	  OJ	  L331/84.	  1199	  Article	  16(3).	  1200	  RiskMetrics	  Group	  (n	  1183)	  18.	  1201	  In	  particular,	  the	  UK	  CoC	  is	  a	  national	  instrument	  applying	  to	  corporations	  and	  some	  of	  its	  provisions	  are	  backed	  by	  the	  force	  of	  the	  law,	  while	  GAPP	  is	  a	  supranational	  instrument,	  with	  no	  compulsory	  measures	  and	  applying	  to	  national	  governments.	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course,	  which	  may	  be	  reinforced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  additions	  to	  GAPP1202	  and	  developments	  in	  the	  wider	  financial	  sector.1203	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	   that	   GAPP	   is	  not	   a	   set	   of	   ideals	   that	   SWFs	  will	   struggle	   to	   reach,	   ‘but	   an	  inventory	  of	  best	  practices	  that	  already	  exist’1204	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  the	  UK	  codes	  seen	   above.	   This	  means	   that	   GAPP	   do	   not	   require	   SWFs	   to	   adopt	   any	   practice	  that	   is	  not	  already	  being	  followed	  by	  at	   least	  one	  other	  SWF.	  This	  fact	  makes	  it	  difficult	   for	   SWFs	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   CoC’s	   standards	   of	   accountability	   and	  transparency	   are	   a	   costly	   burden.	   It	   is	   equally	   important	   that	   GAPP	   is	  constructed	   in	   a	   broad	  way	   so	   as	   to	   provide	   SWFs	  with	   sufficient	   flexibility	   in	  their	  manner	  of	  implementation	  as	  long	  as	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  code	  is	  complied	  with.	  In	  short,	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  since	  SWFs	  have	  signed	  up	  to	  GAPP,	  they	  should	  observe	  ‘a	  process	  of	  competitive	  emulation’1205	  amongst	  them.	  For	   the	   time	   being,	   the	   available	   evidence	   on	   compliance	   to	   GAPP	   shows	  mixed	  results:	  while	  overall	  compliance	  is	  still	   lacking,	  many	  encouraging	  signs	  can	  already	  be	  observed.	  According	   to	   the	  Behrendt	  Report	  on	   the	  progress	   in	  the	   implementation	  of	  GAPP	  by	  SWFs,	   conducted	   for	   the	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	   International	   Peace,	   compliance	   with	   GAPP	   eighteen	   months	   after	   their	  publication	  remained	  low.1206	  The	  Behrendt	  Report	  (see	  table	  6.2)	  identified	  four	  different	   categories	   of	   compliance.	   The	   first	   category	   included	   funds	   that	   fully	  comply	   with	   the	   Principles,1207	  all	   of	   which	   were	   established	   in	   democratic	  countries	   (New	   Zealand,	   Australia,	   Ireland	   and	   Norway).	   This	   first	   group	  represented	  nearly	  $500	  billion	  in	  assets	  under	  management—some	  20%	  of	  the	  total	   assets	   under	   management	   by	   the	   Principles’	   signatories.1208	  The	   second	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1202	  As	  it	  is	  argued	  below	  at	  283-­‐286,	  such	  as	  formalising	  the	  process	  of	  compliance	  monitoring	  and	  introducing	  a	  ‘comply	  and	  explain’	  component	  to	  the	  code.	  1203	  See	  the	  next	  section	  ‘SWFs	  and	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Hedge	  Funds’.	  1204	  Katinka	  Barysch,	  Simon	  Tilford	  and	  Philip	  Whyte,	  ‘State,	  Money	  and	  Rules:	  An	  EU	  Policy	  for	  Sovereign	  Investments’	  (2008)	  Centre	  for	  European	  Reform	  <www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_swf_dec08-­‐1342.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012,	  14.	  1205	  ibid. 1206	  Behrendt	  (n	  1106)	  7. 1207	  Each	  provided	  sufficient	  and	  detailed	  information	  about	  its	  policy	  objectives,	  governance	  arrangements,	  funding	  and	  withdrawal	  arrangements	  financial	  positions,	  and	  overall	  investment	  policy,	  including	  information	  about	  non-­‐financial	  and	  non-­‐economic	  considerations	  that	  might	  drive	  investment	  behaviour.	  ibid	  6.	  1208	  ibid.	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group	   included	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   funds,	   each	   of	   which	   reached approximately	  60%. 1209 	  This	   group	   represents	   nearly	   $1.2	   trillion	   in	   assets	   under	  management—some	   50%	   of	   the	   total	   assets	   under	   management	   by	   the	  Principles’	   signatories.1210	  The	   third	   group,	   which	   included	   two	   Russian	   funds	  and	   the	   two	   funds	   from	   Kuwait	   and	   Qatar,	   represented	   nearly	   $500	   billion	   in	  assets	  under	  management,	  some	  20%	  of	  the	  total	  assets	  under	  management	  by	  SWFs.1211	  These	   institutions	   provided	   only	   basic	   information	   about	   how	   they	  observed	  GAPP.	   Finally,	   the	   fourth	   group,	   representing	   the	   remainder	   of	   some	  US$200	   billion	   assets	   under	  management,	   included	   funds	   for	   which	   only	   very	  limited	  or	  no	  data	  could	  be	  obtained.1212	  	  	  
Table	  6.2:	  Santiago	  [GAPP]	  Compliance	  Index	  as	  of	  March	  2010	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1209	  All	  provided	  at	  least	  basic	  information	  that	  covers	  most	  of	  the	  Principles	  but	  struggled	  to	  explain	  how	  their	  checks	  and	  balances	  system	  shielded	  them	  from	  their	  governments	  political	  considerations,	  ibid	  7.	  1210	  ibid.	  1211	  ibid.	  1212	  ibid.	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  (Behrendt,	  'SWFs	  and	  the	  Santiago	  Principles'	  (2010)	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  6)1213	  	  Behrendt	  made	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  ‘the	  distinct	  local	  political	  institutions	  of	  each	   country	   transcend	   SWFs’	   governance,	   accountability,	   and	   transparency	  commitments	   and	   have	   a	   measurable	   impact	   on	   their	   compliance	   with	  [GAPP]’.1214	  He	  then	  tested	  this	  hypothesis	  side	  by	  side	  to	   the	  democracy	   index	  2008	  (see	  below,	  chart	  6.1).	  	  
Chart	   6.1:	   Compliance	   with	   Santiago	   Principles	   by	   Democratic	   Institutions	  
(2008)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1213	  This	  index,	  which	  represents	  the	  author’s	  estimate,	  is	  based	  on	  relevant	  data	  accessed	  from	  January	  2010	  to	  March	  2010	  and	  provided	  by	  SWFs,	  the	  IWG,	  and	  the	  IMF.	  The	  author	  acknowledges	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  in	  this	  assessment	  that	  affect	  data	  accuracy,	  such	  as	  availability	  and	  accessibility.	  A	  more	  thorough	  description	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Santiago	  [GAPP]	  Compliance	  Index	  is	  provided	  at,	  Sven	  Behrendt,	  ‘Gulf	  Arab	  Sovereign	  Wealth	  Funds:	  Governance	  and	  Institution	  Building’	  (2010)	  11th	  Mediterranean	  Research	  Meeting,	  European	  University	  Institute:	  Florence	  &	  Montecatini	  Terme.	  1214	  Behrendt	  (n	  1106)	  9.	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  (Behrendt	  ‘SWFs	  and	  Santiago’	  9)	  	  Drawing	   from	   the	   democracy	   index	   above,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   to	   see	   that	  SWFs	   established	   in	   countries	   with	   democratic	   institutions	   tend	   to	   be	   more	  transparent	   and	   accountable. 1215 	  As	   the	   author	   affirms,	   governance	   and	  government	  effectiveness	  explains	  a	  SWF’s	  compliance	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.1216	  Overall	   Behrendt	   draws	   pessimistic	   conclusions	   from	   his	   findings.	   He	  believes	  that	  the	  GAPP	  process	  has	  lost	  its	  momentum,	  especially	  since	  attitudes	  towards	  SWFs	  have	  shifted.1217	  It	  cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  the	  compliance	  levels,	  as	  reflected	   in	   the	   Behrendt	   Report,	   are	   unsatisfactory.	   This,	   however,	   does	   not	  constitute	   a	   reason	   to	   abandon	   the	   entire	   effort.	   The	   progress	   recorded	   in	   the	  Behrendt	  Report	  took	  place	  within	  a	  short	  period	  from	  the	  conclusion	  of	  GAPP.	  It	  is	  natural	   to	  expect	   institutional	  change	   to	  be	  slow,	  especially	  when	   it	  happens	  on	   a	   voluntary	   basis	   and	   it	   takes	   place	   in	   countries	  with	   varying	   traditions	   of	  governance	   and	   administration.	   If	   anything,	   the	   results	   of	   the	  Behrendt	   report	  constitute	  an	  additional	  reason	  to	  formalise	  the	  task	  of	  reporting	  the	  compliance	  progress	   of	   SWFs	   by	   entrusting	   it	   to	   the	   International	   Forum	   of	   Sovereign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1215	  This	  point	  has	  been	  made	  before	  in	  chapter	  2,	  see	  table	  1.3	  and	  the	  analysis	  below.	  1216	  Behrendt	  (n	  1106)	  12.	  1217	  He	  believes,	  however,	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  enforce	  it,	  as	  ‘in	  the	  long	  run,	  a	  more	  accountable	  global	  financial	  system	  is	  more	  robust’,	  ibid	  13.	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Wealth	   Funds	   (IFSWF).1218	  This	   institution	   is	   the	   best	   placed	   to	   carry	   out	   this	  task	  as	   it	   is	  charged	  with	  the	  organisation	  of	  SWF	  meetings	  and	  can	  thus	  cover	  the	   additional	   monitoring	   costs	   through	   the	   contributions	   of	   SWFs	   and	   the	  IMF.1219	  	  	  
4.	  Additional	  Recommendations	  Advocated	  by	  this	  Thesis	  	   The	   following	   suggestions	   aim	   at	   remedying	   the	   lack	   of	   any	   form	   of	  monitoring	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   code	   by	   SWFs	   and	   at	   completing	   the	  existing	   regulatory	   framework	   for	   SWFs	   with	   certain	   additions.	   The	   ultimate	  goal	   is	   to	   enhance	   governmental	   and	   market	   confidence	   towards	   SWFs	   by	  demonstrating	   the	   SWFs	   are	   not	   suspect	   of	   political	   influence	   or	   market	  destabilising	  effects	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  preserve	  their	  competitiveness	  against	  other	  market	  participants.	  Firstly,	  a	  monitoring	  system	  of	   the	  application	  of	  GAPP	  would	  be	  essential.	  This	   system	   could	   draw	   principles	   from	   the	   Behrendt	   Report	   and	   the	   SWF	  Institute	   transparency	   index.	  More	   specifically,	   successful	   implementation	   of	   a	  GAPP	   principle	   could	   be	   represented	  with	   a	   certain	   percentage	   point	   (such	   as	  4%)	   in	   a	   scale	   from	  0	   to	   100%.	   The	   level	   of	   implementation	   of	   each	   principle	  would	   be	   reflected	   by	   the	   amount	   granted	   for	   each,	   i.e.	   1%	   for	   poor	  implementation	  to	  4%	  for	  complete	  implementation.	  Moreover,	  such	  a	  monitoring	  system	  could	  go	  beyond	  the	  simple	  production	  of	   periodic	   progress	   report	   and	   draw	   elements	   from	   the	   UK	   Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  and	  its	   ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  principle.	  Paragraph	  9.8.6	  R	  of	  the	  UK	  Listing	  Authority’s	   listing	  rules	  require	  UK	  companies	  to	  produce	  an	  annual	  statement	  of	  how	  the	  listed	  company	  has	  applied	  the	  main	  principles	  of	  the	  UK	  Corporate	   Governance	   Code,	   and	   a	   statement	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   company	   has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1218	  As	  the	  IWG	  has	  been	  renamed	  in	  its	  meeting	  in	  Kuwait	  City	  in	  May	  2009.	  1219	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  in	  July	  2011,	  the	  IFSWF	  has	  published	  a	  report	  on	  its	  members’	  experience	  in	  the	  application	  of	  GAPP.	  This	  report,	  however,	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  any	  form	  of	  monitoring,	  but	  rather,	  a	  written	  record	  of	  members’	  discussions	  on	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  principles	  in	  their	  internal	  governance	  structure.	  It	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  IFSWF,	  ‘IFSWF	  Members’	  Experiences	  in	  the	  Application	  of	  the	  Santiago	  Principles’	  (2011)	  Report	  prepared	  by	  IFSWF	  Sub-­‐Committee	  1	  and	  the	  Secretariat	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Members	  of	  the	  IFSWF	  <www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070711.pdf>	  accessed	  12	  December	  2012.	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complied	  with	  all	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  Code,	  any	  provisions	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  comply	   with,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   reasons	   for	   that	   failure.	   As	   specified	   by	   the	   UK	  Corporate	   Governance	   Code,	   a	   failure	   to	   comply	   can	   be	   justified	   ‘if	   good	  governance	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	   other	  means’	   and	   for	   that	   reason	   ‘it	   should	   be	  explained	   clearly	   and	   carefully	   to	   shareholders,	   who	   may	   wish	   to	   discuss	   the	  position	  with	  the	  company	  and	  whose	  voting	  intentions	  may	  be	  influenced	  as	  a	  result’.1220	  This	  approach	  is	  generally	  perceived	  by	  companies	  to	  be	  more	  about	  mind-­‐set	   culture	   than	   box-­‐ticking:	   there	   is	   no	   absolute	   right	   answer,	   and	   the	  obligation	  to	  explain	  rests	  as	  much	  as	  on	  those	  who	  are	  doing	  well	  as	  on	  those	  who	   are	   doing	   badly.1221	  Moreover,	   the	   ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	   approach	   is	   said	   to	  satisfy	   both	   smaller	   shareholders	   who	   cannot	   directly	   ask	   the	   company	   for	  information,	  as	  well	  as	  larger	  ones	  who	  see	  those	  explanations	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  more	   dialogue.1222	  Based	   on	   this	  model,	   SWFs	   could	   also	   be	   offered,	   in	   the	  context	  of	  GAPP,	  with	  a	  choice	  between	  complying	  or	  producing	  a	  statement	  of	  progress,	   or	   an	   explanation	   for	   their	   failure	   to	   comply.	   Such	   an	   idea	   would,	  naturally,	  face	  enforcement	  difficulties.	  In	  the	  UK	  the	  choice	  between	  complying	  or	  explaining	   is	  enforced	   through	   the	  LSE’s	   listing	  rules	   (although,	   through	   the	  FRC’s	  coordination	  efforts).	   In	  the	  supranational	  context	  of	  SWFs	  no	  equivalent	  enforcement	  mechanism	   exists.1223	  Nevertheless,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	  why	   SWFs	  would	  refuse	  to	  produce	  such	  reports	  voluntarily	   if	   this	  becomes	  an	  acceptable	  practice	   within	   the	   IFSWF.	   Even	   if	   weakly	   enforced,	   the	   introduction	   of	   this	  element	  in	  the	  monitoring	  system	  of	  the	  IFSWF	  could	  foster	  a	  culture	  of	  dialogue	  and	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   accountability	   among	   SWFs.	   In	   this	   context	   additional	  percentage	   points	   could	   also	   be	   added	   or	   removed	   based	   on	   the	   quality	   of	  ‘comply	  or	  explain’	  reports.	  The	  introduction	  of	  GAPP	  should	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  the	  culmination,	  but	  rather	  as	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   an	   endeavour	   to	   render	   SWFs	   more	   transparent	   and	  accountable.	  This	  view	  would	  be	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  behind	  the	  follow	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1220	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code,	  ‘Comply	  or	  Exlain’	  para	  3.	  1221	  Financial	  Reporting	  Council,	  ‘What	  Constitutes	  an	  Explanation	  under	  “Comply	  or	  Explain”?	  –	  Report	  of	  Discussions	  Between	  Companies	  and	  Investors’	  (2012)	  FRC	  5.	  1222	  ibid	  8.	  1223	  And	  as	  explained	  thoroughly	  in	  chapter	  5	  it	  would	  be	  unadvisable	  to	  enforce	  it	  through	  unilateral	  national	  measures,	  for	  example,	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  carrying	  out	  investments	  within	  a	  jurisdiction.	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up	   to	   the	   IWG	   which	   gave	   birth	   to	   the	   Kuwait	   Declaration	   and	   the	   IFSWF,	  namely,	   that	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   for	   SWFs	   is	   an	   on-­‐going	  process.1224	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  IFSWF	  could	  consider	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  stewardship-­‐type	  code	  for	  SWFs	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  could	  be	  added	  as	  an	  appendix	  to	  GAPP	  to	  guide	  the	   relationship	   between	   SWFs	   and	   investee	   companies.	   It	   could	   focus	   on	  minimising	  potential	   conflict	   of	   interests	   between	   the	   interests	   of	   SWFs’	   home	  governments	  and	  host	  economies	  and	  establishing	  guidelines	  for	  the	  protection	  of	   shareholder	  value	  and	   the	  participation	  of	   SWFs	   in	   shareholder	  meetings.	  A	  disclosure	   of	   voting	   activity	   could	   also	   be	   mandated.	   The	   application	   of	   the	  stewardship	   code	   would	   be	   left	   to	   individual	   SWFs	   and	   the	   management	   of	  investee	  companies	  (and	  thus	  would	  preferably	  not	  make	  part	  of	  the	  monitoring	  grading	  system).	  It	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  by	  Norton	  that	  the	  IFSWF	  should	  seek	  further	  links	  to	   the	   financial	  markets	   and	   to	   the	   global	   policymakers	   responsible	   for	   global	  financial	  stability,	   including	   ‘affiliate’	  status	  with	  the	  International	  Organization	  of	   Securities	   Commissions	   (IOSCO).1225	  The	   IFSWF	   and	   its	   members,	   he	   adds,	  need	  to	  be	  tied	  into	  and	  committed	  to	  the	  IMF's	  bilateral	  surveillance	  initiatives	  of	   financial	   stability	   analyses	   and	   should	   explore	   ongoing	   technical	   assistance	  programs	  for	  its	  members	  through	  the	  IMF,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  OECD	  as	  to	  upgrading	  their	  governance	  structures	  and	  as	  to	  some	  form	  of	  voluntary	  periodic	  assessments.1226	  The	   work	   of	   the	   IFSWF,	   therefore,	   can	   significantly	   contribute	   to	   a	   more	  satisfactory	   integration	   of	   SWFs	   to	   the	   global	   financial	   and	   regulatory	   system.	  The	   work	   of	   the	   IFSWF	   can	   also	   be	   evaluated	   in	   conjunction	   with	   additional	  actions	   taken	   at	   the	   supranational	   level	   to	   enhance	   the	   supervision	   over	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1224	  IWG-­‐SWF	  (n	  1218).	  1225	  Norton	  (n	  1079)	  654.	  (IOSCO)	  is	  an	  association	  of	  organisations	  that	  regulate	  the	  world’s	  securities	  and	  futures	  markets.	  Many	  of	  the	  world’s	  stock	  exchanges	  and	  financial	  supervisory	  authorities	  have	  established	  links	  with	  IOSCO	  as	  ‘ordinary’,	  ‘associate’	  and	  ‘affiliate’	  members.	  For	  more,	  see:	  IOSCO,	  <www.iosco.org/>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  1226	  Norton	  (n	  1079)	  654.	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operation	   of	   SWFs,1227	  but	   also	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   regulation	   of	   parallel	  investment	   entities,	   such	   as	   hedge	   funds.	   These	  matters	   are	   dealt	   with	   in	   the	  following	  section.	  	  	  
5.	  SWFs	  and	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Hedge	  Funds	  	   An	  examination	  of	  all	   the	  available	   regulatory	   frameworks	   for	  SWFs	   in	   the	  previous	  and	  the	  present	  chapter	  has	   led	  to	   the	  conclusion	  that	   that	   those	  that	  are	  structured	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis	  and	  at	  the	  supranational	  level	  are	  preferable	  to	   existing	   binding	   instruments	   adopted	   by	   national	   governments.	   Their	  voluntary	   nature	   may	   not	   bring	   immediate	   results,	   but	   they	   can	   serve	   to	  encourage	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   tendency	   of	   SWFs	   to	   move	   towards	   greater	  transparency	  and	  accountability.1228	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  CoCs,	  there	  are	  also	  other	  means	  available	  to	  regulators	  to	  boost	  the	  tendency	  for	  increased	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  SWFs.	  One	  significant	  tool	  would	  be	  to	  promote	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  transparency	  in	  financial	  markets,	  and	  thus	  step	  up	  pressure	  on	  other	  entities	  to	  follow	  suit.	  It	  was	  seen,	  for	  example,	  above,1229	  that	  SWFs	  react	  negatively	  when	  equivalent	  transparency	  obligations	   are	   not	   imposed	   on	   other	   investment	   vehicles,	   such	   as	   hedge	  funds.1230	  This	  stance	   is	   justifiable	  to	  the	  extent	   that	  SWFs	  compete	  with	  hedge	  funds	  in	  financial	  markets	  and	  fear	  that	  transparency	  requirements	  might	  place	  them	  at	  a	  competitive	  disadvantage.	   It	   is	  not	  equally	   justifiable	  when	  used	  as	  a	  pretext	   to	   preserve	   their	   current	   governance	   structures.1231	  In	   either	   case	   the	  unregulated	  status	  of	  similar	  financial	  actors	  enables	  SWFs	  to	  resist	  pressure	  for	  greater	  regulation	  and	  supervision.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds	  could	   play	   the	   role	   of	   a	   yardstick	   for	   transparency	   in	   SWFs.	   More	   regulation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1227	  Such	  as	  the	  ones	  mentioned	  above	  (Stewardship	  Code,	  institutionalisation	  of	  monitoring	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  ‘comply-­‐or-­‐explain’	  principle).	  1228	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  1	  ‘There	  is	  a	  clear	  trend	  towards	  openness’,	  where	  it	  was	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  trend	  among	  SWFs	  towards	  increasing	  transparency.	  1229	  n	  160,	  1061.	  1230	  See	  also	  n	  294.	  1231	  As	  seen	  above	  in	  chapter	  2,	  the	  relationship	  between	  SWFs	  and	  hedge	  funds	  is	  not	  always	  that	  of	  competition	  in	  an	  open	  market.	  SWFs	  usually	  have	  different	  investment	  horizons	  to	  hedge	  funds,	  and	  often	  even	  invest	  through	  them,	  n	  250.	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applied	   to	   hedge	   funds	   could	   result,	   even	   indirectly,	   in	   more	   regulatory	  principles	   also	   being	   observed	   by	   SWFs	   voluntarily.	   The	   latest	   regulation	   for	  hedge	   funds	   adopted	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   USA	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   GFC,	  discussed	  below,	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  good	  example	  in	  this	  respect.	  Hedge	   fund	   regulation	   is	   designed	   to	   address	   systemic	   risk	   caused	   by	   the	  investment	   behaviour	   of	   hedge	   funds.	   Such	   systemic	   risk,	   as	   demonstrated	   by	  the	   recent	   GFC	   exceeds	   the	   scope	   of	   any	   national	   jurisdiction.	   As	   a	   result,	  negative	  externalities	  arising	  from	  hedge	  fund	  behaviour	  can	  easily	  affect	  other	  countries	  too.1232	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  for	  hedge	  fund	  regulation	  to	  be	  meaningful	  it	   needs	   to	   be	   transnational.	   In	   the	   past,	   various	   forms	   of	   self-­‐regulatory	  instruments	   have	   been	   introduced	   which	   were	   not	   dissimilar	   to	   the	   ones	  attempted	   today	   with	   SWFs.1233	  However,	   since	   the	   GFC,	   hard	   regulation	   was	  deemed	  necessary	  in	  both	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA.	  In	  this	  context,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  the	   incentive	   structure	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   favoured	   a	   degree	   of	  harmonisation	  of	  hedge	  fun	  regulation	  to	  avoid	  regulatory	  arbitrage.1234	  In	  the	  EU,	  the	  Directive	  on	  Alternative	  Investment	  Fund	  Managers	  (AIFMD)	  was	   published	   in	   July	   2011.1235	  Its	   aim	   was	   to	   create	   a	   comprehensive	   and	  effective	  regulatory	  and	  supervisory	  framework	  for	  alternative	  investment	  fund	  managers	  within	  the	  EU.1236	  AIFMD	  introduces	  rules	  relating	  to	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	   operation	   of	   hedge	   funds,	   such	   as	   capital	   requirements,	   remuneration	  policies,	  valuation	  and	  delegation,	  as	  well	  as	  increased	  transparency	  to	  investors	  and	  competent	  authorities.	  The	  directive	  requires	  the	  disclosure	  to	  investors	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1232	  Andreas	  Engert,	  ‘Transnational	  Hedge	  Fund	  Regulation’	  (2010)	  Vol	  11(3)	  EBOR	  319.	  1233	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Counter	  Party	  Risk	  Management	  Policy	  Group	  (CPRMPG),	  an	  initiative	  supported	  by	  most	  financial	  institutions	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  USA.	  It	  has	  issued	  reports	  in	  2005	  and	  2008,	  CRMPG,	  ‘Toward	  Greater	  Financial	  Stability:	  A	  Private	  Sector	  Perspective’	  (CRMPG,	  25	  July	  2005) <www.crmpolicygroup.org/crmpg2/>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012;	  Containing	  Systemic	  Risk:	  The	  Road	  to	  Reform’	  (CRMPG,	  6	  August	  2008)	  	  <http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/>	  accessed	  6	  November	  2012.	  1234	  Engert	  (n	  1232)	  355-­‐364.	  1235	  Council	  Directive	  2011/61/EU	  of	  8	  June	  2011	  on	  Alternative	  Investment	  Fund	  Managers,	  OJ	  L	  174;	  Its	  deadline	  for	  implementation	  by	  national	  governments	  is	  22	  July	  2013,	  Arts	  66(1)	  and	  (2)	  of	  the	  Directive.	  1236	  Alternative	  investment	  funds	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  hedge	  funds.	  Under	  Article	  4(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Directive	  they	  are	  defined	  as	  any	  ‘collective	  investment	  undertaking,	  including	  investment	  compartments	  thereof,	  which	  raises	  capital	  from	  a	  number	  of	  investors	  with	  a	  view	  to	  investing	  it	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  defined	  investment	  policy	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  those	  investors	  and	  which	  does	  not	  require	  authorisation	  pursuant	  to	  Art	  5	  of	  Directive	  2009/65/EC’	  (the	  UCITS	  Directive).	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the	  fund’s	  investment	  strategy	  and	  objectives,	  valuation	  and	  redemption	  policies,	  valuation,	   custody,	   administration	   and	   risk	  management	   procedures,	   and	   fees,	  charges	   and	   expenses.1237	  Thereafter,	   the	   fund	   manager	   must	   also	   submit	   to	  investors	  a	  report	  containing	  the	  fund’s	  balance	  sheet,	  income	  statement,	  activity	  report	   and	   auditor’s	   report.1238 	  The	   fund	   manager,	   in	   addition,	   must	   make	  significant	   disclosures	   to	   the	   competent	   authorities.	   These	  disclosures	   concern	  the	  percentage	  of	   its	  portfolio	  assets	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  special	  arrangements	  arising	  from	  their	  illiquid	  nature,	  any	  new	  arrangements	  for	  managing	  liquidity,	  and	   the	   current	   risk	   profile	   of	   each	   fund.1239	  An	   alternative	   investment	   fund	  manager	  is	  also	  required	  under	  the	  directive	  to	  inform	  regularly	  the	  competent	  authorities	   on	   the	   principal	   markets	   and	   instruments	   in	   which	   its	   fund	   trade,	  their	  principal	  exposures	  and	  important	  concentrations	  of	  risk1240	  as	  well	  as	  the	  use	  of	  short	  selling.1241	  In	  the	  event	  of	  acquisition	  of	  control,	  AIFMD	  requires	  the	  fund	  manager	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  fund	  discloses	  to	  the	  company,	  its	  shareholders	  and	   employees	   relevant	   information	   in	   relation,	   for	   example,	   to	   the	   intentions	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   future	   business	   of	   the	   company	   and	   to	   the	   financing	   of	   the	  acquisition.1242	  AIFMD	  also	   includes	   specific	   rules	   to	  mitigate	   risks	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	  health	  of	  companies	  linked	  to	  ‘asset	  stripping’.1243	  	  In	  the	  USA,	  reporting	  requirements	  for	  hedge	  funds	  and	  private	  equity	  were	  adopted	  in	  July	  2010	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.1244	  The	  reforms	  made	  in	  this	  area	  are	  consistent	  with	  those	  enacted	  later	  in	  the	  EU	  with	  the	  AIFMD.	  The	  Dodd-­‐Frank	   Act	   requires	   hedge	   fund	   managers	   to	   file	   regularly	   with	   the	   SEC	   all	  information	  deemed	  necessary	  and	  appropriate	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  for	  the	  protection	   of	   investors,	   or	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   systemic	   risk	   by	   the	   newly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1237	  Art	  20(1).	  1238	  The	  fund	  manager	  must	  also	  submit	  these	  reports	  to	  the	  competent	  authorities	  in	  its	  home	  Member	  State,	  Art	  19(1)–(3).	  1239	  Art	  20(2)	  and	  Art	  21(2).	  1240	  Art	  21(1).	  1241	  Art	  21(2)(d)-­‐(e).	  1242	  Arts	  27	  –	  29.	  1243	  Meaning	  the	  process	  of	  buying	  an	  undervalued	  company	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  sell	  off	  its	  assets	  for	  a	  profit.	  Art	  30.	  1244	  H.R.	  4173,	  (Public	  Law	  111	  –	  203):	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Wall	  Street	  Reform	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act.	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created	  Financial	  Stability	  Oversight	  Council	  (FSOC).1245	  The	  FSOC	  will	   focus	  on	  the	   hedge	   funds’	   assets	   under	   management;	   leverage;	   credit	   exposure;	  counterparty	   risk	   trading	   and	   investment	   positions;	   valuation	   policies	   and	  procedures;	   types	   of	   assets	   held;	   side	   letters;	   trading	   practices,	   as	  well	   as	   any	  other	  information	  that	  the	  SEC	  deems	  to	  be	  ‘necessary	  or	  appropriate’.1246	  Hedge	   funds	  are	  rarely	  systemically	   important1247	  and,	   just	   like	  with	  SWFs,	  their	   behavior	   is	   not	  perceived	   as	   one	  of	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   recent	  GFC.1248	  But	   a	  powerful	  argument	  is	  made	  that	  the	  world’s	  economies	  cannot	  afford	  to	  wait	  for	  incontestable	  evidence	  of	  an	  actual	  systemic	  problem	  before	  acting,	  because	  then	  the	  regulatory	  response	  will	  be	  too	  late.1249	  A	  similar	  line	  of	  argument	  could	  also	  be	   invoked	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	   SWFs:	   regulation	   is	   established	   in	  order	   to	   avert	   future	   crises.	   However,	   the	   case	   for	   hedge	   fund	   transparency	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  SWFs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  hedge	  funds,	  the	  point	   is	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	   to	   systemic	   stability,1250	  for	   SWFs	   it	   is	   to	   alleviate	   concerns	   for	   national	  security.	  Nevertheless,	  both	  types	  of	  regulation	  can	  also	  serve	  to	  bolster	  investor	  confidence1251	  and	   thus	   bring	   additional	   benefits	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   financial	  markets.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   regulation	  usually	   impacts	   each	   sector	   differently.	   It	   is	   reported	   that	   compliance	   costs	  deriving	   from	   AIFMD	   could	   be	   significant	   for	   hedge	   funds, 1252 	  whereas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1245	  Private	  Fund	  Investment	  Advisers	  Registration	  Act	  of	  2010,	  15	  USC	  80b-­‐20	  note,	  Sec.	  404.	  1246	  ibid.	  1247	  Dan	  Awrey,	  ‘The	  Limits	  of	  EU	  Hedge	  Fund	  Regulation’	  (2011)	  Vol	  5(2)	  LFMR	  119.	  1248	  Ellis	  Ferran,	  ‘The	  Regulation	  of	  Hedge	  Funds	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Study	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  EU’s	  Regulatory	  Response	  to	  the	  Financial	  Crisis’	  (2011)	  Working	  Paper	  No	  176/2011	  European	  Corporate	  Governance	  Institute	  2.	  1249	  ibid	  28.	  1250	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  address	  risks,	  such	  as	  the	  high	  accumulation	  of	  leverage	  by	  hedge	  funds,	  or	  to	  control	  the	  impact	  of	  hedge	  fund	  behavior	  on	  equity	  prices	  at	  times	  of	  crisis.	  For	  the	  first	  type	  see,	  Sugandha	  Kamal,	  ‘Hedge	  Fund	  Regulation	  and	  the	  EU	  Directive’	  (2012)	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  5,	  11;	  For	  the	  second	  type	  see,	  Engert	  (n	  1232)	  340.	  1251	  Regarding	  hedge	  funds	  see,	  Ferran	  (n	  1248)	  29,	  also	  mentioned	  in	  Dan	  Awrey	  (n	  1247)	  15;	  Regarding	  SWFs,	  see	  the	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  4,	  at	  151.	  1252	  Costs	  could	  increase	  up	  to	  31.5%	  once	  the	  AIFMD	  comes	  into	  force,	  Kyla	  Malcolm	  and	  others,	  ‘Impact	  of	  the	  Proposed	  AIFM	  Directive	  across	  Europe’	  (2009)	  Charles	  River	  Associates	  <www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/Impact_of_AIFM_Directive.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  November	  2012,	  93-­‐115.	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compliance	  with	  GAPP	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  particularly	  costly	  for	  SWFs.1253	  There	  is	  still	  not	  sufficient	  experience	  with	  the	  AIFMD	  to	  prove	  or	  disprove	  its	   success	   as	   a	   regulatory	   structure.	   In	   fact,	   concerns	   persist	   on	   the	   part	   of	  market	  participants	  who	  feel	  that	  this	  directive	  in	  many	  respects	  is	  unworkable	  and	  the	  one-­‐size	  fits	  all	  approach	  fails	  to	  recognise	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  different	  alternative	   fund	  business	  models	  operate.1254	  Concerns	  are	  also	  expressed	  over	  the	   directive's	   overly	   protectionist	   stance	   as	   this	   may	   drive	   alternative	   fund	  managers	   to	   exit	   Europe	   and	   effectively	   preventing	   non-­‐European	   managers,	  administrators	  and	  depositaries	  from	  servicing	  alternative	  funds	  being	  marketed	  in	  Europe.1255	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  stressed	  by	  Ferran,	  that	  the	  central	  place	  of	  the	  alternative	  industry	  in	  financial	  markets	  warrants	  the	  adoption	  of	  some	  form	  of	  regulation,1256	  and	  the	  industry’s	  quick	  recovery	  from	  its	  decline	  is	  enough	  to	  silence	   concerns	   about	   the	   industry’s	   viability	   under	   the	   new	   regulations.1257	  Moreover,	   as	   she	   says,	   the	   principles	   laid	   down,	   such	   as	   proper	   disclosure	   to	  investors,	   regular	   reporting	  of	   investment	  performance,	   independent	   valuation	  and	  segregation	  of	  assets,	  are	  ‘basically	  sound’	  and	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  wider	  industry	   standards. 1258 	  Ferran	   underlines	   her	   concern	   over	   the	   overtly	  prescriptive	   and	   inflexible	   approach	  of	   the	  directive,1259	  but	   she	  notes	   that	   full	  evaluation	  of	  AIFMD's	  significance	  must	  also	  be	  postponed	  until	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  compare	   its	   effects	   to	   those	   resulting	   from	   similar	   regulatory	   developments	  elsewhere.1260	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  ESMA	  has	  undertaken	  to	  clarify	   and	   adapt	  many	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   directive	   through	   a	   process	   of	  public	  consultations.1261	  Although	  those	  consultations	  may	  not	  touch	  on	  central	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1253	  See	  above,	  n	  1204,	  1205.	  1254	  Peter	  Yeoh,	  ‘Hedge	  funds:	  from	  privileged	  child	  to	  locust	  and	  now	  bogeyman?’	  (2012)	  Co	  Law	  Vol	  33(2)	  48. 1255	  ibid.	  1256	  Ellis	  Ferran,	  ‘After	  the	  crisis:	  the	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds	  and	  private	  equity	  in	  the	  EU’	  (2011)	  EBOR	  Vol	  12(3)	  410. 1257	  Ibid.	  In	  particular,	  by	  2010	  hedge	  funds	  were	  already	  deemed	  to	  have	  bounced	  back	  strongly	  from	  their	  2008/9	  nadir,	  Sam	  Jones,	  ‘Hedge	  Funds	  Harbour	  Corporate	  Ambitions’	  Financial	  Times	  (London,	  27	  September	  2010)	  12.	  1258	  Ferran	  (n	  1256)	  411.	  1259	  ibid	  410.	  1260	  ibid	  412.	  1261	  Such	  as	  those	  on	  key	  concepts	  of	  the	  AIFMD	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aspects	   of	   AIFMD,	   it	   can	   be	   hoped	   that	   various	   drawbacks	   of	   the	   current	  framework	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  future.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  above	  legal	  developments	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA	  may	  have	   a	   significant	   impact	   by	   substantially	   increasing	   the	   benchmark	   of	  transparency,	  not	  simply	  in	  the	  area	  of	  private	  funds	  and	  alternative	  investment	  funds,	   but	   in	   the	  wider	   financial	  world.	   This	   is	   also	   supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  SWFs	  often	  evoke	  competition	  with	  hedge	  funds	  to	  defend	  their	  right	  to	  remain	  opaque.1262	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   existence	   of	   this	   legislation	   could	   drive	   other	  investment	  funds	  not	  directly	  targeted	  by	  the	  regulation,	  such	  as	  SWFs,	  through	  a	  process	  of	  competitive	  emulation	  to	  increase	  their	  transparency	  levels.	  In	  this	  event,	   one	   could	   speak	   of	   a	   positive	   spill-­‐over	   effect	   of	   AIFMD	   and	   the	   Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  SWFs.	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  legislation	  enacted	  in	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  USA	  to	  extend	  its	  effect	  beyond	  those	  that	  it	  was	  designed	  for.	  It	  has	  been	  reported	  in	  April	  2012	  that	   sweeping	   new	  hedge	   fund	   regulations	   in	   Switzerland	  were	   an	   example	   of	  the	   growing	   impact	   of	   AIFMD,	   even	   before	   its	   final	   legislative	   shape	   has	   been	  formulated	  and	  passed	  into	  law.1263	  It	  would	  not	  be	  surprising	  to	  observe	  similar	  spill-­‐over	  effects,	  not	  only	  territorially,	  but	  across	  different	  types	  of	   funds,	   thus	  extending	  the	  effects	  of	  AIFMD	  to	  SWFs.1264	  The	  results	  of	  such	  a	  spill-­‐over	  effect	  could	  be	  assimilated	  to	  the	  conclusions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Consultation-­‐Guidelines-­‐key-­‐concepts-­‐AIFMD>	  accessed	  4	  February	  2013;	  on	  technical	  standards,	  ESMA,	  ‘Consultation	  on	  Guidelines	  on	  key	  concepts	  of	  the	  AIFMD’	  <www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Consultation-­‐Draft-­‐regulatory-­‐technical-­‐standards-­‐types-­‐AIFMs>	  accessed	  4	  February	  2013;	  as	  well	  as	  on	  remuneration	  guidelines,	  ESMA,	  ‘Consultation	  on	  Draft	  regulatory	  technical	  standards	  on	  types	  of	  AIFMs’	  <www.esma.europa.eu/consultation/Consultation-­‐Guidelines-­‐sound-­‐remuneration-­‐policies-­‐under-­‐AIFMD>	  accessed	  4	  February	  2013.	  1262	  n	  106,	  1061.	  1263	  The	  Hedge	  Fund	  Journal	  staff,	  ‘AIFMD’s	  Extra-­‐Territorial	  Effects’	  Hedge	  Fund	  Marketing	  
Index	  (London,	  16	  April	  2012)	  <www.hedgefundmarketingindex.com/article.php?title=AIFMD's-­‐extra-­‐territorial-­‐effects&id=1512>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  1264	  On	  a	  related	  tone,	  see	  also	  Awery,	  who	  predicts	  in	  his	  paper	  that	  the	  AIFMD	  is	  ‘a	  harbinger	  of	  things	  to	  come’,	  thus	  reinforcing	  the	  view	  that	  the	  AIFMD	  may	  have	  generated	  a	  momentum	  in	  the	  field	  of	  financial	  regulation	  in	  Europe,	  Awrey	  (n	  1247)	  127.	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of	  a	  2012	  survey	  by	  Hofstra	  University1265	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  on	   hedge	   funds.	   One	   of	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   survey	   was	   that	   Dodd-­‐Frank	   rules	  driving	   increased	   transparency	   while	   increasing	   investor	   demand	   for	  information	   have	   been	   broadly	   positive	   for	   the	   hedge	   fund	   industry.	   It	   is	  reported	  that	  due	  diligence	  process,	  risk	  management	  procedures	  and	  reporting	  requirements	   all	   have	   increased	   investor	   acceptance	   of	   hedge	   funds,	   allowing	  them	   to	   become	   increasingly	  mainstream	   investment	   vehicles	   for	   institutional	  and	   individual	   investors.1266	  Judging	   from	   the	   results	   of	   the	   above	   survey,	   it	  would	   not	   be	   surprising	   to	   observe	   a	   similar	   stance	   by	   SWFs	   towards	   the	  principles	   contained	   in	   the	   CoCs	   examined	   above.	   Reporting	   and	   governance	  rules	  for	  SWFs	  could	  enable	  sovereign	  investors	  to	  improve	  their	  reputation	  and	  links	  with	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   financial	  world,1267	  in	   the	   same	  way	   the	   Dodd-­‐Frank	  rules	  have	  been	  positive	  for	  hedge	  funds.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1265	  Eisneramper	  staff,	  ‘Dodd-­‐Frank	  Bill	  -­‐	  A	  Year	  and	  a	  Half	  Later	  Views	  From	  the	  Hedge	  Fund	  Industry’	  (2012)	  Eisneramper/Hofstra	  University	  <www.eisneramper.com/Dodd-­‐Frank-­‐Bill-­‐Hedge-­‐Fund-­‐0412.aspx>	  accessed	  27	  December	  2012.	  1266	  Post-­‐crisis,	  investors	  required	  increased	  information	  and	  transparency	  regarding	  a	  firm’s	  due	  diligence	  and	  risk	  management,	  and	  their	  requirement	  regarding	  a	  firm’s	  audit	  firm,	  ibid	  4.	  1267	  This	  would	  allow	  SWFs	  to	  reduce	  protectionist	  backlashes	  against	  their	  investments	  and	  enable	  them	  to	  enhance	  their	  cooperation	  with	  other	  investment	  vehicles,	  for	  instance,	  as	  joint	  ventures	  or	  investment	  consortia.	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  CONCLUSION	  	   This	   chapter	   presented	   and	   analysed	   various	   supranational	   regulatory	  frameworks,	  known	  as	  CoCs	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  SWFs.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  build	  on	   the	   conclusions	  drawn	   in	   the	  previous	  ones	   and	  offer	   a	   viable	   and	   efficient	  structure	   for	   the	   regulation	   of	   SWFs,	   namely	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   greater	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  SWFs.	  First,	   a	   comparison	   was	   made	   between	   national	   and	   supranational	  responses	  where	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  second	  approach	  were	  exposed.	  Then,	  the	  chapter	   continued	   into	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   CoC	   model	   before	   specific	  supranational	  instruments	  were	  examined	  and	  assessed,	  namely	  those	  produced	  by	  the	  OECD,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  EU.	  It	  was	  seen	  that	  these	  codes	  mainly	  advocate	  transparency,	  the	  establishment	  of	  some	  form	  of	  accountability	  and	  the	  division	  of	   responsibilities	   in	   the	   functioning	   of	   SWFs.	   It	   was	   also	   argued	   that	   these	  instruments	   should	   be	   viewed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   wider	   debate	   about	  regulating	  the	  global	  financial	  sector	  post-­‐crisis.	  Various	   reactions	   to	   those	   CoCs	   were	   also	   offered	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	  concrete	   impact	   of	   the	   codes	   on	   SWFs	   and	   the	   academic	   community.	   While	  assessing	   the	   benefits	   and	   drawbacks	   of	   those	   codes,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  those	  codes	  is	  not	  a	  major	  setback	  to	  its	  application	  since	  a	  slow	   implementation	   of	   those	   principles	   in	   the	   governance	   of	   SWFs	   is	   already	  underway.	  However,	  more	  could	  be	  done	  to	  formalise	  a	  monitoring	  mechanism	  to	  assess	  the	  progress	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  code	  by	  SWFs.	  Finally	  the	  chapter	  has	  also	  explored	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  regulation	  of	  SWFs	   and	   the	   current	   regulatory	   structure	   for	   hedge	   funds	   in	   the	  EU	   to	   argue	  that	  regulation	  of	  comparable	  investment	  entities,	  such	  as	  hedge	  funds,	  can	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  transparency	  levels	  of	  SWFs	  as	  well.	  Overall,	   this	   final	   chapter	   illustrated	   that,	   although	   not	   without	   problems	  themselves,	   supranational	   responses	   to	   SWFs	   which	   are	   constructed	   on	   a	  voluntary	  basis	  present	   fewer	  downsides	   than	   their	  national	   legal	   alternatives.	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As	  such	  they	  constitute	  the	  most	  efficient	  and	  viable	  model	  for	  regulating	  SWFs	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time.	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CONCLUSION	  	  	  It	  is	  time	  to	  take	  stock	  of	  the	  significance	  and	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  in	  a	  wider	   context	   indicating,	   in	  particular,	   the	   lessons	   that	   can	  be	  drawn	   from	   the	  research.	  These	  should	  guide	  policy	  on	  SWFs	  and	  foreign	  investment	  regulation	  in	   general.	   There	   is	   a	   recap	   of	   the	   specific	   recommendations	   for	   policymakers	  which	   have	   been	   made	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   and,	   finally,	   a	   number	   of	  projections	  about	  the	  future	  of	  SWFs	  and	  their	  regulation	  are	  presented.	  	  	  
1.	  Significance	  and	  contribution	  of	  this	  research	  	  The	   significance	   of	   this	   research	   is	   that	   it	   provides	   a	   basis	   for	   regulating	  some	  of	   the	  world’s	   largest	   investment	   funds.	  The	  rapid	  growth	  of	  SWFs,	   in	  an	  uncertain	  economic	  environment,	  means	  that	  SWFs	  are	  playing	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  fostering	   growth	   in	   financial	   markets	   and	   will	   continue	   to	   do	   so.	   More	  importantly,	   SWFs	  may	  play	  a	   critical	   role	   in	   safeguarding	   financial	   stability	   in	  the	   future,	   as	   they	   did	   during	   the	   GFC	   in	   2008–2009.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	  understood	   that	  preserving	   the	  competitiveness	  of	  SWFs	  and	  allowing	   them	   to	  allocate	   their	   capital	   efficiently,	   whilst	   aiming	   to	   reduce	   potential	   negative	  effects,	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  financial	  markets.	  The	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  an	  integral	  analysis	  of	  SWFs	  and	  uses	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  to	  justify	  the	  adoption,	  or	  not,	  of	  regulatory	  instruments.	  The	   thesis	   examined	  both	   theoretical	  proposals	   and	  ones	  actually	  implemented	   in	   various	   countries.	   Such	   research	   and	   analysis,	   with	   a	   view	   to	  making	  regulatory	  conclusions,	  appears	  not	  to	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  before.	  The	  thesis	   has	   taken	   economic	   as	   well	   as	   political	   considerations	   into	   account	   to	  reach	   its	   conclusions,	   whilst	   aiming	   to	   preserve	   the	   necessary	   distance	   from	  recent	   events1268	  to	  scrutinise	  them	  with	  objectivity.	  The	  majority	  of	  other	  works	  on	  SWFs	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which	   have	   been	   published	   during	   the	   described	   events	   lack	   this	   necessary	  perspective.	  The	   regulatory	   conclusions	   of	   this	   analysis	   cover	   all	   types	   of	   sovereign	  investors	  that	  operate	  as	  described	  in	  the	  first	  two	  chapters;	  namely,	  those	  that	  allocate	   government	   revenue	   to	   a	   special	   fund	   and	   then	   use	   this	   revenue	   to	  invest	   internationally	   in	   long-­‐term	   securities.	   The	   regulatory	   options	   explored	  could	  also	  apply	  to	  certain	  public	  pension	  funds	  or	  even	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  The	   applicability	   of	   the	   conclusions	   is	   limited	   by	   two	   important	   factors	  explained	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  body	  of	  this	  thesis.	  These	  factors	  are,	  first,	  the	  extreme	  opacity	  of	  the	  most	  SWFs,	  which	  limits	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  available,	  and	  second,	   the	  current	  volatility	  of	   the	  global	  economy,	  which	   impedes	   the	   task	  of	  drawing	   conclusions	   about	   the	   operation	   of	   SWFs.	   Both	   limitations	   have	   been	  addressed	  so	  as	  to	  minimise	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Firstly,	  transparent	  SWFs	  have	  been	  used	  as	  proxies	  for	  the	  entire	  SWF	  community,	  and	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  information	  has	  been	  collected	  from	  financial	  reports	  and	  financial	   news	   to	   counter	   the	   secrecy	   of	   others.	   Secondly,	   this	   research	   has	  observed	   SWFs	   as	   well	   as	   the	   attitudes	   of	   recipient	   governments	   over	   long	  periods	  and	  has	  analysed	  them	  both	  at	  times	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  slump	  (i.e.	  from	   2000	   to	   2008	   for	   periods	   of	   economic	   growth,	   and	   2008	   onwards	   for	  periods	  of	  crisis),	  to	  arrive	  at	  solid	  conclusions	  about	  the	  behaviour	  of	  SWFs	  and	  host	  economies.	  	  	  
2.	  Lessons	  drawn	  	  The	   research	  carried	  out	   in	   this	   thesis	   suggests	  a	  number	  of	   lessons	  about	  the	   operation	   of	   SWFs	   and	   the	   principles	   that	   should	   inform	   future	   policy-­‐making.	   Firstly,	   it	   is	   recognised	   that	   SWFs	   are	   opaque	   institutions	  which	  may	  sometimes	  (although	  rarely)	  include	  national	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  purely	  economic	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1268	  Such	  events	  include	  the	  heightened	  national	  security	  concerns	  discussed	  widely	  during	  the	  period	  until	  2008	  when	  SWFs	  exhibited	  rapid	  growth,	  and	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  which	  totally	  altered	  the	  debate	  and	  attitudes	  on	  SWFs.	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objectives	   in	   their	   investment	   strategies.1269	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   recognised	  that	   SWFs	   are	   conservative,	   passive	   and	   long-­‐term	   investors,	   a	   fact	   which	  counterbalances	   many	   of	   the	   concerns	   identified.1270	  More	   importantly,	   SWFs	  have	   so	   far	   exhibited	   clear	   signs	   of	   progressing	   towards	   greater	   transparency,	  which	   is	   an	   effective	   way	   of	   neutralising	   some	   concerns. 1271 	  Greater	  transparency,	   moreover,	   can	   improve	   the	   reputation	   of	   SWFs	   and	   consolidate	  their	  place	  and	  role	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  system.	  Secondly,	  the	  debate	  about	  regulating	  SWFs	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  opacity	  of	   SWFs	   and	   the	   difficulty	   of	   evaluating	   their	   investment	   strategies	   and	   long-­‐term	  objectives.	   It	   is	  submitted	   in	   this	   thesis	   that	   there	   is	  no	  unanimity	  among	  commentators	   as	   to	   the	   merits	   of	   transparency	   for	   SWFs.	   While	   some	  commentators	   maintain	   a	   more	   principled	   approach	   towards	   transparency	  (claiming	  that	  transparency	  should	  be	  sought	  because	   it	   is	  a	  sound	  principle	   in	  itself),1272	  others	   see	   it	   as	   a	  means	   to	   alleviate	   concerns.1273	  Others	   still	   believe	  that	  it	  is	  not	  relevant	  at	  all.1274	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  no	  unanimity	  as	  to	  the	  basis	  for	  requiring	  SWFs	  to	  become	  more	  transparent.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  it	  has	  been	  accepted	  that	   transparency	   for	   SWFs	  may	  help	  dissipate	   concerns	   about	   the	   investment	  motives	  of	  SWFs,	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  may	  be	  a	  sound	  objective.	  That	  said,	  heightened	  transparency	   becomes	   problematic	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   places	   SWFs	   at	   a	  competitive	   disadvantage	   against	   their	   immediate	   competitors,	   such	   as	   hedge	  funds.1275	  Thirdly,	   building	   on	   the	   above	   conclusion,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   degree	   to	  which	  SWFs	  will	  become	  transparent	  in	  the	  future	  will	  be	  directly	  proportional	  to	   the	  degree	  that	  similar	  requirements	  are	   imposed	  on	  hedge	   funds	  and	  other	  similar	   investment	   entities.1276	  In	   this	   context,	   recent	   hedge	   fund	   regulation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1269	  Chapter	  3,	  at	  123.	  1270	  Chapter	  2,	  at	  75-­‐80.	  1271	  Chapter	  1,	  at	  53-­‐56.	  1272	  n	  605,	  606.	  1273	  n	  602.	  1274	  n	  611.	  1275	  See	  arguments	  made	  at	  175,	  287.	  1276	  See	  argument	  at	  291-­‐292.	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implemented	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA	  requiring	  the	  dissemination	  of	  information	  by	  such	  funds	  may	  exert	  a	  positive	  spill-­‐over	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  SWFs	  as	  well.1277	  Fourthly,	  it	  is	  submitted	  that	  SWFs	  have	  significant	  positive	  effects	  on	  their	  target	   countries	   and	   the	   global	   financial	   system	   in	   general.1278	  Moreover,	   the	  negative	  effects,	  supported	  by	  a	  number	  of	  commentators,	  appear	  to	  lack	  a	  solid	  basis.	  There	  is,	  currently,	  no	  record	  linking	  SWFs	  to	  any	  form	  of	  national	  security	  threat.	   Indeed	   such	   funds	   aim	   primarily	   to	   remain	   low	   profile	   and,	   therefore,	  often	  act	  hyper-­‐cautiously.	  With	  regard	  to	  their	  economic	  impact,	  the	  analysis	  of	  their	   impact	   at	   a	   micro	   (individual	   companies)	   and	   macro	   level	   (economy	   at	  large)	   shows	   no	   actual	   costs	   that	   should	   make	   them	   a	   special	   subject	   of	  regulatory	  intervention.1279	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  SWFs	  may	  bring	  indirect	  costs,	  in	  the	   sense	   that	   they	   may	   create	   strong	   protectionist	   backlashes	   in	   their	   host	  countries	   and	   they	   may	   increase	   the	   political	   leverage	   enjoyed	   by	   their	  respective	   governments.1280	  It	   is	   explained,	   however,	   that	   regulation	   is	   hardly	  the	  appropriate	  instrument	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  indirect	  costs.1281	  Finally,	   SWFs	  are	  deeply	   image-­‐conscious	  entities.	  Not	  only	  do	   they	  aim	   to	  shun	  negative	  connotations	  in	  their	  commercial	  practices,	  they	  also	  highly	  object	  to	  being	  discriminated	  against	  through	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	  investment	  regulatory	  instruments	  or	  being	  portrayed	  as	  ‘bad	  investors’	  by	  the	  national	  media.	  As	  such,	  SWFs	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  opt	  for	  jurisdictions	  where	  they	  will	  not	  be	  subjected	  to	  additional	  legislation	  or	  attract	  intense	  criticism	  by	  the	  press.	  On	  this	  basis,	  it	  is	  concluded	   that	   increased	   protectionism	  may	   harm	   both	   foreign	   investors	   and	  host	  economies	  by	  distorting	  the	  investment	  climate	  and	  the	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  capital.1282	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  national	  bodies	  made	  responsible	  for	  conducting	  national	   security	   reviews	   of	   foreign	   investments	   may	   be	   overburdened	   in	  fulfilling	  such	  a	  task,	  thus,	  weighing	  excessively	  on	  national	  administrations.1283	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1277	  ibid.	  1278	  See	  discussion	  at	  105-­‐110.	  1279	  Chapter	  3.	  1280	  Discussed	  at	  126-­‐128,	  133-­‐135.	  1281	  As	  argued	  at	  153.	  1282	  Chapter	  5,	  at	  237-­‐243.	  1283	  at	  185.	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3.	  Recommendations	  for	  policy	  makers	  	  The	  abovementioned	   findings,	  established	   in	   the	  body	  of	   the	   thesis,	   can	  be	  used	  by	  policymakers	   to	   set	   principles	   behind	   regulation	   of	   SWFs.	   Firstly,	   it	   is	  shown	  that	  any	  enacting	  of	  national	  measures	  for	  the	  financial	  sector	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   to	  assess	   the	   impact	  of	   those	  measures	  on	   economic	   activity.1284	  In	   addition,	   when	   politically	   sensitive	   issues,	   such	   as	  foreign	   state	   investments	   are	   concerned,	   regulation	   should	   not	   be	   primarily	  driven	  by	  political	  or	  short-­‐term	  considerations,	  as	  these	  may	  seriously	  hamper	  economic	  activity.1285	  Such	  adverse	  effects	  are	  particularly	  harmful	  during	  times	  of	  economic	  distress,	   as	   the	  one	  currently	  being	  experienced	  by	  many	  western	  economies.	  Secondly,	   national	   regulators	   should	   limit	   themselves	   to	   goals	   that	   are	  achievable	   by	   regulatory	  measures.	  More	   specifically,	   governments	   should	   not	  try	  to	  expand	  the	  ambit	  of	  regulatory	  activity	  to	  sectors	  that	  are	  normally	  dealt	  with	  by	  foreign	  or	  macroeconomic	  policy.1286	  Thirdly,	   regulations	   at	   a	   national	   level	   are	   inadequate	   to	   address	   the	   SWF	  phenomenon.	   National	   responses	   to	   SWFs	   depend	   largely	   on	   the	   prevailing	  conditions	   of	   each	   national	   economy,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   historic	   record	   of	   each	  country	   in	   dealing	   with	   foreign	   investors	   and	   SWFs	   in	   particular.	   Perceived	  threats	   to	   a	   country’s	   national	   security	   can	   also	   play	   a	   role	   in	   formulating	   a	  response	   to	   SWFs.	   National	   measures	   might	   seem	   to	   offer	   flexibility,	   but	   in	  practice	  rarely	  deal	  adequately	  with	  SWFs.	  They	  are	  often	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  popular	   perceptions	   and	   xenophobic	   concerns	   about	   foreign	   economic	  predators.	   Consequently,	   national	   responses	   are	   often	   overly	   protectionist	   and	  increase	  costs	  unnecessarily.1287	  It	  has	  been	  submitted,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  USA	  and	   Germany	   are	   among	   the	   most	   attractive	   destinations	   for	   SWFs,	   although	  their	  governments	  often	  aim	  to	  keep	  their	  national	  champions	  out	  of	  the	  ambit	  of	  foreign	  investments.1288	  In	  the	  USA,	  in	  particular,	  issues	  of	  national	  security	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1284	  at	  180.	  1285	  See	  analysis	  at	  250-­‐252.	  1286	  See	  at	  153.	  1287	  As	  argued	  at	  237-­‐243.	  1288	  Such	  as	  the	  VW	  in	  Germany	  and	  energy	  companies	  in	  the	  USA.	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appeared	   on	   the	   political	   agenda,	   even	   if	   unwarranted,	   and	   have	   framed	   the	  debate	   on	   SWF	   regulation.	   France	   and	  Greece,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   have	   always	  exhibited	   a	   degree	   of	   economic	   protectionism.1289	  The	   extent	   of	   protectionism	  and	   regulation	   of	   economic	   activity	   may	   be	   related	   to	   the	   economic	   setbacks	  recently	   observed	   in	   countries	   such	   as	   France	   and	   Greece	   in	   particular.	  Moreover,	  most	  of	  the	  measures	  analysed	  lay	  down	  vague	  regulatory	  standards,	  either	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   industries	   protected,	   or	   the	   behaviour	   that	   is	   under	  regulation,	   thus	   generating	   a	   highly	   uncertain	   environment	   for	   foreign	  investments.	   Measures	   taken	   by	   France	   and	   Greece	   were	   struck	   down	   by	   the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  declared	   them	  disproportionate	   to	   the	  objectives	  pursued	  and	  thus	  incompatible	  with	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital.1290	  Taking	  all	  the	  above	  into	  account,	  it	  is	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  national	  measures	  adopted	  to	  respond	  to	  SWFs	  should	  be	  abolished	  or	  amended	  substantially	  to	  reflect	  the	  real	  benefits	  and	  the	   lack	  of	  costs	  created	  by	  the	  operation	  of	  SWFs	  in	  western	  economies.	  It	   is	  established	  that	  supranational	  responses	   involving	  the	  participation	  of	  SWFs	  are	  preferable	  as	  regulatory	  options,	  as	  they	  present	  fewer	  distortions	  and	  better	   advance	   the	   mutual	   interests	   of	   sovereign	   investors	   and	   host	  countries.1291	  Such	   frameworks,	   structured	   in	   the	   form	   of	   CoCs,	   have	   already	  been	  introduced	  by	  the	  OECD,	  the	  IFSWF	  (under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  IMF)	  and	  the	  EU	  Commission.	  It	  is	  seen	  that,	  of	  those	  frameworks,	  the	  one	  prepared	  by	  the	  IFSWF	  (GAPP	  or	   ‘Santiago	  Principles’),	   involving	  the	  participation	  of	  SWFs,	  constitutes	  the	  most	  effective	  platform	  for	  establishing	  rules	  for	  SWFs.1292	  As	  a	  general	  rule,	  supranational	  responses	  rarely	  succeed	  in	  creating	  a	  legally	  binding	  framework	  and	   they	   are	  more	   often	   structured	   for	   voluntary	   compliance.	   This	   is	   the	   case	  with	   GAPP,1293	  which	   is	   largely	   left	   to	   SWFs	   to	   incorporate	   into	   their	   internal	  structure.	  Attempting	  to	  impose	  binding	  rules1294	  in	  this	  context	  would	  be	  futile.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  n	  555,	  556.	  1289	  n	  521,	  522.	  1290	  n	  861,	  922.	  1291	  at	  2450-­‐252.	  1292	  Chapter	  6.	  1293	  But	  also	  the	  frameworks	  proposed	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  the	  European	  Commission.	  1294	  Such	  as,	  the	  compulsory	  dissemination	  of	  information	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  specific	  governance	  structures.	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Such	   an	   endeavour	   would,	   firstly,	   be	   hampered	   by	   the	   reluctance	   of	   relevant	  stakeholders1295	  to	   be	   subjected	   to	   binding	   rules	   and,	   secondly,	   it	   would	   not	  prevent	   them	   from	   devising	   ways	   to	   evade	   the	   spirit	   of	   those	   rules	   following	  their	   adoption.1296	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   voluntary	   nature	   of	   the	   GAPP	   (and	  other	  CoCs)	  may	  not	  bring	  immediate	  results,	  it	  may	  serve	  to	  encourage	  the	  pre-­‐existing	   tendency	   of	   SWFs	   to	   move	   towards	   greater	   transparency	   and	  accountability.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   number	   of	   amendments	   should	   be	  made	   to	   the	  current	   form	   of	   GAPP	  with	   a	   view	   to	   strengthening	   its	   effect	   and	   rendering	   it	  more	  efficient.	  In	  particular,	  the	  IFSWF	  should	  include	  a	  monitoring	  mechanism	  and	   a	   ‘comply	   and	   explain’	   element,	   as	   found	   in	   the	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  appendix	  to	  GAPP	  guiding	  the	  relationship	  between	  SWFs	  and	  target	  companies	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  UK	  Stewardship	  code.1297	  It	  is	  also	  stated	  that	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   IFSWF	  would	  benefit	   considerably	   from	  developing	  links	   with	   financial	   market	   actors	   and	   regulators,	   and	   also	   from	   obtaining	  ‘affiliate’	  status	  with	  the	  IOSCO.1298	  	  	  
4.	  What	  does	  the	  future	  hold	  for	  SWFs	  and	  national	  regulations?	  	  From	  the	  body	  of	  this	  work,	  a	  number	  of	  predictions	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  future	  of	  SWFs	  and	  their	  regulation.	  Firstly,	  SWFs	  will	  almost	  certainly	  continue	  to	  increase	  in	  number	  and	  size,	  as	  well	  as	  influence.1299	  Therefore	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  impact	  and	  regulation	  of	  SWFs	  is	  expected	  to	  intensify	  in	  the	  future.	  With	   regard	   to	   their	   investment	   strategies,	   SWFs	   are	   expected	   to	   show	  an	  increasing	   preference	   for	   joint	   ventures	   with	   private	   entities,	   as	   opposed	   to	  making	  individual	  investments.1300	  Western	  policymakers	  can,	  moreover,	  benefit	  from	  the	  creation	  of	  partnerships	  between	  national	   investment	  funds	  and	  third	  country	  SWFs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1295	  Namely	  the	  SWFs	  and/or	  their	  managing	  governments.	  1296	  at	  177-­‐178.	  1297	  at	  274.	  1298	  n	  1225.	  1299	  at	  45-­‐47.	  1300	  n	  380.	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Sovereign	   investors	   are	   also	   likely	   to	   become	   more	   engaged	   with	   the	  management	   of	   their	   target	   companies,	   although	   not	   to	   an	   extent	   where	   they	  may	   raise	   concerns	   about	   the	   political	   involvement	   of	   foreign	   governments	   in	  the	  management	  of	  western	  corporations.1301	  Moreover,	  SWFs	  will	   also	   seek	   to	  take	  advantage	  of	  developing	  economic	  sectors,	  for	  instance,	  by	  increasing	  their	  portion	  of	  capital	  allocated	  in	  the	  field	  of	  alternative	  energy.1302	  The	  tendency	  of	  SWFs	  towards	  greater	  transparency	  will	  probably	  continue,	  with	   existing	   SWFs	   scoring	   higher	   in	   future	   transparency	   ratings.1303	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  similar	  transparency	  will	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  future	  newly	  created	  funds.	  Considering	   host	   economies,	   protectionist	   tendencies	   which,	   during	   the	  current	  economic	  uncertainty,	  have	  been	  silenced,	  will	  most	  likely	  revive	  in	  the	  future.1304	  The	  EU	  Commission	  and	  the	  CJEU	  should	  continue	  to	  apply	  the	  same	  policies	   against	   national	  measures	   that	   restrict	   SWFs.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   in	   the	  context	   of	   the	   debate	   on	   SWFs,	   the	   issue	   of	   global	   imbalances	   should	   be	  addressed	   through	   the	  use	  of	  appropriate	   tools,	   such	  as	   foreign	  diplomacy	  and	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1301	  For	  instance,	  participating	  in	  voting	  procedures	  may	  be	  acceptable,	  although	  in	  many	  cases	  demanding	  board	  representation	  could	  appear	  more	  problematic.	  1302	  n	  382,	  383.	  1303	  Such	  as	  the	  Linaburg-­‐Maudell	  Transparency	  Index,	  n	  155.	  1304	  See,	  for	  instance,	  n	  519.	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